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HISTORY OF EUROPE
DURING THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION.

1789—1815.

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“ BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum ; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello ; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus ; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.” — Liv. lib. 21.

HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS


IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

VOLUME THE SEVENTH.

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CHAPTER LI.

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA, PRIOR TO LORD WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION.

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Comparison
of the Ro-
man Em-
pire and Bri-
tish India.

VAST and interesting as are the events which have now been traced, springing out of the wars of the French Revolution, they are yet outdone by the spectacle which, at the same period, the Oriental World exhibited. The BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA forms, beyond all question, the most dazzling object in that age of wonders; perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon in the history of the species. Antiquity may be searched in vain for a parallel to its lustre. During the plenitude of its power, the Roman Empire never contained above an hundred and twenty millions of inhabitants, and they were congregated round the shores of the Mediterranean, with a great inland sea to form their interior line of communica-

tion, and an army of four hundred thousand men to secure the submission of its multifarious inhabitants. Magnificent causeways emanating from Rome, the centre of authority, reached the farthest extremities of its dominions ; the legions not only conquered but humanized mankind ; and the Proconsuls, whether they journeyed from the Forum to the wall of Antoninus and the solitudes of Caledonia, or the shores of the Euphrates and the sands of Parthia, the cataracts of the Nile, the banks of the Danube, or the mountains of Atlas, rolled along the great roads with which these indomitable pioneers of civilisation had penetrated the wilds of nature. Their immense dominions were the result of three centuries of conquest ; and the genius of Scipio, Cæsar, and Severus, not less than the civic virtues of Regulus, Cato, and Cicero, were required to extend and cement the mighty fabric.

But in the Eastern world, an empire hardly less extensive or populous, embracing as great a variety of people, and rich in as many millions and provinces, has been conquered by the British arms in less than eighty years, at the distance of above eight thousand miles from the ruling state. That vast region, the fabled scene of opulence and grandeur since the dawn of civilisation, from which the arms of Alexander rolled back, which the ferocity of Timour imperfectly vanquished, and the banners of Nadir Shah traversed only to destroy, has been permanently subdued and moulded into a regular province by a company of British merchants, originally settled as obscure traffickers on the shores of Hindostan ; who have been dragged to their present perilous height of power by incessant attempts at their destruction by the native princes ; whose rise was contemporaneous with numerous and desperate

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Wonderful
circum-
stances at-
tending the
British do-
minion in
India.

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struggles of the British nation with its European rivals, and who never had a fourth part of the disposable national strength at their command. For such a body, in such times, and with such forces, to have acquired so immense a dominion, is one of those prodigies of civilisation of which the history of the last half century is so pregnant; with which we are too familiar to be able fully to appreciate the wonder; and which must be viewed by mankind, simplified by distance, and gilded by the colours of history, before its due proportions can be understood.

Its Extent,
Population,
Revenue,
and Military
Strength.

The British empire in India,—extending now, with few interruptions, and those only of tributary or allied states, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains,—comprehends by far the richest and most important part of Southern Asia; is nearly four times in extent the area of France,* and six times that of Great Britain and Ireland; contains above an hundred millions of inhabitants;† and yields a revenue of nearly twenty millions sterling.‡ The land forces rose in the year 1826, when two bloody wars were to be maintained at the same time, to the enormous amount of 260,000 native troops, including 45,000 cavalry, and 1000 pieces of artillery, besides 31,000 native English; and even under the reduced peace establishment of the present time, they still amount to 194,000, of whom 35,000 are British soldiers.¹ This immense force, all in the very highest state of discipline and equipment, is raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a compulsory conscription ever being resorted to; and so popular is the British service, and so unbounded the general confidence both in the Company's stability and its

¹ Martin,
ix. 90.

* See note A.

† See note B.

‡ See note C.

fidelity to its engagements, that the only difficulty
 the authorities experience, is to select the most de-
 serving from the numerous competitors who are
 desirous of being enrolled under its banners. If
 public danger threatened, or the Russian eagles ap-
 proached the Indus, this force might be instantly
 raised by the same means to a million of armed men.
 When the British power was threatened with a
 double attack, and the Rajah of Bhurtpore raised
 the standard of revolt at the time that the bulk of their
 forces were entangled in the jungles of the Irrawuddy,
 or dying under the fevers of Arracan, no vacillation
 or weakness appeared in the British councils; with the
 right hand they humbled what the Orientals styled
 the giant strength of Ava, while with the left they
 crushed the rising power of the northern rajahs;
 and while a larger force than combated in Portugal
 under Wellington was pursuing the career of con-
 quest in the Burmese empire, and advancing the
 British standard almost to the minarets of Ummera-
 poor, a greater force than the native British who
 conquered at Waterloo assembled as if by enchant-
 ment round the walls of Bhurtpore, and, at the dis-
 tance of fourteen hundred miles from Calcutta, and
 ten thousand from the British isles, carried the last
 and hitherto impregnable stronghold of Hindoo in-
 dependence.* The greatness of Napoleon flits as a
 brilliant vision across our recollection; the power
 of Russia stands forth a present object of terror to

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1836.

1825.

* Lord Combermere besieged Bhurtpore in 1825, with 36,000 red-
 coats and 180 pieces of cannon; the force employed in the Burmese
 empire at the same time, was in all 55,000 strong.—MARTIN, viii. 36;
 and *Ann. Reg.* 1825. The British and King's German legion at Wa-
 terloo were 29,715 infantry, 8219 cavalry, 6054 artillery; the Hano-
 verians and Brunswickers about 15,000; the Belgians, 12,000.—See
Adjutant-General's Report, 6th Nov. 1816—*Battle of Waterloo*, by a near
Observer, II. 138.

CHAP. our senses ; but Russia never invaded Persia or
 LI Turkey, albeit adjoining her own frontiers, with
 1836. forces equal to those which England has arrayed in
 the plains of Hindostan : * and the host which fol-
 lowed Napoleon to Austerlitz and Friedland was
 inferior to that with which Lord Hastings made war
 on the Mahratta states.†

Physical de-
 scription of
 the Indian
 Peninsula.

Imagination itself can scarcely do justice to the
 varied and magnificent scenery of Hindostan. From
 the snowy summits of the Himalaya to the green
 slopes of Cape Comorin, from the steep Ghauts of
 Malabar to the sandy shores of Coromandel, it exhi-
 bits a succession of the most noble or beautiful fea-
 tures : at times stupendous mountain ranges, their
 sides clothed with lofty forests, their peaks reposing
 in icy stillness ; at others, vast plains rivalling the
 Delta of Egypt in richness, and, like it, submerged
 yearly by the fertilizing waters of the Ganges ; here
 lofty ghauts running parallel, at a short distance from
 the shore of the ocean, to the edge of its waters, and
 marking the line of demarcation between the low
 rich or sandy plains on the sea-side, and the elevated
 table-land, several thousand feet in height, in the in-
 terior ; there, rugged hills or thick forests teeming

* In the war of 1828, and which terminated in the crossing of the
 Balkan and capture of Adrianople, the Russians could never collect
 40,000 men in a single field. In the Persian war of 1824-5, they never
 had 10,000 men together in one army to the south of the Caucasus. In
 1792 and 1800, the English besieged Seringapatam with 42,000 men
 and 104 pieces of cannon ; in 1814, Lord Hastings sent 30,000 men
 against the Goorkhas on the first range of the Himalaya Mountains.—
 MARTIN, viii. 33, 51.

† In 1817, Marquis Hastings took the field against the Mahratta
 confederacy at the head of 81,000 regular infantry and 33,000 cavalry,
 the greatest force ever assembled under one commander on the plains
 of Hindostan. The French who fought at Austerlitz were 90,000, of
 all arms ; at Friedland, 80,000.—*Ante* v. 471, and vi. 268—and MAR-
 TIN, viii. 35.

with the riches of a southern sun. The natural boundaries of India are the Himalaya range and mountains of Cabul and Candahar on the north; the splendid and rapid stream of the Indus, seventeen hundred miles in length, of which seven hundred and sixty are navigable, flowing impetuously from their perennial snows, on the north-west; the deep and stagnant Irrawaddy, fourteen hundred miles in length, fed by the eastern extremity of the chain, and winding its way to the Bay of Bengal through the rank luxuriance of tropical vegetation, on the north-east; and the encircling ocean on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, on the south. Nature every where appears in this highly favoured region in her most imposing array: the Himalaya mountains, surmounting even Chimborazo in elevation; the Indus, rivalling the river of the Amazons in magnitude; the plain of Bengal, outstripping Mesopotamia itself in fertility,—form some of the features of a country which from the earliest times has been the seat of civilisation, and the fabled abode of opulence and magnificence.¹

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¹ Malte Brun, iii. 5, 11. Martin, viii. 91, 92.

All the productions of the globe are to be found, and for the most part flourish to perfection, in the varied climates and soils of this splendid Peninsula. The forests, the fruits, the crops of Europe, are recognised by the delighted traveller in the Himalaya Mountains, where the prodigy is exhibited of valleys tolerably peopled, and bearing crops, at the height of sixteen or seventeen thousand feet above the sea, or considerably above the summit of Mount Blanc, or the Great Glochner. The peach, the apricot, the nectarine, even apples, pears, and strawberries, refresh the European, to whom they recall, in a distant land and amidst Oriental luxuries, the images and

Its vegetable and animal productions.

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enjoyments of his youth. Wheat, barley, and oats, with noble forests of teak and oak, flourish on the cool slopes of the Mountains; while at their feet the vast plain of Bengal is covered to an incalculable extent with double crops yearly of rice, or thickets of bamboo canes, fed by the fertilizing floods, which, often to the breadth of a hundred miles, exhibit a sea of water, interspersed only with tufts of wood, solitary palms, hamlets, and pagodas. Indigo grows in luxuriance in many districts, and forms a staple article of commerce to the country; sugar thrives as well as in the West Indies, and promises to fill up the gap in the production of the globe, occasioned by the disastrous emancipation of the slaves in the western tropical regions; grapes, melons, pine-apples, figs, dates, mangoes, are every where found in profusion, with many other fruits still more luscious, peculiar to the Eastern Hemisphere. The elephant, at once the strongest, the most sagacious, and the most docile of animals; the camel, the ship of the desert; the horse, the companion, and fellow-soldier of man,—alike flourish in a country where the tiger and the rhinoceros rule the wilds of nature. Even the flowers and birds partake of the splendid character of creation: the roses of Cachmere and Delhi send their highly prized perfume through the world; the scarlet flowers of the ixora and mussonda and innumerable other tropical plants, diffuse a blaze of beauty through the woods: the scarlet plumage of the flamingo, the varied hue of the parrots, rival the colours of the setting sun. But the woods are silent, or resound only with the harsh scream of birds, or the fearful cry of beasts of prey;¹ no troops of feathered songsters fill the air with their melodious voices, nor welcome in the breath

¹ Hamilton's Account of Hindostan, i. 24, 72. Malte Brun, iii. 32, 33. Martin, viii. 153, 157.

of Spring with the voice of gladness and the notes of love.

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In the transactions of Europe, the historian has too good reason frequently to lament the indecision and want of foresight with which both diplomatic negotiations and military operations have been conducted by the English Cabinet ; and he is, perhaps, driven to the conclusion, that greatness has rather been forced on the State by the energy and virtues of its inhabitants, than conferred upon the inhabitants by the wisdom or ability of the Government. But in the East the reverse has from the outset been the case. If the intelligence, vigour, and bravery of the middle and working classes of England, who sent forth their sons to push their fortunes in the plains of Hindostan, has furnished an inexhaustible supply of talent and resolution to conduct their enterprises, the foresight and capacity of the Indian Government has almost invariably brought their qualities to bear upon the public service in the most efficient manner. Perhaps there is not to be found in the history of any country, so remarkable a succession of able statesmen and warriors as in India have reared the mighty fabric of British greatness. The cool, daring, invincible intrepidity and military genius of LORD CLIVE laid the foundation of the structure ; the quick sagacity, prompt determination, and high moral courage of WARREN HASTINGS rescued it more than once from ruin : but it was the enlarged views, statesman-like wisdom, and energetic conduct of MARQUIS WELLESLEY which completed the superstructure, and left to succeeding Governors a force which nothing could resist, a moral ascendancy which nothing could counterbalance. MARQUIS HASTINGS has since, with equal ability, followed

Extraordi-
nary diplo-
matic ability
with which
India has
been go-
verned.

CHAP. out the same enlightened principles; crushed the
 LL. united confederacy of the Mahrattas and Pindarries;
 1836. vanquished the hill strength of the Goorkhas, and
 left to his successors a matchless empire, from the
 Himalaya snows to the Cape Comorin, and from the
 frontiers of China to the banks of the Indus, united
 under one rule, obeying one Government, and actu-
 ated by one common sense of experience and obli-
 gation.

Immense
 advantages
 of the Bri-
 tish Go-
 vernment to
 the Indian
 people.

Mr Burke has said that if the English were to be expelled from India, they would leave no better traces of their dominion than the hyæna or the tiger. Even at the period when this celebrated expression was used, it savoured more of the fire of the orator than the sober judgment of the statesman; but had that great man survived to these times he would have gratefully retracted the sarcasm, and admitted that of all the marvels attending the British sway in the East, the most wonderful is the extraordinary blessings which it has conferred upon the inhabitants. Facts more eloquent than words, statistics more irresistible than arguments, place this important point beyond the possibility of a doubt. While under its native princes the state of capital in India was so insecure, that twelve per cent was the common, and thirty-six per cent no unusual rate of interest; under the British rule the interest of the public debt has, for the first time in Eastern History, been lowered to five per cent, and at that reduced rate, the capitalists of Arabia and Armenia daily transmit their surplus funds to be purchased into the Company's stock, as the most secure investment in the East. Of the public debt of L.47,000,000, a large proportion is due to native or Asiatic capitalists; and such is the unbounded confidence in the good faith and probity of the

Government, that bales stamped with their signet circulate unopened, like coined money, through the vast empire of China. So complete has been the protection, so ample the security enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British provinces, compared with what obtains under their native rajahs, that the people from every part of India flock, as Bishop Heber has observed, to the three Presidencies; and the extension of the Company's empire, in whatever direction, is immediately followed by a vast concourse of population, and increase of industry, by the settlers from the adjoining native dominions.¹

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¹ Sinclair's Account of India, 13, 27. Heber's India, iii. 274. Life, i. 98, 211, ii. 74, 114.

Brilliant as has been the career of England in the European world during the last half-century, there are several circumstances in its internal situation, which cannot be contemplated without painful feelings. Among these, the constant and uninterrupted increase of crime, through all the vicissitudes of peace and war, unchecked by penal vigilance, undiminished by intellectual cultivation, is one of the most alarming. But under the British Empire in the East, a very different and much more satisfactory progress has taken place. Rapid as has been the *growth* of crime in the European dominions of England during the last half-century, its *decrease* in her Eastern possessions has been still more striking; and the steady powerful rule of a central Government has done as much for the inhabitants of Hindostan, as the vices consequent on a corrupted manufacturing population have undone for the people of Great Britain.* From our returns of commitments and crime in many different provinces of India for the last thirty years, it distinctly appears that crime has, during that period, diminished one-half, in many

Great diminution of crime under the British rule.

* See note D.

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¹ Statistical
Tables in
Martin's
India, ix.
322, 329.

Great
change ef-
fected in the
aspect of the
country in
central and
western pro-
vinces.

places sunk to a sixth, in the East ; while it has in the same time more than quadrupled in the British Islands, and in Ireland multiplied ninefold.* Nor is it difficult to perceive to what cause this remarkable difference is owing. Robbery and plunder, the crimes of violence, were those chiefly prevalent in India, growing out of the lawless habits which ages of misrule had diffused through a large portion of the population. These savage and dangerous crimes have been every where severely repressed, in some districts totally extirpated, by the strong and steady arm of the English Government. The long-established hordes of robbers have been in most places dissolved ; the Pindarries, who so long spread ruin and desolation through central India, rooted out ; the gangs of Dacoits and Looties, who levied a frightful tax on honest industry, transported or broken up. But if this unwonted feeling of security against hostile spoliation is so generally perceptible even in the provinces which have enjoyed the benefit of English protection for the longest period, what must it be to those which have been lately rescued from a state of anarchy, misery, and bloodshed, unparalleled in the modern history of the world ?¹

“ Nothing,” says an intelligent observer, “ can be more gratifying to an Englishman than to travel through the central and western provinces, so long the theatre of merciless and oppressive war, and to witness the wonderful change which has every where been wrought. Every village in that part of the country was closely surrounded by fortifications, and no man ventured to go to the labours of the plough or the loom without being armed with his sword and shield. Now the forts are useless, and are slowly crumbling

* See note E.

into ruin; substantial houses begin for the first time to be built in the *open plain*; cultivation is extended over the distant and undefended fields; the useless incumbrance of defensive armour is laid aside, and the peasant may fearlessly venture to enjoy the wealth and comforts which his industry and labour enable him to acquire. In short, the course of events within the last fifteen years has done more than the whole preceding century to improve the condition of the middle and lower classes through the whole of India; to give them a taste for the comforts and conveniences of life, and to relieve their industry from the paralysis under which a long continuance of internal dissension had caused it to sink. Englishmen, who have so long been blessed with internal tranquillity, and to whom the idea of an invasion presents only a vague and indistinct notion of confusion, bloodshed, and rapine, can hardly conceive the rapturous delight which animates the Hindoo peasant, who has had from time immemorial a wretched experience of these frightful realities, or the gratitude he feels to those who protect him from them, who enable him to reap his harvest in security, defend his home from profanation, and his property from the never-ending extortion of the powerful.”¹

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This progress, accordingly, of wealth, comfort, and population during the last twenty years, especially in Central India, has been rapid in a most extraordinary degree; and even that short period of firm pacific administration has gone far to obliterate the deep furrows which the devastating wars and interminable oppression of former times had produced. Old neglected tanks have been cleared out, their banks restored and again filled with vivifying floods; roads repaired or struck out anew in the most im-

¹ Sinclair's India, 8, 9. Heber's India, iii. 336, and Life, 314.

Rapid progress of wealth, population, and comfort, over all India.

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portant lines of communication; harbours excavated, bridges erected, aqueducts constructed, with all the advantages of European skill; irrigation spread over the thirsty plains, and cultivation extended far into the open country, at a distance from any villages, the centres, in former times, of all the operations of human labour.* Villages, almost beyond the power of enumeration, have risen up from their ruins in every part of the country; the ryots around them are to be seen cheerfully cutting into the jungle, and chasing the leopard and the tiger from their hereditary haunts; † an entirely new feature in Indian society has arisen, a *middle class*, which is gradually approximating to the yeomanry of the Western world; and the never-failing symptoms of a prosperous population have generally appeared,—a great increase in the numbers of the people, co-existent with a marked elevation in their standard of comfort and individual prosperity. ‡

¹ Heber, iii. 252. Mart. ix, 336, 352. Sinclair, 29. Malcolm's Central India, App.

Increased taste for British manufactures over India.

The effect of this progressive elevation in the situation of the middle, and improvement in the circumstances of the lower orders, has already been strongly and beneficially felt in the extended commercial intercourse between India and the British Islands. The growing taste for British manufactures of almost every kind, as well as the increased capability of the working classes to purchase them, in

* The public works undertaken and carried through by the British Government in India, especially in the formation of roads, bridges, aqueducts, canals, harbours, tanks, &c., almost exceed belief; and though less pompously set forth in official reports, equal those which have shed such an imperishable lustre over the reign of Napoleon in Europe. An enumeration of them will be found in the *Parl. Papers* in 1833, and an abstract in MARTIN, ix. 344–349. The roads constructed under Lord W. Bentinck's administration alone, in 1831, were 1784 miles, and 10,000 persons were employed on them. MARTIN, ix. 349.

† See note F.

‡ See note G.

every part of Hindostan, was long ago remarked by Bishop Heber, and the same gratifying change has, since his time, been noticed by not less competent observers. The gradual rise of the more opulent of the working into a middle class, has spread a taste among them for luxuries and conveniences to which their fathers, during the many ages of Hindostan oppression, were strangers. The calicoes and long cloths of Manchester and Paisley have now obtained as undisputed possession of the markets of the East, as the hardwares of Sheffield, Birmingham, and Leeds; and the abundance and cheapness of British manufactures have diffused a taste for these articles among classes who formerly never had a wish beyond the mere necessities of life. While the industry of Indian artisans was, in former times, exclusively directed to fabricate only the coarsest articles for the poorer, and the most costly luxuries for the richer classes, the rapid increase of the consumption of a superior sort of fabric (still much below the Cachmere shawls and brocades of the rich), unknown till within these twenty years in any part of Hindostan, marks the slow but gradual growth, under British protection, of an intermediate class in society, superior to the naked ryot, but inferior to the pampered zemindar: while, by one of those changes which bespeak the revolutions of ages, and measure the difference in the progress of different quarters of the globe, the cotton of India, transported to the British shores and manufactured by the refinements of European machinery, is sent back to the East, and, by its greater cheapness, has opened to a class who never before could enjoy them, the comforts of the original produce of Hindostan.^{1*}

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¹ Sinclair,
29, 30.
Heber iii.
284.
Martin, ix.
353, 355.

* See note H.

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Vast police
force esta-
blished
throughout
Bengal, and
its admir-
able effects.

The extraordinary diminution of crime, especially of a violent kind, in all parts of the Indian Peninsula of late years, and progressive amelioration of the people, is in a great measure to be ascribed to the extensive and powerful police force which is very generally established. The discipline and organization of this civil body is admirable; and such is its extent, that in the provinces of Bengal and Bahar it numbers one hundred and sixty thousand men in its ranks. In most villages there are two or three, in many, ten or twelve of this protecting force permanently established. Europeans may feel astonished at the magnitude of this establishment; but experience has completely demonstrated that it is highly useful, and indeed indispensable, amidst the habits of rapine and violence to which ages of license and rapine have inured the inhabitants of India. The rapid diminution of crimes of violence in Bengal under the operation of this preventive system, proves that a remedy has been discovered and applied to the prevailing causes of evil in those regions: would that human wisdom could devise an equally effectual preservative against the passion for illicit gain, sensual indulgence, and habitual intoxication; which are now, like a gangrene, overspreading the face of society in the British Islands!¹

¹ Martin, ix.
94, 96.

Auber, 553.

Principles of
Indian Tax-
ation.

Taxation in India is for the most part direct; that is, it consists of the rent of lands belonging in property to the Government, and which, from time immemorial, have been devoted to the maintenance of the supreme authority. Of the nineteen millions which at present constitute the general revenue of India, nearly eleven millions are drawn in this manner from the rent of the Government lands. The principle on which this immense revenue is derived

from land, has no analogy to the European land-tax, which is a burden superinduced upon the owner of the rent; it is, on the contrary, the rent itself. The modes in which this tax is levied over India are three: either a perpetual settlement with, or fixed rent constantly payable by, the proprietors of land; or a temporary settlement with the heads of villages or townships; or a definite settlement with each individual occupant of the ground. These different modes of taxation are all founded on one principle, which is universally admitted and acknowledged in every part of Hindostan, viz., that Government, as the paramount owner of the soil, has right to a certain portion of the gross produce of every foot of cultivated land, which may be commuted generally or partially, by permanent or partial settlements, with classes of men or separate individuals, but never can be wholly alienated by any ruler to the prejudice of his successors. Government, therefore, in India, is at once the ruling power and the universal landlord in the State; and hence the general and omnipotent influence which its severity or justice has upon the prosperity and well-being of the people, and the immediate effect of the British sway,—by whose agents the collection of rent has been fixed, upon comparatively equitable principles,—upon the welfare of the humbler classes.¹

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¹ Com. Report, 1832, 2, 29. Martin, ix. 116. Heber, iii. 275.

When the East India Company came into possession of the Bengal provinces, they found the land revenue every where collected by the intervention of officers under the Mahomedan Government, who had charge of districts or provinces under the title of *zemindars*. These officers were paid by a percentage on the sums which they collected: the utmost irregularity and abuse generally existed; military

Management of land. The Zemindar System.

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force was constantly resorted to, to enforce the collection; and some of them held their offices for life only, others transmitted them, by hereditary succession, to their descendants. Misled by the analogy of European institutions, or desirous of laying the foundation for their establishment in the East, Marquis Cornwallis, in 1793, conceived and carried into effect the idea of transforming the zemindars into landed proprietors, by conferring upon them and their descendants an indefeasible right to the territories over which their powers extended, so long as they continued to pay regularly the fixed land-tax to Government. The propriety of this change was very much doubted at the time, and gave rise to a long and interesting controversy; but it was, nevertheless, carried into execution, and now forms the basis on which the taxation of two hundred thousand square miles of the Bengal territory, a district thrice the size of Great Britain, is founded. Though framed on the principles of benevolence and moderation, it has, however, like almost all similar institutions borrowed from the analogy of other nations, and a different state of society, proved altogether ineffective for the principal object in view. The zemindars could not, by the mere regulation of the Company, be converted from Asiatic to European habits: instead of acquiring the interests and views of hereditary landholders, they continued to act with the characteristic improvidence of eastern rulers. To squeeze the last farthing, by any means how unjust soever, from the ryots, and squander it in extravagance or luxury upon themselves or their families, was the general practice: numbers were ruined and disposed by the Company, who exacted the quit rent with unrelenting and injudicious rigour;¹ and thus

¹ Parl. Pap.
1831, 3115.
et seq. 1832,
p. 21.

no step was made towards the formation of a landed aristocracy, while no alleviation was experienced in the burdens of the poor.

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The evil, in effect, became so great, that it has in some degree worked out, like all other excessive ills, its own cure. The zemindar system has come in the end to benefit a class of landed proprietors, though not the one which Lord Cornwallis originally intended. From the general ruin which overtook these powerful officers, and the terror every where inspired by the rigorous exactions of the Company, the price of estates fell so low, that at last it became a prudent matter of speculation to buy land, and look to its returns for the interest of the price. A different and more provident class has thus, to a considerable extent, been introduced into the management of estates; and, as the land-rent which they are required to pay continues fixed, they have the strongest possible inducement to increase by good management the surplus which may accrue to themselves and their families. But, unfortunately, they have not learned in the East to look so far into the future as to see that this is to be most effectually done by equitable and just dealings towards the cultivators: the burdens imposed on the ryots are still generally exorbitant, often ruinous; and the benefits of the British Government are felt by that numerous and important class rather by the cessation of war and depredation, than in any practical diminution of the duties legally exigible from them by their landlords.¹

Its practical operation.

¹ Heber, iii. 273, 275.
Mart. ix. 118, 119.
Parl. Pap. 1831. Com. 3115, et seq. 1832, p. 21.

Impressed with these evils, a different system was adopted by Sir Thomas Munro, late Governor of Madras, in his administration of some of the newly acquired provinces of that presidency. The principle acted on by that able ruler, of whom Mr Can-

The Ryot-war system.

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ning justly said, that "Asia did not possess a braver warrior, nor Europe a more enlightened statesman," was to consider the ryot, according to the true oriental principle, as the real proprietor; to dispense altogether with the zemindar or intermediate collector; and to levy the Government duties, fixed for ever in amount, directly from the cultivator or landholder, whatever was the size of his possession. It is evident that this system is calculated to be much more beneficial than the zemindar one to the cultivators of the soil; because they are thereby brought directly into contact with Government, and participate at once, without the intervention of any middle man, in the benefit of a fixed quit rent only being exacted from the land. It has, accordingly, found many and able supporters, and in some districts has been found in practice to be attended with the most admirable effects.* But when so powerful a party as Government is brought into immediate contact with the cultivators, in a matter of such vital importance as the rent of land, it is indispensable to the success of the system that its demands should be moderate, and enforced with justice and consideration; and, unfortunately, this can hardly be generally expected under an empire of such immense extent as that of Hindostan, in which the supreme authority is situated at such a distance from the theatre of its fiscal opera-

* See, in particular, a most interesting account of a settlement on these principles in MALCOLM'S *India*, 526-528. It is also much more beneficial to Government; as is proved by the fact that, in 1827, the land-tax per head, was,—

	Per head.	Per square mile.	Population per square mile.
In Bengal,	22 pence.	23 pence.	244
In Madras,	52 —	17 —	77
In Bombay,	60 —	19 —	76

Parl. Papers, quoted in MARTIN, ix. 123.

tions. The land-tax is usually taken at twelve shillings in the pound, of the net produce of the soil; an enormous exaction, rendered still more burdensome by the rigour with which it is collected. The project of bringing the cultivator at once into contact with Government, so equitable in theory, has often proved most fallacious in practice; for such is the subdivision of forms in most parts of India, that the immediate collection of the land-revenue by the Government collector is out of the question. He is obliged to delegate his duties to a host of subordinate agents, over whose operations or oppression he is little able to keep any effectual control: the treasury officers too often come to esteem a subordinate functionary in proportion to the regularity and amount of his remittances, rather than any other quality: the expenses of collection rise enormously with the multiplication of inferior agents, and the ryot has often little reason to congratulate himself on the exchange of a British collector for a native zemindar.¹

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¹ Sinclair, 33, 36. Parl. Pap. Com. 3156, 4577, 4579. Mart. ix. 122, 123.

A third system of land-rents is the *Village* system. This prevails chiefly in the upper districts of India, and is the prevalent institution over the greater part of the East, to which, probably, more than any other cause, the preservation of its population and industry amidst the endless devastations of wars is to be ascribed. Each village forms a little community or republic in itself, possessing a certain district of surrounding territory, and paying a certain fixed rent for the whole to Government. As long as this is regularly paid, the public authorities have no title to interfere in the internal concerns of the community: they elect their own *mocuddims*, or head men, who levy the proportions of the quit rent from each individual, settle disputes, and allocate to each

The village system.

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profession or individual the share of the general produce of the public territory which is to belong to it. As the community is justly desirous of avoiding any pretext for the interference of the state collectors in its internal concerns, they make good the quota of every defaulter from the funds of his neighbours, so as to exhibit no defalcations in the general return to Government. The only point in which the interference of the national authorities is required, is in fixing the limits of the village territories in a question with each other, which is done with great care by surveyors, in presence of the competing parties and their witnesses, and a great concourse of the neighbouring inhabitants. In times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves, drive their cattle within their walls, and often contrive, by the payment of a certain contribution, to avoid the evils of actual pillage, even by the most considerable armies. These villages are, indeed, frequently burned or destroyed by hostile forces, the little community dispersed, and its lands restored to a state of nature; but when better times return, and the means of peaceable occupation are again restored, the remnant re-assemble with their children in their paternal inheritance. A generation may pass away, but the succeeding generation return: the sons take the place of their fathers; the same trades and occupations are filled by the descendants of the same individuals; the same division of lands takes place; the very houses are rebuilt on the site of those which had been destroyed; and, emerging from the storm, the community revives, "another and the same."¹

¹Com. Committee,
1832, p. 29.
Lords, 398,
399, 405,
529. Mart.
ix. 120, 121.

It is in these village municipalities that the real secret of the durability of society in the East is to be found. If we contemplate the desolating invasions

to which, from the earliest times, the Asiatic monarchies have been exposed from their proximity to the regions of central Asia; if we reflect on the wide-spread devastation consequent on the twelve dreadful irruptions of the Tartars into Hindostan; and recollect that society, in the intervals of these terrific scourges, has invariably been subjected to the varied but never-ending oppression of different rulers, who seemed to have no other idea of government but to extract as large contributions as possible from the people,—it seems surprising how the human race did not become extinct under such a succession of calamities. But amidst those multiplied evils, the village system has provided an unheeded, but enduring and effectual refuge for mankind. Invasion may succeed invasion, horde after horde may sweep over the country—dynasty may overturn dynasty, revolution be followed by revolution; but the wide-spread foundations of rural society are unchanged: the social families bend, but break not, beneath the storm; industry revives in its ancient seats, and in its pristine form, under whatever government ultimately prevails; and the dominant power, intent only on fresh objects of plunder or aggrandisement, rolls past these unheeded fountains of industry and population. The Hindoos, the Patans, the Moguls, the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and the English, have all been masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same. Abuses and oppression, without doubt, may prevail in this as in all other human institutions; but its extensive establishment and long duration in the East, proves that it has been found capable by experience of affording tolerable security to the labouring classes; and perhaps by no other means, in the absence of those

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Admirable
effect of the
village sys-
tem in all
ages.

CHAP. effective bulwarks of freedom which the intelligence,
 LI. hereditary succession, and free spirit of Europe, create,
 1836. is the inestimable blessing of protection to humble industry to be so generally and effectually obtained.

The whole upper and western provinces of Bengal, the greater part of the Bombay territories, the ceded districts on the Nerbuddah, and the province of Tanjore, comprising about 260,000 square miles, are assessed according to this system.¹

Effects of this large land revenue on the general system of taxation. The concentration in the hands of Government of so large a proportion of the surplus produce of the earth, as is effected by the great land-tax of India, is undoubtedly prejudicial to society, in so far as it prevents the growth of that important class, so well known in European civilisation—a body of hereditary independent landed proprietors; but it is attended by this important advantage, that it renders the other imports of the state extremely trifling. Of the total revenue of L.19,500,000, more than a half is derived from the land revenue; and of the indirect taxes, nearly two-thirds is laid on the single articles of salt and opium.* When we reflect on the numerous taxes which are levied on almost every article of consumption in Great Britain, this must appear no small recommendation of the Eastern system. It is obviously the same advantage to a nation to have a considerable portion of its revenue derived from Crown lands, as it is to have its ecclesiastical or charitable institutions supported by separate property of their own. In either case, the cost of these expensive establishments, essential to the protection, religious instruction, or relief of the people, is laid upon their own funds, instead of being imposed as a burden upon the earnings of the other classes of the

* See note I.

community. It is, perhaps, the most remarkable instance of political blindness on record, that the republican party, both in France and England, should so long have endeavoured, and in the former country successfully, to destroy the property both of the Church and the corporations holding funds devoted to the purposes of charity and education; that is, to terminate the payment of these necessary establishments by their own funds, and throw their maintenance as a tax on the wages of labour. And, without going the length of the opinion, that the oriental system is preferable to the landed proprietors of modern Europe, with the stability which they confer upon society, it may safely be asserted, that the receipt of a considerable portion of the public revenue from landed property, vested in Government or public bodies, is an invaluable feature in political institutions, and the very last which a real patriot would seek to subvert.

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Religious difference, and the exclusive possession of power by persons of one ecclesiastical establishment, political party, or dominant race, have been found to be the great obstacles to the pacification of the kingdoms of modern Europe; and in the centre of her power, England has found it impossible to conciliate the affections or overcome the antipathy of the native inhabitants of Ireland. But, in her Eastern empire, political exclusion far more rigid, religious distinctions far more irreconcilable, have, under the able and judicious management of the Company, proved no obstacle to the consolidation of a vast and peaceable dominion. In India, notwithstanding the long period that some districts have been in British possession, and the universal peace which reigns from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains, the na-

Complete
system of
toleration
established
in India.

CHAP. tives are still ineligible to offices of trust, both in the
 LI. civil and military departments. In religion, the prin-
 1836. ciple of separation is still more rigid. Hindostan
 has, in different ages, been overrun, not merely by
 conquerors of different races, agreeing only in their
 ferocity to the vanquished, but by hosts of totally
 distinct and irreconcilable religious creeds. The
 mild and pacific followers of Bramah have in different
 ages been obliged to bow the neck to the fierce idol-
 aters of Caubul, the rigid followers of Shiva, the
 savage pagans of Tartary, the impetuous fire-wor-
 shippers of Persia, the triumphant followers of Ma-
 homet, the disciplined battalions of Christ. These
 different and hostile religions have imprinted their
 traces deeply and indelibly on the Hindoo population;
 and of the two hundred millions who now inhabit
 the vast Peninsula to the south of the Himalaya
 mountains, a considerable proportion still follow the
 faith of the dominant races from which they severally
 sprang.

Vast varie-
 ties of reli-
 gious belief
 found in
 India.

Fifteen millions of Mussulmen, haughty in man-
 ners, indolent in character, voluptuous in disposition,
 even now recall the era when the followers of Ma-
 homet issued from their burning deserts, with the
 sword in one hand and the Koran in the other,
 to win, through the blood of conquest, a path to
 the houris of Paradise; sixty millions of pacific
 Hindoos on the banks of the Ganges, still con-
 tinue the worship of Bramah and Vishnu, which
 has endured unchanged for four thousand years;
 fifteen millions of hardy freebooters, in the upper
 provinces, follow a mixed creed, in which the tenets
 of Islamism and the doctrines of the Hindoo faith
 are strangely compounded together. Heathens and
 cannibals are found in great numbers on the hilly

regions of the north-eastern frontier; a numerous fragment of Parsees or fire-worshippers, scattered through various parts of India, still preserve, untainted by foreign usage, the pure tenets, charitable practices, and elevating worship of Zoroaster; Jews are to be seen in many places, whose Old Testament, coming down no further than the Babylonian Captivity, indicates that they had strayed to the East after that memorable event; while a small number of Christians have preserved inviolate, through eighteen hundred years, the fundamental principles of the Gospel, and traces are to be found in some remote quarters of the lost tribes of the children of Israel.¹

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Mart. ix.
207, 233.
Sinclair, 40,
48, 49.

At first sight it would be natural to conclude, that this extraordinary amalgamation of different religions in one community would produce an insurmountable difficulty in conducting the government, and that the strength of an united empire could never be obtained with such various and discordant materials. The reverse, however, is so much the case that it is owing to this, more, perhaps, than any other cause, that the subjection of so great a body of natives to the government of a handful of Europeans is to be ascribed. The Indian population is divided into so great a number of different faiths, that no one is predominant or can claim an undisputed pre-eminence over the others; and political power has so long been dissevered from religious belief, that it no longer constitutes a bond of union by which any formidable coalition can be held together. Not only are there to be found Hindoos of every province, and tribe, and dialect, in the ranks of the British native army, but the worshippers of Shiva, the adorers of Vishnu, a multitude of Mahommedans, both of the

Effect of this
religious di-
vision in fa-
cilitating
the govern-
ment of the
country.

CHAP. Soonee and Shiah sects, Protestant and Catholic half-
 LI. castes, and even Jews and Ghebirs. By this inter-
 1836. mixture, unparalleled in history, the chances of any
 considerable combination, either for the purposes of
 military revolt or political hostility, have been con-
 siderably reduced. Although all classes live to-
 gether on terms of mutual forbearance, and this
 amazing diversity of religious sentiment in no way
 interrupts the chain of military subordination, no
 sooner are their professional duties at an end than
 the distinctions of religion and caste return with
 undiminished influence. When the regimental pa-
 rade is dismissed, the soldiers break into separate
 knots, the gradation of caste is restored, the distinc-
 tions of faith return; the Sudra sergeant makes his
salaam to the Brahmin or the Rajpoot private; the
 Mussulman avoids the Christian, the Shiah the
 Soonee, the Hindoo all; and an almost impassable
 barrier of mutual distrust and jealousy obstructs all
 amalgamation of opinion, or unity of action, even
 upon those national objects which separately interest
 the whole body. Thus the heterogeneous and dis-
 cordant mass is kept in a state of complete subordi-
 nation by the only power among them which possesses
 the inestimable advantage of unity of action; and
 the British Government, strong in its established pro-
 bity, and the good faith with which it observes its en-
 gagements both towards its subjects and its enemies,
 is enabled to maintain an undisputed dominion over
 its innumerable and multifarious subjects.¹

¹ Sinclair
 48, 49.
 Malcolm,
 Central In-
 dia, i. 42,
 47.

Vast variety
 of national
 character in
 India.

It is a common opinion in Great Britain,—where the
 real nature of our Eastern dominions is unknown to an
 extent which, *a priori*, would appear incredible,—
 that the whole of India is inhabited by a race of meek
 and inoffensive Hindoos, who willingly bow the neck

to every invader who chooses to oppress them, and are incapable, alike from their character, climate, and ignorance, of opposing any effectual resistance to an European invader. The slightest acquaintance, not merely with Indian but Asiatic history, must be sufficient to demonstrate the unfounded nature of this opinion. In no part of the world, perhaps, has foreign conquest implanted its traces in more indelible features on the original population, in none is variety of present character and qualities so conspicuous. So far from the inhabitants of India being all of one description, alike timid and inoffensive, there is within its limits to be found a greater intermixture of races than in any part of the world, and as large a proportion of hardy valour and desperate daring as in any people recorded in history. Bishop Heber justly observes, that there is as great a disparity between the inhabitants of Guzerat, Bengal, the Duab, and the Deccan, as between any four nations of Europe; and that the inhabitants of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and of the Deccan, are as different from each other as the French and Portuguese from the Greeks, Germans, or Poles. Independent of the varieties of the proper Indian race, which are innumerable, there are to be found in the peninsula of Hindostan, at least *thirty* distinct nations, speaking different languages, and almost entirely unknown to each other. The Mahrattas are as much strangers to the people of Bengal as to the Europeans; the inhabitants of the Carnatic are foreign to both; the Seiks have no resemblance to the Mahrattas; and even the fifteen millions of Mahommedans have no common bond but their religion, and exhibit the descendants of adventurers, from all the nations of Asia, who crowded to the standards

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of the Prophet. If we penetrate into more distant possessions, the varieties of human character are still more remarkable: the inhabitants of the swamps of Arracan, or the meadows of the Irrawuddy, are as distinct from the highlanders of Nepaul as the rice-growers of the Ganges are from the horsemen of Mysore, or the Pindarries of Malwa. It was in the plains of Bengal alone, that the British force met with the genuine Hindoo race, and there victory was of comparatively easy acquisition: but, as foreign aggression, or the necessities of their situation, forced them into more distant warfare, they were brought in collision with nations as fierce, and forces as formidable, as any that are arrayed under the banners of Western Europe. The desperate defence of Saragossa, the obstinate valour of Aspern, the enthusiastic gallantry of Tyrol, have all their parallels in the annals of Indian warfare; and the heroism with which Napoleon and his redoubtable followers resisted and overcame these varied modes of hostility, was not greater than that with which the British soldiers, and their worthy native allies, combated on the plateau of Mysore, the hills of Nepaul, or the plains of Hindostan. The harassing hostility and terrible sweep of the Cossacks were fully equalled by the squadrons of Hyder and the Pindaree hordes; the free-born valour of the Tyrolese was rivalled by the heroic resistance of the Goorkhas; the storm of Badajoz, the devotion of Saragossa, have their parallels in the defence of Bhurtpore and the ramparts of Seringapatam; and the decision and skill which converted the perils of Assaye into a decisive victory, were not outdone by the most illustrious deeds of the conqueror of Napoleon.¹

¹ Mart. ix. 267, 279.
Heber's India, iii. 262.
Crawford's Eastern Archipelago, i. 47, 54.

Climate, and physical circumstances, in addition

to original difference of race, have exercised their wonted influence on the character of the Indian population. In the flat, hot regions of Bengal, on the shores of the Ganges, and amidst the meanderings of its tributary streams, is to be found a timid, gentle, pacific race: educated, but prone to superstition; servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors; obsequious, yet treacherous; skilled in the arts of Eastern adulation, but mild and inoffensive in their intercourse with each other. In the elevated regions of the Peninsula, on the other hand, on the high table-land of Mysore, in the wild hills of Almorah, on the lofty mountains of Nepaul, the inhabitants are brave, ardent, and impetuous; glowing with ardour, chivalrous to women, courteous to strangers, glorying in deeds of heroism, faithful in their friendships, vehement in their hatred. With these elevated qualities are mingled, however, others which belong to the same national character; a fierce and revengeful temper, a disposition uncultivated and impatient of discipline; habits prone to violence, and nursed to crime by ages of uncontrolled licentiousness. It is in these nations, among the proud Rajpoots, the roving Mahrattas, the daring Affghans, that the restraints of regular government are with most difficulty introduced, and its blessings most sensibly felt by the inhabitants; but it is amongst them also that the military spirit is most prevalent, and the British Government has found its most faithful and intrepid native defenders.¹

Among all the prodigies attending the British dominions in India, none, perhaps, is so extraordinary as the rise, progress, and fidelity of the SEPOY FORCE. It was in Bombay that these invaluable auxiliaries were originally organised, and the first mention of

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Difference
of character
owing to
physical
causes.

Malte
Brun, iii.
280, 299.
Mart. ix.
278, 279.

Origin and
composition
of the Sepoy
force.

CHAP. them in history is when a corps of 100 natives
LI. from Bombay, and 400 from Tellicherry, assisted the
1836. army at Madras in 1747. From these humble beginnings has arisen the present magnificent native army of India, which at one period amounted to nearly three hundred thousand men, and even now, on a reduced peace establishment, numbers a hundred and ninety-five thousand. Their ranks have from the first been filled indiscriminately with recruits of all nations and religious persuasions; and Mahommedans, Hindoos, Parsees, Jews, and Christians are to be found blended among them, without the distinction of race having ever interfered with the unity of action, or the difference of religion ever shaken fidelity to duty. The whole have throughout been raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a conscription or forced levy having ever been found necessary; and, great as the present army is, it could be quadrupled in a few months, if the circumstances of the Indian Government required such an augmentation of force. The facility with which vast armies can be raised in the East, when compared to the violent measures by which it has been found necessary in Europe to accomplish the same object, appears at first sight surprising; but it ceases to be so, when the effects of the distinction of castes, and the relative situation of the sepoy soldiers and the other classes of the community, are considered. The military form a distinct caste in all the Hindoo communities; and from father to son, deeds of arms are handed down, as the only object of honourable ambition, the true incitement to glorious exploit. The Rajpoot of Bengal is born a soldier. The mother recounts acts of heroism to her infant; from earliest youth he is habituated to the use and exer-

cise of arms. Even when still a child, the future warrior is accustomed to handle the sword and dagger, and to look without fear on the implements of death. If his father tills the ground, the sword and shield are placed near the furrow, and moved as his labour advances. The frame of the youth is constantly strengthened by martial exercises ; he is habitually temperate in his diet ; of a generous though warm disposition ; and, if well treated, zealous, faithful, and obedient. It was from this military caste that the chief Indian armies were first formed, and they still form the strength of the native infantry. In process of time, however, as our empire has extended into more distant regions, the military qualities of its varied inhabitants have been called into action ; and the desultory activity of the Mahratta horse, not less than the firm intrepidity of the Mysore cavalry, or the chivalrous valour of the Affghan gunners, have contributed to the formation of our mighty dominions.¹

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¹ Quart.
Rev. xviii.
414, 415.
Orme's Hin-
dostan, i.
72, 104.
Mart. ix.
64, 65.
Sinclair, 46.

Unlike the soldier of Europe, the sepoy is an object of envy to his less fortunate compatriots. His profession gives him the precedence, not less in general estimation than in that of his caste, to persons engaged in civil occupations ; and his pay is so considerable as to raise him, both in station and enjoyments, far above his brethren who are left behind him in his native village. Each private sepoy is attended by two servants : in the field there are, at an average, nine followers to every two fighting men : a system which gives to a hundred thousand men, in a campaign, nearly five hundred thousand attendants : and goes far to explain both the prodigious hosts recorded in history, as commanded by Xerxes and Darius, and the facility with which they

Elevated
rank and
situation of
the sepoy
troops.

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LL.

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¹ Malte
Brun, iii.
328. Mar-
tin, ix. 79,
80.

General
character of
the Indian
army.

were routed by a comparatively small body of Greeks, all real soldiers. Such a mode of carrying on war augments to a great degree the difficulty of providing subsistence for so prodigious a multitude as attend every considerable army,* but it renders it comparatively an easy matter to raise a military force. When the pay given to a private soldier is so considerable as to admit of his keeping two servants in the camp, and a still greater number in the field, no want of recruits will ever be experienced: the real difficulty is to find resources adequate to the support of a large army at that elevated standard. When Cromwell gave half-a-crown a-day to every dragoon, he readily got recruits for the Parliamentary armies.¹

The Indian infantry can hardly be said to be equal, even when led by British officers, to that of England, and, when left to the direction of their own leaders, evince the general inferiority of the Asiatic race to the European; but it is only in the last extremity or most trying situations that this difference is conspicuous, and for the ordinary duties of a campaign, no troops in the world are superior to the sepoys. In many of the most essential duties of a soldier,—sobriety during duty, patience under privation, docility in learning, hardihood in undergoing fatigue, steady enduring valour, and fidelity to their colours under every temptation to swerve from them, the Indian auxiliaries might serve as a model to every service in Europe. Nay, examples are numerous, in

* When General Harris advanced against Seringapatam in 1799, his army was composed of 35,000 fighting men and 120,000 attendants; and when Marquis Hastings took the field in 1817, against the Mahrattas, his regular forces, amounting to 110,000 men, were swelled by above 500,000 camp followers; among whom, chiefly of the lower grades in society, and persons habituated to the humblest fare, the cholera made the most unheard-of ravages.—MALTE BRUN, iii. 328.

which, emulous of the deeds of their British comrades, they have performed deeds of daring worthy of being placed beside the most exalted of European glory, and instances are not wanting where they have unhesitatingly faced dangers, before which even English troops had recoiled.* The native cavalry is of more recent introduction than the infantry, but it is not less admirable in many of the most valuable qualities: the men are fearless riders, indefatigable in the service of light troops, sober and vigilant; they take exemplary care of their horses, many of which are of the best Persian and Arabian breeds, and in the sword exercise or single combat are superior to almost any of the cavaliers of Europe. Nor is the artillery

* At the first siege of Bhurtpore, in 1805, the 12th regiment of native Bengal infantry was associated with the 75th and 76th British infantry, whose deeds of valour they had emulated at the battle of Laswarree. The British were first led to the assault and gallantly mounted the breach; but they were driven back with dreadful slaughter; and such was the panic inspired by the disaster, that, when they were ordered a second time to advance, the soldiers refused to follow their officers and leave the trenches. The 2d battalion of the 12th native regiment was then ordered to advance; they did so with resolute steps, though well aware of the desperate nature of the service on which they were sent, and cheered as they passed the English troops, who lay sheltered in the trenches. Such was the heroic valour of their onset that they overcame all opposition, and planted their colours, in sight of the whole army, on the summit of the breach. This work, unfortunately, was cut off by a deep ditch from the body of the fortress, and, finding it impossible to pass that barrier, Lord Lake was reluctantly obliged to order a retreat. It was with great difficulty, however, that the brave sepoys could be prevailed on to retire from the perilous post of honour which they had won, and not till they had sustained a loss of 360 men, being half their total number when they went into action. The British regiment, stung with shame, now implored to be allowed to return to the assault, which was granted, but, notwithstanding their desperate valour, it was still unsuccessful.—*See* MARTIN, viii. 30–31, and ix. 69–70. The author has frequently heard this anecdote from his late lamented brother-in-law, Colonel Gerard, Adjutant-general of the Bengal army, who was present on the occasion, an officer to whose talents, zeal, and bravery, the wonders of Lord Lake's campaign are, in a considerable degree, to be ascribed.

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LI.

1836.

¹ Martin, ix.
83. Wil-
liams's In-
dian army,
32, 68.
Quart. Rev.
xviii. 414,
415.

Touching
anecdotes of
the fidelity
of sepoy
troops.

inferior to any in the world, either in the perfection of the material, the condition of the horses, or the coolness, precision, or bravery of the gunners. The immense host is entirely under the direction of British officers, nearly five thousand of whom are employed in this important service ; but the non-commissioned officers and subalterns always were natives, and the avenue to more elevated promotion is now opened to the most deserving of their number.* In the shock of a regular charge alone, the native horse is still inferior to the British, a peculiarity which has distinguished the cavalry of the eastern and western worlds in every age, from the days of Marathon to those of the Crusades.¹

Volumes might be filled with the anecdotes which have occurred within the last eighty years, illustrative of the steady courage and incorruptible fidelity of the sepoy troops. They first rose to eminence in the wars of Lord Clive, Lawrence, Smith, and Coote, in the middle of the last century ; and the number of Europeans who were then engaged in Indian warfare was so inconsiderable, that almost the whole glory of their marvellous victories is in reality due to the sepoys. The hardships which were undergone at this period, by all the soldiers, both native and European, from the defective state, or rather total want of a commissariat, were excessive ; but, although the British power was then only in its infancy, and little promised future stability to its empire, nothing could shake the fidelity of the sepoy

* The British officers in the Indian army amount to 4487 ; the Indian to 3416 ; but the latter cannot rise to a higher rank than that of ensign or cornet. The total British troops in India amount at present to 30,915 sabres and bayonets, of whom 19,540 are composed of the Queen's regiments ; the remainder being English in the service of the East India Company ; but the expense of the whole is defrayed by the Indian Government.—MARTIN, ix. 73, 79-81.

troops. On one occasion, when the provisions of a garrison were very low, and a surrender, in consequence, appeared unavoidable, the Hindoo soldiers entreated their commander to allow them to boil their rice, the only food left for the whole garrison. "Your English soldiers," said they, "can eat from our hands, though we cannot from theirs; we will allow them as their share every grain of the rice, and subsist ourselves by drinking the water in which it has been boiled." In the years 1780, 1781, and 1782, they suffered hardships almost unparalleled; there was hardly a corps that was not twenty months in arrear, and their families, under the pressure of a dreadful famine, were expiring on all sides; nevertheless, their fidelity never gave way under this extreme trial, and they repaid, with gratitude and attachment, the consideration, to them unwonted, with which they were treated by their European officers. The campaigns of Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Clive, in which they bore so prominent a part, still form an object of well-founded pride to the sepoy of Madras; and when a regiment comes into garrison, they lead their children into the great room of the exchange of that capital, to point out the portraits of the chiefs who first led their fathers to victory.¹

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¹ Sir J. Malcolm, in Quarterly Rev. xviii. 389, 396.

Towards the close of the war with Tippoo, in 1782, General Mathews, with his whole troops, almost entirely native, were made prisoners. The Sultan, sensible of the advantages he might derive from the services of so large a body of disciplined men in his ranks, made every effort to induce the English sepoy to enter his army, but in vain. He then tried severity, and subjected them for long to the most rigorous confinement, and unhealthy employments: but nothing could shake their fidelity;

Their fidelity to the English under every trial.

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and at the peace of 1783, fifteen hundred of these brave men marched a distance of five hundred miles to Madras, to embark and rejoin the army to which they belonged, at Bombay. During the march, the utmost pains were taken by Tippoo's guards to keep the Hindoo privates separate from their European officers, in the hope that their fidelity might yet sink under the hardships to which they were exposed, but in vain; and not only did they all remain true to their colours, but swam the tanks and rivers by which they were separated from the officers during the night, bringing them all they could save from their little pittance; "for we," they said, "can live on any thing, but you require beef and mutton." A battalion of the Bombay 12th regiment mutinied in 1764, on account of some promises made to the soldiers having, as they said, been broken. A severe example was thought necessary, and twenty-eight of the most guilty were sentenced to be blown from the mouth of a cannon. As they were on the point of being executed, three grenadiers who happened to be among them, stepped forward and claimed the honour of being blown away from the right guns: "they had always fought on the right," they said, "and they hoped they should be allowed to die at that post of honour."* In the advance of Lord Lake's army to Delhi and Agra in 1804, the hardships and privations which the troops of all sorts endured were such as almost to break down the

* "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who was an eye-witness of this remarkable scene, "there was not a dry eye among the marines who executed the sentence, though they had long been accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been in the execution party which shot Admiral Byng in 1757. The corps to which they belonged, subsequently distinguished itself greatly both at Laswarree and the first siege of Bhurtpore."—WILLIAMS' *Indian Army*, 247, and ante vii.

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spirit of the British officers ; but the Hindoo privates never showed the least symptoms of faintness or despondence, saying, "Keep up your spirits, sir ; we will bring you in safety to Agra." When in square, and sustaining charges of the enemies' horse, it more than once happened, when a musket was fired by a young soldier, that a veteran struck him with the but-end of his firelock, exclaiming : "Are you mad, to destroy our discipline, and make us like the rabble that are attacking us?" Nor was the same steady courage and devoted fidelity wanting, on still more trying occasions, when the national or religious prejudices of the native soldier were brought still more violently in collision with their military duties. At the mutiny of Vellore, which shook the Indian empire to its foundation, and was brought on by an absurd interference with the religious feelings of the troops, the sabres of the native dragoons were dyed as deep as those of the British in the blood of their unhappy countrymen ; and on occasion of a recent tumult at Bareilly, the capital of Rohilcund, occasioned by the introduction of a necessary but unpopular police tax, which commanded the sympathy of the whole neighbouring population, a battalion of the 27th native infantry, with four hundred Rohilla horse recently embodied, were all that could be brought against the insurgents, who were above twelve thousand strong. They continued to resist till two thousand were slain ; and, although many of them were their relations and neighbours, and their priest advanced and invoked them to join their natural friends, only one man was found wanting to his duty, and he was immediately put to death by his comrades, who throughout maintained the most unshaken fidelity and courage.¹

¹ Martin, ix.
66, 72.Williams's
Indian
Army, 272,
304. Mal-
colm, in
Quart. Rev.
xviii. 389,
415.

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LI.

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Which is
owing to the
fidelity of
the English
government
to its en-
gagements.

The secret of this extraordinary fidelity of the native troops, under every temptation, to a foreign power, professing a different religion, and known only by its successive overthrow of all the native potentates, is to be found in the wise and magnanimous policy with which the East India Company, through every vicissitude of fortune, have made good their engagements, and the inviolable fidelity with which they have rewarded the services of the troops engaged in their ranks. From the earliest times the Indian princes have known no other way of paying their troops than by quartering them on some of the hereditary or conquered provinces of their dominions; where, though military license was allowed every latitude in the exaction of their pay or provisions, the soldiers experienced great difficulty, and were subject to a most vexatious uncertainty, in the recovery of their dues. When, therefore, instead of this harassing and oppressive system, the Indian sepoy found that they received their daily pay as regularly as an English soldier; that their wants were all provided for by a vigilant and honest Government; that no subaltern fraud or chicanery was permitted to intercept the just rewards of their valour, and that, after a certain number of years' service, they were permitted to retire on ample allowances, or a grant of land which formed a little patrimony to themselves and their descendants;*

* "I have beheld," says Sir John Malcolm, "with more patriotic pride than has ever been excited in my mind by any other act of British policy in India, a tract of country more than a hundred miles in length, upon the banks of the Ganges,—which had a few years before been a complete jungle, abandoned for ages to tigers and robbers,—covered with cultivated fields and villages, the latter of which were filled with old soldiers and their families, in a manner which showed their deep gratitude and attachment for the comfort and happiness they enjoyed. When we

they were struck with astonishment, and conceived the most unbounded confidence in a power which had thus for the first time set them the example of an upright and beneficent administration. Power in India is, even more than elsewhere in the world, founded on opinion; and the belief which gradually spread universally that the East India Company would, with perfect regularity and good faith, discharge all its engagements, formed a magnet of attraction which in the end drew almost all the strength and military virtue of the Peninsula to its standards. When minutely examined, it will be found that it was neither the military discipline, nor the scientific acquisitions, nor the political talents of the British which gave them the empire of India, for all these were matched in the ranks of their enemies, recruited and directed as they were by French officers; but their HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, which filled them with confidence in each other, and inspired the same reliance in the native powers; qualities which, though often over-reached in the outset by cunning and perfidy, generally prove more than a match for them in the end, and are destined ultimately to give to the Anglo-Saxon race the dominion of the globe.¹

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¹ Malcolm's Evidence before Parliament, quoted in Martin, ix. 35, 72, 74, 80. Sinclair, 47, 49.

The order and regularity which prevail both in the maintenance of the Indian army, and the administration of its provinces, have produced the greater impression on the natives of the East, from the con-

consider the immeasurable quantity of waste land in the dominions of the Company, it appears extraordinary that this plan has not been adopted in every part of British India, upon a more liberal and enlarged scale. The native soldiers of Bengal are almost all cultivators, and a reward of this nature was peculiarly calculated to attach them. The accomplishment of this object would add in an incalculable degree to the ties which we have upon the fidelity of those by whom our dominion in India is likely to be preserved or lost."—MALCOLM'S *British India*, 1st Ed. 526–528.

CHAP. trasts which they afford to the hideous scenes of
 LI. devastation and massacre, with which, from the
 1836. earliest times, conquest had been invariably attended

Contrast of
 the Com-
 pany's rule
 to the de-
 vastating
 Mahomme-
 dan sway
 which pre-
 ceded it.

in the plains of Hindostan. Throughout the whole period of the Mahomedan ascendancy in the south of India, the same enormities, the never-failing accompaniments of their presence and power, have occurred as in the northern provinces. The annals of this period give a succession of examples of the same unprovoked and devastating warfare; the same struggles for power among the nobles; the same unbridled lust of conquest in the government; the same perfidy, treason, and assassination, in the transactions of courts; the same massacres, oppression, and suffering, inflicted on the people. It was no unusual thing for sixty, eighty, or a hundred thousand persons of all ages and sexes to be put to death in a single day; great cities and even capitals were at once destroyed and delivered over tenantless to the alligator and the tiger; the treasures of the native princes were invariably filled with the plunder of their defenceless subjects. The system of Mahomedan exaction, at first under the name of contribution, permanently under that of revenue, being every where the same, with the power of rapacious armies to enforce it, the fate of the unhappy people was stamped with permanent wretchedness. Dreadful as were the devastations of war and conquest, they were as nothing compared to the lasting evils of military exaction and cupidity. There was no security whatever either for persons or property; the latter was always considered as the fair object of seizure wherever it was known to exist, and the mass of the people were subject to a state of poverty from which there was no escape—of violence and oppression, against which there was

no redress. Wars between the native or Mahomedan princes were perpetual, and their devastation extended not merely to the troops or armed men engaged, but to the whole population: weeping mothers, smiling infants at their breasts, were alike doomed to destruction; the march of troops might be tracked by hillocks of bodies and pyramids of human heads, burning villages, and desolated capitals. Under the Mahratta chiefs, who rose upon the decline of the Tartar dynasty, the same boundless rapacity continued, aggravated by the establishment of above twenty petty chiefs, each of whom exercised the right of making war on his own account; the work of devastation was perpetual—massacres, conquests, conflagrations, make up the history of India for the last eight hundred years. So universal had this oppression been, and so deeply rooted had its effects become in the habits of the people, that the display of property was universally avoided as the certain forerunner of additional exaction; property was invariably either buried or vested in diamonds, which admitted of easy concealment; of the vast and fertile plains of India not more than a fourth part was cultivated;* the population was hardly a fifth of what, under a more beneficent government, it might become; while the long-continued drain of the precious metals to the East, so well known to politicians of every age, indicated as clearly the precarious tenure of wealth which rendered concealment of property indispensable, as the recent and unparalleled occurrence of the *importation* of gold and silver from India, demonstrates the arrival of the era for the first time in Eastern history, when the necessity for hoarding has ceased,¹ and, under British protection, the

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¹ Rickard's India, i. 223, 234.
Orme, b. 1, c. 4. Martin, ix. 75, 86. Malte Brun, iii. 310, 314.

* See note K.

CHAP. natural desire for enjoyment can find an unrestrain-
 LI. ed vent among the natives of Hindostan.

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Wonderful
 nature of
 this empire,
 won by so
 small a
 force.

To complete the almost fabulous wonders of this oriental dominion, it only requires to be added, that it has been achieved by a mercantile company in an island of the Atlantic, possessing no territorial force at home: who merely took into their temporary pay, while in India, such parts of the English troops as could be spared from the contests of European ambition; who never had, at any period, thirty thousand British soldiers in their service, while their civil and military servants did not amount to six thousand; the number of persons under their auspices who proceed yearly to India, is never six hundred, and the total number of white inhabitants who reside among the two hundred millions of the sable population, is hardly eighty thousand! So enormous, indeed, is the disproportion between the British rulers and their native subjects, that it is literally true what the Hindoos say, that if every one of the followers of Bramah were to throw a handful of earth on the Europeans, they would be buried alive in the midst of their conquests.¹

¹ Sinclair,
 27. Martin,
 ix. 73, 78.

Desperate
 wars during
 which this
 empire has
 arisen in the
 East.

It augments our astonishment at the wisdom and beneficence of the Indian Government, that these marvellous conquests have been gained, and these lasting benefits conferred upon their subjects, during a period chequered by the most desperate wars; when the very existence of the English authority was frequently at stake, and the whole energies of Government were necessarily directed, in the first instance, to the preservation of their own national independence. During the growth of this astonishing prosperity in the Indian provinces, the Peninsula has been the seat of almost unceasing warfare. It

has witnessed the dreadful invasion of Hyder Ali; the two terrible wars with Tippoo Sultaun; the alterations of fortune, from the horrors of the Black Hole at Calcutta to the storming of Seringapatam; the long and bloody Mahratta wars; the Pindarree conflict; the Goorkha campaigns; the capture of Bhurtpore, and the murderous warfare in the Burmese empire. During the seventy years of its recent and unexampled rise, twelve long and bloody wars have been maintained; the military strength of eighty millions of men, headed and directed by French officers, has been broken, and greatness insensibly forced upon the East India Company, in the perpetual struggle to maintain its existence. The Indian Government has been but for a short time in the possession of its vast empire: twenty years only have elapsed since the Mahratta confederacy was finally broken; its efforts for a long period have been directed rather to the acquisition or defence of its territories than their improvement; and yet, during this anxious and agitated period, the progress of the sable multitude who are embraced in its rule, has been unexampled in wealth, tranquillity, and public felicity.

It was a maxim with the Romans, from which they never deviated, not to undertake two great wars at the same period; but rather to submit even to insults and losses for a time, than bring a second formidable enemy on their hands. Strongly as this principle is recommended, both by its intrinsic wisdom, and the example of that renowned people, it is not always capable of being carried into execution; and the British were frequently compelled in Hindostan, by the pressure of native confederacies, to sustain the most formidable foreign conflicts, at a

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Wars in which the empire was involved during the growth of the Indian power.

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time when the resources of the monarchy were all required to sustain the fortunes of the state in the contests of European ambition. At the same time that the East India Company, with their brave and faithful sepoys, were successfully combating the immense and disciplined hordes of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, the vast American colonies of England, directly ruled by Parliament, were severed from the empire without any considerable external aid, by the mere force of internal discontent; the dissatisfaction of Canada has more than once led to alarming collisions between the central Government and the native French population; and the West India islands have been restrained only by the inherent weakness of a slave colony from breaking off all connexion with the parent state. The first rise of our Indian empire was contemporaneous with the energetic administration of Chatham, and the glories of the Seven Years' War: the moral courage and decided conduct of Hastings saved it from destruction, at the very time when the weakness and corruptions of Lord North's administration occasioned the loss of the North American colonies: the contest with the Mysore Princes occurred at the same time as that with Revolutionary France, and "Citizen Tippoo" was not the least esteemed ally both of the Directory and the Consular Government: while the able and vigorous administration of Marquis Wellesley took place when Napoleon was commencing his immortal career in Europe; and Great Britain stretched forth her mighty arms into the Eastern hemisphere, and struck down the formidable confederacy of the Mahratta Princes, at the very moment when she was engaged in a desperate contest for her existence with the conqueror of continental Europe.

It is an interesting object of enquiry,—what was the form of government and system of foreign administration under which those astonishing triumphs were achieved by England in the Eastern hemisphere? Were these triumphs, as the Continental writers and the enemies of the East India Company assert, the result of a continual system of aggression on their part, like the wars of the Romans in ancient, or the conquests of Napoleon or of Russia in modern times; or were they, as their supporters maintain, forced upon them, much against their will, by native combinations and intrigues, which constantly gave them no other alternative but conquest or ruin?

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What were
the causes of
these extra-
ordinary
successes?

It is observed by a French annalist, and quoted with approbation by the greatest of modern historians, that “in a light of precaution all conquest must be ineffectual, unless it could be universal; since the increasing circle must be involved in a larger sphere of hostility.”¹ There can be no doubt that this remark is well founded, and that it sufficiently explains the experienced impossibility which the British, like all other conquering nations, have felt, of stopping short in their career when once commenced, before they had reached the limits assigned by nature to their further progress. From the time when they first became territorial sovereigns in the East, and a handful of Europeans ventured to rear the standard of independence among the sable multitudes of Asia, they had no alternative but to go on conquering, in a continually increasing circle, till they came to the snows of the Himalaya and the waves of the Indus. But, while the British were, unquestionably, equally with the Romans or Napoleon, exposed to this necessity, yet there was a wide difference in their relative situations, and the conse-

Conquest
was forced
upon the
British by
necessity,
not adopted
from incli-
nation.

¹ Gaillard,
quoted by
Gibbon, c.
49, ix. 187

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quent readiness with which they may be supposed to have embraced the career of conquest, thus in a manner forced upon them. Rome had an inexhaustible stock of vigour and capacity in the numerous bands of experienced soldiers whom she nourished in her bosom ; and from the moment that they left the frontiers of the republic, they subsisted at the expense of the allied or conquered states. France vomited forth a host of ardent, starving insolvents, to regenerate by plundering all mankind ; and, borrowing from her predecessors in ancient times the maxim that war should be made to maintain war, experienced not less relief to her finances than security to her institutions, by providing either by death or victory for such a multitude of turbulent defenders. But England had a very different task to execute when she became involved in the task of subjugating Hindostan. The centre of her strength was situated eight thousand miles from the banks of the Ganges ; a few thousand soldiers were all she could spare, for Eastern, from the pressure of European or the dangers of American warfare ; the power which was involved in Indian hostilities was a mere company of merchants, who looked only to a profitable return for their capital, or a rise in the value of their stock, and dreaded nothing so much as the cost of unproductive warfare : for thirty years after they were involved in hostilities, so far from effecting any conquests, they were barely able to defend their own mercantile establishments from destruction ; and every foot soldier they transported from Europe to Hindostan cost thirty, every horseman eighty, pounds sterling. In these circumstances, it requires no argument to demonstrate that foreign aggression could not, in the first instance at least,

have been voluntarily entered upon by the East India Company; and, in fact, the slightest acquaintance with their annals is sufficient to show that they stood in every instance, really, if not formally, on the defensive; and that it was in the overthrow of the coalitions formed for their destruction, or the necessary defence of the allies whom previous victory had brought to their side, that the real cause of all their Indian acquisitions is to be found.

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When the English, in the middle of the eighteenth century, quitted their commercial establishments at Calcutta and Madras to engage in a perilous contest with the native powers of India, the chief potentates with whom they were brought in contact, either as allies or as enemies, were the following:—In the northern parts of the Peninsula, on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges, which is properly called Hindostan, the once dreaded empire of Timour had sunk into the dust; and the Mogul emperors, on their throne at Delhi, could with difficulty retain even a nominal sway over the powerful rajahs in their vast dominions. The most considerable of these was the Rajah of Bengal and Berar, whose dominions extended over the vast and fertile plains watered by the Ganges, and who boasted of thirty millions of inhabitants who acknowledged his authority. The next formidable potentate on the eastern coast, between Calcutta and Madras, was the Nizam, whose dominions embraced eleven millions of souls, and whose seat of government was Hyderabad. Dread of the Mahrattas, who lay contiguous to this state on the west, and the Sultan of Mysore, who adjoined it on the south, rendered the court of Hyderabad the firm and faithful ally of the East India Company. In the southern part of the Peninsula,

Sketch of
the principal
Indian
powers
when the
British em-
pire arose.

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LI.

1836.

the dominions of the Rajah of Mysore extended over a vast extent on the high table-land of Mysore, three or four thousand feet above the sea, and from his strong fortress of Seringapatam he gave the law to sixteen millions of brave men. This dynasty, however, was supplanted, about the same time that the British dominion was established on the banks of the Ganges, by that of Hyder Ali, a soldier of fortune, who usurped his dominions, and added to them various lesser states in its vicinity, and soon communicated to the whole the vigour of enterprise, and the thirst for foreign dominion. With this great power serious and bloody wars were waged by the English for above thirty years.

Further to the north, and on the western coast, the Mahratta confederacy governed a territory of vast extent and boundless resources, though their predatory and restless habits, which engaged them in constant wars with their neighbours and each other, kept the country, in great part, desolate, and blighted the fairest gifts of nature. If united, the Mahratta chieftains could bring two hundred thousand horsemen, long the scourge of Northern and Central India, into the field; but their constant quarrels with each other rendered it improbable that this vast force would be concentrated against any external enemy. The most renowned of these chieftains were the Rajah of Berar, Scindiah, and Holkar; each of whom could muster sixty thousand men, almost entirely cavalry. They acknowledged allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confederation, and from his seat of government at Poonah, professed to execute treaties, and issue orders, binding on the whole confederacy; but his authority was little more than nominal, and each of these

powerful chieftains took upon himself, without scruple, to make war and conclude alliances on his own account. A vast number of lesser chieftains occupied the intervening country, from the northern frontier of the Mahratta states to the Indus, which was inhabited by different races, the Seiks and Rajpoots, famed in every period of Indian history for their martial qualities; while, in the great Alpine ridge which separated Hindostan from Tartary, the Goorkha and Nepaul tribes had found shelter, and maintained, amidst forest-steeps and narrow vales, the indomitable valour which, in every part of the world, seems to be the peculiar attribute of the mountain race.

CHAP.
LI.
1756.

The first charter of incorporation of the East India Company was granted by Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the sixteenth century; but it was not for a hundred and fifty years that they became territorial sovereigns. During the long period that intervened from their first origin till the middle of the eighteenth century, they painfully and industriously pursued a pacific career, neither aspiring after foreign conquest, nor accumulating any force to defend even their own factories from aggression. So humble were their fortunes at this period, that, in 1756, when the ferocious tyrant Surajee Dowlah invested and captured Calcutta, the destined Queen of the East, and now the abode of a million of inhabitants, the whole persons made prisoners amounted only to one hundred and forty-six! They were all confined, by his orders, in a dungeon not twenty feet square, with only one window, during an intensely hot night in June. Only twenty-four survived the dreadful suffocation which followed, among whom was Mr Hollwell, the governor; but the indignation excited

Origin and
early history
of the East
India Com-
pany.

1756.

Capture of
Calcutta by
Surajee
Dowlah.

CHAP. throughout England by that inhuman cruelty was
 LI. unexampled: all classes were animated by a gene-
 1756. rous desire to avenge the sufferings of their country-

¹Auber's India, i. 53,
 54. Martin, *Calcutta*, the glories of our Indian Empire may be
 vii. 10.
 Orme, ii. said to have taken their rise.¹

71, 76.

Calcutta re-
 taken.

Rise and
 great ex-
 ploits of
 Clive.

The East India Company, at that period, possessed an inconsiderable settlement at Madras, on the eastern coast of India, protected by a fort, called Fort-George, and to it the distressed merchants at Calcutta despatched a deputation, earnestly soliciting succour. Fortunately, at that period, the hostilities which were hourly expected with France had caused a considerable body of British troops to be assembled in that city, which, from its comparative vicinity to Pondicherry, the principal seat of French power in the East, was most exposed to danger, and a detachment of nine hundred Europeans, and fifteen hundred sepoys, was forthwith despatched to restore the British fortunes at the mouth of the Ganges. This inconsiderable band seemed little qualified to combat the vast armies of the Mogul Nabob on the plains of Bengal; but it was under the direction of one of those heroes who appear at distant intervals in history, whose master minds acquire such an ascendancy over mankind, as almost to command fortune; and from whose exertions, in circumstances the most adverse, unhoped for triumphs often proceed. In the end of December 1756, COLONEL CLIVE appeared in the mouth of the Ganges, defeated the Mogul detachment sent to oppose his landing, retook Calcutta, and, disregarding the timid expostulation of the council, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs. It soon appeared how essential the guidance of a chief of such personal and moral courage was to the sal-

vation of our Indian possessions at that critical juncture. Surajee Dowlah in a few weeks returned with increased forces; but Clive stormed his camp and struck such terror into his troops, that a treaty was concluded, by which Calcutta was restored to the Company, and permission granted to *fortify* it. From that hour, the territorial empire of England in India may be said to have been founded.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1757.

¹ Orme, ii.
127, 137.
Auber, i.
60, 61.

Shortly after this important event, intelligence arrived in India of the commencement of hostilities between France and England, and the Government at Calcutta received advices that Surajee Dowlah was preparing to join the former with all his forces. Clive instantly took his determination; he resolved to raise up Meer Jaffier, a renowned military leader in Bengal, to the viceroyship of that province, in the hopes that, owing his elevation to the British, he would be less disposed to join their enemies than the Nabob, who was already their inveterate enemy. Such a treaty was immediately concluded with Meer Jaffier, on terms highly favourable to the English; and shortly after hostilities commenced, by Colonel Clive marching with two thousand men against the French fort of Chandernagore, on the Hooghley, sixteen miles above Calcutta. This fort was soon taken, and several other forts reduced. At length, on the 22d June, Clive, with his little army, then raised to 900 Europeans, 2000 sepoy, and six guns, came up with the vast array of Surajee, consisting of fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, under French officers. For the first and last time in his life, Clive called a council of war: the proverb held good, and the council declined to fight;* but

Dethrone-
ment of Su-
rajee Dowlah
by Clive.

22d June,
1757.

* Clive stated in his evidence before the House of Commons,—“ This was the only council of war I ever called, and if I had abided by its decision, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company.” The

CHAP.
LL

1757.

¹ Orme, ii.
171, 179.
Mills, iii.
165, 169.
Martin, viii.
17.

the English General consulted only his own heroic character, and led his troops against the enemy. The odds were fearful, but valour and decision can sometimes supply the want of numbers: the British were sheltered, in the early part of the day, by a high bank from the cannon shot of the enemy; treachery and disaffection reigned in their ranks, and before Clive led his troops in their turn to the attack, the victory was already gained. The Nabob fled on his swiftest elephant; Clive remained master of the Indian camp, artillery, and baggage; and the fate of a kingdom as great as France, containing thirty millions of inhabitants, was determined with the loss of seventy men.¹

Acquisition
of territory
by the Com-
pany, and
defeat of the
Mogul Em-
peror.

The British ascendancy on the Ganges was now secured; Meer Jaffier, as the reward of his treachery, was saluted by the conqueror as Nabob of Bengal and Bahar; Surajee was soon made prisoner and slain, and his successor paid for the foreign aid which had gained him the throne, by the grant of an ample territory around Calcutta and the immediate payment of L.800,000 as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Mogul Emperor, alarmed at this formidable irruption of strangers into one of the provinces of his mighty dominions, made an attempt to expel the intruders, and reinstate the former same truth may be observed in all ages, and in all transactions civil and military, where vigour and decision are requisite to success. The shelter of numbers is never sought but by those who have not the moral courage to act on their own conviction; true intrepidity of mind never seeks to divide responsibility; in the multitude of the counsellors there may be safety, but it is safety to the counsellors, not the counselled.—See CLIVE'S *Evidence before House of Commons*, given in MILL'S *App.* No. vi., and iii. 166.

He assigned the following reasons for his treaty with Meer Jaffier to dethrone Surajee Dowlah. "That after Chandernagore was attacked, he saw clearly they could not stop there, *but must go on*; that having established themselves by force and not by the consent of the Nabob,

dynasty on the throne ; but he was defeated by Meer Jaffier, aided by the Company's forces ; the former was soon after deposed in consequence of his weak and tyrannical disposition, and succeeded by his natural son, Meer Cossim : the Moguls were finally routed by Major Carnac, and the French auxiliaries made prisoners ; and the British proceeded from one acquisition to another, till, after several intrigues and revolutions in the native Governments of Bengal, sometimes effected by the British influence, sometimes forced upon them by the inconstancy of the Mahommedan princes, a great battle was fought at Buxar, in which the Moguls were totally defeated with the loss of six thousand killed, and one hundred and fifty guns.¹

CHAP.

LI.

1760.

22d Feb.

1760.

15th June,

1761.

23d Oct.

1764.

¹ Orme, ii,

347, 365.

Auber. i.

90, 94.

This important victory decided the fate of Bengal : Lord Clive, who had returned to Europe in 1760, soon after was sent out again to Hindostan, and, foreseeing the necessity of the East India Company assuming the government of the whole of that province, if they would preserve their footing on the banks of the Ganges, insisted as an indispensable preliminary that its sovereignty should be ceded to the English power. The court of Delhi was too much humbled to be enabled to resist ; and after a short negotiation, the Mogul Emperor signed a he would endeavour to drive them out again ; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, and some upon record ; that he suggested, in consequence, the necessity of a revolution, and Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the Nabob instead of Surajee Dowlah." This is precisely the language and principles of Napoleon ; this necessity of *advancing* to avoid being destroyed, is the accompaniment of power founded on force in all ages. The British power in India was driven on to greatness by the same necessity which impelled the European Conqueror to Moscow and the Kremlin ; it is the prodigious difference in the use they made of their power, even when acquired by violence, which, hitherto at least, has saved them from the fate which so soon overtook him.—CLIVE'S *Evidence, ut supra*, and MILL, iii. 162.

Cession of
all Bengal
and Bahar
to the Eng-
lish.

CHAP. treaty, by which he resigned all sovereign claims over
 LL. Bengal, and part of Bahar and Orissa, in consider-
 1765. ation of an annuity of L.325,000 a-year; Surajee
 24th June, Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude, was restored to all his
 1765. dominions, on condition of being taken under British
 protection, and paying a tribute for the support of
 the subsidiary force stationed in his capital; while
 the claims of the family of Meer Jaffier were adjusted
 by the settlement of a pension of L.660,000 on his
 natural son. Thus, in the short space of ten years,
 was the English power on the Ganges raised from the
 lowest point of depression to an unexampled height
 of prosperity and glory; the refugees from an insig-
 nificant mud-fort at Calcutta, were invested with the
 sovereignty over 150,000 square miles, and thirty
 millions of men; the frightful dungeon of the Black
 Hole was exchanged for the dominion of the richest
 part of India; and, in the extremity of human suf-
 fering, the foundations laid of an empire destined in
 half a century to overshadow the throne of Baber
 and Aurengzebe.¹

¹ Auber, i.
 90, 94, 119,
 149. Orme,
 ii. 347, 365.
 Martin, 21,
 22.

Origin and
 progress of
 the Madras
 Presidency.

While the genius of Clive, supported by the com-
 manding spirit of Chatham and the resolutions of
 the local government, was thus spreading the British
 dominion on the banks of the Ganges, the English
 had to sustain a still more obstinate contest in the
 southern part of India. MADRAS, on the coast of
 Coromandel, was, so early as the year 1653, invested
 with the dignity of a presidency, though at that
 period its garrison was limited by an express reso-
 lution of the Court of Directors, to *ten* men. This
 insignificant town was the object of fierce contests
 between the English and French in the middle of
 the eighteenth century; the war which broke out
 in Europe in 1744, was as warmly contested in the

east as the west; and a strong French military and naval force besieged and took it in 1746, its weak garrison of two hundred soldiers being allowed to retire by capitulation. Clive, then a clerk in a mercantile house at Madras, first embraced the profession of arms at this siege, and after the capture of the town, escaped in the disguise of a Moor to Fort St David, a fortress sixteen miles distant, where the remnant of the British successfully made a stand, and the talents of the young soldier materially contributed to the defeat which followed, of the French, seventeen hundred strong, by two hundred British soldiers. Madras continued in possession of the French till the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749, when it was restored to the English dominion. Although, however, the direct war between England and France was terminated by this treaty, yet the mutual jealousy of these powers led to the continuance of a smothered and ill-disguised hostility in the East; the rival potentates struggled for the ascendancy in the councils of the Carnatic, a vast district, five hundred miles in length and a hundred in breadth, stretching along the coast of Coromandel, comprising the dominions and dependencies of the Nabob of Arcot. For several years the skill and address of M. Dupleix, the French commander, prevailed; but at length the daring courage of Colonel Clive, and the diplomatic ability of Major Lawrence, counterbalanced his influence. This, however, was more than counterbalanced in the Deccan, where M. Du Bussy had gained firm possession of an extensive district, six hundred miles in length, and yielding a million sterling of revenue for the French crown.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1746.

7th Sept.

1746.

8th Nov.

¹ Martin,
viii. 42, 43.

Orme, i.

360, 420.

Auber, i.

48, 53.

No sooner had hostilities broken out a second time in Europe, between France and England, in

- CHAP. 1756, than the cabinet of Versailles made a strenu-
 LI. ous effort to root out the British settlements on the
 1758. coast of Coromandel. The expedition fitted out
 Sieges of from Pondicherry, the chief French stronghold, for
 Madras and this purpose, consisted of eight thousand men, of
 Pondi- whom more than half were Europeans, under Lally ;
 cherry by the French and Eng- and after capturing Fort St David, to which the
 lish. British had retired on the former war, besieged Ma-
 1st June, dras in form, and the garrison, consisting of eighteen
 1758. hundred European and two thousand sepoy troops,
 had to sustain a variety of desperate assaults, almost
 18th Aug. the seige was raised, when the brave garrison were
 1758. nearly reduced to extremities, by the arrival of the
 English fleet with six hundred fresh troops. Lally
 retired precipitately, and the British immediately
 carried the war into the enemies' territories. Colonel,
 afterwards Sir Eyre Coote, invested and took the
 important fortress of Wandimash in the Carnatic ;
 and Lally, having collected all his forces to regain
 that stronghold, was met and totally defeated by
 Jan. 12th, Coote, with 6000 men, who made General Bussy
 1760. and several of the ablest French officers prisoners,
 and took twenty pieces of cannon. This great vic-
 tory proved decisive of the fate of the French power
 April, 1760. in India. Lally was soon after shut up in his capi-
 tal, after losing all the detached forts which he held
 in the province ; he was closely blockaded by sea
 and land by the victorious armies and fleets of Eng-
 land ; and at length, after a protracted seige of eight
 months, in which the gallant Frenchman exerted all
 the resources of courage and skill to avert his fate,
 his resources were exhausted, he was compelled to
 capitulate, and in the middle of January the British
 standards were hoisted on the towers of Pondicherry.¹

¹ Orme, ii.
 480, 724.
 Martin, viii.
 43, 44.
 Auber, i.
 102, 104.

The downfall of the French power in India first brought the English into contact with a still more formidable enemy than the ambitious rivals who had so long disputed with them the palm of European ascendancy. On the high table-land of Mysore, elevated three or four thousand feet above the level of Madras, are to be found a race of men, very different from the inhabitants of the level plains of India, breathing a purer air, hardened by a cooler temperature, inured to more manly occupations. The inhabitants of Mysore are bold, restless, and impetuous, roving in disposition, predatory in habit, warlike in character, whose fierce poverty had for ages "insulted the plenty of the vales beneath." HYDER ALI was originally a private soldier in the army of the Rajah of this district, and he received the command of three hundred men, in consequence of his gallantry at a siege in one of the hill forts of a neighbouring Rajah. He was one of those domineering characters whom nature appears to have formed to command, and who, in troubled times, so often make their way, despite every obstacle, to the head of affairs. So illiterate as to be unable either to read or write, he was yet possessed of the ambition to desire, the daring to seize, and the capacity to wield supreme power; and the natural sagacity of his mind more than supplied what, in others, is the fruit of lengthened study, or the dear-bought result of the experience of the world.* Active, indefatigable, and intrepid, he fearlessly incurred danger and underwent fatigue in the pursuit

CHAP.
LI.

1760.

Rise and
character of
Hyder Ali.

* He was entirely ignorant of arithmetic; but such was the power he possessed of mental calculation, that he could outstrip, in arriving at a result even of complicated figures, the most skilful arithmeticians; and none of his followers could deceive him in his estimate of the amount of the plunder which should be brought into his treasury.—MILL, iii. 407.

CHAP. of ambition : liberal of money, affable in manner,
 LI. discerning in character, he soon won the affections
 1762. of his followers, and attracted to his standards that
 host of adventurers who, in the East, are ever ready
 to swell the trains of conquest : faithless in disposi-
 tion, regardless of oaths, unscrupulous in action, he
 was distinguished by that singular mixture of great
 and wicked qualities which, in every age, from the
 days of Cæsar to those of Napoleon, has marked the
 character of those who raise themselves amidst blood
 and tumult from a private station to the command
 of their country. He appeared at that era, ever so
 favourable to usurpers, when the established govern-
 ment is falling to pieces from the weakness and vices
 of its possessors, and the experienced evils of anar-
 chy at once prepare the throne for an audacious sol-
 dier, and induce men to range themselves in willing
 multitudes under his banners. His career began as
 a subaltern at the head of two hundred foot and fifty
 horse ; but he was soon vested with the command of
 the important fortress of Dindigul, and rapidly at-
 tracted numbers to his standard, by the success of
 his operations and the boundless license which he
 permitted to his followers in plundering the adjacent
 territories. He experienced many reverses, but rose
 superior to them all, and went on from one acquisi-
 tion to another, till he had entirely subverted the
 ancient government, seized the great commercial city
 of Bednore, with its treasures, estimated at twelve
 millions sterling, placed himself on the throne of
 Seringapatam, and established his authority over al-
 most the whole southern parts of the Indian Penin-
 sula.¹

¹ Wilks'
 Historical
 Sketches,
 240, 449,
 472. Mill.
 iii. 404,
 417. Mar-
 tin, viii. 46.
 47. Auber,
 i. 112, 115,

Hyder had established amicable relations with the French in the Carnatic, during the period of their

influence in India; but the early destruction of their power after the commencement of his importance prevented any rupture for a number of years from taking place. At length, however, the growing importance of the Mysore usurper on the one hand, and the preponderating strength of the Company on the other, necessarily led these two great powers into collision; hostilities with Hyder were resolved on, and as a precautionary measure, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded with the Nizam, a Rajah whose dominions were more immediately exposed to his incursions, by which Lord Clive engaged to support him, if attacked, with a considerable body of European and sepoy troops. The Directors at home, less impressed than the authorities on the spot with the indispensable necessity of advancing in power, if they would avoid destruction, evinced the utmost repugnance at this treaty, and distinctly foretold, that if offensive wars were once engaged in, the British would be drawn on from one conquest to another, till they could find no security but in the subjection of the whole, and would be involved in destruction by the very magnitude of their acquisitions.* But ere their pacific instructions could reach their destination, the die was already cast, and the dreadful war with Hyder Ali had commenced.

CHAP.
LI.

1766.

First rupture between
the British
and Hyder.12th Nov.
1766.July, 1767.
Mill. iii.
414, 470.
Auber, i.
249.

* "If once we pass the bounds of defensive warfare, we shall be led from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose you the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan." And again, in another despatch, "We utterly disapprove and condemn offensive wars." The same principles were constantly followed by the Court of Directors, both during the administration of Warren Hastings and Marquis Wellesley; but these great statesmen early perceived that it was in vain for a handful of foreigners to stop short in the career of conquest, and that, like Napoleon, they were constantly placed in the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.—*Directors' Despatch*, 22d April, 1768; AUBER, i. 223-226.

CHAP. LI.
 1767. First cam-
 paigns with
 him, and
 early disas-
 ters.

Aug. 1767. 26th Sept.
 1767.

1768.

Within a few weeks after its opening, the British were rewarded for their aggression by the defection of their faithless ally the Nizam, who deserted to the Mysore chief with all his forces; and at the same time intelligence was received that he had accommodated all his differences in the north with the Mahrattas, so that the confederacy which the English had projected against Hyder was now turned against themselves. The united forces of Hyder and the Nizam, forty thousand strong, approached Madras, and ravaged the country up to the very gates of the fortress; and, though Colonel Smith, with the British and sepoy troops, defeated them with the loss of sixty pieces of cannon, want of cavalry prevented him from obtaining any decisive success in the face of the innumerable squadrons of the Mysore horse. The hostile incursion was repeated in the following year, when he laid waste the Company's territory in so savage a manner, that, like the countries desolated by Timour or Gengis Khan, nothing remained but bleached skeletons and smoking ruins to attest where the dwellings of man had been. In the midst of these successes, Hyder opened a communication with the French authorities at Pondicherry, to whom he announced the approaching destruction of the English power in the Peninsula; while the East India Directors at home, panic-struck by the magnitude of the disasters already incurred, and the interminable prospect of wars and difficulties which opened before them, renewed in earnest terms the necessity of resuming the now almost hopeless prospect of effecting an accommodation. At length he struck a decisive blow. Sending all his heavy cannon and baggage home from Pondicherry, which during his incursions he

had twice visited to confer with the French, he put himself at the head of six thousand of his swiftest horse, drew the English army by a series of able movements to a considerable distance from Madras, and then, by a rapid march of a hundred and twenty miles in three days, interposed between them and that capital, and approached to Mount St Thomé, in its immediate vicinity. The council were filled with consternation: although the fortress could have held out till the arrival of the English army, the open town and villas in its vicinity were exposed to immediate destruction; and they gladly embraced the overtures of accommodation which, like Napoleon, he made in the moment of his greatest success, and concluded peace on the invader's terms. By this treaty it was provided that both parties should make a mutual restitution of their conquests, and that in case of attack they should afford each other mutual aid and assistance.¹

CHAP.

LI.

1769.

April, 1769.

Mill. iii.

414, 424.

Auber, i.

249, 250.

The principal object of Hyder in concluding thus suddenly this important treaty, was to obtain for his usurped throne the countenance of the English power: the same motive which was Napoleon's inducement, immediately after obtaining the consular power, in making proposals of peace to Great Britain. He soon after, accordingly, made a requisition for the junction of a small body of English soldiers to his forces, in order to demonstrate to the native powers the reality of the alliance. The Company's affairs received so serious a shock by this inglorious treaty, that their stock fell at once sixty per cent. Hyder, some years afterwards, became involved in wars with his powerful northern neighbours, the Mahrattas, in which he was at first reduced to great straits, and he made an earnest requisition for assist-

Transactions in the Carnatic, down to the renewal of the war with Hyder in 1780.

CHAP. ^{LI.} ance to the Company in terms of the treaty of 1769 ;
 1776. but the Madras Council contrived, on one pretence
 July 1776. or another, to elude the demand, to the inconve-
 niences of which they were now fully awakened.
 These repeated refusals excited great jealousy in the
 breast of the Mysore chief, the more especially as he
 was well aware that the English had, in the interval
 since the cessation of hostilities, greatly augmented
 their army, especially in cavalry, in which it had
 formerly experienced so lamentable a deficiency, and
 that they had now thirty thousand well-disciplined
 men in the Presidency. Accordingly, in June 1780,
 he descended into the Carnatic, at the head of the
 most powerful and best appointed army which ever
 had appeared in India, consisting of twenty thousand
 regular infantry, and seventy thousand horse, of
 whom nearly one half were disciplined in the Euro-
 pean method. So suddenly, and with such secrecy,
 were his measures taken, that the dreadful torrent
 was in motion before the English were so much as
 aware of its existence ; and the Government of
 Madras were apprised of the approach of the enemy
 for the first time by vast columns of smoke rising
 from burning villages in the Carnatic, which, con-
 verging from different directions, threatened to wrap
 the capital in conflagration.¹

¹ Martin,
viii. 47, 48.
Auber, i.
540, 579.
Mill. iv.
145, 153.

The success of Hyder in this tremendous inroad
 was almost equal to that of Surajee Dowlah, in the
 Great suc-
 cesses of
 Hyder in the
 Carnatic. attack upon Calcutta twenty-four years before. With
 a degree of daring and military skill which rivalled
 that of Napoleon himself, he interposed with his
 whole forces between the two English armies, the
 one commanded by Colonel Baillie, the other by Sir
 Hector Monro, who were approaching each other,
 and only six miles distant ; overwhelmed the former,

10th Sept.,
1780.

when caught in ambuscade, by the multitude and vehement charges of his horse, literally trampling the English infantry under foot with his terrible squadrons and ponderous elephants,* and compelled the latter to retreat, and leave open the whole fortresses of the Carnatic to his attacks. The Indian chief was not slow in following up this extraordinary tide of success: Arcot was speedily reduced; the whole open country ravaged, and siege laid to Wandimash, Vellore, Chingleput, and all the strongholds of the Carnatic. Parties of the Mysorean horse approached to the gates of Madras; the whole villas in its vicinity were deserted, and preparations were even made in the presidency for crossing the surf at the bar and abandoning the Carnatic for ever.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1780.

3d Nov.
1780.¹ Mill, iv.
168, 171.
Martin, viii.
48, 49.
Auber, i.
580, 582.

It is invariably on a crisis of this kind that the really great acquire an ascendancy: the timid shrink

* The valour displayed on this occasion by Colonel Baillie with his little band of followers, consisting only of 400 European and 2000 sepoys, never was exceeded even in the glorious fields of Indian warfare. Surrounded on all sides by the countless squadrons of Hyder's horse, torn in pieces by a terrible fire from sixty pieces of cannon, borne down by the weight and fury of the armed elephants, they yet long resisted with such vigour as more than once balanced the fortunes of the day, and threw Hyder into such perplexity that, but for the advice of Lally, he would have drawn off in despair. The accidental explosion of two ammunition waggons early deprived them of their reserve ammunition; but, nevertheless, they continued the combat with heroic resolution to the last, forming a square which repelled thirteen different attacks of the Mysore horse, the men raising themselves, in many cases, from the ground to resist the enemy with their bayonets, while the officers kept them at bay with their swords. Two hundred were made prisoners, for the most part desperately wounded; including the commander himself and his principal officers. They owed their lives to the humane interposition of Lally and the other French officers in the service of Hyder, who also did all in their power to mitigate the horrors of the captivity, more terrible far than death, which they afterwards underwent in the Mysorean dungeons.—*See Narrative of the Sufferings of those who fell into Hyder's hands after the battle of Conjeveram, Sept. 10, 1780.*—*Mem. of War in Asia*, ii. 102–188.—MILL, iv. 185–166.

CHAP.
LI.

1780.

Firm conduct of Warren Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote re-establishes affairs.

Nov. 7th,
1780.

1st July
1781.

from responsibility, the multitude clamour for submission ; the brave and intrepid stand forth as the deserving leaders of mankind. The Council of Madras in the last extremity applied to the Government of Calcutta for aid ; and WARREN HASTINGS was at its head. Instantly summoning up all his resources, he rose superior to the danger ; dispatched Sir Eyre Coote, with five hundred Europeans, and an equal number of sepoy, to the succour of Madras, and superseding the Council, whose improvidence or incapacity had brought the public fortunes to such a pass, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs both in his own and the sister presidency. Nothing could exceed the disastrous state of affairs when Sir Eyre Coote now took the field against Hyder. His whole force did not exceed seven thousand men, of whom only one thousand seven hundred were Europeans ; and he had to oppose above an hundred thousand enemies, of whom eighty thousand were admirable horse, and three thousand French auxiliaries who had recently landed from Europe, in hopes, by the aid of so renowned a chieftain, of restoring their fallen fortunes in the East. By a conduct, however, at once prudent and intrepid, he succeeded in re-establishing affairs in the Carnatic : the sieges of Wandimash, Vellore, and the other beleaguered fortresses, were raised by Hyder, at the approach of this new and more formidable enemy ; and at length, after a variety of operations attended with various success, a decisive battle was fought between the opposing forces on the sea-coast near Porto Novo, where the English had proceeded, in order to stop the incursions of the Mysoreans in the direction of Cuddalore. The contest lasted six hours, and success was, for a long period, so nearly

balanced, that the whole reserves of the English were brought into action; but at length, by incredible exertions, Hyder's forces were repulsed at all points, and driven off the field in such confusion, that if Sir Eyre Coote had possessed an adequate force of cavalry, he would have been involved in total ruin.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1781.

¹ Mill, iv.
224, 228.
Auber, i.
624, 626.

This great success, however, was balanced by a bloody action, fought on the very ground where Baillie had so recently been defeated, in which, though neither party could boast decisive success, the English, upon the whole, were worsted, and Hyder, as they retreated during the night, had good ground for proclaiming it to all India as a decided victory. The affairs of Madras were now reduced to extremities; Lord Macartney, who had just arrived there as Governor, in vain made proposals of peace to the victorious chief; another murderous and indecisive action took place in the end of September; there was not a rupee in the treasury, nor the means of fitting out an additional soldier; the supreme Government at Calcutta was as much straitened in finances, in consequence of a burdensome war with the Mahrattas, as the Madras presidency, and nothing but the unconquerable firmness and energy of Mr Hastings' administration preserved the affairs of the Company from total ruin. By his indefatigable efforts the resources of Lord Macartney were so much augmented that his lordship was enabled, in November, to undertake the important enterprise of attacking Negabatam, a stronghold of Hyder's on the sea-coast, which gave him an easy entry into the Carnatic; and with such vigour were the operations conducted, that in a few weeks the place was taken and the garrison of seven thousand men made pri-

27th Aug.

Further disasters stemmed by the energy of Mr Hastings. Death of Hyder.

Aug. 3d.

28th Sept.

12th Nov.
1781.

CHAP. soners. The British, upon this, regained their su-
 LI.
 1781. periority over the enemy in the field, and Sir Eyre
 3d Dec. Coote, taking advantage of it, pushed on and relieved
 Vellore, to the infinite joy of the garrison, who had
 been sixteen months closely blockaded, and were then
 reduced to the last extremities. Sir Eyre Coote,
 whose valour and conduct had done so much towards
 the re-establishment of affairs in the Carnatic, soon
 after reduced Chittor and drove the enemy entirely out
 of the Tanjore. He afterwards fought, with chequered
 success, several other actions with his old antago-
 nist Hyder. Colonel Brathwaite with two thousand
 17th Feb. men, was totally defeated by TIPPOO SAIB, Hyder's
 1782. son, at the head of ten thousand horse and twenty
 pieces of cannon, on the banks of the Cole river in the
 Tanjore, and the humane interposition of Lally and
 the French auxiliary officers alone preserved the pri-
 soners from destruction ; while, after a bloody action,
 Hyder in person was repulsed by Sir Eyre Coote
 near Arnee, a few months after. This was the last
 contest between these two redoubtable antagonists ;
 Sir Eyre was soon after obliged by bad health to re-
 turn to Calcutta, and Hyder, in the midst of the
 most active operations, in conjunction with the French
 fleet of twelve sail of the line, which had arrived off
 the coast, was summoned to another world, and died
 at Chitore at the advanced age of eighty-two.¹

¹ Auber, i.
 600, 631.
 Mill, iv.
 210, 225.

Peace had been concluded between the Bombay
 government and the Mahrattas in the May preced-
 ing, which enabled the governor-general to assist the
 Madras presidency with large succours ; and offensive
 operations were commenced, at all points, against
 Tippoo, who had succeeded to his father's dominions,
 and all his animosity against the English govern-
 ment. The contest, however, was still extremely

War with
 Tippoo, and
 invasion of
 Mysore
 from Bom-
 bay.

equally balanced; and the government at Madras was far from exhibiting the unanimity and vigour which the importance of the occasion demanded. In vain Lord Macartney, who was aware of the slender tie by which oriental armies were held together, urged General Stuart, who had succeeded Sir Eyre Coote in the command of the army, to take advantage of the consternation produced by the death of Hyder and absence of Tippoo, and instantly attack the enemy. The precious moments were lost: dissension broke out between the civil and military authorities, and Tippoo joined the army and established himself on his father's throne in the beginning of January. He was recalled, however, to the centre of his dominions, obliged to evacuate all his father's conquests in the Carnatic, and abandon and blow up Arcot, in consequence of the appearance of a formidable enemy in the vitals of his power. The Bombay government, having considerable disposable forces, in consequence of the Mahratta peace, had detached a powerful body, under Colonel Humberstone and General Matthews, into the Mysore country. These enterprising officers carried Onore by storm, on the sea-coast, mounted the great pass called the Hussain-gurry Ghaut, four thousand feet high, surmounted by a road slowly ascending through cliffs and precipices for five miles, drove the enemy from all the batteries and forts hitherto deemed impregnable, by which it was defended, and rapidly advancing along the table-land of Mysore, at the summit made themselves masters of the rich city of Bednore, with a vast treasure, by capitulation; carried Ananpore and Bangalore by assault, and spread terror throughout the whole centre of Tippoo's dominions.¹

CHAP.
LI.

1782.

Dec. 1782.

Jan. 4th,
1783.¹ Mill, iv.
224, 231.
Auber, iv.
624, 631.

This formidable irruption completely relieved the

CHAP. Carnatic, which had hitherto been almost exclusively
 LI. the seat of hostilities, from the invasion by which it
 1783. had been for a series of years so cruelly ravaged, and,
 Early suc- by depriving Tippoo of the treasure at Bednore,
 cess and final amounting to above a million sterling, seriously
 disasters of crippled his power; but it led, in the first instance,
 the expedi- to a cruel and unexpected reverse. The magnitude
 tion. of the spoil taken at Bednore threw the apple of
 discord among the victors: General Matthews re-
 fused to devote any portion of it to the pay of the
 troops, though they were above eighteen months in
 arrears; Colonel Humberstone and several of the lead-
 ing officers threw up their commands, and returned to
 lay their complaints before the government at Bom-
 bay; the army was ruinously dispersed to occupy
 all the towns which had been taken; and, in the midst
 of this scene of cupidity and dissension, Tippoo sud-
 denly appeared amongst them at the head of fifty
 thousand men. Matthews, with two thousand in-
 fantry, was defeated before Bednore, and soon after
 forced to surrender in that town. The prisoners
 were put in irons, marched off like felons to a dread-
 ful imprisonment in the dungeons of Mysore; the
 whole towns taken by the British, in the high coun-
 try, were regained; and the remnant of their forces,
 driven down the passes, threw themselves into the
 important fortress of Mangalore on the sea coast be-
 low the Ghauts, where they were immediately in-
 vested by the victorious troops of the Sultan.¹

¹ Mill, iv.
 232, 239.
 Auber, i.
 629, 632.

Siege of
 Mangalore
 raised by the
 British in-
 vasion of
 Mysore.

The governments of Madras and Bombay, alive to
 the vital importance of withdrawing Tippoo's atten-
 tion from this siege by diversions in other parts of his
 dominions, put in motion two different expeditions
 from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, into the
 country of Coimbatore, in the centre of his dominions,

and endeavoured to stir up a civil war there by supporting the cause of the deposed Rajah of Mysore whom Hyder had dispossessed. This project proved entirely successful. Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the southern army, acted with great vigour and intelligence, reduced Palacatcherry, one of the strongest places in India, commanding an important pass on the sea-coast, made himself master of Coimbatore on the high road to Seringapatam, the centre of the Sultan's power, and menaced that capital itself. At the same time the northern army made considerable progress on the other side, and both, converging towards the capital, had the conquest of Seringapatam full in view. The superiority of the British forces in the field was now apparent; the conclusion of a peace between France and England, of which intelligence had lately arrived in India, had deprived Tippoo of all hope of European aid, and the gallantry of the brave garrison of Mangalore had baffled all the efforts of his vast army, and exposed them to dreadful losses by sickness during the rainy months. Discouraged by so many untoward circumstances, the bold spirit and inveterate hostility of the Sultan at length yielded: after several insincere attempts at an accommodation, a real negotiation was set on foot in the close of 1783; and, though the pacification came too late to save Mangalore, the brave garrison of which, after sustaining a siege of seven months against sixty thousand men, had at length been forced by famine to capitulate, on the honourable terms of marching to the nearest English territories with all their arms and accoutrements; yet it was in the end concluded, and delivered the English from the most formidable war they have ever sustained for the empire of the East.¹ On the 11th of

CHAP.
LI.

1783.

13th Nov.

26th Nov.

Which leads
to a peace.March 11,
1784.¹ Mill. iv.
239, 247.
Mem. of late
war in Asia,
i. 286, 403.Auber, i.
631, 641.

CHAP. March, 1784, peace was concluded on the equitable
LI. terms of a mutual restitution of conquests.

1784.

Change in-
troduced by
Tippoo in
the Indian
armies.

It is seldom, says Gibbon, that the father and the son, he who has borne the weight and he who has been brought up in the lustre of the diadem, exhibit equal capacity for the administration of affairs. Tippoo inherited from his father all his activity and vigour, all his cruelty and perfidy, and if possible, more than his hatred and inveteracy against the English; but he was by no means his equal either in military genius, or in the capacity for winning the affections and commanding the respect of mankind. Above all, he was not equally impressed as his great predecessor with the expedience of combating the invaders with the national arms of the East, and wearing out the disciplined and invincible battalions of Europe by those innumerable horsemen in whom, from the earliest times, the real strength of Asia has consisted. Almost all Hyder's successes were gained by his cavalry; it was when severed from his infantry and heavy artillery, and attended only by a few flying guns, that his forces were most formidable; and it augments our admiration of the firmness and discipline with which the British and sepoy regiments under Coote withstood his assaults, when we recollect that they had to resist for days and weeks together, under the rays of a tropical sun, the incessant charges of a cavalry, rivalling that of the Parthians in swiftness, equalling that of the Mamelukes in daring, approaching to that of the Tartars in numbers. But it was the very excess of the admiration which their great qualities awakened among the native powers which proved the ruin of Tippoo, and in the end gave the British the empire of the East. The officers of the Mysore court

were so much struck by the extraordinary spectacle of a few thousand disciplined men successfully resisting the thundering charges of thirty or forty thousand admirable horsemen, that they conceived that the secret lay not in their character but their tactics ; and naturally enough imagined, that if they could give to their own numbers and daring the discipline and steadiness of Europe, they would prove irresistible.

CHAP.
LI.

1785.

Hence the general adoption, not only in the Mysore but the other Indian states, of the European tactics, arms, and discipline ; a change of all others the most ruinous to their arms, and which, in subsequent times, has proved fatal to the independence of Turkey. Every people will find safety best in their own peculiar and national forces ; the adoption of the tactics and military systems of another race, will generally share the fate of the transplantation of a constitution to a different people ; it was neither by imitating the Roman legions that the Parthians defeated the invasions of Crassus and Julian ; nor by rivalling the heavy armed crusaders of Europe, that Saladin baffled the heroism of Richard ; nor by vanquishing the French infantry, that Alexander forced Napoleon into the Moscow retreat. Light horse ever have been, and ever will be, the main strength of the Asiatic monarchies, and when they rely on such defenders, and they are conducted by competent skill, they have hitherto proved invincible. It is the adoption of the system of European warfare which has uniformly proved their ruin. Hyder's horse, like the Parthian or Scythian cavalry, might be repulsed, but they could not be destroyed ; the European squares toiled in vain after their fugitive squadrons, and, when worn out by incessant marching, found themselves enveloped by an indefatigable and long invisible

Its ruinous
effects on
the inde-
pendence of
the native
powers.

CHAP.
LI.

1785.

enemy. But Tippoo's battalions could not so easily escape; protection to their guns, and ammunition waggons, required that they should stand the shock of regular soldiers. Asiatic vehemence strove in vain to withstand European valour; the strength of the East was lost without that of the West being gained; and in the attempt to substitute the one for the other, the throne of Mysore fell to the earth.*

Mr Hastings' long-protracted prosecution.

Soon after the Indian empire of the East India Company had been engaged in these desperate contests for their very existence, on the plains of the Carnatic, the statesman whose firmness and ability had brought them through the crisis was exposed

* In the war with Hyder in 1768, Colonel Wood, who commanded the British forces, found it impossible to bring him to a pitched battle. In vain the Madras government tried to equip him with a light train of artillery and a body of chosen men, in hopes that by the velocity of their advance they might succeed in bringing him to action; all their efforts were defeated by the rapidity and secrecy of his movements. At length, Wood, completely exhausted with the pursuit, hoping to rouse the Sultan's pride, wrote him a letter, stating "that it was disgraceful for a great prince, at the head of a large army, to fly before a detachment of infantry and a few pieces of cannon, unsupported by cavalry." Hyder, however, returned the following characteristic answer:—"I have received your letter, in which you invite me to an action with your army. Give me the same sort of troops that you command, and your wishes shall be accomplished. You will in time come to understand my mode of warfare. Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost a thousand rupees each horse, against your cannon-balls, which cost two-pence? No! I will march your troops until their legs shall become the size of their bodies—you shall not have a blade of grass nor a drop of water. I will hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a month. I will give your army battle, but it must be when I please, not when you please." Hyder was as good as his word. He laid waste the country, and, retiring before Colonel Wood, drew him on till his little army was exhausted with fatigue and privations, and in that weakened state attacked him, captured all his artillery, and reduced him to such straits that nothing but the opportune arrival of succours under Colonel Smith saved him from a total defeat. Had Tippoo's armies been formed on the same model, his descendants would, in all probability, have been still on the throne of Seringapatam.—See MARTIN, viii. 46, note.

to an unparalleled persecution from the people on whom he had conferred so inestimable a benefit. In the confusion and vicissitudes of an empire thus suddenly elevated to greatness in a distant hemisphere, without any adequate restraint either on private cupidity or public ambition, many deeds of injustice had been committed, many private fortunes made by means which would not bear the light, many acts of oppression perpetrated, in the name, and sometimes under the pressure, of state necessity. All these misdeeds, inseparable from an empire rising under such peculiar and unparalleled circumstances, were visited on the head of Mr Hastings: faction fastened on the East, as the chosen field of its ambitious efforts, where the lever was to be found by which the inestimable prize of Indian opulence was to be wrested from the hands of its present possessors; the sacred names of justice and equity, of religion and humanity, were prostituted as a cloak to the selfishness of private ambition; and the whole efforts of a powerful party in the British Islands, devoted for a long course of years to the persecution of the statesman who had saved our empire in the East from destruction.

CHAP.
LI.

1782.

30th May,
1782.

Early in 1782, the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr Dundas, and under the influence of the Rockingham administration, adopted a resolution condemnatory of Mr Hastings' administration, which led to a vote of recall by the East India Company; and, although the latter resolution was, after the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the head of the Ministry, rescinded by a large majority of the East India proprietors, yet the investigation resolved on by the Commons was prosecuted with increased vigour by the Coalition Ministry of Mr

Proceedings
in Parlia-
ment on the
subject.

14th June.

31st Oct.

CHAP.
LI.

1785.

1st Feb.
1785.

9th May,
1787.

13th Feb.
1788.

¹ Auber, i.
683, 692.
Mill. v. 40,
100. Parl.
Deb. 1786.

Fox and Lord North, by which the former cabinet was succeeded. Mr Hastings finally resigned his office, and returned to this country early in 1785; and in the following year the prosecution commenced under the administration of Mr Pitt, who had succeeded to the helm. The impeachment was solemnly voted by a large majority of the Commons: proceedings soon after commenced with extraordinary solemnity before the House of Lords, and were protracted for many years in Westminster Hall, with a degree of zeal and talent altogether unexampled in the British Senate.¹

His trial and
acquittal.

Never before had such an assemblage of talent, eloquence, and influence, been exerted in any judicial proceeding. The powerful declamation and impassioned oratory of Mr Fox; the burning thoughts and thrilling words of Mr Burke; the playful wit and fervent declamation of Mr Sheridan, gave lustre to the progress of the prosecution; while the cool judgment and sagacious mind of Mr Pitt interposed with decisive effect, in the earlier stages of the proceedings against the accused.* During one hundred

* In the earlier stages of the proceedings against Mr Hastings, Mr Pitt voted with him, and, in consequence, a considerable part of the accusations were negatived by the House of Commons; and his friends looked forward with reason to a total absolution. Not only on several preliminary questions, but on the great question of the Rohilla war, he had the support of Government, and these charges were negatived in the House of Commons by a majority of 119 to 67. But, in regard to the charge of extortion from the Rajah of Benares, he suddenly took part with the Whig prosecutors, stigmatizing the fine levied on that potentate (L.500,000) as enormous and oppressive, and declaring, in regard to these transactions, "the conduct of Mr Hastings had been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible that he, as a man of honour or honesty, having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and therefore he had fully satisfied his conscience that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constitute a crime sufficient to call for an impeachment." This sudden and unexpected change of measure on

and thirty days that the trial lasted, diffused over seven years, the public interest was unabated: Westminster Hall was thronged with all the rank, and wit, and beauty of the realm: and though it terminated in his acquittal by a majority of eight to one on all the charges, yet the national mind was seriously impressed with the numerous accusations enforced with so much eloquence: his private fortune was almost ruined in the contest; and nothing but the liberality of the East India Company, who nobly supported him against such a torrent of obloquy, with unshaken firmness, preserved the otherwise unbefriended statesman from total ruin.* The Sovereign of Hindostan, the man who might have placed himself on the throne of Aurengzebe, and severed the empire of the East from the British crown during the perils of the American war, was bowed to

CHAP.
LI.

1785.

23d April,
1795.

the part of Mr Pitt, was decisive against Mr Hastings, as it immediately brought the majority in the Lower House against him; and it led in consequence to many vehement reflections on the conduct of the minister, by the friends of the illustrious accused. And, without disputing that the fine was excessive, it must be allowed that it was imposed on a refractory delinquent, who had failed in the duty which his allegiance required; that it was determined on under the overbearing pressure of state necessity; that the exhaustion of the treasury, and the pressing dangers in the Carnatic, imperatively required an immediate supply of money, which could be obtained in no other way; that the funds thus acquired proved the salvation of India, by enabling Sir Eyre Coote to make head against Hyder, and were all applied by Mr Hastings to public purposes; and that, if justice and not persecution had been the object of the House of Commons, it would have been better obtained by a vote of restitution or reparation from the English legislature to the injured Rajah, than by the adoption of vindictive proceedings against a statesman who, in this matter, did evil that good might come of it.—*See Parl. Hist.* 1786. xxvi. 108–112; *MILL*, v. 55, 56; and *WRAXALL'S Mem.* ii. p. 174, 201.

* The East India Company lent Mr Hastings' L.50,000 for eighteen years without interest, to meet the expenses of his trial, and settled on him a pension of L.4000 for twenty-eight years, from June 24, 1785, being till the expiration of their charter; and it was continued on its renewal in 1813.—*Debates of Lords on Mr Hastings' Trial*, 495; *MILL*, v. 230.

CHAP. the earth by the stroke ; he remained for twenty
 LI. years in retirement in the country, and sank at last
 1784. unennobled into the grave.

Aug. 4th,
 1818.

Ultimate
 change of
 public opi-
 nion on the
 subject.

But truth is great and will prevail. Time rolled on, and brought its wonted changes on its wings. The passionate declamations of Mr Burke were forgotten ; the thrilling words of Mr Fox had passed away ; the moral courage of Mr Pitt had become doubted in the transaction ; but the great achievements, the far-seeing wisdom, the patriotic disinterestedness of Mr Hastings had slowly regained their ascendancy over general thought ; many of the deeds proved against him, it was seen, had been imposed on him by secret instructions, others originated in overbearing necessity ; the poverty of the illustrious statesman pleaded eloquently in his favour ; the magnitude of his services rose in irresistible force to the recollection ; and a few years before his death he was made a privy councillor, from a growing sense of the injustice he had experienced. When he appeared in 1813 at the bar of the House of Commons, to give evidence on the renewal of the Company's charter, the whole members spontaneously rose up in token of respect to the victim of their former persecution ; and when he was called from this chequered scene, his statue was, with general consent, placed by his unshaken friends, the East India Directors, among those of the illustrious men who had founded and enlarged the empire of the East.^{1*}

¹ Auber, i.
 683, 697.

Mill, iv. 40,
 256. Parl.,
 Hist. 1788
 1795.

* A few hours before Mr Hastings' death, he wrote to the East India Directors—" I have called you by the only appellation that language can express me, ' Var Wooffadar,' my profitable friend ; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it, unprofitably I own, but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests me that I myself have not been wanting in my

Bright, indeed, is the memory of a statesman who has statues erected to his memory forty years after his power has terminated, and thirty after all the vehemence of a powerful faction, and all the fury of popular outcry had been raised to consign him to destruction. To how many men, once the idol of the people during the plenitude of their power, will similar monuments, after the lapse of such a period, be raised? Persecution of its most il-

CHAP.
LI.

1784.

Reflections
on the cruel
injustice of
this prosecu-
tion.

duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I still draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that, in the efficient body of Directors, I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not express my full feelings, I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger constituent body I can only express a hope that, if there be any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interest both have so long committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to his own."

In January 1820, a proposition was submitted to the East India Directors, by their chairman, Campbell Marjoribank, Esq. After enumerating the great services of Mr Hastings, he asked, "How were these great services rewarded? He was not allowed even to repose in dignified retirement; he was dragged forward to contend with public accusations, and rewarded with two-and-twenty articles of impeachment. He

Mr M.) would not enter on the proceedings which distressed and harassed the feelings of that great man; they were at an end, and the feelings which excited them and that great man himself were now no more; but this he thought himself allowed to say, that those proceedings were contrary to the practice and spirit of the laws of this happy nation."

It was unanimously resolved, "That, as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Hon. Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India, against the combined efforts of European, Mahomedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."—See AUBER, i. 695, 696.

CHAP.
LI.

1785

lustrious citizens, of the greatest benefactors of their country, has ever been the disgrace of free states: the sacrifice of Sir Robert Calder, who saved England from Napoleon's invasion; of Lord Melville, who prepared for it the triumph of Trafalgar; of the Duke of York, who laid the foundation of Wellington's victories; of Warren Hastings, who preserved the empire of the East,—prove that the people of this country are governed by the same principles which consigned Themistocles to Asiatic exile, banished Aristides, because it was tiresome to hear him called the Just, and doomed Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, to an unhonoured sepulture in a foreign land. But the friends of freedom may console themselves with the reflection, that, if popular institutions sometimes expose their best citizens to the effects of these occasional fits of national insanity, they furnish the only sure security for the ultimate triumph of just principles; that, if despotic power discerns more correctly the real character of its servants, it is liable to no external correction, from the growing influence of equitable feelings after the decay of transitory passion; and that, if the historian of England, under other direction, would not have had to record the impeachment of the statesman who had saved its Eastern dominions from destruction, there would not have been permitted to him the grateful duty of contributing, against the united efforts of Whigs and Tories, against all the acrimony of selfish ambition, and all the fury of public passion, to rescue the memory of a great Eastern statesman from unmerited obloquy.

These frequent and interesting discussions on Indian affairs, however characteristic of the grievous injustice which the efforts of party frequently inflict

on individuals in all popular communities, were, however, attended with one important and salutary consequence, that it drew the attention both of Government and the nation to the administration of our Indian dominions, and the absolute necessity of assuming a more direct control than could be maintained by a mere body of directors of a trading company, over the numerous servants, civil and military, of their vast and growing possessions. This opinion, which had been strongly impressed upon the public mind by the serious and protracted disasters in the campaigns with Hyder in 1780 and 1781, was already general with all parties before the fall of Lord North's Ministry; and when Mr Fox succeeded to the head of affairs in 1783, all parties were already prepared for a great and important change in the government of our Eastern empire.* But the designs of that able and ambitious statesman far outstripped either the reason or necessity of the case. He proposed, in his famous India Bill, which convulsed the nation from end to end, and in its ultimate results occasioned the downfall of his administration, to vest the exclusive right of governing India in seven directors to *be named in the act*, that is, appointed by the legislature under the direction of the ministry for the time. The vacancies in these commissioners were to be filled up by the House of Commons under the same direction. The ferment raised by this prodigious change in the country, was unprecedented in the eighteenth century; Mr Pitt, from the first, denounced it as tyrannical, unconsti-

CHAP.
LI.

1783.

Mr Fox's
India Bill.
Its prema-
ture fate.

Nov. 1783.

* Mr Pitt, in November, 1783, when the coalition ministry were still in power, called on Mr Fox "to bring forward a plan, not of temporary palliation or timorous expedient, but vigorous and effectual, suited to the magnitude, the importance, and the alarming exigence of the case."—*Parl. Hist.* xxiv. 129.

CHAP.
LI.

1783.

Which occasions the downfall of his administration.

Dec. 15th,
1783.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxiv. 122,
195.

Objections to which this bill was liable.

April, 1789.

tutional, and subversive of the public liberties: the sagacious mind of George III. at once perceived that it would render the present ministers, to whom he was secretly hostile, irremovable in their places, and put Mr Fox at the head of a powerful empire, an *imperium in imperio*, which would soon overshadow the British diadem. By the combined exertions of the crown and the Tory party, this important innovation was defeated, after it had passed the Lower House, by a small majority of nineteen in the House of Peers, and this defeat was immediately followed by the dismissal of Mr Fox and his whole administration.¹

The ground taken by the King and the Tory party against this celebrated bill, was its unconstitutional tendency, by vesting the patronage of so large a portion of the empire in directors appointed, not by the executive, but the House of Commons; and it was this consideration which gave them the decisive majority which they obtained upon the dissolution of Parliament in the April following. Nevertheless, it is now apparent that, though at that period unperceived or unnoticed, the greatest danger of the proposed change would have arisen, not from this cause, but from the direct control thereby conferred over our Indian empire on the British legislature. If the vacillating and improvident policy on many occasions forced even upon the resolute and clear-sighted mind of Mr Pitt, by the unreflecting habits, and, on material questions, popular control of the House of Commons,—and still more the total want of foresight in all financial measures since the peace of Paris, on the part both of government and the legislature, be compared with the steady rule, invincible firmness, and wise anticipations of our In-

dian government during the same period, no doubt can remain, that the interest of the East would inevitably have been sacrificed by the change; that the ministerial directors, acting under the guidance of the House of Commons, could never have carried into execution those prompt and vigorous resolutions indispensable for the preservation of dominions so critically situated as those in Hindostan, and so far removed from the resources of the ruling state; and that no government under the direct control of a popular assembly, would have been permitted to engage in those vast undertakings, or incur the expense of those gigantic establishments, which were necessary to ward off future danger, or obtain present success, over the immense extent of our Indian dominions.*

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1784.

Although, however, Mr Fox's India bill was rejected, yet the numerous abuses of our Indian dominions, as well as the imminent hazard which they had run during the war with Hyder Ali from the want of a firmly constituted central government, were too fresh in the public recollection to permit the existing state of matters to continue. Mr Pitt, accordingly, was no sooner installed in power, than he brought forward an India bill of his own, which, it was hoped, would prove exempt from the objec-

Mr Pitt's
India bill,
which be-
comes a law.

* This is not the place to discuss the details of Mr Fox's bill; but it does not appear to have been calculated to afford any practical remedy for most of the evils under which the administration of Indian affairs at that period laboured; and, accordingly, it is observed with great candour by Mr Mill, whose leaning to the popular side is well known,—“The bills of Mr Fox, many and celebrated as were the men who united their wisdom to compose them, manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They demonstrate that the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill in speaking, were not remarkable for their powers of thought. For the right exercise of the powers of government in India, not one new security was provided, and it would not be very easy to prove that any strength was added to the old.”—MILL'S *British India*, iv. 480.

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LI.

1784.

13th Aug.
1784.

tions to which its predecessor had been exposed, and, at the same time, remedy the serious evils to which the administration of affairs in India had hitherto been liable. This bill passed both houses, and formed the basis of the system under which, with some subsequent but inconsiderable amendments, the affairs of the East have been administered from that period down to the present time. By it the Court of Directors, appointed by the East India Company, remained as before, and to them the general administration of Indian affairs was still intrusted. The great change introduced, was the institution of the *Board of Control*, a body composed of six members of the Privy Council, chosen by the King; the chancellor of the exchequer and one of the secretaries of state being two, in whom the power of directing and controlling the proceedings of the Indian empire were vested. The duties of this board,—which were very loosely defined, and which have come all to centre in the president, an officer who has become a fourth secretary of state for the Indian empire,—were defined to be “from time to time, to check, superintend, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government, or revenues of the territories and possessions, of the East India Company.” These powers were ample enough, but in practice they have led to little more than a control of the Company, in the more important political or military concerns of the East, leaving the directors in possession of the practical direction of affairs in ordinary cases. All vacancies in official situations, with the exception of the governor-general of India, governors of Madras and Bombay, and commanders-in-chief, which were to be filled up by the British government, were left at the

disposal of the East India directors. A most important provision was made in the institution of a secret committee, who were to send to India in duplicate, such despatches as they might receive from the Board of Control, and in the establishment of the supreme government at Calcutta, with a controlling power over the other presidencies, a change which at once introduced unity of action into all parts of the Peninsula. It cannot be affirmed that this anomalous constitution will stand the test of theoretical examination, or that a distribution of supreme power between a governor-general and two subordinate governors in the East, and a board of control and body of directors in the British Islands, gave any fair prospect either of unity of purpose or efficiency of action. Nevertheless, if experience, the great test of truth, be consulted, and the splendid progress of the Indian empire of Great Britain since it was directed in this manner, be alone considered, there is reason to hold this system of government one of the most perfect that ever was devised by human wisdom, for the advancement and confirmation of political greatness.¹

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¹ See 24
Geo. III. c.
24. 26 Geo.
III. c. 16.
Auber, ii.
1, 16. Parl.
Deb. xxiv.
1085, 1215.

It soon appeared how much the vigour and efficiency of Indian administration had been increased by the important changes made in its central government. By Mr Pitt's India bill, all ideas of foreign conquest in the east had been studiously repressed, it having been declared that "to pursue schemes of conquest or extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation." But this declaration, in appearance so just and practicable, differed widely from the conduct which extraneous events shortly after forced upon the British government; and in truth,

Arrange-
ment with
the British
government
for the in-
crease of the
British
force in In-
dia.

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LI.

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an extended view of human affairs, as well as the past experience of our Indian possessions, might even then have shown the impracticability of following out such a course of policy, and convinced our rulers that a foreign people settled as aliens and conquerors on the soil of Hindostan, could maintain themselves only by the sword. In order to carry into execution the pacific views of government, a nobleman of high rank and character, Lord Cornwallis, was sent out by Mr Pitt, who united in his person the two offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief, so as to give the greatest possible unity to the action of government : but no sooner had he arrived there than he discovered that Tippoo was intriguing with the other native powers, for the subversion of our Indian dominion ; and, as a rupture with France was apprehended at that juncture, four strong regiments were dispatched to India ; and, as the company complained of the expense which this additional force entailed upon their finances, a bill was brought into Parliament by Mr Pitt, which fixed the number of King's troops which might be ordered to India by the Board of Control, at the expense of the Company, at eight thousand, besides twelve thousand European forces in the Company's service.¹

¹ Auber, ii.
45, 65.

Fresh war
with Tippoo
Saib.

The wisdom of this great addition to the native European force in India, as well as the increased vigour and efficiency of the supreme government, speedily appeared in the next war which broke out. Tippoo, whose hostility to the English was well known to be inveterate, and who had long been watched with jealous eyes by the Madras presidency, at length commenced an attack upon the Rajah of Travancore ; a prince in alliance with the British, and actually supported by a subsidiary force of their

Jan. 1790.

troops; and at first, from the total want of preparation which had arisen from the pacific policy so strongly inculcated upon the Indian authorities by the government at home, he obtained very great success, and totally subdued the Rajah against whom he had commenced hostilities. Perceiving that the British character was now at stake in the Peninsula, and being well aware that a power founded on opinion must instantly sink into insignificance, if the idea gets abroad that its allies may be insulted with impunity, Lord Cornwallis immediately took the most energetic measures to re-assert the honour of the British name. Fifteen thousand men were collected in the Carnatic under General Meadows, while eight thousand more were to ascend the Ghauts from the side of Bombay, under General Abercrombie. So obvious was the necessity of this war, and so flagrant the aggressive acts which Tippoo had committed, that, notwithstanding their general aversion to hostile measures, from the expense with which they were attended, and their recent declaration of pacific intentions,—on this occasion, both the English Parliament and the Court of Directors passed resolutions cordially approving of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis in the transaction.* Treaties of alliance were at the

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LI.

1790.

April 11th,
1791.

* It is remarkable that the most violent declaimer against this war in the House of Peers, as uncalled for, inexpedient, and unjust, was Lord Rawdon, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, who, himself, in 1817, with much less provocation, was drawn into the great contest with the Mahrattas, which terminated so gloriously for the British arms. So dangerous is it to judge of distant transactions from party prejudice or preconceived European ideas.—See *Parl. Hist.* 1791, xxix. 119–159. On this occasion, Lord Porchester, the nobleman who opened the debate against the war, said, “I have proved that it has been the uniform policy of the Directors and of the Legislature, *to avoid wars of conquest in India*, and to confine the Company to the limits of their present territories, and the management of their commercial interests.”—*Ibid*, 133. In 1815, Lord Hastings, then Governor-general of India, observed, in

CHAP. same time entered into with the Peishwa and the
 LI. Nizam, native powers, whose jealousy of the Mysore
 1791. chief had been of long standing ; and hostilities com-
 1st June, menced, which were at first attended with chequered
 1790. success ; General Meadows having taken Caroor and
 1 Auber, ii. other towns, and Tippoo having surprised Colonel
 103, 111. Floyd, and burst into the Carnatic, where he com-
 Parl. Hist. xxix. 119, mitted the most dreadful ravages.¹
 159. Mill, v. 257, 314.

The energies of Government, however, were now
 Lord Corn- thoroughly aroused. In December, 1791, Lord Corn-
 wallis's first wallis embarked in person for Madras : the Bengal
 campaign with Tip- sepoy were with great difficulty reconciled to a sea
 poo. voyage, and great reinforcements, with the comman-
 der-in-chief, safely landed in the southern presidency.
 It was resolved to commence operations with the
 siege of Bangalore, one of the strongest fortresses in
 Mysore, and commanding the most eligible pass
 from the coast to the centre of Tippoo's dominions.
 Jan. 29th, In the end of January the grand army moved for-
 1791. ward ; the important pass of Coorg, leading up the
 27th Feb. Ghauts, was occupied within a month after ; Benga-
 lore was invested in the beginning of March, and
 carried by assault on the 21st. Encouraged by this
 great success, Lord Cornwallis again pushed on
 direct to Seringapatam, although the advanced pe-
 riod of the season, and scanty supplies of the army,
 rendered it a service of considerable peril, which was
 increased rather than diminished by the junction

a very valuable minute on India finance,—“ It was by preponderance of power, that those mines of wealth were acquired by the Company, and by preponderance of power alone could they be retained. The supposition that the British power could discard the means of strength, and yet enjoy the fruits of it, was one that would speedily and certainly be dissipated: in the state of India, were we to be feeble, our rule would be contemptible and a very short one.”—LORD HASTINGS' *Minute on Revenue*, 15th Sept. 1815 ; AUBER, ii. 352.

shortly after of ten thousand of the Nizam's horse, who, without rendering any service to the army, consumed every particle of grass and forage within its reach. Still the English general continued to press forward, and at length reached the fortified position of the enemy, on strong ground, about six miles in front of Seringapatam. An attack was immediately resolved on; but Tippoo, who conducted his defence with great skill, did not await the formidable onset of the assaulting columns, and after inflicting a severe loss on the assailants by the fire of his artillery, withdrew all his forces within the works of the fortress. The English were now within sight of the capital of Mysore, and decisive success seemed almost within their reach. They were in no condition, however, to undertake the siege; the supplies of the army were exhausted: the promised co-operation of the Mahrattas had failed; of General Abercrombie, who was to advance from the side of Bombay, no advices had been received; and the famished state of the bullock-train precluded the possibility of getting up the heavy artillery or siege equipage. Orders were, therefore, given to retreat, and both armies retired with heavy hearts and considerable loss of stores and men; but the opportune arrival of the advanced guard of the Mahratta contingent, on the second day of the march, which at first caused great alarm, suspended the retrograde movement, and the army encamped for the rainy season in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam.¹

The attack on the capital of Mysore, however, was only suspended by this untoward event: in the autumn following, Lord Cornwallis was again in motion, having in the preceding months, after the termination of the rains, made himself master of

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LI.

1791.

15th May.

26th May.

¹ Mill, v.

314, 325.

Auber, ii.

118, 121.

Wilks, iii.

115, 146.

Vast preparations for the siege of Seringapatam.

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1792.
31st Oct.
20th Nov.
22d Dec.
5th Jan.
30th Jan. 1792.

several important forts, which commanded or threatened his communications with the Carnatic. A most important blow was struck by a detachment of the British against a general of Tippoo's, who had taken post in the woods, near Simoga, in order to disturb the siege of that place, which was commencing, and who was defeated with the loss of ten thousand men; a disaster which led to the surrender of that fortress shortly after. Meanwhile, Abercrombie, with a powerful force, amply provided with all the muniments of war, broke up from Bombay; surmounted with incredible labour the ascent of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, and was in readiness to take his part in the combined enterprise. In the end of January, Lord Cornwallis's army moved forward towards Seringapatam, no longer depending on the doubtful aid of the Mahratta chiefs, but presenting a vast array of native, British, and sepoy troops, such as had never before been presented on the plains of India. Eleven thousand English, thirty thousand regular sepoy, with eighty-four pieces of cannon, exhibited a force worthy of contending for the empire of the East. Nor was this force, considerable as it was, disproportioned to the magnitude and hazard of the enterprise in which they were engaged; for not only were the ramparts of Seringapatam of surpassing strength, but Tippoo lay in front of them at the head of fifty thousand regular infantry and five thousand horse, in a strong position, defended by numerous fortifications, and one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery.¹

Mill, v. 356, 361.
Martin, viii. 48, 49.
Auber, ii. 122, 123.
Wilks, iii. 162, 168.

No sooner had Lord Cornwallis reconnoitered the enemy's position, than he resolved to commence an attack, and the assault was fixed for that very night. The army was formed in three divisions; his lord-

ship in person commanded the centre, General Meadows the right, Colonel Maxwell the left. Seringapatam is situated on an island, formed by two branches of the river Cavery, which inclose between them a space four miles in length and a mile and a half in breadth. On the eastern portion of the island, Tippoo had constructed without the walls, but within reach of them, in case of disaster, a strongly fortified camp, supported by numerous field-works and batteries, and without this stronghold, beyond the river, the bulk of the Sultan's army was encamped on elevated ground, covered on one side by a large tank, on the other by a small river which falls into the Cavery, and supported on the side next the enemy by six large redoubts. Three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the interior fortifications and the walls of the fortress, besides one hundred and fifty on the exterior line; and a thick hedge, formed of bamboos and prickly shrubs, connecting the works formed a most serious obstacle to the attacking columns, from presenting no resistance to cannon shot, and being altogether impervious to foot soldiers. To attack such a force so posted, in the dark, and subject to the chances and confusion of a nocturnal assault, must be considered one of the most daring deeds even in the annals of Indian heroism.¹

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LI.

1792.

Preparations for a decisive battle under the walls of Seringapatam, 6th Feb. 1792.

¹ Mill, v. 360, 361. Wilks, iii. 172, 180.

At eight o'clock the order was given to march. The evening was calm and serene, the moon shone bright, and the troops advanced swiftly and steadily, but in perfect silence; while the reserve, with the whole artillery and ammunition train, struck their tents, and stood to their guns in breathless anxiety. The surprise was complete: so admirably was silence preserved, that the centre came upon the enemy

Total defeat of Tippoo.

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LI.

1792.

wholly unawares, forced their way through the bound hedge, and, carrying every thing before them, pushed through the camp, passed the ford of the Cavery, crossed over to the opposite side, and, taking the batteries, which had opened their fire upon the other division in the inner intrenchment in the rear, drove the gunners from their pieces. The right wing, under General Meadows, also cut through the bound hedge about half-past eleven, while the left with ease carried the Carighaut hill; the roar of artillery was heard on all sides, while the flash of musketry now illuminated the whole extent of the horizon. Panic-struck at the celerity and vigour of the attack, which had penetrated their works in so many different quarters at once, the enemy gave way on all sides, when fortune was nearly restored by one of those accidents to which all nocturnal attacks are subject, and the centre, with its noble commander, was nearly cut off. The right wing, under Meadows, had been grievously impeded in its march within the bound hedge, by several rice enclosures and water courses, which could not be crossed without great difficulty, and, in consequence, for two hours he was unable to reach the advanced point to which Cornwallis had arrived in the island in the early part of the night. Mean-while, Tippoo's troops began to recover from their consternation, and, as day dawned and they perceived that the body which had penetrated into the centre of their intrenchments did not exceed five thousand men, they closed in on all sides, and commenced with overwhelming numbers an attack upon this band of heroes.¹

¹ Lord Cornwallis's Despatches, 4th March, 1792. Ann. Reg. 469. Mill, v. 372.

The British troops, however, animated by the presence of their commander-in-chief, made a gallant defence: the repeated and furious onsets of

the enemy were repulsed by a rolling fire, enforced when necessary by the bayonet, and at length, when day-light dawned and the guns of the fortress began to be turned upon them, they retired towards Carighaut hill in perfect order, and took post beyond their destructive range. Mean-while, the troops of Meadows having by a mistake of their guides been brought close to the Mosque redoubt, which was meant to have been passed without molestation, transported by the ardour of the moment, commenced an assault, which at first was repulsed with heavy loss; the troops, however, returned to the charge, and that formidable work was at length carried amidst cheers which were heard over the whole camp. Animated by the joyful sound, Cornwallis's men stood their ground with invincible firmness, while Meadows was no sooner disengaged from the perilous contest into which he had been unwillingly drawn, than he pressed on with renewed alacrity to the relief of the main body, which he was well aware, from the weight of the firing in that direction, must be engaged in a very serious contest; and, as morning broke, the two divisions met and mutually saluted each other as victors.* The

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1792.

Dangers of
Cornwallis,
and his ultimate rescue.

* When the enemy had surrounded Lord Cornwallis, in the middle of the night, and a heavy fire had set in on all sides, he said to those around him,—“If General Meadows is above ground this will bring him.” Nor was he mistaken. True as the magnet to the pole, his gallant lieutenant pressed to the scene of danger, and, attracted by the sound, reached in time the theatre of that desperate conflict. The unanimity and heart-felt mutual admiration of these two great men is, as Mill has justly observed, one of the finest features of this campaign; and is particularly worthy of admiration on the part of Meadows, considering that Cornwallis, by assuming the direction in person, deprived him of the honour of a separate command in so momentous a service. What a striking circumstance, that he so soon after should have the means of rescuing his noble and respected commander-in-chief from destruction! But India is the theatre of romantic adventure, as well as of heroic and dis-

CHAP. victory was complete. Out of six of the enemy's
LI. redoubts, four were in the hands of the victors ;

1792. Tippoo in an early part of the night had taken refuge

¹ Lord Corn- in his capital ; the intrenched camp, with above a
wallis's Des- hundred pieces of cannon, was abandoned ; four thou-
patches, 4th sand men had fallen, and nearly twenty thousand
March, more had disbanded and left their colours, while
1792. Ann. the loss of the victors did not amount to six hundred
Reg. Mill, men.¹
v. 372, 374.
Auber, ii.
120, 124.

Concluding
operations of
the war.

On the following morning Tippoo made a despe-
rate attempt to regain the Sultan's redoubt, which

was so near the capital as to be commanded in rear
by its guns : and a body of two thousand chosen
horse came on with appalling cries to storm the
gorge, before the slender garrison, consisting only of
an hundred and fifty men, could barricade it ; but

16th Feb.

they were repulsed by the steady gallantry and
ceaseless fire of this heroic band. Upon this the
enemy retreated entirely within the fort ; and, soon
after, the army obtained an important accession
of strength by the arrival of Abercrombie with two
thousand Europeans and four thousand sepoy troops.
Operations were now commenced in form against

18th Feb.

the fortress : the first parallel was begun and com-
pleted on the night of the 18th ; the splendid gar-
dens and shady walks of the country palace, in which
the Sultan so much delighted, were destroyed, and
the palace itself converted into a great hospital ;
and at length, when the breaching batteries were in

24th Feb.

readiness and armed with fifty pieces of heavy can-
non, the Sultan concluded a treaty on such terms as
Lord Cornwallis chose to prescribe, and hostilities

interested exploits ; and a most inadequate conception will be formed of
British character or glory, till the memorable history of its empire in
the East is given by an historian worthy of so magnificent a theme.—
See MILL, v. 367, note.

terminated. Such, however, was the ardour of the troops, especially the sepoy, who were engaged in the trenches, that it was with the greatest difficulty they could be prevailed on to cease firing, and, when the European troops enforced the command, they retired sullen and dejected to their tents; while Tippoo's men by a vain bravado continued discharging cannon for some time after the British lines were silent: as if to demonstrate that they had not been the first to give in in the contest.¹

By the treaty of peace which followed, Tippoo was compelled to submit to the cession of half his dominions to the British, the Nizam, and the Marattas; to pay L.3,500,000, as the expenses of the war; deliver up all the prisoners made in Hyder's time, some of whom still lingered in a miserable captivity; and to surrender his two sons as hostages. The young princes were immediately after courteously received, and splendidly treated, by the British government. Lord Cornwallis, whose health had for some time been declining, and who had postponed his return to England only on account of the contest in the Mysore, soon after returned to his native country, having, during his short government, added 24,000 square miles to its Eastern dominions.¹

Human affairs are every where governed at bottom by the same principle; the varieties of colour, language, and civilisation, are but the different hues which conceal the operation of passions and interests which are for ever identical among mankind. Differing widely in its origin and its effects upon social happiness, the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a very close analogy to the contemporaneous French domination in Europe; and in none more than in the experienced necessity of advancing, in order to avoid destruction, which was felt equally

1792.

¹ Auber, ii.
123, 124.
Mill, v. 377,
378. Wilks
iii. 225,
235.

Treaty
with Tip-
poo, 19th
March,
1792.

¹ Martin,
viii. 50.
Auber, ii.
125

Experienced
necessity of
further con-
quests in
India.

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LI.

1794.

strongly by the Emperor Napoleon and the English governors-general of India. The reason in both cases was the same, viz. that a power had got a footing in the midst of other states, so formidable in its character, and so much at variance in its principles with the policy of the powers by whom it was surrounded, that of necessity it was engaged in constant hostilities, and had no security for existence but in the continual extension of its dominions, or increased terrors of its name. The East India Company had fondly flattered themselves that Tippoo, being thus humbled, would lay aside his hereditary hostility to the English power, just as Napoleon seems to have imagined that after the spoliation of Tilsit, he might rely upon the forced submission or cured inveteracy of Prussia, and the result to both was the same.

Pacific ad-
ministration
and princi-
ples of Sir
John Shore.

Sir John Shore, a most respectable civil servant of the company, who was appointed governor-general after the retirement of Lord Cornwallis, was strongly imbued with those maxims of the necessity of pursuing a pacific policy in India, and avoiding all causes of collision with the native powers, which were so general both with the government, the directors, and the people at home, and which had been so strongly enforced upon the local authorities by the Board of Control. Ample opportunities soon occurred for putting the expedience of their apparently reasonable and just principles to the test. Shortly after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, differences broke out between the Mahrattas and the Nizam; and the English Government, as the old ally of the latter Prince, were strongly urged by his partisans to support him, as they had done the Rajah of Travancore, in the contest.¹ This, however, Sir J. Shore, acting on the pacific system, refused, and even declined to permit the Nizam to employ in his warfare with the Mahrattas

1794.

¹ Malcolm, 136, 154.
Auber, ii. 137, 142.

the battalions which were placed as a protecting force in his territories. CHAP.
LI.

The consequences of this temporizing conduct might easily have been foreseen. The Nizam, after a short contest, was overthrown by the superior force of the Mahrattas (who could bring twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and two hundred guns into the field), and compelled to make peace on very disadvantageous terms. Such was the dissatisfaction produced very naturally at the court of the Nizam, by this desertion of their ally at the most perilous crisis, that they soon after signified a wish to be relieved of the presence of the British subsidiary force, which was complied with; and the Nizam immediately threw himself without reserve into the arms of the French resident, M. Raymond, and augmented the organized force in his dominions, under the direction of officers of the French republic, to twenty-three battalions and twelve pieces of artillery. These troops carried the colours of the French republic, and the cap of liberty was engraven on their buttons. Thus, by the timid policy of the British government at that crisis, not only was the power and influence of the Mahrattas materially increased, but their old and faithful ally, the Nizam, converted from a friend into an embittered enemy, and the moral sway resulting from the glorious termination of the war with Mysore seriously impaired.¹

1794.
Its disastrous effects.
March, 1794.
1795.
Malcolm's India, 136.
177. Auber, ii. 137, 145.

Tippoo was not slow in turning to the best advantage this unexpected course of events in his favour. Already had exaggerated reports of the growing power and conquests of the great Republic reached the courts of Hindostan; and numerous French agents had found their way to all the native powers, who represented in glowing colours the

Intriguing of Tippoo to form a confederacy against the English.

CHAP.
LI.

1795.

favourable opportunity which now presented itself for expelling the English from the Peninsula, and re-establishing, on a durable basis, the independence of all the Indian states. The Mysorean chief, whose cunning and perfidy were equal to his ability, strove, in the first instance, by professions of eternal gratitude and attachment, to disarm the suspicions of the British government, and he succeeded so far, that, in two years after the treaty of Seringapatam, his two sons were restored to his embraces. No sooner had he got free from this restraint, than he sent a secret circular to the different native powers of India, proposing to them all to unite in a common league for the expulsion of the English from Hindostan; received with unbounded confidence the agents who had been dispatched to the court of Seringapatam by the French Directory; and even sent emissaries to the distant court of Caubul, beyond the Himalaya snows, to confirm Zemaun Schah, the restless and ambitious chief of that formidable people, in his declared design of invading the northern parts of India, and reinstating, in its original splendour, the throne of the Moguls. Mean-while his own activity was indefatigable, and his preparations were complete; his army was on the best footing, and constantly ready to take the field; and while the Mahrattas and the Nizam had, by mutual dissensions, broken up the triple league of which he had formerly experienced the weight, and the former had fallen entirely under the guidance of the large French force in his capital, the military strength and political consideration of Mysore were more formidable than ever.¹

¹ Wellesley's
Despatches,
i. 25, 82,
83. Mal-
colm, 185,
186.

Matters were at length brought to a crisis, by the Sultan's taking the extraordinary step, in spring 1798, of sending ambassadors to the Isle of France

to negotiate with the French authorities for the ex-
 pulsion of the English from India, and effect the
 levy of a subsidiary European force to assist him in
 his designs, and afterwards publicly receiving the
 troops then raised at Mangalore, and conducting
 them with great pomp to his capital. It was im-
 possible to doubt, after this decisive step, that he
 was only awaiting the favourable moment for com-
 mencing his operations; the more especially when,
 at the very same period, a French armament, of un-
 precedented magnitude, sailed from Toulon for the
 Nile, and both the Directory and Napoleon publicly
 spoke of their communications with the redoubted
 Mysorean chief, as their principal inducement for
 giving it that direction, and "Citizen Tippoo" was
 openly announced as the powerful ally who was to
 co-operate in the ultimate objects of the expedi-
 tion.¹* It was evident, therefore, that a crisis of

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LI.

1797.

Tippoo's
overt acts
of hostility.

Feb. 1798.

¹ Wellesley's
Despatches,
i. xi. Intro-
duction.
Auber, ii.
167. Gurw.
i. 7.

* The following were the terms of this remarkable proclamation by General Hypolite Malartie, Governor of the Isle of France,—“Tippoo Jan. 30, Sultaun has dispatched two ambassadors to us with particular letters 1798. to the colonial assembly, to all the generals employed under this Govern- ment, and to the executive Directory. 1. He desires an alliance offen- sive and defensive with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent him. 2. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him. 3. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance *to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.* 4. This power desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour; we there- fore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag to enrol them- selves.”—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, ix. x. *Introduction*.

On the 20th July, 1798, Tippoo transmitted to the Directory at Paris a note of proposals for an alliance offensive and defensive, “in order to obtain such an accession of force as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack and annihilate for ever our common enemies in Asia; and may the heavens and the earth meet ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest diminution.” The proposals were, 1. That the French should furnish a subsidiary force of ten or fifteen thousand troops of every description, with an adequate naval force. 2. That the sultan

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LI.

1797.

the most dangerous kind was approaching, and that, too, at the very time when the diminution in the consideration of the English in India, and the weakening of their alliances among the native powers, had rendered them least capable of bearing the shock. But the hand of fate was upon the curtain. At this perilous moment the sons of Britain were not wanting to herself. Sprung from one family, two illustrious men were now entering upon the theatre, who were destined to carry its glory to the highest point of exaltation, and leave an empire, both in the East and West, unrivalled in the extent of its dominions, unequalled in the impression it was destined to produce upon the fortunes of mankind.

should furnish military stores, horses, bullocks, provisions, and all other necessaries. 3. That the expedition should be directed to Porto Novo, or some other point on the coast of Coromandel, where it will be joined by an army under the command of the King in person. 4. All conquests which shall be made from the common enemy, excepting the dominions of the Sultan which have been wrested from him by the English, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties.—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, 711, 712, *Appendix*.

Napoleon's letter to Tippoo, upon landing in Egypt, already alluded to,* was in the following terms:—"Cairo, 25th Jan. 1799. You have already been made acquainted with my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England. I hasten to convey to you my desire, that you should give me, by the way of Mascat or Mokha, intelligence of the political circumstances in which you find yourself placed. I desire even that you will send to Suez, or Grand Cairo, some able man in whom you have confidence, with whom I may confer. BUONAPARTE."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon*, vii. 192.

* *Ante*, iii. 446.

CHAPTER LII.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND FIRST
APPEARANCE OF WELLINGTON IN INDIA.

ARGUMENT.

Birth of the Duke of Wellington and Marquis Wellesley—Illustrious men then rising into manhood in England and France—Wellington's Education and first Military Services—His Talents are distinguished during the Retreat from Flanders—Excellent effect of this Campaign on his mind—He is sent to India, and first entry on separate command there—His Character as a public man—His Military Character—Difficulties with which he had to contend in that capacity—Admirable ability and skill with which he overcame them—Character of Marquis Wellesley—And of his Indian Administration—Statesman-like Wisdom with which it was accompanied—Character of Lord Melville—His great abilities and vast information on Indian affairs—Lord Wellesley's first objects of policy, and early perception of the necessity of war—He is unable, from financial and military difficulties, to commence immediate hostilities—Rapid effect of his Administration in improving affairs—Successful reduction of the French subsidiary force at Hyderabad—Its great effects in India—Prodigious energy of Lord Wellesley in overcoming the difficulties of his situation—Commencement of hostilities against Tippoo, and his Defeat by the Bombay army—General Harris's advance to Seringapatam, and defeat of the Sultaun—Investment of that capital—Progress of the Siege, and repulse of Colonel Wellesley—Assault and storm of the fortress—Death of Tippoo—Immense importance of the blow thus struck—Appointment of Colonel Wellesley as Governor of Seringapatam—Judicious arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore—Rise and formidable force of Doondiah Waugh—His Defeat and overthrow by Colonel Wellesley—Alliances with the Nizam, Persia, and the Imaum of Muscat—Expedition of Sir D. Baird from India to Egypt—Great acquisition of territory from the Vizier of Oude—Assumption of the Government of the Carnatic—Causes of the rupture with the Mahrattas—Character and situation of the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah—And of Holkar—Reasons for a Mahratta war—Perron's French force—Collection of forces, and delivery of Poonah by General Wellesley—War with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar—Lord Wellesley's Plan of Operations—Defeat of Perron's force, and storming of Allighur—Battle of Delhi—Lord Lake's strong opinion on the necessity of European troops in India—Alliance with the Mogul Emperor, and surrender of the French chiefs—Battle and Fall of Agra—Humane conduct of the British troops—Battle of Laswarro—Desperate Fight and final Victory of the English—Conquest of the Cuttack—Operations in the Deccan under General Wellesley—Movements which led to the Battle of Assaye—Battle of Assaye—Imminent Danger and final Victory of the English—Opera-

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tions after the Battle—Battle of Argaum—Siege and Fall of Gawilghur—which compels Scindiah to sue for Peace—Its Terms—Pecuniary difficulties of the Government on the conclusion of the War—Negotiations and Rupture with Holkar—Commencement of the War with that Chief—Its arduous character—His Strength, and its Causes—Defeat and Capture of Mahommed Khan—Plan of the Campaign against Holkar—Its Errors and early Disasters—Holkar's able Conduct against Colonel Monson in Bundelcund—Advance of Monson's division—His Disasters and Defeat—Desperate Action on the Bannas river, and conclusion of the Retreat—Alarming fermentation produced through the whole of India—Generous conduct and able resolutions of Lord Wellesley and Lord Lake—Advance of Holkar to Delhi—His Repulse and Retreat—Battle of Dieg—Pursuit and Defeat of Holkar at Furruckabad—Siege and Capture of Dieg—Siege and unsuccessful Assault of Bhurtpore—Repeated Assaults, and their Defeats—Reasons on both sides which led to an accommodation with that Chieftain—Peace with the Rajah of Bhurt-pore—Holkar, expelled from Bhurtpore, joins Scindiah—Operations in Cuttack, Bundelcund, and against Meer Khan—And against Scindiah, who sues for Peace—Lord Wellesley returns to England—Second Administration, and Death of Marquis Cornwallis—Arrival of Sir G. Barlow—Treaty of peace with Holkar and Scindiah—Review of Lord Wellesley's Administration—Return of Wellington to Europe—Reflections on the rise of the British power in India—Causes of its extraordinary progress—It was owing to the union of democratic energy with aristocratic foresight—Causes of this unusual combination—Circumstances which will eventually subvert our Eastern dominion—Great and lasting benefits it has produced in human affairs.

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Birth of
Wellington,
and Mar-
quis Welles-
ley.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, afterwards Duke of WEL-
LINGTON, was born on the 1st May, 1769. His father
was the Earl of Mornington, and he was descended
by the mother's side from an ancient and noble fa-
mily. His elder brother, who succeeded to the here-
ditary honours, afterwards was created MARQUIS
WELLESLEY; so that one family enjoyed the rare
felicity of giving birth to the statesman whose ener-
getic councils established the empire of England in
the Eastern, and the warrior whose immortal deeds
proved the salvation of Europe in the Western Hemis-
phere.¹

¹ Scherer,
i. 1, Gurw.
i. 1.

The young soldier was regularly educated for the
profession of his choice, and received his first com-
mission in the year 1787, being then in the eighteenth
year of his age. Napoleon had entered the artillery
two years before, at the age of sixteen, and was then
musing on the heroes of Plutarch; Sir Walter Scott,

at the age of seventeen, was then relieving the tedium of legal education by wandering over the mountains of his native land, and dreaming of Ariosto and Amadis in the grassy vale of St Leonards, near Edinburgh; Viscount Chateaubriand was inhaling the spirit of devotion and chivalry, and wandering, in anticipation, as a pilgrim to the Holy Land, amidst the solitude of La Vendée; Goëthe, profound and imaginative, was reflecting on the destiny of man on earth, like a cloud which "turns up its silver lining to the moon;" Schiller was embodying in immortal verse the shadows of history and the creations of fancy; and the ardent spirit of Nelson was chafing on inaction and counting the weary hours of a pacific West Indian station. Little did any of them think of each other, or anticipate the heart-stirring scenes which were so soon about to arise, in the course of which their names were to shine forth like stars in the firmament, and their genius acquire immortal renown. There were giants in the earth in those days.

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Illustrious
men then
rising into
manhood in
England and
France.

Scherer.
Life of Wel-
lington.

Ante, iii. 9.
Lockhart's
Life of
Scott, i. 45-
54.

Southey's
Nelson, i.
73, 77.

Chateaub.
Mem. 72-
77.

Mr Arthur Wellesley, educated at Eton, studied for a short time at the Military Academy of Angers, in France, but he was soon removed from that seminary to take a part in the active duties of his profession. As subaltern and captain he served both in the cavalry and infantry; in spring 1793 he was promoted to the majority of the 33d regiment, and in autumn of the same year he became, by purchase, its lieutenant-colonel. At the head of that regiment he first entered upon active service, by sailing from Cork, in May, 1794, and landing at Ostend in the beginning of June following, with orders to join Lord Moira's corps, which was assembling in that place, to reinforce the Duke of York, who was in the field near Tournay. That ill-fated prince, however, was then hard pressed by the vast army of the Re-

Wellington's
education
and first
military
services.

June 1794.

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1794.

¹ Gurw. i.
1. Scherer,
i. 23.

His talents
are distin-
guished du-
ring the re-
treat from
Flanders.

30th Dec.
1794,
5th Jan.
1795.

15th Jan.
1795.

publicans, under Pichegru,* and as he was under the necessity of retreating, it was justly deemed unadvisable to attempt the retention of a fortress so far in advance as Ostend, and Lord Moira marched by Bruges and Ghent to Scheldt, and crossing that river at the Tête de Flandre, joined the English army encamped around Antwerp.¹

The multiplied disasters of that unhappy campaign soon brought Colonel Wellesley into contact with the enemy, and taught him the art of war in the best of all schools, that of great operations and adverse fortune. The English army, now entirely separated from that of the Austrians, who had marched off towards the Rhine, were in no sufficient strength to face the immense masses of the Republicans in any considerable combat; but a number of detached actions took place with the rear-guard, in which the spirit and intelligence of Colonel Wellesley speedily became conspicuous. On the river Neethe, in a warm affair near the village of Boxtel, and in a hot skirmish on the shores of the Waal, the 33d did good service; the ability with which they were conducted excited general remark, and Colonel Wellesley was in consequence promoted to the command of a brigade of three regiments in the ulterior retreat from the Leck to the Issel. They were no longer, indeed, pursued by the enemy, who had turned aside for the memorable invasion of Holland; but the rudeness of the elements proved a more formidable adversary than the bayonets of the Republicans. The route of the army lay through the inhospitable provinces of Gueldreland and Over Issel; the country consisted of flat and desert heaths; few houses were to be found on the road, and these scattered, singly, or in small hamlets, affording no shelter to any considerable body

* Ante, ii. 474, 476.

of men. Over this dreary tract the British troops marched during the dreadful winter of 1794-5, through an unbroken wilderness of snow, with the thermometer frequently down at 15° and 20° below zero of Fahrenheit, and, when it was somewhat milder, a fierce and biting north wind blowing direct in the faces of the soldiers. In this trying crisis, Colonel Wellesley commanded the rear guard; his activity and vigilance arrested in a great degree the disorders which prevailed; and, in his first essay in arms, he experienced severities equal to the far-famed horrors of the Moscow retreat.¹*

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¹ Gurw. i.
^{2, 3.}
Scher. i. 4,

^{5.}

Short as was this first campaign of the Duke of Wellington, it was the best school that had been presented for nearly a century, for the formation of a great commander. War was there exhibited on a grand scale: it was in an army of sixty-eight battalions and eighty squadrons that he had served. The indomitable courage and admirable spirit of the British soldiers had there appeared in their full lustre: but the natural results of these great qualities were completely prevented by the defects, at that period, of their military organization; by total ignorance of warlike measures in the cabinet which planned their movements; a destructive minuteness of direction, arising from too little confidence on the part of government in their generals in the field; a general want of experience in officers of all ranks in the most ordinary operations of a campaign; and, above all, the ruinous parsimony which, in all states subject to a really popular government, breaks down, on the return of peace, the military force, by which alone, on the next resumption of hostilities, early success can be secured. These defects appeared in

Excellent
effect of this
campaign on
his mind.

* "The cold in Russia in 1812 never fell so low as in Holland in the winter of 1794-5."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv. 74.

CHAP.
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1795.

painful contrast to the brilliant and efficient state of the more experienced German armies, which, with national resources no ways superior, and troops far inferior, both in courage and energy, were able to keep the field with more perseverance, and, in the end, achieve successes to which the British soldiers could hardly hope to arrive. These considerations forcibly impressed themselves on the mind of the young officer, and he was early led to revolve in his mind those necessary changes in the direction and discipline of the army, which, matured by the diligence and vigour of the Duke of York, ultimately led the British nation to an unparalleled pitch of strength and glory.¹

¹ Scherer, i.
6, 10.

Colonel
Wellesley
sent to In-
dia, and
first entry
on com-
mand there.

It was not long before an opportunity presented itself for witnessing the capability of British soldiers when subjected to an abler direction, and led by more experienced officers. After the return of the troops from Flanders to England, the 33d regiment was ordered to the West Indies ; but contrary winds prevented the transports on which it was embarked from sailing, and their destination was soon after changed for the East. Colonel Wellesley arrived with his corps at Calcutta in January 1797. During the voyage out it was observed that he spent most of his time in reading ; and after he landed in India, he was indefatigable in acquiring information regarding the situation and resources of the country in which he was to serve, so that when he was called, as he early was, to high command, he was perfectly acquainted, as his correspondence from the first demonstrates, both with the peculiarities of Indian warfare, and the intricacies of Indian politics.² And, when his division of the army took the field in January, 1799, against Tippoo Sultaun, the fine condition and perfect discipline of the men, as well as the skill and

² Gurw. i.
2, 3.
Scher. i. 9,
10.
Wellesley's
Desp. i.
425.

judgment of the arrangements made for their supplies, called forth the warm commendations of the commander-in-chief, who little thought what a hero he was then ushering the name into the world.*

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The name of no commander in the long array of British greatness will occupy so large a space in the annals of the world as that of Wellington; and yet there are few whose public character possesses, with so many excellencies, so simple and unblemished a complexion. It is to the purity and elevation of his principles, in every public situation, that this enviable distinction is to be ascribed. Intrusted early in life with high command, and subjected from the first to serious responsibility, he possessed that singleness of heart and integrity of purpose which, even more than talent or audacity, are the foundation of true moral courage, and the only pure path to public greatness—a sense of duty, a feeling of honour, a generous patriotism, a forgetfulness of self, constituted the spring of all his actions. He was ambitious, but it was to serve his king and country only; fearless, because his whole heart was wound up in these noble objects; disinterested, because the enriching of himself or his family never for a moment crossed his mind; insensible to private fame when it interfered

His character as a public man.

* “I have much satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops under the orders of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley do honour to themselves and to him, while the judicious and masterly arrangements as to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence into dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Wellesley, than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my marked approbation.” How early is the real character of great men shown when once thrown into important situations! This might have passed for a description of Wellington’s arrangements for the supply of his army in the South of France in spring 1814.—GENERAL HARRIS to the *Governor-general in Council*, Feb. 2, 1799; *WELLESLEY’S Despatches*, i. 425.

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' Sall. Bell
Cat.

with public duty, indifferent to popular obloquy when it arose from rectitude of conduct. Like the Roman patriot, he wished rather to be, than appear deserving. "*Esse quam videri bonus malebat, ita quo minus gloriam petebat eo magis adsequebatur.*"¹ Greatness was forced upon him, both in military and political life, rather because he was felt to be the worthiest, than because he desired to be the first; he was the architect of his own fortune, but he became so almost unconsciously, while solely engrossed in constructing that of his country. He has left undone many things, as a soldier, which might have added to his fame, and done many things, as a statesman, which were fatal to his power; but he omitted the first because they would have endangered his country, and committed the second because he felt them to be essential to its salvation. It is to the honour of England, and of human nature, that such a man should have risen at such a time, to the rule of her armies and her councils; but he experienced, with Themistocles and Scipio Africanus, the mutable tenure of popular applause, and the base ingratitude of those whom he had saved. Having triumphed over the arms of the threatening tyrant, he was equally immovable in the presence of the insane citizens; and it is hard to say whether his greatness appeared most when he struck down the conqueror of Europe on the field of Waterloo, or was himself with difficulty rescued from death on its anniversary, eighteen years afterwards, on the streets of London.

His military
character.

A constant recollection of these circumstances, and of the peculiar and very difficult task which was committed to his charge, is necessary, in forming a correct estimate of the Duke of Wellington's military achievements. The brilliancy of his course is

well known : an unbroken series of triumphs from Vimiera to Toulouse ; the entire expulsion of the French from the Peninsula ; the planting of the British standard in the heart of France ; the successive defeat of those veteran marshals who had so long conquered in every country of Europe ; the overthrow of Waterloo ; the hurling of Napoleon from his throne ; and the termination, in one day, of the military empire founded on twenty years of conquest. But these results, great and imperishable as they are, convey no adequate idea, either of the difficulties with which Wellington had to contend, or of the merit due to his transcendent exertions. With an army seldom superior in number to a single corps of the French marshals ; with troops dispirited by recent disaster, and wholly unaided by practical experience ; without any compulsory law to recruit his ranks, or any strong national passion for war to supply its want,—he was called on to combat successively vast armies, composed, in great part, of veteran soldiers, perpetually filled by the terrible powers of the conscription, headed by chiefs who, risen from the ranks, and practically acquainted with the duties of war in all its grades, had fought their way from the grenadier's musket to the marshal's baton, and were followed by men who, trained in the same school, were animated by the same ambition. Still more, he was the general of a nation in which the chivalrous and mercantile qualities are strongly blended together ; which, justly proud of its historic glory, is unreasonably jealous of its military expenditure ; which, covetous beyond measure of warlike renown, is ruinously impatient of pacific preparation ; which starves its establishment when danger is over, and yet frets at defeat when its terrors are present ; which

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Difficulties
with which
he had to
contend in
that capacity.

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dreams, in war, of Cressy and Agincourt, and ruminates, in peace, on economic reduction. He combated at the head of an alliance formed of heterogeneous states, composed of discordant materials, in which ancient animosities and religious divisions were imperfectly suppressed by recent fervour or present danger; in which corruption often paralysed the arm of patriotism, and jealousy withheld the resources of power. He acted under the direction of a ministry which, albeit zealous and active, was alike inexperienced in hostility and unskilled in combinations; in presence of an opposition, which, powerful in eloquence, supported by faction, was prejudiced against the war, and indefatigable to arrest it; for the interests of a people who, although ardent in the cause and enthusiastic in its support, were impatient of disaster and prone to depression, and whose military resources, how great soever, were dissipated in the protection of a colonial empire which encircled the earth.

Admirable
ability and
skill with
which he
overcame
them.

Nothing but the most consummate prudence, as well as ability in conduct, could, with such means, have achieved victory over such an enemy; and the character of Wellington was singularly fitted for the task. Capable, when the occasion required, or opportunity was afforded, of the most daring enterprises, he was yet cautious and wary in his general conduct; prodigal of his own labour, regardless of his own person, he was avaricious only of the blood of his soldiers; endowed by nature with an indomitable soul, a constitution of iron, he possessed that tenacity of purpose and indefatigable activity, which is ever necessary to great achievements; prudent in council, sagacious in design, he was yet prompt and decided in action; no general ever revolved the probable

dangers of an enterprise more anxiously before undertaking it, none possessed in a higher degree the eagle eye, the arm of steel, necessary to carry it into execution. By the steady application of these rare qualities, he was enabled to raise the British military force from an unworthy state of depression to an unparalleled pitch of glory ; to educate, in presence of the enemy, not only his soldiers in the field, but his rulers in the cabinet ; to silence, by avoiding disaster, the clamour of his enemies ; to strengthen, by progressive success, the ascendancy of his friends ; to augment, by the exhibition of its results, the energy of the government ; to rouse, by deeds of glory, the enthusiasm of the people. Skilfully seizing the opportunity of victory, he studiously avoided the chances of defeat : aware that a single disaster would at once endanger his prospects, discourage his countrymen, and strengthen his opponents, he was content to forego many opportunities of earning fame, and stifle many desires to grasp at glory ; magnanimously checking the aspirations of genius, he trusted for ultimate success rather to perseverance in a wise, than audacity in a daring course. He thus succeeded, during six successive campaigns, with a comparatively inconsiderable army, in maintaining his ground against the vast and veteran forces of Napoleon, in defeating successively all his marshals, and baffling successively all his enterprises, and finally rousing such an enthusiastic spirit in the British empire as enabled its government to put forth its immense resources on a scale worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown, and terminate a contest of twenty years by planting the English standard on the walls of Paris.

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To have given birth to such a man is a sufficient

CHAP. distinction for one family ; but Wellington is not the
 LII. only illustrious character which England owes to the
 1795. house of Mornington. It is hard to say whether, in
 Character of a different line, in the management of the cabinet,
 Marquis the civil government of men, and the far-seeing
 Wellesley. sagacity of a consummate statesman, MARQUIS
 WELLESLEY is not equally remarkable. He was
 the elder brother of the family, and gave early pro-
 mise, both at school and college, of those brilliant
 qualities which afterwards shone forth with such
 lustre in the administration of India. His talents
 for business soon introduced him to the notice of
 government, but his predilection was so strongly
 evinced from the first for Oriental affairs, that nature
 appeared to have expressly formed him for the com-
 mand of the East. At an age when most of his con-
 temporaries were acquainted with the affairs of India
 only through the uncertain medium of distant re-
 port, or the casual hints of private conversation, he
 was fully master of the politics of Hindostan, and
 had already formed those clear and luminous views
 of the condition and situation of our power there,
 which enabled him, from the very outset of his career,
 to direct with so steady a hand the complicated
 mazes of Indian diplomacy. He had for several years
 been an active member of the Board of Control,
 then under the able direction of Lord Melville, and
 had acquired, from his remarkable proficiency in the
 subject, a large share in the confidence of govern-
 ment ; but it was not in any of the public offices, it
 was not from the inspiration of Leadenhall Street,
 that he drew the enlarged and statesman-like views
 which from the first characterised his eastern admi-
 nistration. It was in the solitude of study that the
 knowledge was obtained ; it was from the sages and

historians of antiquity that the spirit was inhaled ; it was in the fire of his own genius that the light was found.

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The maxims on which Marquis Wellesley acted in the East, were the same with those which Napoleon perceived to be indispensable to his existence in Europe, and which, in former times, had given the Romans the empire of the world. He at once perceived that the British sway in India was founded entirely on opinion ; that twenty or thirty thousand Europeans, scattered among a hundred million of Asiatics, must have acquired their supremacy by fascinating the mind ; that this moral sway could be maintained only by fidelity to engagement, and fearlessness in conduct ; and that, in such circumstances, the most prudent course was generally the most audacious. Disregarding, therefore, entirely that temporizing policy which the government at home had taken such pains to impress upon its rulers, which Cornwallis had triumphed over only by disregarding, and Sir John Shore had obeyed only to destroy, he resolved, at all hazards, to maintain the British faith inviolate, to strike terror into his enemies by the vigour of his measures, and secure victory by never despairing and being always worthy of it. He recollected the words of Cato,—“Quanto vos attentior ea agetis tanto illis animus infirmior erit ; si paullulum modo vos languere viderint, jam omnes feroces aderunt.”¹

Character of
his Indian
administra-
tion.

¹ Sall. Bell,
Cat.

But vigour and resolution are not alone capable of achieving success, though they are generally essential towards it : wisdom in combination, foresight in council, prudence in preparation, are also indispensable ; and it was in the union of these invaluable qualities, with the courage of the hero and the heart

Statesman-
like wisdom
with which
it was ac-
companied.

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of the patriot, that Marquis Wellesley was unrivalled. Boldly assuming the lead, he kept it without difficulty, because he was felt to be the first; ardently devoted to his country, he inspired a portion of the sacred fire into all his followers;* discerning in the estimation of character, he selected from the many men in his service the most gifted; penetrated with the most lofty, as well as the soundest views, he communicated his own statesman-like principles both to the direction of the councils and the guidance of the armies of India. In vigour of resolution, moral courage, diplomatic ability, and military combination, he was the first of British statesmen, even in the days of Pitt and Fox. Never, perhaps, in so short a time, was such a change produced on the character of public administration, the vigour of national councils, or the success of national arms, as by his eastern rule. He found them vacillating, he left them decided; he found the public service weakened by corruption, he left it teeming with energy; he found the East India Company striving only to defend their possessions on the coast, he left them seated on the throne of Aurengzebe. So vast a change effected in

▪ “So entirely devoted am I,” said Lord Wellesley, “to the indispensable duty of providing a large force in the field and an efficient system of alliance, that my estimate of character, and my sentiments of respect, and even of affection, in this country, are regulated absolutely by the degree of zeal and alacrity which I find in those who are to assist me in this great struggle. Nor can I conceive a more firm foundation, or a more honourable bond of friendship, than a common share in the labours, difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valuable a part of the British empire. This is the nature of the connexion which I seek with your Lordship, and these are the sentiments which render me so averse to those men who appear negligent, or reluctant, or irresolute in a conjuncture which ought to extinguish all partialities, all private resentments and affections, and unite and animate all talents and exertions in one common cause.”—MARQUIS WELLESLEY to LORD CLIVE, *Governor of Madras*, 14th Nov. 1798; WELL. *Despatches*, i. 344.

a few years, is one of the most remarkable instances which history affords of the impress which a lofty character can communicate to the sphere of its influence; and, like the corresponding and simultaneous elevation of France under the guidance of Napoleon, may tend to modify the ideas which philosophic minds are apt to entertain of the entire government of human affairs by general causes, and to make us suspect, that in working out its mysterious designs, Providence not unfrequently makes use of the agency of individual greatness.

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1795.

Another statesman, possessed of less brilliant, but equally important qualities, presided over the direction of Indian affairs in this country during the most momentous period of Lord Wellesley's government, and had long contributed essentially, by the enlarged and statesman-like views with which he himself was impressed, to train the mind of the future ruler of the East to those great conceptions which, from the very first, distinguished his administration. HENRY DUNDAS, afterwards LORD VISCOUNT MELVILLE, was descended from the house of Arniston in Scotland: a family which, since the Revolution, had enjoyed a large share of the legal honours and offices in that country, and had early risen, alike from his talents and his connexions, to the office of Lord Advocate. But his force of mind and ambition impelled him into a more elevated career. In 1782, he entered Parliament, and from that time, for the next twenty-five years, enjoyed to a greater degree than any other person the confidence and friendship of Mr Pitt. In 1792, he was promoted to the important situation of President of the Board of Control, and from that period down to Mr Pitt's retirement in 1800, had the almost exclusive

Character of
Lord Mel-
ville.

CHAP.
LII.

1795.

His great
abilities and
vast infor-
mation on
Indian
affairs.

direction of Eastern affairs. When that great man resumed the helm in 1804, he was made first Lord of the Admiralty, and by his indefatigable energy soon restored the navy from the state of decay into which it had fallen during the short-sighted parsimony of the Addington Administration: so that the same statesman enjoyed the rare distinction of framing the policy which produced Lord Wellesley's triumphs in India, and launching the fleets which extinguished the Navy of France amidst the shoals of Trafalgar.

Lord Melville's talents were of the highest order; but they were of the solid and useful rather than the brilliant and attractive kind. A powerful debater from strength of intellect and vigour of thought, he overcame by these qualities the disadvantages of a northern accent, a deficiency in imaginative or oratorical qualities, and the prejudices against his country, which were general in England, till the genius of Sir Walter Scott and the increasing intercourse between the two nations converted it into a sometimes indulgent partiality. But if he could not rival Mr Fox or Mr Sheridan in the fire of genius or graces of eloquence, he excelled them in many sterling qualities which constitute a great statesman; and the want of which is too often, to its grievous loss, thought to be compensated in Great Britain by the more showy but inferior accomplishments which command and seduce a popular assembly. To vast powers of application, he united a sound judgment and a retentive memory; the native force of his mind made him seize at once the strong points of a subject, his prodigious information rendered him thoroughly master of its details. Nowhere is to be found a more comprehensive and statesman-like series of instructions than is presented in his Indian correspondence; it has been

declared by an equally competent judge and unbiassed
opponent, that in these and Marquis Wellesley's Des-
patches is to be sought the whole materials both of
history and information on our Eastern dominions.¹
All the features of Lord Wellesley's administration
are to be there found chalked out with prophetic
wisdom, even before that illustrious man left the
British shores. The true principles of colonial go-
vernment are developed with a master's hand and
a statesman's wisdom; all his subsequent measures
obtained the cordial support of that able auxiliary
in the British Cabinet. It may safely be affirmed,
that if England ever lose the empire of the seas, it
will be from departing from his maxims in the man-
agement of the navy; if she is stripped of her Indian
empire, from forgetting his principles of colonial ad-
ministration.*

CHAP.
LII.

1795.

¹ Lord.
Brougham,
Edin.
Review, No.
139.

The general objects of his policy are clearly pointed
out in his letters from the Cape of Good Hope in
February, 1798, to Lord Melville; a series of state
papers drawn up before he had set foot in India,
which will bear a comparison with any in the world

* "It is of the last importance to keep up the means of a large impor-
tation from India; not only from the encouragement it affords to the
navigation and shipping of the kingdom, and the addition which it makes
annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and being a fruitful
source of revenue, but its necessity as immediately connected with the
prosperity of our Indian provinces. It is to the *increased exports from
India to Europe that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity,
industry, population, and revenue*, and the manufacturers of that country
would immediately be reduced to a deplorable state if any check were
ever given to their annual exports to this country."—LORD MELVILLE
to LORD WELLESLEY, August, 1799; WEL. *Desp.* ii. 102. It is on this
principle, a *fair reciprocity of advantages*, that all really wise colonial
administration must be founded, and by it alone that such distant pos-
sessions can be permanently preserved; but how different is this view,
from the sacrifice of all colonial interest to *cheap purchasing by the mother
state*, which, under the free trade system, has almost exclusively regulated
our policy for the last fifteen years!

CHAP. for sound and enlarged views of complicated politics.
LII.

1795.

Lord Wel-
lesley's first
objects of
policy, and
early per-
ception of
the necessity
of war.

Wellesley's
Desp. to
Lord Mel-
ville, Feb.
28, 1798, i.
1, 34, 81,
91.

He is unable,
from finan-
cial and mi-
litary diffi-
culties, to
commence
immediate
hostilities.

He at once perceived that the advantages of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, and the ascendancy acquired by the glorious victory of Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, had been in a great measure lost by the timid policy of the succeeding administration, and therefore the first object of his endeavours was to recover the ascendancy which had been so unhappily impaired, and take measures against the powers which had risen upon its ruins. The destruction of the French subsidiary force at Hyderabad and restoration of our influence at the court of the Nizam; the arrangement by mediation of the differences among the Mahratta powers; the removal of the league which was to prove a counterpoise to the ascendancy of Tippoo, and the separation of his territories, if hostilities became unavoidable, from the coast, so as to detach him from French intrigue or co-operation, were the objects which presented themselves to his mind, not so much as steps to power as essential to existence.¹

No sooner had he landed in India, however, than he perceived that the open alliance of Tippoo with the French, joined to the success of their expedition to Egypt, and the increase to their influence among the native powers which Napoleon's victories had produced, rendered an early attack on the Mysore chief indispensable.* Had he possessed the means, he would immediately have commenced hostilities before the Sultaun's preparations were completed; but un-

* Sir Thomas Monro, one of the ablest men that India has ever produced, was of the same opinion at this period. "Men read books," says he, "and because they find all warlike nations have had their downfall, they declaim against conquest as not only dangerous but unprofitable; but there are times and situations where conquest not only brings a revenue greatly beyond its expenses, but also additional security. Let us advance to the Kistna; we shall triple our revenue, our barrier will

fortunately the state of the Government finances and military establishment at Madras, where the principal efforts required to be made, rendered that altogether impracticable. So low had the credit of the Company fallen at that presidency, that their eight per cent paper had sunk to a discount of eighteen or twenty per cent.; the finances both there and at Bombay were completely exhausted; the present deficit was eighteen lacks of pagodas (L.480,000); bills designed to supply the want of specie had multiplied so much that they had alarmingly depreciated; only fourteen thousand men of all arms could be drawn together for the attack on Tippoo; a war was pronounced impracticable without at least six months' previous preparation; the frontier fortresses were without provisions, the army without stores, equipment, or transport train; and so far from being in a condition to equip it for the field, the Government had hardly the means of moving it from Madras to the Mysore territory. These evils were also felt, though in a lesser degree, at Calcutta; the general treasury was drained by the incessant demands of the sister presidencies, and that general despondency prevailed which is so often both the forerunner and the cause of national disaster.¹*

CHAP.
LII.

1795.

Mem. of the
Madras Government,
6th July,
1798.
Wellesley's
Desp. i. 72,
79, 191

But it soon appeared how powerful is the influence of a gifted and magnanimous mind upon national fortunes, if called into action at a time when the heart of the nation is sound, and those symptoms or debility have arisen not from the decline of public

then be both stronger and shorter. The dissensions and revolutions of the native governments will point out the time when it is proper for us to become actors. While Tippoo's power exists, we shall be perpetually in danger of losing what we have."—SIR THOS. MONRO to EARL OF MORNINGTON, June 7, 1798; MONRO's *Memoirs*, i. 234; and AUBER, ii. 174.

* See Note A.

CHAP.
LII.

1795.

Rapid effect
of Lord
Wellesley's
administra-
tion in im-
proving
affairs.

virtues, but the timidity or misdirection of those who have been placed at the head of affairs. Many months had not elapsed before Lord Wellesley had communicated the impress of his zeal and energy to every branch of the public service. Disregarding altogether the sinister forebodings and gloomy representations of the Madras Government, he laboured assiduously to augment the military force and restore the financial resources of that important part of our Eastern dominions; by never yielding to difficulties, he soon found none; by boldly assuming the lead in diplomacy, he speedily acquired the command. All classes, both at home and abroad, rapidly discovered the character of the man with whom they were now brought in contact; British patriotism was roused by the clear indications which were afforded of capacity at the head of affairs: Asiatic hostility sunk before the ascendant of European talent; Indian jealousy before the force of English courage. The army was rapidly augmented; the frontier fortresses were armed and victualled; the bullock service and commissariat put on a respectable footing; a powerful battering train was collected at Madras; voluntary subscriptions, on a magnificent scale, at all the three presidencies, bespoke at once the public spirit and opulence of the inhabitants; corps of European volunteers were formed, and soon acquired a great degree of efficiency, while a subsidiary treaty concluded with the Nizam in the beginning of September, restored the British influence at the court of Hyderabad, and gave public proof of the renewal of British influence among the native powers.¹

1st Sept.
1798.

¹ Wellesley's
Desp. ii.
626, and i.
355.
Auber, ii.
179.

The first vigorous stroke was directed against the French subsidiary force, now fourteen thousand strong, which had so long exercised a domineering influence

at the court of the Nizam. Fortunately for the interests of England, the same overbearing character which has in every age made the permanent rule of the French insupportable to a vanquished people, had already manifested itself; and the Nizam, now reposing confidence in the support of the English Government, had become exceedingly desirous of ridding himself of his obnoxious defenders. By the new treaty of Hyderabad, the British subsidiary troops, formerly two thousand, were to be augmented to six thousand men, and they were under the direction of Colonel Kirkpatrick, an officer whose skill and prudence was equal to the difficult and important task committed to his charge. The increased force entered the Nizam's territories in the beginning of October, reached Hyderabad on the 10th, joined a large body of the Nizam's horse, and surrounded the French camp on the 22d. A mutiny had broken out in the corps on the preceeding day, and the sepoy had arrested their officers; in this state of insubordination no authority existed capable of withstanding the British troops, and the whole French officers were, without bloodshed, delivered up to the English authorities, on condition of their private property being preserved, and their being immediately transported to France; conditions which were immediately and faithfully executed.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1798.

Successful
reduction of
the French
subsidiary
forces at
Hyderabad.
22d Oct.Lord Wel-
lesley to
Court of
Directors,
21st Nov.
1798.
Dup. i. 356.

This bold and important stroke was immediately attended with most important effects. The French influence at the native courts received a rude shock, while that of the English was proportionably augmented; the natives of the subsidiary corps almost all entered the British ranks, and formed an important addition to the sepoy force; while the Nizam, overjoyed at his delivery from such supercilious de-

Its great
effects in
India.

CHAP.
LII.

1798.

¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
General
Harris, 23d
Feb. 1799,
Desp. i. 581;
and to the
Directors,
22d April,
1799,
Ibid, i. 535.

fenders, renewed his ancient and cordial alliance with the East India Company. It soon appeared how necessary this decisive stroke had been, and what was the magnitude of the dangers which would soon have assailed the British power if the war had not in this manner been at once carried into the enemies' territory. Secret information was received that Scindiah had entered into correspondence with Tippoo and the French; the Peishwa was ascertained to have supported his views against the Company and the Nizam; the inveterate hostility of the Sultaun of Mysore was well known, and his preparations, though secretly conducted, were daily assuming a more formidable character; Zemaun Schah, by the terrors of an Affghan invasion, operated as a powerful diversion, and rendered it necessary to station a large force on the northern frontiers of Hindostan; a deep-laid plot was on foot for expelling the English from Bengal, Bahar, and all their provinces on the banks of the Ganges, in which most of the Mahommedan chiefs of those countries were implicated; while the whole Mahratta potentates were secretly intriguing against the British power, and only awaited the expected arrival of the French from Egypt, to join openly in the general confederacy against it.¹

The indefatigable activity and commanding energy of Lord Mornington, however, enabled him to make head against all these difficulties; and he soon made such progress in the military preparations as enabled him, early in 1799, to anticipate the designs of his enemies, by striking a decisive blow at the heart of their power. The army collected at Madras was raised, before the close of the preceeding year, to thirty thousand fighting men, with an immense battering train; a noble force, in an incomparable state

of discipline and equipment, while a co-operating body of six thousand men, in equally admirable condition, were ready to advance from Bombay under General Stuart. Explanations were demanded from Tippoo of his hostile measures, particularly his sending ambassadors to the Isle of France, but no reply was received, although the British Government gave ample proof of their disposition to act with fidelity according to the existing treaties, by relinquishing to him, at this very crisis, the territory of Wynaad, a disputed district which, on Lord Wellington's arrival in India, was in the possession of the British authorities, without any adequate title. A proposition on the part of the Governor-general to open an amicable negotiation through Colonel Doveton, having been eluded with characteristic artifice* by the Sultaun, and the military preparations being complete, Marquis Wellesley, early in January, proceeded to Madras in person, and on the 10th of February the army, under General Harris, entered the Mysore territory, while, shortly after, General Stuart also advanced with his co-operating force from the side of Bombay.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ Wel. Desp.
i. 452, 466,
478.

Notwithstanding the depth and extent of his plans, Tippoo was on this occasion taken by surprise. He had not anticipated the vigour and celerity of the new Governor-general, and calculated upon being permitted to choose his own time, as on former occasions, for the commencement of hostilities, which he would have deferred till his preparations were complete, and the extensive confederacy in the course of

* Tippoo wrote in answer to the communication, announcing Major Doveton's mission,—“that being frequently disposed to *make excursions and hunt*, he was accordingly *proceeding upon a hunting excursion*; but that he would be pleased that the Governor-general would be so good as to dispatch Major Doveton to him unattended, or slightly attended.—TIPPOO to Governor-general, Feb. 9, 1799; WELLESLEY'S Desp. i. 452.

CHAP. formation was encouraged by the presence of a
 LII. French auxiliary force. His military power, how-
 1799. ever, was already very great ; Seringapatam was in
 a formidable state of defence, and he had above fifty
 thousand men in a central position, under arms.
 Finding, therefore, that his territories were menaced
 on two sides at once, he judiciously resolved to direct
 his efforts, in the first instance, against the least con-
 siderable of the invading armies ; and with that
 view moved against General Stuart, even before he
 had crossed the Bombay frontier. The Sultaun's
 force on this occasion amounted to twelve thousand
 men, the flower of his army ; but though the weight
 of the contest fell on two thousand European and
 Sepoy troops, they were defeated in half an hour,
 and quickly retired to the neighbourhood of Serin-
 gapatam, with the loss of fifteen hundred killed and
 wounded.¹

¹ Well.
 Desp. i.
 505, 508.
 Scherer. i.
 21, 23.

The progress of the grand army, thirty thousand strong, which advanced from the side of Madras, was at first very slow, owing to the immense battering and seige equipage which followed in its train, and the sickness which almost uniformly seizes the transport cattle when they leave the coast and ascend the high table land of Mysore. They experienced, however, very little molestation from the Sultaun until the 27th March, when a general engagement took place. Tippoo's army occupied a range of heights beyond the little town of Malavilly ; and a distant exchange of cannon shot from the batteries on either side at length led to a general action. Colonel Wellesley (Wellington) commanded the division on the left, and General Floyd the centre. Owing to the exhausted state of the bullocks which drew the artillery, a delay occurred in the formation of the

line, of which the Mysore horse took advantage to make a daring charge on Colonel Wellesley's division, which moved on to the attack, and was considerably in advance, and separated by a wide gap from the centre.* A huge mass of cavalry, supported by the bravest of Tippoo's turbaned infantry, bore down on the English division, and filled the opening; but the 33d were ordered to reserve their fire till within pistol shot, when they delivered it with decisive effect, and immediately charged with the bayonet, while the red plumed dragoons of Floyd soon after coming up from the centre, charged them on the other flank, and completed the rout. Two thousand of the enemy fell in the battle or the pursuit, while the loss of the victors did not exceed three hundred.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ General Harris' Desp. 5th April, 1799. Well. Desp. i. 515. Scher. i. 23, 24.

No further obstacle now remained to prevent the British from taking up their ground before Seringapatam, which was done on the 5th April. The assembled host, which was soon joined by the corps under General Stuart, from Bombay, presented a formidable apperance, and exhibited a splendid proof of the magnitude and resources of the British empire in the East. Thirty-five thousand fighting men, an hundred pieces of battering cannon, and camp fol-

Investment of Seringapatam. April 5.

* Colonel Wellesley on this occasion was not intended by General Harris to make the attack, but to wait till the onset was made by the right and centre, and orders to that effect were sent him by the commander-in-chief. When they were delivered, however, he saw, from the confusion into which the enemy in his front had fallen, that the attack could be made with more prospect of success by his division, and he said so to the officer who bore the despatches. He agreed with him, but stated that he had only to deliver his orders; but that he would report the circumstance, and Colonel Wellesley's opinion, to General Harris; and that, if he did not hear from him to the contrary in ten minutes, he might conclude the suggestion was approved of. Nothing was heard during that time, and Colonel Wellesley made the attack, which proved successful. "I was a little annoyed," said the Duke, in London in 1823, "at the time, that this circumstance was not noticed by Harris in his official despatches, but I now see he was quite right not to mention it."

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ Well. Desp.
i. 517, and
ii. 98.
Ante, iv.
485.

Progress of
the siege and
repulse of
Colonel
Wellesley.

lowers in the usual Asiatic proportion of four to one soldier, formed a stupendous array of above an hundred and fifty thousand men, assembled on the high table-land of Mysore, three thousand feet above the level of the sea, and above eight thousand miles from the parent European state. The greatness of this effort will not be duly appreciated unless that it is recollected that at the same moment twenty thousand admirable troops, under Sir James Craig, lay in the territories of Oude, to guard the northern provinces of India from Zemaun Schah ; that the army was collected in the Mediterranean which so soon after expelled the French from Egypt, and the fleet was afloat which was to dissolve, by the cannon of Nelson, the northern coalition.¹

The efforts of Lord Cornwallis had been directed against the northern face of the fortress of Seringapatam, and Tippoo, anticipating an attack in the same quarter, had greatly strengthened the defences in that direction. These preparations, however, were rendered altogether unavailing, by the able movement of General Harris, previous to taking up his ground before the town, in suddenly crossing the Caverry by a neglected ford, and appearing before its southern front ; a quarter in which the country was not yet ravaged, the fortifications in a comparatively neglected state, and the communication with the Bombay army direct and easy. The camp was formed opposite to the south-western side of the fortress, the army from Bombay effected its junction on the 9th, and the approaches were conducted with great vigour. In the course of these operations, much annoyance was experienced from an advanced post of the Sultaun's, placed on a rocky eminence near the walls, from whence a destructive fire, chiefly with rockets, was kept up on the parties working in the trenches. In

order to put a stop to this harassing warfare, an attack on the post during the night was resolved on, and intrusted to Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Shaw. This nocturnal encounter would be of little importance, were it not rendered remarkable by a circumstance as rare as it is memorable, and worthy of being recorded for the encouragement of young officers exposed to early disaster—a failure by Wellington.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ Wellesley's
Desp., i.
534, 540.
Gurw. i.
23, 25.

Both divisions marched a little after it was dark: Colonel Shaw succeeded in getting possession of a ruined village, within forty yards of the aqueduct from whence the firing issued; but Colonel Wellesley, on entering the rocky eminence, near the Sultanpettah Tope, was assailed on all sides with so severe a fire, that both the 33d regiment and sepoy battalion, which he commanded, were thrown into disorder, and he was obliged to fall back to the camp; and such was the confusion which prevailed, owing to the darkness of the night, that he arrived there accompanied only by Colonel Mackenzie. The young officer proceeded at midnight to the General's tent at first much agitated, but finding General Harris not yet awake, he threw himself on the table of the tent and *fell asleep*; a fact in such a moment singularly characteristic of the imperturbable character of the future hero of Torres Vedras. General Harris next morning drew out the troops for a second attack, and offered the command to General Baird, but that generous officer suggested that Colonel Wellesley should again be intrusted with the command. General Harris happily allowed him an opportunity of obliterating his failure, by resuming the command, and at ten next morning, Colonel Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoy, again advanced against the Tope, which was soon carried in gallant style,

6th April.

CHAP. while Colonel Shaw, at the same time, drove the My-
 LII. soreans from their post on the side of the ruined vil-
 1799. lage. But for this circumstance, and the elevation of
 mind which prompted both General Harris and Gene-
 ral Baird to overlook this casual failure, and intrust
 the next attack to the defeated officer, the fate of the
 world might have been different, and the star of the
 future conqueror of Napoleon extinguished in an
 obscure nocturnal encounter in an Indian water
 course.¹*

¹ Wellesley's
 Desp., 20th
 April,
 1799, i.
 534, 540.
 Gurwood, i.
 23, 25.

The approaches to the fortress being much facili-
 tated by this success, the operations of the seige were
 conducted with great rapidity. Several formidable
 sallies of the Mysore horse were repulsed by the
 steadiness of the besiegers' infantry, and the admir-
 able vigilance exhibited in all parts of the trenches,
 the most exposed part of which were under Colonel
 Wellesley's direction. At length, on the 30th April,
 the breaching batteries opened on one of the bastions,
 which was soon shaken by a severe cross-fire from
 different sides; the curtain on the right was soon

Assault and
 fall of Serin-
 gapatam.
 4th May.

30th April.

* General, afterwards Sir David Baird, in particular, delicately sug-
 gested that Colonel Wellesley should be intrusted with the second attack;
 an instance of magnanimity in a superior officer, who might, if actuated
 by selfish feelings, have been anxious rather to throw into the shade a
 rival for the honours of the siege, worthy of the highest admiration. This
 fact is mentioned in Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*, and some doubt
 is thrown upon it in Gurwood's *Despatches of Wellington*; though
 that gallant officer admits that Baird's elevated character was perfectly
 capable of so honourable a course. But, for the honour of human nature,
 the author is happy to be able to give it an entire confirmation; having
 repeatedly heard the anecdote from a most gallant officer who was pre-
 sent on the occasion, and afterwards contributed, in no small degree, to
 the glories of Delhi and Laswaree,—Colonel Gerard, afterwards Adju-
 tant-general of the Bengal army, then engaged in the siege, the author's
 lamented brother-in-law, to whose talents and virtues, durably recorded
 in the exploits of that band of heroes, he has a melancholy pleasure in
 bearing this public testimony.—See Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*,
 i. 193; and GURWOOD, i. 25, note.

levelled ; a great magazine of rockets blew up in the town on the morning of the 2d May, and spread terror and devastation far and wide by its tremendous explosion. Early on the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the assault were placed in the trenches ; and the hour of one o'clock in the afternoon was chosen for the attack, when the sultry heat usually disposed the Asiatics to repose. Two thousand five hundred Europeans, and eighteen hundred natives formed the storming party, under the command of General Baird. They had a fearful prospect before them, for two and twenty thousand veteran troops composed the garrison, and the bastions, of uncommon strength, were armed with two hundred and forty pieces of cannon.¹ “ Follow me, my brave fellows, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers,” was the brief address of that noble officer to his gallant followers, as, leaping sword in hand out of the trenches, he descended the slope which led to the rocky bed of the Cavery, and required to be crossed before the foot of the breach was reached. He was rapidly followed by the forlorn hope, which soon led the host, and was immediately succeeded by the assaulting column in close array. But the enemy were at their post ; all was ready for the assault, every battery was manned, and from every bastion and gun which bore on the assailants a close and deadly fire was directed which speedily thinned their ranks, and would have caused any other troops to recoil. On, however, the British rushed, followed by their brave allies, through the deadly storm ; in five minutes the river was crossed, in five more the breach was mounted ; a crimson torrent streamed over the ruin ; a sally on the flank of the assaulting column by a chosen body of Tippoo’s

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

4th May.

¹ Baird’s
Life, i. 367,
378.
Well. Desp.
i. 697, 698.

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ Baird's
Desp. i.
Well. Desp.
i. 697, 699.
Harris'
Desp.,
7th May,
1799.
Ibid, 569.
Hook's Life
of Baird, i.
367, 386.
Scher. i. 29,
33.

Death of
Tippoo.

guards was repulsed ; and, as Baird was leading his men up the entangled steep, a loud shout and the waving of the British colours on its summits, announced that the fortress was won, and the capital of Mysore fallen. Dividing his men into two columns, under Colonels Sherbrooke and Dunlop, Baird soon swept the ramparts both to the right and left ; the brave Asiatics were by degrees forced back, though not without desperate resistance, to the palace, where a dreadful slaughter took place. It at length surrendered, with two of Tippoo's sons, when the firing had ceased at other points ; while the Sultan himself, who had endeavoured to escape at one of the gates of the town, which was assaulted by the sepoy, was some time afterwards found dead under a heap of several hundred slain, composed in part of the principal officers of his palace, who had been driven into a confined space, and mowed down by a cross fire of musketry. He was shot by a private soldier when stretched on his palanquin, after having been wounded himself, and had his horse killed under him ; while Baird, who for three years had been detained a captive in chains in his dungeons, had the glorious triumph of taking vengeance for his wrongs, by generously protecting and soothing the fears of the youthful sons of his redoubted antagonist. ¹

Tippoo could never be brought to believe that the English would venture to storm Seringapatam, and he looked forward with confidence to the setting in of the heavy rains which were soon approaching, to compel them to raise the siege. He was brave, liberal, and popular, during his father's life ; but his reign was felt as tyrannical and oppressive by his subjects, which, however, as is often the case in the East, they ascribed rather to the cupidity of his ministers than

his own disposition. The Bramins had predicted that the 4th of May would prove an inauspicious day to him; he made them large presents on that very day, and asked them for their prayers. He was sitting at dinner under a covered shed, to avert the rays of the sun, when the alarm was given: he instantly washed his hands, called for his arms, and, mounting his horse, rode towards the breach. On the way he received intelligence that Syed Goffar, his best officer, was killed. "Syed Goffar was never afraid of death," he exclaimed; "let Mahomed Cassim take charge of his division." His corpse was found under a mountain of slain, stripped of all its ornaments and clothing, but with the trusty amulet which he always wore, still bound round his right arm. He had received three wounds in the body, and one in the temple; but the countenance was not distorted, the eyes open, and the expression that of stern composure. The body was still warm; and for a minute Colonel Wellesley, who was present, thought he was still alive; but the pulse had ceased to beat, which had so long throbbed for the independence of India.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

¹ Scher. i.
31, 37.

The storming of Seringapatam was one of the greatest blows ever struck by any nation, and demonstrated at once of what vast efforts the British empire was capable, when directed by capacity and led by resolution. The immediate fruits of victory were immense: the formidable fortress, the centre of Tippoo's power, garrisoned by twenty-two thousand regular troops, with all his treasures and military resources, had fallen; the whole arsenal and founderies of the kingdom of Mysore were taken, and the artillery they contained amounted to the enormous number of 451 brass, and 478 iron guns, besides 287 mounted on the works. Above 520,000

Immense
importance
of the blow
thus struck.

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

pounds of powder, and 424,000 round shot, also fell into the hands of the victors: the military resources, on the whole, resembled rather those of an old-established European monarchy, than of an Indian potentate recently elevated to greatness. But these trophies, great as they were, constituted the least considerable fruits of this memorable conquest; its moral consequences were far more lasting and important. In one day a race of usurpers had been extinguished, and a powerful empire overthrown; a rival to the British power struck down, and a tyrant of the native princes slain; a military monarchy subverted, and a stroke paralyzing all India delivered. The loss in the assault was very trifling, amounting only to three hundred and eighty-seven killed and wounded, though fourteen hundred had fallen since the commencement of the siege; but the proportion in which it was divided, indicated upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and how superior in the deadly breach European energy was to Asiatic valour; for of that number, three hundred and forty were British, and only forty-seven native soldiers.¹

¹ Wellesley's
Desp., i.
709, App.,
and 572.
Scher. i.
39.

Appoint-
ment of Col.
Wellesley as
governor of
Seringapa-
tam.

Colonel Wellesley was not engaged in the storm, but he commanded the reserve, which did not require to be called into action, and viewed merely with impatient regret the heart-stirring scene. He was next day, however, appointed governor of the town by General Harris, which appointment was confirmed by Lord Wellesley, and constitutes one of the few blots on his administration. History, indeed, apart from biographical discussion, has little cause to lament an appointment which early called into active service, the great civil as well as military qualities of the Duke of Wellington, and which were immediately exerted with such vigour and effect in arresting the plunder and disorders consequent on the

storm, that in a few days the shops were all re-opened, and the bazaars were as crowded as they had been during the most flourishing days of the Mysore dynasty. But individual injustice is not to be always excused by the merits of the preferred functionary ; and, unquestionably, the hero of Seringapatam, the gallant officer who led the assault, was entitled to a very different fate from that of being superseded in the command almost before the sweat was wiped from the brow which he had adorned with the laurels of victory.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

Hook's
Life of
Baird, i.
226.
Scher.
i. 34.

The political arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore, rivalled in ability and wisdom the vigour with which the military operations had been directed. The body of Tippoo was interred with the honours due to his rank, in his father's mausoleum ; his sons obtained a splendid establishment from the prudent generosity of the victors ; the principal Mahomedan officers of the Mysore family, the main strength of the monarchy, were conciliated by being permitted to retain their rank, offices, and emoluments, under the new government ; the heir of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed, was restored to the sovereignty of the country, with a larger territory than any of his ancestors had possessed ; the Nizam was rewarded for his fidelity by a large accession of territory taken from the conquests made by the Hyder family ; the Peishwa was confirmed in his alliance by a grant somewhat more than a half of what had been allotted to the Nizam, although his conduct during the war had been so equivocal as to have forfeited all claim to the generosity of the British Government, and rendered his participation in the spoil a matter merely of policy ; while to the Company were reserved the rich terri-

Judicious
arrange-
ments con-
sequent on
the fall of
Mysore.

CHAP.
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1799.

teries of Tippoo on either coast, below the Ghauts, the forts commanding those important passes into the high table-land of Mysore, with the fortress and island of Seringapatam in its centre; acquisitions which entirely encircled the dominions of the new Rajah of Mysore by the British possessions, and rendered his forces a subsidiary addition to those of the Company. With such judgment were these arrangements effected by the directions of Lord Wellesley, and under the immediate superintendence of Colonel Wellesley, and so considerable were the territories which were at the disposal of the victorious power, that all parties were fully satisfied with their acquisitions; the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun enjoyed more magnificent establishments than they had even done during the late reign; the infant Rajah of Mysore was elevated from a hovel to a palace, and reinstated in more than his ancestral splendour; the Mahomedan officers of the fallen dynasty, surprised by the continuance of all the honours and offices which they had formerly enjoyed, were impressed with the strongest sense of the generosity of the British government; while the substantial power of Mysore had passed, with a territory yielding L.560,000 a-year, to the munificent victors,* and Marquis Wellesley, the distributor of all this magnificence, put the purest gem in the diadem of glory with which his brows were encircled,¹ by refusing for himself and his family any portion of the extensive prize money derived from the public stores

¹ Lord
Well. Desp.
to Directors,
3d Aug.
1799, ii.
72, 101.

* The territory acquired by Tippoo's conquest at this juncture by the Company was 20,000 square miles, while the Rajah of Mysore was reinstated in 29,250. The cession made by Tippoo on occasion of Lord Cornwallis's treaty was 24,000 square miles. England contains 43,000 square miles.—MARTIN'S *Map of India*, Colonial Library, and WELL. Desp. i. p. 1.

taken at Seringapatam, which had fallen into the hands of the victorious army.*

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

Little difficulty was experienced in effecting the pacific settlement of the Mysore after the death of Tippoo—the principal rajahs having hastened to make their submission after they heard of the favourable terms offered by the conqueror to the nobles; and the judgment as well as firmness of Colonel Wellesley, upon whom, as Governor of Mysore, the principal part of that important duty devolved, was alike conspicuous. One, however, Doondiah Waugh, a partisan of great energy and activity, was imprudently liberated during the confusion consequent on the storm of Seringapatam, and, having collected a band of freebooters and disbanded soldiers from the wreck of Tippoo's army, long maintained, with indefatigable perseverance, a desultory warfare. He first retired into the rich province of Bednore, which he plundered, during the paralysis of Governmen consequent on the fall of the Mysore dynasty, with merciless severity; but Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple having advanced against him at the head of light bodies of cavalry and infantry, he was

Rise and
power of
Doondiah
Waugh.

June.

20th Aug.

* His Letter on this subject is as follows:—"I understand that if the reserved part of the prize taken at Seringapatam, consisting of prize money and ordnance, should come into the possession of the Company, it is their intention to grant the whole to the army, reserving L.100,000, to be afterwards granted to me. I am satisfied that upon reflection you will perceive that the accepting such a grant would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army. And, independent of any question of my character, or of the dignity and vigour of my government, I should be miserable, if I could ever feel, that I had been enriched, at the expense of those who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration, and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive possession of all that a munificent king and an admiring country can bestow. Even if the independence of my family were at stake, which, I thank God it is not, I never could consent to establish it on an arrangement injurious to the conquerors of Mysore."—LORD WELLESLEY to Henry Dundas, 29th April, 1800, *Desp. ii.*, 262, 263.

CHAP.
LII.

1799.

defeated in several encounters, the forts which he had occupied carried by assault, and himself driven, with a few followers, into the neutral Mahratta territory. Doondiah, however, though defeated, was not subdued. Meeting with no very friendly reception from the Mahratta chiefs, he again, in the succeeding year, hoisted the colours of independence, and soon attracted to his standard multitudes of those roving adventurers who, in India, are ever ready to join any chieftain of renown who promises them impunity and plunder.¹

¹ Auber, ii.
196, 197.
Scherer, i.
42, 43.

His pursuit
and over-
throw by
Colonel
Wellesley.

Colonel Wellesley was so fully aware of the necessity of not permitting such a leader to accumulate a considerable force in provinces but recently subjected to European rule, and abounding with disorderly characters of every description, that, though he had recently refused the command of the projected expedition against Batavia from a sense of the importance of his duties in Mysore, he took the field against him in person, and soon brought the contest to a successful termination. Doondiah having entered the Peishwa's territories in May, 1800, he immediately moved against him with a body of light infantry, two regiments of British, and two of native dragoons. A victory recently gained over a considerable body of Mahratta horse, had greatly elated the spirits of Doondiah and his followers; he was rapidly following in the footsteps of Hyder Ali in the formation of a dynasty; and, in the anticipation of boundless dominion, he had already assumed the title of "King of the World." But the hand of fate was upon him. Advancing with a celerity which exceeded the far-famed swiftness of the Indian chief, marching frequently twenty-five or thirty miles a-day, even under the burning sun and over the waterless plains of

India, Colonel Wellesley at length came up with the enemy, who retired at his approach. Hangal, into which he had thrown a garrison, was stormed; Dummul, garrisoned by a thousand choice troops, carried by escalade; a division of his army, four thousand strong, attacked and routed, early on the morning of the 30th, on the banks of the Malpoorba, the whole artillery, baggage, and camels being taken; and at length intelligence was received, that Doondiah himself, with five thousand horse, lay at Conaghur, about thirty miles distant from Colonel Wellesley's cavalry. The latter made a forced march to reach him before it was dark, but the jaded state of the horses rendered it impossible to get nearer than nine miles; two hours before daylight, however, on the following morning, he was again in motion, and at five o'clock met the "King of the World," as he was marching to the westward, without any expectation of the British being at hand. Colonel Wellesley had only the 19th and 22d dragoons, and two regiments of native horse, in all about twelve hundred men; but with these he instantly advanced to the attack. Forming his troops into one line, so as not to be outflanked by the superior numbers of the enemy, who were quadruple his own force, and leading the charge himself, the British general resolutely bore down upon the foe. Doondiah's men were hardy veterans, skilfully drawn up in a strong position; but they quailed before the terrible charge of the British horse, and broke ere the hostile squadrons were upon them. The whole force was dispersed in the pursuit, and Doondiah himself slain—a decisive event, which at once terminated the war, and afforded no small exultation to the English soldiers,¹ who brought back

CHAP.
LII.

1800.

14th July.

26th July.

¹ Sir A. Wellesley to Col. Monro, 11th Sept. 1800, and Lord Wellesley, 31st Aug. 1800. Gurw. i. 69, 72, 73.

CHAP. his body in triumph, lashed to a galloper gun, to the
LII. camp.

1800.

Alliances
with the
Nizam and
the Rajah
of Tanjore.

12th Oct.
1800.

The effect of these brilliant successes soon appeared in the alliances which were courted with the Company by the Asiatic powers. The Nizam, who had obtained so large an accession of territory by the partition treaty of Mysore, soon found himself unequal to the task of governing his newly acquired territories, which were filled with warlike hordes, whom the strong arm of military power alone could retain in subjection, and he solicited, in consequence, to be relieved of a burden which his character and resources were alike incapable of bearing. A treaty, offensive and defensive, was accordingly concluded with that potentate soon after he had entered into possession of his new dominions, by which the Company guaranteed the integrity of his dominions against all attacks from whatever quarter, and, to add to the security which he so ardently desired, agreed to augment the subsidiary force stationed at Hyderabad by two additional regiments of infantry and one of cavalry; while the Nizam ceded to the Company the whole territories which he had acquired by the treaties of Seringapatam in 1792, and Mysore in 1799, of which he had never been able to obtain more than a nominal possession. The territories thus acquired by the Company amounted to 25,950 square miles, or more than half of all England, and yielded a revenue of L.450,000. The Rajah of Tanjore, anxious to shelter himself under a similar protection, entered into a treaty of the same description, and in return ceded territories, for the maintenance of his subsidiary force, amounting to 4000 square miles.¹ The Portuguese settlement of Goa was voluntarily

25th Oct.
1799.

¹ Auber, ii.
205.

Malcolm, ii.
283, 284.

Well. Desp.
ii. 580,
582.

surrendered by its debilitated possessors to the English authorities, and the descendants of the ancient discoverers and conquerors of India acknowledged the rising supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race. HAP.
LII.
1801.

Amicable relations were, at the same time, established with the Imaum of Muscat, a powerful chief, And with
the Imaum
of Muscat,
and the
King of
Persia. having a considerable naval force and vast maritime coast in the Persian Gulf and on the shores of Arabia, and the King of Persia, which terminated in the conclusion of a most important treaty, both commercial and political, with the Court of Ispahan. 12th Jan.
1801. By it valuable privileges were secured to British trade in the interior of Asia, and a barrier was provided against the only powers which, at that period, were thought to threaten the provinces of Hindostan. It was agreed that, in the event of any inroad being threatened by the Affghans, or any hostile measures attempted by France, Persia should make common cause with England in arresting the invader. No stipulations were deemed necessary against Russia, though all history told that it was from that quarter that all the serious invasions of India had emanated, and although only two years before a treaty had been concluded between Napoleon and the Emperor Paul for the transport of a force of thirty-five thousand French, and fifty thousand Russian troops, from the banks of the Rhine and of the Wolga to those of the Indus.¹ So short-sighted are the views even of the ablest statesmen and diplomatists, ¹ See ante,
iv. 516. when, carried away by the pressing, and, perhaps, ² Auber, ii.
205.
Malcolm,
283-4, 317.
App. 534,
538. Well.
Desp. ii.
580-1. accidental dangers of the moment, they overlook the durable causes which, in every age, elevate and direct the waves of conquest.²

Delivered from all domestic dangers by these prosperous events, Lord Wellesley was enabled to direct

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

Expedition,
under Sir
D. Baird,
from India
to Egypt,
March,
1801.

the now colossal strength of the Indian empire to foreign objects. Such was the extent of resources at the disposal of Government, that, without weakening, in any considerable degree, the force at any of the Presidencies, he was enabled to fit out an expedition at Bombay, consisting of seven thousand men, to take part in the great concerted attack by the British Government upon the French in Egypt. Sir D. Baird, as a just reward for his heroic conduct at Seringapatam, received the command, and sailed from Bombay on the 30th March. Colonel Wellesley had been appointed second in command, and he looked forward with exultation to the service for which he was destined, but a severe illness rendered it impossible for him to follow out his destination. General Baird, therefore, proceeded alone, and Colonel Wellesley, to whom the importance and romantic character of the expedition had rendered it an object of the highest interest, continued, during his recovery, to write letters to his brave commanding officer, containing suggestions for the conduct of the campaign, and precautions against its dangers, highly characteristic of the sagacious foresight of his mind. General Baird conducted the expedition with admirable skill, and contributed in no small degree, by his opportune arrival, to the surrender of the French force at Cairo, and the triumphant issue of the Egyptain campaign;¹ while fate, which here seemed to have blasted Colonel Wellesley in the brightest epoch of his career, was only reserving him for higher destinies, and preparing, in the triumph of Assaye, the opening of that career which was destined to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion.²

¹ Ante, iv. 574, 575.

² Baird's Life, ii. 283, 293. Col. Wellesley to Gen. Baird, 11th April, 1801. Gurw. i. 84, 97.

Civil transactions, however, of the most important nature, highly conducive to the power and stability

of the British empire in the East, ensued before the sword was again drawn on the plains of Hindostan. The kingdom of Oude had long been the seat of a large British force, both on account of the internal weakness of its Government, and the importance of its situation on the northern frontier of India, and the first likely to fall a victim to foreign invasion. By existing treaties the Company were at liberty to augment the subsidiary force serving in that province, if they deemed such increase requisite for the security of the two states ; and the mutinous, turbulent disposition both of the vizier's soldiers and subjects, as well as his inextricable pecuniary embarrassments, had long made it too apparent that it was indispensably necessary for the very existence of society in these provinces, the security of our northern frontier, as well as the payment of the subsidized force, that the weakness and corruption of the native Government should be exchanged for the vigour and equity of British rule. The native prince, however, though well aware of his inability either to conduct his own administration, or discharge his engagements to the British Government, evinced the utmost repugnance to make the proposed cessions of territory in discharge of his obligations to maintain a subsidiary force ; but at length his scruples were overcome by the firmness and ability of the British diplomatic agent, Mr Henry Wellesley, and a treaty was concluded at Lucknow, by which his highness ceded to the British Government all the frontier provinces of Oude, particularly Goorackpoor and the lower Doab, containing thirty-two thousand square miles, or three-fourths of the area of England. The revenue of the ceded districts, at the time of the treaty, was estimated at considerably less than the subsidy which the Nawaub was

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

Great acquisition of territory from the Vizier of Oude.

Sept. 6.

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

¹ Sultan's
Treaty,
Well. Des.
ii. 599.
Malcolm,
322, 325.
Auber, ii.
227, 231.

bound to furnish for the pay of the subsidiary force, by which alone his authority had been maintained ; but the British Government was amply indemnified for this temporary loss by the value of the ceded districts, which, under the firm government of the Company, soon rose to triple their former value, while the native prince obtained the benefit of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Company, and a permanent force of thirteen thousand men to defend his remaining territories ; and the inhabitants of the transferred provinces received the incalculable advantage of exchanging a corrupt and oppressive native for an honest and energetic European government.¹

Assumption
of the Go-
vernment of
the Car-
natic, July
31, 1801.

Another transaction of a similar character, about the same period, put the British in possession of territories of equal value in the Carnatic. Among many other important papers discovered in the secret archives of Tippoo Sultaun at Seringapatam, was a correspondence in cypher between that ambitious chief and the Nawaub of the Carnatic, Omdut-ul-Omrah, which left no doubt that the latter had been engaged in a hostile combination against the British Government.* The situation of the rich and fertile district of the Carnatic, so near to the British provinces on

* This correspondence, the cypher to which was accidentally discovered, was very curious. It contained decisive evidence that the Nawaub had severely reprobated the Nizam's alliance with the English, as contrary to the dictates of religion ; as well as the triple alliance between that potentate and the Mahrattas and the English, which had been the principal means in 1792 of reducing the power of Tippoo. The English were denominated *Taza Waruds*, or the new-comers ; the Nizam himself *Fleech*, or nothing ; and the Mahrattas *Pooch*, or contemptible. By the 10th article of the treaty of 1792, he was bound "not to enter into any negotiation or political correspondence with any European or native power whatever, without the consent of the Company."—MALCOLM'S *India*, 337, 339.

the Madras coast, rendered it of the highest importance that no hidden enemy should exist in that quarter; and as the authority of the Nawaub had been little more than nominal for a number of years past, Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, received orders to take military possession of the country in June 1801. The old Nawaub died about that time, and, after a difficult negociation with his son, who had succeeded to his dominions, a treaty was at length concluded, by which the British obtained the entire command of his dominions, under the condition only of providing an income suitable to the splendour and dignity of the deposed family. This condition, like all others of a similar character, was faithfully complied with; and though, in making the cession, the young Nawaub unquestionably yeilded to compulsion, yet he obtained for himself a peaceable affluence and splendid establishment; for his country, the termination of a distracted rule and a ruinous oppression; and for his subjects blessings which they never could have obtained under a native dynasty. The territories thus acquired amounted to twenty-seven thousand square miles, and were of the richest description, extending on the plains from the foot of the Mysore mountains to the coast of Coromandel.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

31st July,
1801.

¹ Well.
Desp. ii.
515, 531,
547, 561.
Auber, ii.
209, 211.
Malcolm,
334, 360.

But there never was a juster observation than the one already noticed, that conquest to induce security must be universal; for any thing short of that only induces additional causes of jealousy, and a wider sphere of hostility. By destroying the power of Tippoo and reducing the Nizam to a mere tributary condition, the English had done what Napoleon had achieved by crushing Prussia, humbling Austria, and establishing the confederation of the Rhine; they had

Causes of
the rupture
with the
Mahrattas.

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

rendered inevitable a contest with a more formidable power than either, and induced a struggle for life or death with the most powerful nations in India. The formation of alliances offensive and defensive with the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, necessarily brought the British Government into contact with their restless and enterprising neighbours the MAHRATTAS, and made them succeed to all the complicated diplomatic relations between the courts of Hyderabad, Seringapatam, and Poonah. It is needless to examine minutely the causes of the jealousy and ultimate rupture which ensued between them. That the Mahrattas, a powerful confederacy, inflamed by conquest, inured to rapine, whose hand was against every man and every man's hand against them, and who could bring two hundred thousand horsemen into the field, should view with apprehension the rapid advances of the English to supreme dominion, is not surprising; the only thing to wonder at is, that like the European powers in regard to Napoleon, they should so long have looked supinely on while the redoubtable stranger beat down successively every native power within his reach. They owed, as already mentioned, a nominal allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confedracy, and held his seat of government on the Musnud, or throne, at Poonah; and it was with him that all the treaties and diplomatic intercourse, both of the Company and the native powers had been held. But his authority, like that of the Emperor in the Germanic confederacy,

¹ Lord Well.
Memoirs,
iii. 26,
Introd.
Auber, ii.
272, 273.

was more nominal than real; and the principal chiefs in this warlike restless race, acted as much on their own account as the cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, or Munich.¹ Three of these had recently risen to emi-

nence, and formed the chief powers with whom the English had to contend in the arduous conflict which followed: the Rajahs of BERAR, SCINDIAH, and HOLKAR.

CHAP.
LII.
1801.

The Rajah of Berar had established a sway over all the territory from the sea on the western shore of the bay of Bengal, to the dominions of the Nizam on the south-west. His capital was at Nagpoor; and he could bring twenty thousand disciplined cavalry, and half that number of infantry, into the field. Scindiah's power was much more considerable. Besides eighteen thousand admirable horse, he had sixteen battalions of regular infantry under the command of European officers, and above two hundred pieces of cannon ready for action. Holkar's territories were further removed from the scene of action, being situated between the dominions of the Scindiah and Bombay, but his power was greater than either of the other chieftains. He could with ease bring eighty thousand men into the field; and though the greater part of them were cavalry, they were only on that account the more formidable to an invading enemy. The families of the two latter of these chiefs had been of recent elevation; the founder of that of Scindiah, the grandfather of the present Rajah, had originally been a cultivator, and owed his rise, when a private soldier in the guard of the Peishwa, to the accidental circumstance of being discovered by his sovereign, when left at the door in charge of his slippers, asleep with the slippers clasped with fixed hands to his breast; a proof of fidelity to his humble duty which justly attracted the attention of the monarch. Both the present Rajah and his father had been the resolute opposers of the English power; and though they wielded at will the resources of the Peishwa, they were careful to observe all the cere-

Character
and situa-
tion of Ra-
jah of Berar
and Scin-
diah.

CHAP.
LII.

1801.

¹ Auber, ii.
272, 277.
Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret Com-
mittee, Sept.
1803, iii.
372.

monials of respect to that decayed potentate. When Scindiah was at the head of sixteen regular battalions, an hundred thousand horse, and two hundred pieces of cannon, he placed himself at the court of the Peishwa below all the hereditary nobles of the state, declined to sit down in their presence, and untying a bundle of slippers, said, "This is my occupation: it was my father's." But, though thus humble in matters of form, no man was more vigorous and energetic in the real business of government. He was the nominal subject, but real master of the unfortunate Mogul Emperor, Schah Aulum; the ostensible friend, but secret enemy of his rival Holkar; the professed inferior but actual superior and oppressor of the Rajpoot chiefs of central India; the enrolled soldier, but tyrannic ruler of the declining throne of the Peishwa.¹

The family of Holkar were of the shepherd tribe; the first who rose above the class of peasants was Mulhar Row, born in 1693. By the vigour and ability which they displayed, his ancestors gradually rose to eminence under the Mahratta chiefs, and at the death of Tukajie, the head of the family, in 1797, two legitimate and two natural sons appeared to contest the palm of supremacy. Jeswunt Row was the youngest of the latter class; and in the first civil contest which ensued with his legitimate brothers he was totally defeated, and obliged to fly with only a few followers. The native vigour of his character, however, rose superior to all his difficulties; after undergoing the most extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune, in the course of which he on one occasion quelled a revolt among his Pindarrie followers by springing from his horse, and with his own hand loading and discharging a field-piece among them, he at length succeeded in all his designs, and under

1798.

the title of guardian to the infant son of his elder legitimate brother, in effect obtained the command of the whole possessions of the Holkar family. For some time he was engaged in hostilities with Scindiah; but no sooner was his power fully established than these two formidable chieftains united their forces against the Peishwa, the acknowledged head of their confederacy. The combined armies encountered those of the Peishwa in the neighbourhood of Poonah; Scindiah's forces commenced the action, and his troops at first met with a repulse; while Holkar, with his cavalry dismounted, watched the conflict from the heights in the rear. Instantly mounting his horse, the brave chief bade all who did not intend to conquer or die to return to their wives and children; for himself, he was resolved not to survive defeat. Bearing down with his squadrons, yet fresh, on the wearied foe, Holkar soon restored the combat, and finally routed the Peishwa's troops with great slaughter. The unhappy monarch was obliged to fly from his capital, which was soon occupied by his enemies, and the august head of the Mahrattas appeared as a suppliant in the British territories.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1802.

25th Oct.
1802.¹ Auber, ii.
275, 287.
Malcolm,
287, 290.
Well. Desp.
iii. 27, 34,
Introd.

Lord Wellesley justly deemed this a favourable opportunity to establish a proper balance of power among the Mahratta states, and erect a barrier between their most enterprising chiefs and the British dependencies. It had long been a leading object of English policy, to prevent the establishment of any considerable power in India with whom the French might form dangerous connexions; and already a sort of military state had risen up, of the most formidable character, under French officers, and under Scindiah's protection, on the banks of the Jumna.

Reasons for
a Mahratta
war. Per-
ron's French
force.

CHAP.
LII.

1802.

Perron, a French officer in the service of that chief-tain, had organized a formidable force, consisting of thirty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, admirably equipped and disciplined, with a train of an hundred and fifty pieces of cannon of brass, and one hundred and twenty iron guns, entirely under the direction of officers of his own country, and disposed equally to second the hostile views of the Mahratta confederacy, or forward those of Napoleon for the subversion of the British power in the East. For the maintenance of this subsidiary force he had obtained a grant of a rich and extensive territory yielding L.1,700,000 a-year of revenue, extending from the banks of the Jumna towards those of the Indus, through the Punjaub, and comprising Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Doab, or alluvial plain between the Jumna and the Ganges. It was not the least important circumstance in this military establishment that it gave M. Perron the entire command of the person of the unfortunate Shah Aulum, the degraded heir of the throne of Delhi; and promised at no distant period to put the French Emperor in possession of the rights of the House of Timour over the Indian peninsula.¹

¹ Malcolm, 308. Wellesley's Desp. iii. 29, 31, Introd. Auber, ii. 286, 287. Gurw. i. 87.

The Peishwa at length joins the British alliance.

The Peishwa was not insensible of the need in which he stood of British protection, to maintain his precarious authority over the unruly Mahratta chiefs; but dread of the hostility of Scindiah and Holkar, joined to a secret jealousy of the rising power of those aspiring foreigners had hitherto prevented him from closing with the advances made to him by the governor-general; and he had even declined to accept the share of the spoils of Mysore, which, in order to conciliate his cabinet, had, notwithstanding their dubious conduct in the war with Tippoo, been

offered by the British government. The decisive overthrow received from Scindiah and Holkar, however, and the desperate state of his affairs in consequence of their invasion, entirely overcame these scruples; and, on the morning of the day on which he evacuated his capital, the fugitive monarch eagerly solicited the aid of a British subsidiary force to enable him to make head against his rebellious feudatories. He was cordially received, therefore, by the English authorities, and having escaped out of his dominions, he embarked on board a British vessel, and landed safely at Bombay. The result of these disastrous circumstances was the conclusion of the treaty of Basseiu, between the Company and the Peishwa, in virtue of which a close alliance offensive and defensive was contracted by the two powers, and the latter agreed to receive a subsidiary force, to be maintained at his expense, of six thousand men.¹

This crisis was rightly considered by Lord Wellesley, to require the immediate application of the most vigorous measures. In contemplation of its arrival, he had already collected a body of twenty thousand men under General Stuart, at Hurrighur, a town of the Madras presidency, near the Mahratta frontier; while General, afterwards LORD LAKE, received the command of the principal force, called the army of Bengal, which was stationed in Oude. The Madras army, however, was afterwards divided into two parts, and the command of the advanced guard, consisting of ten thousand European and sepoy troops, with two thousand of the Mysore horse, was intrusted to Colonel Wellesley, whose admirable disposition during the war with Doondiah, had both won for him the confidence of the troops and conciliated the good will of the native powers. With this

CHAP.
LII.

1802.

25th Oct.

3d Dec.

18th Dec.

1802.

Wellesley's

Desp. iii.

33, 36.

Malcolm,

290, 291.

Auber, ii.

287, 289.

Collection
of forces,
and delivery
of Poonah
by Col.
Wellesley.

CHAP. force, that enterprising officer broke up from Hurri-
 LII. ghur on the 9th March, and after crossing the Tum-

1803. budra river, entered the Mahratta territory. He was

9th March, every where received by the people as a deliverer :
 1803. the peasants, won by the strict discipline of his troops

and the regular payment for provisions in the former campaign, flocked in crowds with supplies to the camp ; while the whole inhabitants, worn out with the incessant oppression of the Mahratta sway, welcomed, with loud shouts, the troops who were to introduce in its room the steadiness of British rule and the efficiency of British protection. Holkar had left Poonah some time before, with the bulk of his forces, and the garrison which he had left in that capital abandoned it on the approach of the British forces. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, deemed it unnecessary to wait the tardy movements of the infantry ; and aware of the importance of gaining possession of the capital before Scindiah could assemble forces for its relief, or the threats of burning it, which they had uttered, could be executed, put himself at the head of the cavalry, and advancing by forced marches, reached Poonah on the 19th April, and entered the city amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, whom, by an extraordinary effort, he had saved from the vengeance of the retiring enemy. In the thirty-two hours immediately preceding, he had march at the head of his horse above sixty miles, an instance of sustained effort, under the burning sun of India, which never has been exceeded in history.¹

¹ Wellesley's
 Desp. iii.
 37, 38,
 Introd.
 Gurw. iii.
 138, 145.

War with
 Scindiah
 and Rajah
 of Berar.

The effects of this vigorous step were soon apparent. The Peishwa, relieved from his compulsory exile in Bombay, returned to his dominions, and was re-seated with much pomp, in presence of the British army, on the Musnud or hereditary throne of the

Mahrattas. His principal feudatories renewed their allegiance to him, and even, in some instances, joined their troops to the British forces ; and it was for a short time hoped that this great stroke of securing the Peishwa to the British interest, by the strong bond of experienced necessity, would be accomplished without the effusion of human blood. It soon appeared, however, that those hopes were fallacious. The jealousies and animosities of the Mahratta chiefs had been subdued by the approach of common danger ; and it speedily became manifest, from the great accumulation of forces which assembled on the frontiers of the Nizam's territories, that hostilities on a very extended scale were in contemplation. Lord Wellesley's preparations were immediate, and proportioned to the imminence of the danger. General Lake assumed the command of the principal army, twenty-five thousand strong, which had assembled in Oude ; while Colonel Wellesley, now promoted to the rank of General, drew near to the threatening mass of forces which was collected on the Nizam's frontier. A long negotiation ensued, conducted by Colonel Collins, the British resident at the court of Scindiah, the professed aim of which was to smooth away the subjects of jealousy which had arisen between the two powers ; its real object to gain time for Scindiah, till the preparations of the Rajah of Berar were completed, and his approach had enabled the combined forces to take the field. At length, in the end of May, Scindiah 27th May. being much pressed to give an explanation of his armaments, or direct the withdrawal of his troops, broke up the conference, by declaring, "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether we will have peace or war." It was evident to the persons who conducted this negotia-

CHAP.
LII.
1803.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

22d July.

3d Aug.

Wellesley's

Desp. iii.

38, 41,

Introd. and

344, 346.

Malcolm,

293, 307.

Auber, ii.

291, 299.

tion, that the success of the Mahratta confederacy with Hyder in 1780, which had brought the Madras presidency to the brink of ruin, had inspired the chiefs of that nation with a most extravagant opinion of their own importance: that they were wholly unaware of the vast intermediate progress which the British power had made; and deemed that the renewal of hostilities on their part, was to be immediately followed by the siege of Madras and expulsion of the English from India. Perceiving this, and being convinced that a rupture was inevitable, Lord Wellesley committed full diplomatic powers to his generals in the field; and General Wellesley demanded, in peremptory terms, an explanation of his intentions, and removal of his forces from Scindiah, to a less threatening station. The Rajah, in his turn, insisted upon the withdrawal of the British forces, to which General Wellesley at once agreed; but when the time for carrying the mutual retreat into effect arrived, the Mahrattas showed no disposition to move, and the British government received information that the combined chiefs had resolved not to retire from their threatening position. Upon this, the resident quitted Scindiah's court, and war began both in the Oude frontier under Lord Lake, and that of the Nizam under General Wellesley.¹ *

• The substance of this important negotiation was thus pithily summed up by the Duke of Wellington, in a letter to Scindiah at this period:—
“The British government did not threaten to commit hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against them and their allies; and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war, and, in conformity with your threats and declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam frontier. On this ground, I called upon you to withdraw your army to its usual stations, if your pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your

The campaign which followed, though it lasted only five months, was one of the most brilliant in the British annals, and conducted our eastern empire, by an uninterrupted series of victories, to the proud pre-eminence which it has ever since attained. General Lake's instructions, dictated by that clear perception of the vital point of attack, which, as much as his admirable foresight, characterised all Marquis Wellesley's combinations, were to concentrate all his efforts, in the first instance, upon the destruction of M. Perron's formidable force on the banks of the Jumna; next to get possession of Delhi and Agra, with the person of Shah Aulum, the Mogul Emperor; and finally, to form alliances with the rajpoots and other native powers beyond the Jumna, so as to exclude Scindiah from the northern parts of India. General Wellesley was directed to move against the combined forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier, and distract their attention by vigorous operations, while the decisive blows were struck by General Lake at the centre of their power, and subsidiary operations were to be conducted by Colonel Campbell against the province of Cuttack, and the city of Jaggernaut, with the view of adding that important district, the link between the Bengal and Madras provinces to the British dominions.¹

General Lake's army commenced its march from the ceded provinces of Cawnpore on the 7th August, and on the 28th, as he drew near to Perron's force,

designs; and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence. This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand to the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt to repel your aggressions. I offered you peace upon terms of equality, and honourable to all parties; you have chosen war, and are responsible for all the consequences."—GENERAL WELLESLEY to SCINDIAH, 6th Aug. 1803, WELL. Despatches, iii. 277.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

Lord Wel-
lesley's plan
of opera-
tions.

¹ Auber, ii.
301, 305.
Wellesley's
Desp. iii.
210, 215.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

Defeat of
Perron's
force, and
storm of
Allighur.
20th Aug.

29th Aug.

4th Sept.

¹ Lord
Lake's
Desp. Sept.
4, 1803.
Well. Desp.
iii. 291,
294.
Auber, ii.
306.

Battle of
Delhi.

Sept. 11.

he received a letter from that officer, proposing to enter into an arrangement, by which he himself and the troops under his command, might remain neutral in the contest which was approaching; but the terms proposed were deemed inadmissible, and the flag of truce returned without effecting any arrangement. On the day following, the English came up with the whole of Perron's force, drawn up in a strong position, covering the important fort of Allighur. They were immediately attacked by the British army with the greatest vigour, and, after a short resistance, put to flight. The fortress of Allighur was next besieged; and, as the extraordinary strength of its fortifications, armed with one hundred and eighty guns, rendered operations in form a very tedious undertaking, General Lake, after a few days cannonading, resolved to hazard the perilous attempt of an escalade. The ditch, to use his own expression, was so large as to float a seventy-four, and the garrison, four thousand strong, both disciplined and resolute; but all these difficulties were overcome by the devoted gallantry of the storming party, headed by the 76th regiment, led by Colonel Monson; and after a bloody struggle, an hour in duration, the gates were blown open, and the British colours hoisted on the walls of the fortress.¹

Brilliant as was this opening of the campaign, it was speedily succeeded by other successes still more important. Advancing rapidly towards Delhi, General Lake was met by General Perron, who entered into a separate negotiation, and soon passed through the British camp on his way to embark for France, with the large fortune which he had made in the Mahratta service. But he was succeeded in the command of the French subsidiary force by M. Louis, who, instead

of showing any disposition to come to an accommodation, advanced in great force, and with a most formidable train of artillery. The British army, after a fatiguing march of eighteen miles on the 11th of September, found the enemy, twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand disciplined in the European method, with an hundred pieces of cannon, posted on a strong ridge which covered the approaches to the city of Delhi. The troops which General Lake had at his immediate disposal, as the whole of the army had not come up, did not exceed five thousand men; but with this handful of heroes, he did not hesitate instantly to advance to the attack. When the men came within range, they were received by a tremendous fire, first of round and chain shot, and afterwards of grape and musketry. Advancing, however, without flinching, through the dreadful storm, the British waited till the order was given, at the distance of an hundred yards, to fire; and then, after pouring in a close and well-directed volley, rushed forward with the bayonet, and in a few minutes drove the enemy from their guns and from the field in the utmost confusion. Sixty-eight pieces of heavy artillery, thirty-seven tumbrils, and eleven standards were taken; but such was the severity of the fire to which they were exposed during their rapid advance, that in that short time, four hundred of the British army were killed and wounded, and it was to the steady intrepidity of the 76th regiment that General Lake mainly ascribed the glorious result of the battle. ^{1*}

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Lord Lake's
Desp. Sept.
13 and 12,
1803.
Well. Desp.
iii. 308,
313.

* The following passage in Lord Lake's private despatch to Lord Wellesley on this occasion, contains a remark of permanent interest, more especially in anticipation of the future progress of events in the Indian peninsula:—"I cannot avoid saying, in the most confidential manner, that, *in the event of a foreign foe coming into this country, without a very great addition of force in Europeans*, the consequences will be fatal; ^{Lord Lake's strong opinion on the necessity of European troops in India.}

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

Alliance
with the
Mogul Em-
peror, and
surrender of
the French
chiefs.
Sept. 16.

The immediate consequence of this victory was the capture of Delhi, the ancient capital of Hindostan, and seat of the Mogul emperors, which was taken possession of without resistance on the following day, and the liberation of the Emperor Shah Aulum from the degrading servitude in which he had long been retained by the Mahratta and French authorities. The English general was received by the descendant of Timour, seated on his throne with great pomp, in presence of all the dignitaries of the empire; and experience in the end proved that he had made a most beneficial change for his own interest; for if the original Tartar conqueror would have had much to regret in the deprivation of real power with which his circumstances were attended, his enfeebled successors would have seen much to envy in the perfect security and unbounded luxury which he enjoyed as there ought always to be at least one European battalion to four native ones: this I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced that, *without King's troops, very little is to be expected*: in short, the infantry of this army, as well as cavalry, should be remodelled."—*Confidential Dispatch, Sept. 12, 1803*; WELL. Desp. iii. 312. This wise advice has been since entirely thrown away; because Government did not venture, in the face of popular clamour for reduction and retrenchment, to keep up the British troops in India at their former level, far less to augment them to double their amount, as they should have been, to preserve the proper balance between the European and native forces. It was immediately after the battle of Austerlitz that Napoleon, gifted with the sagacity which amounts to prescience, formed his designs for the fortification of Paris; and it was immediately after the battle of Delhi, that Lord Lake impressed upon Government the necessity of a great augmentation in the European forces in India. The future to the one has passed; and Napoleon, as we shall see in the sequel, fell, because dread of offending the Parisian populace prevented him from carrying into execution what he felt to be essential to the salvation of their independence: the future to us is still to come, though the prospect is enveloped in clouds, and sinister omens may already be discerned in the heavens; but posterity will see whether the British empire is to be an exception to the rule, and stability is to be given to our power by concessions to popular clamour, which have proved fatal to the greatest of those which have preceded us.

under the liberal protection of his generous allies. CHAP. LII.
 The British power derived great moral influence and 1803.
 consideration from this auspicious alliance, and the
 name of the emperor of Delhi proved of more service
 in the end, than ever his arms could have been. But
 an event of more immediate importance to the suc-
 cess of the campaign soon after occurred. M. Louis,
 and five other chiefs of the French subsidiary force,
 despairing of their cause, delivered themselves up to
 the British, and were marched off to Culcutta; while¹ Well.
 the remainder of the troops under their orders, in a^{Desp. iii.}
 great degree destitute of leaders, retired, though in^{316, 318,}
 good order, towards Agra.^{319.}

Thither they were speedily followed by General
 Lake with the British army; and, on the 10th Octo-^{Battle and}
 ber, a general attack was made on their strong posi-^{fall of Agra.}
 tions, intersected by ravines, covering the city from^{Oct. 13.}
 the south. The gallant sepoy troops, emulating the
 conduct of their European brethren in arms, under^{Oct. 10.}
 the guidance of Lieut.-Colonel Gerard, the Adjutant-
 general of the army, drove the enemy in the finest
 style from the rugged ground which they occupied,
 and, pursuing their advantages hotly, ascended the
 glacis, and gained possession of the town, though not
 without sustaining a heavy loss. Two days after-
 wards, two thousand five hundred of the enemy came
 over and entered the British service; and the breach-
 ing batteries having been completed, and the fire^{Oct. 17.}
 commenced with great effect on the ramparts, the
 garrison, six thousand strong, soon after surrendered¹ Lord
 at discretion. By this decisive blow, the last strong-^{Lake's}
 hold and great arsenal of the enemy fell into our^{Desp. 10,}
 hands.^{13, and} The stores captured were immense: one^{18th Oct.}
 hundred and sixty pieces of brass and iron cannon^{1803. Well.}
 were taken, with all their equipments and ammuni-^{Desp. iii.}
^{393, 408,}
^{and App.}
^{670.}

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

tion; while the discipline observed by the troops in the midst of their triumphs was so extraordinary, and afforded such a contrast to the license and devastation usually attendant on military success in Hindostan, that it contributed, even more than their astonishing victories, to the belief that they were, and the wish that they should continue to be, invincible.*

Battle of
Laswaree.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 21.

Nov. 1.

Humane
conduct of
the British
troops.

This early and unparalleled series of successes, secured the submission or alliance of all the native potentates in the north of Hindostan; and a treaty of alliance was concluded with the Rajah of Bhurt-pore, and another with Runjeet Sing, the Rajah of Lahore, in consequence of which, fifteen hundred of the latter's horse joined the British camp. Meanwhile, however, Scindiah moved up fourteen batta-

* "All the inhabitants of this place (Delhi), who for a time fled, perceiving that no ravages had been committed by the troops, returned to their habitations last night. I am informed from all quarters that the inhabitants beheld with astonishment this proof of the discipline and good conduct of the army, and declare that hitherto it has been unknown in Hindostan, that a victorious army should pass through a country, without destroying by fire, and committing every excess the most injurious to the inhabitants: but on the contrary, from the regularity observed by us, our approach is a blessing, instead of bringing with it, as they at first feared, all the horrors of war, attended by rapine and murder; that their cattle remain in their fields without being molested, and the inhabitants in their houses receive every protection."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, 2d Oct. 1803; WELL. *Desp.* iii. 426, 427.

On this occasion, also, Lord Lake reiterates his observation of the indispensable necessity of having a large proportion of British troops to achieve success in India. "The sepoys," says he, "have behaved excessively well; but from my observation on this day, as well as every other, it is impossible to do great things in a gallant and quick style without Europeans; therefore, if they do not in England think it necessary to send British troops in the proportion of one to three sepoy regiments, which is, in fact, as one to six, they will stand a good chance of losing their possessions in India, if a French force once get a footing in India. You may perceive, from the loss of European officers in sepoy regiments, how necessary it is for them to expose themselves; in fact, every thing has been done by the example and exertions of the officers, and without which, we had not been where we are."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, Oct. 10, 1803; WELL. *Desp.* iii. 396.

lions of his best regular infantry from the Deccan by
 forced marches into the northern provinces; and these
 troops, having joined some regiments which had
 escaped from the wreck of Delhi and Agra, and received
 an ample supply of artillery, formed a formidable
 force, which it was of the last importance to destroy
 before its numbers were still further augmented by
 additions from other quarters. Leaving behind him,
 therefore, his artillery, and the greater part of his
 infantry, General Lake set out with the cavalry and
 light infantry, by forced marches in pursuit of the
 enemy. After several fatiguing days' journey, he
 reached the spot they had quitted the day before, and
 received intelligence that they were not more than
 forty miles from the British camp. Setting out at
 midnight, he accomplished that distance at the head
 of his cavalry, in the next twenty-four hours, and
 about noon, on the 1st November, came up with the
 enemy, sixteen thousand strong, with seventy pieces
 of cannon, advantageously posted with their right
 upon a rivulet, which required to be crossed before
 their position was reached, and their left resting on
 the village of LASWAREE. The dust, which obscured
 all the ground in advance of the enemy as soon as the
 rivulet was crossed, prevented the English general from
 seeing the extent of the formidable array of guns which
 protected his front, and in his anxiety to cut off his
 retreat to the neighbouring hills, he resolved upon an
 immediate assault with the cavalry alone, before any
 part of the infantry had come up. The attack was
 made, and at first with brilliant success. Wearied as
 they were, the British and native horse forced the
 enemy's line at several points, penetrated into the
 village, and even carried a part of the artillery;¹ but,
 being unsupported by infantry and cannon, these

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

Oct. 30.

Nov. 1.

¹ Lord
Lake's
Desp. Nov.
2, 1803.
Well. Desp.
iii. 441,
442.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

gallant horsemen could make no reply to the severe fire of artillery and musketry with which they were assailed; the taken guns could not be withdrawn for want of bullocks, and, after sustaining a severe loss, they were obliged to evacuate all the ground they had gained, and retire to a short distance from the field.

Desperate
action and
final victory
of the
English.

Encouraged by this success, but yet fearful of the onset of the British infantry, when it came up, the enemy sent to say, that if certain terms were allowed them, they would deliver up their guns. General Lake, being doubtful of the issue of a second attack, acceded to the proposal, and gave them an hour to carry it into effect; during which time he formed his little army, consisting of the 76th regiment and seven weak battalions of sepoy, with a few galloper guns, and three regiments of British and five of native cavalry, in all four thousand infantry and three thousand five hundred horse, into two columns; and when the time allowed expired, moved on to the attack. The 76th regiment headed the array, and was directed to move against the enemy's left flank and assault the village of Laswaree; the second column of infantry and all the cavalry were to support the onset of the first, and take advantage of any confusion which might appear in the enemy's line. With an undaunted step, the 76th, with General Lake and all his staff at their head, advanced against the terrible line of cannon which was planted along the enemy's front; so admirable was their steadiness that a staff officer observed at the moment, as they approached the fire, that an arrow discharged at one end of the line would go through half the feathers of the regiment.* No sooner, however, were they

* I received this striking anecdote from the adjutant-general of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard, to whom the words in the text were addressed by Major Lake, the gallant son of the commander-in-chief.

arrived within range of canister shot than they were received by so tremendous a fire that in a few minutes a third of their number were struck down; and, at this awful moment, a large body of the enemy's horse bore down to the charge. A close and well-directed volley from this heroic regiment, however, who had never yet fired a shot, repulsed the attack; but, as they retired only to a little distance, and still preserved a menacing attitude on the flank of the advancing column, General Lake ordered them to be charged by the British cavalry.¹

CHAP.

LII.

1803.

Lord

Lake's

Desp. Nov.

2, 1803.

Well. Desp.

iii. 435,

436.

This momentous duty was instantly and ably performed by the 29th regiment of English dragoons, who, by a brilliant charge, overthrew the Mahratta horse, and, by clearing the flank of the column of infantry, enabled the successive regiments, as they came up, to deploy. The whole now moved forward at a rapid pace against the enemy's batteries, and sustaining, without flinching, the continued and terrific fire of his artillery, at length, by a sudden rush, made themselves masters of the guns. Even then, the left wing did not fly, but commenced, in admirable order, a regular retreat; which, however, was ultimately changed into a rout by the repeated and impetuous charges of the British and native horse, under Colonel Vandeleur. So obstinate was the resistance, so complete the victory, that, of seventeen regular battalions who had engaged in the battle, the whole, with the exception of two thousand prisoners, were either killed or wounded; all the guns, seventy in number, forty-four colours, and the whole ammunition and baggage, taken. By this decisive overthrow, not only was the power of Scindiah in the northern provinces completely broken, but the French influence and authority on the banks of the Jumna, which had sud-

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Lord
Lake's
Desp. Nov.
2, 1803.
Well. Desp.
iii. 435,
446.

Conquest of
the Cuttack,
Sept. 25.

Sept. 7.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 14.

² Well.
Desp. iii.
432, 433.

Operations
in the Dec-
can under
General
Wellesley.

denly grown up to so formidable a height, finally destroyed. But the success was dearly bought by the British army; above eight hundred of that band of heroes had fallen, or were wounded in the fight; the battle was the most severe that had yet been fought in India; Lord Lake avowed, in his secret despatches to the Governor-general, that, if the enemy's sepoy had had an adequate appointment of French officers, the result would have been extremely doubtful; and that the victory was owing entirely to the incomparable valour of the native English troops.^{1*}

Successes of a subordinate kind, but nevertheless material to the issue of the campaign, at the same time took place in the eastern provinces. In the beginning of September, a British force under Colonel Harcourt broke up from the Bengal frontier, invaded Cuttack, and, a short time after, reached the far-famed city of Jaggernaut. Heavy rains for some weeks afterwards prevented further operations; but, in the end of the month, they again advanced, and occupied, without resistance, the town of Cuttack, and, some days afterwards, stormed the citadel; and this rich and highly important province, a link lying on the sea-coast between the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, was permanently added to the British dominions.²

While this splendid succession of victories was establishing the British power in the north of India, triumphs of an equally brilliant kind signalled their efforts in the western provinces. Operations commenced in the Deccan, with the invasion of the ter-

* "The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do any thing without British troops; and of them there ought to be a very great proportion. The returns of yesterday, will, I fear, prove the necessity of what I say too fully."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY *Secret Despatch*, 2d Nov. 1803; WELL. *Desp.* iii. 446.

ritories of the Rajah of Berar, by General Wellesley, on the 8th August. On the following day he arrived at the town of Achmednugger, a strong fortress defended by lofty walls of masonry, supported by towers: without hesitating an instant, he directed an escalade, which was bravely executed, and proved successful without any very serious loss. Batteries were immediately erected against the citadel, and with such effect that it surrendered at discretion in two days; the garrison of fourteen hundred men being made prisoners. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar now advanced towards the invader, who soon after took possession, without resistance, of the noble city of Aurungabad. Scindiah, upon that, moved as if to threaten Hyderabad; but General Wellesley, by marching eastward along the banks of the Godavary, effectually frustrated his designs, and, at the same time, covered the advance of two important convoys which were coming up to his army. Jalna, an important fort on the frontier of the Mahratta territory, was soon after carried by Colonel Stevenson by assault; and a few days after he surprised a considerable detachment of the enemy, by a nocturnal attack, and routed them with very heavy loss; while, on the side of Bombay, the fortress of Baroach was carried by storm by Colonel Woodington. But more decisive events were approaching. The confederate chieftains, who hitherto had merely hovered round the British troops with clouds of horse, followed by a few thousand irregular foot, were now joined by the flower of their forces; sixteen battalions of Scindiah's regular infantry, and an immense train of artillery, under French officers, entered their camp, and they exhibited an imposing array of fifty thou-

CHAP.
LII.

1803

Aug. 8.

Aug. 10.

Aug. 12.

Aug. 29.

Sept. 2.

Aug. 29.

Gurw. i.

299, 301,

366, 370.

Scherer, i.

55, 56.

CHAP. sand men, of whom thirty thousand were admirable
 LII. horse, with a hundred pieces of cannon.

1803.

Movements
 which led to
 the battle of
 Assaye.
 22d Sept.

This formidable concentration of force evidenced the necessity of combined operations to the British generals; and, for this purpose, a conference took place between General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, on the 21st September. It was then agreed that a joint attack should be made on the enemy, who were about a day and a half's journey off, and reported to be encamped at Bokerdun. The two generals separated on the day following, and advanced towards the concerted point by different routes; Colonel Stevenson by the western, General Wellesley by the eastern road, having a range of hills between them. The motive for this separation, though it may be doubted whether it was a sufficient one for a division in the neighbourhood of so great a force, was the difficulty of getting forward the united army through the narrow defiles by which both roads passed, and the chance that, if they both moved by one line, the enemy would retire by another, and the opportunity of striking a decisive blow be lost. In moving forward thus parallel to each other, the two corps were not more than twelve miles asunder; but the intervening hills rendered any mutual support impossible. Upon arriving within five miles of the enemy, General Wellesley received intelligence that their horse had retreated, and that the infantry alone remained, exposed to the chance of defeat if quickly assailed. As the chief strength of the Mahrattas lay in their cavalry, the English general resolved upon an immediate attack, and dispatched orders to Colonel Stevenson to co-operate in the proposed enterprise. When he arrived, however, in sight of the

enemy, he found their whole army, infantry and cavalry, with an immense artillery, drawn in a strong position, with the river Kaitna, which could be crossed over only by a single ford, flowing along their front. The sight was enough to appal the stoutest heart: thirty thousand horse, in one magnificent mass, crowded the right; a dense array of infantry, powerfully supported by artillery, formed the centre and left; the gunners were beside their pieces, and a hundred pieces of cannon in front of the line, stood ready to vomit forth death upon the assailants. Wellington paused for a moment, impressed but not daunted by the sight; his whole force, as Colonel Stevenson had not come up, did not exceed eight thousand men, of whom sixteen hundred were cavalry; the effective native British were not above fifteen hundred; and he had only seventeen pieces of cannon. But, feeling at once that a retreat in presence of so prodigious a force of cavalry was impossible, and that the most audacious course was, in such circumstances, the most prudent, he ordered an immediate attack. “*Dux cautus et providens Scipio, victus necessitatibus, temerarium capit consilium, ut statim hosti obviam iret; et, quocumque occurreret loco, prælium consereret. ‘Scio,’ inquit, ‘audax videri consilium; sed in rebus asperis et tenui spe, fortissima quæque consilia tutissima sunt: quia, si in occasionis momento cujus prætervolat opportunitas, cunctatus paullulum fueris, nequidquam mox omis- sam quæras.’*”¹

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Liv. Lib. xxv. c. 34, 38. Gen. Wellesley's Desp. 1st Nov. 1803, and 24th Sept. 1803. Well. Desp. iii. 372. Gurw. i. 401, 386. Scher. i. 57, 58.

Wellington wisely determined to direct his attack against the Mahratta left, as the infantry, which was there crowded together, presented less formidable obstacles than the immense mass of horse which glittered on the right. With this view, the British troops was moved off to their own right; the lateral

Battle of
Assaye.

Sept. 23.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

movement being covered by the cavalry and the Mysore horse; and the whole crossed the Kaitna at the ford, and immediately formed in two lines, with the cavalry in reserve, on the enemy's extreme left. The confederates upon this altered their front, and, instead of remaining parallel to the Kaitna, formed a diagonal line across the plain from that river to the village of ASSAYE. The guns were disposed along the whole front, and presented one immense battery, formidable alike by the number and weight of its metal. With the picquets of the 85th and whole 74th in front on the right, and the 78th on the left, the British line marched swiftly forward to the attack; but, when they came within range, their guns were almost immediately dismounted by the superior fire of the enemy's artillery. Nothing, however, could arrest the steady advance of the picquets and 74th regiment, who moved direct upon Assaye; but, as they approached the enemy and got within reach of their grape-shot, the execution became so severe, that frightful chasms were soon made in their ranks, and a large body of Mahratta horse, which had got round the village unperceived, taking advantage of the openings thus made, dashed through with fearful effect, and a forest of uplifted sabres were seen in the centre of the British line.¹ *

¹ Wellesley's Letter to Sir T. Munro. Gurw. i. 401, and Mem. Ibid. i. 391, 394.

* The extraordinary loss sustained by the 74th on this occasion, was chiefly owing to the officer who led the picquets not having followed out Wellington's instructions, which were to make the attack on Assaye by a circuitous sweep, which would have kept the men for the greater part of the way, out of the reach of cannon shot, instead of which, carried away by an heroic courage, he moved direct upon the village, over a space swept like a glacis by the cannon of the enemy. "I lament," said Wellington, "the consequences of this mistake; but I must acknowledge, it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against Assaye. One company of the picquets alone, consisting of one officer and fifty men, lost the officer and forty-four rank and file."—WELLINGTON'S *Mem.* 24th Sept. 1803; Gurw. i. 393, 403.

All seemed lost ; but at that critical moment Wel-
 lington ordered up the British and native cavalry, under Colonel Maxwell. On they came at the gallop ; the gallant 19th dragoons, headed by their heroic leader, bore down upon the Mahratta horse, now disordered by success, with irresistible force, and drove them off the field headlong into the Juah. The 74th and picquets, relieved from their oppressors, now rallied with admirable discipline ; and the second line coming up, a great part of the guns which had spread such havoc through the field were taken. Still, however, the enemy held Assaye with a large body of infantry ; and the cannon placed around it thundered on the attacking corps with terrific effect ; but at that critical moment Wellington, having taken the guns on the left, assailed it with the 78th and a regiment of native horse, with such resolution that that important post was at length carried by storm. In this desperate conflict, Wellington, who led on the 78th regiment, had a horse shot under him. The enemy resisted to the very last, the artillerymen being bayoneted at their guns ; the infantry in many places lying in files on the ground, as they had stood in their ranks. During the retreat a large body of foot soldiers collected together, and, for a short time, showed a determined front ; but they were dispersed by a brilliant charge of Colonel Maxwell with the unconquerable 19th, in which that gallant officer lost his life. Some of Scindiah's gunners, when the flight was general, fell on the earth and feigned to be dead, to avoid the sabres of the cavalry, but no sooner had the horsemen passed, than they started up, turned the guns about, and opened a destructive fire on the backs of the advancing enemy. Indignant at the fraud, the British soldiers wheeled about, again

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

Imminent
danger and
ultimate
victory of
the English.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Gen. Wel-
lesley's
Desp. to
Sir T.
Munro.
Gurw. i.
401, 403,
and i. 386.
Well. Desp.
iii. 669.
Seher. i.
60, 61.

stormed the batteries, and bayoneted the deceitful gunners at their pieces. At length they fled on all sides, just as night set in, leaving in the hands of the British ninety-seven pieces of cannon, and almost all the ammunition and stores of the army. The Mah-rattas had two thousand men slain on the field, and six thousand wounded ; but the British loss was very severe, and the victor found himself weakened by above fifteen hundred killed and wounded, including more than a third of the whole British force.¹

“Never,” says Southey, “was victory gained under so many disadvantages ; superior arms and discipline have often provided against as great a numerical difference, but it would be describing the least part of this day’s glory to say that the number of the enemy was as five to one ; they had disciplined troops in the field, under European officers, who more than doubled the British force ; they had a hundred pieces of cannon, which were served with fearful skill, and which the British, without the aid of artillery, twice won with the bayonet.”¹ *

¹ Quarterly
Rev. xiii.
225.

Operations
after the
battle of
Assaye.

After this decisive overthrow, the confederates retired twelve miles from the field of battle, where they passed the night ; but no sooner did they hear of the approach of Colonel Stevenson, who, with eight thousand men, was advancing against them, than they fled headlong down the Ghauts, and reached the bottom in great confusion, without either cannon or ammunition. These losses, however, were soon restored, and the exhausted state of both corps of

* “Their fire,” said the Duke of Wellington, “was so heavy, I much doubted, at the time, whether I should be able to prevail on the troops to advance ; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India ; our troops behaved admirably, the sepoy astonished me.”—WELLINGTON to MAJOR MALCOLM, *October 3, 1803*, GURW. i. 437.

the British army, rendered any effective pursuit of an enemy still so immensely superior in cavalry, altogether impossible. Colonel Stevenson soon after reduced Asseeghur, an important fortress in the Rajah of Berar's dominions; while Wellington, by a series of masterly manœuvres, defended the territories of his allies, the Nizam and Soubadar of the Deccan, and threw back the clouds of the Mahratta horse on their own territories. After some weeks marching and countermarching, Scindiah, disgusted with a war in which no plunder was to be obtained, and of which the burden, as well as dangers, fell entirely on his own dominions, made proposals for peace. An armistice, on certain terms, was agreed to by the British general; but the conditions not having being complied with by the Mahratta chiefs, he resolved not to lose the opportunity which presented itself of determining their indecision by striking a decisive blow against their united forces before they were thoroughly recovered from their late defeat. Having effected a junction with Colonel Stevenson, the whole moved against the enemy; and, late on the evening of the 28th, after a fatiguing march in a sultry day, when the Mysore horse, which were skirmishing with the Mahratta cavalry in front, cleared away, a long line of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, could be distinctly perceived, extending about five miles in length, in the plains in front of ARGAUM. Though the men were much exhausted by the heat, Wellington deemed the opportunity too favourable to be lost; for he had fourteen battalions of infantry, and six regiments of cavalry, in all about fourteen thousand men, besides four thousand irregular horse, and the enemy did not exceed forty thousand. Rapidly, therefore, the formation was made, the infantry, with the 74th

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

21st Oct.

11th Nov.

23d Nov.

28th Nov.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Wellington's
Desp. Gurw. i.
528, 531.

and 78th on the right, and in advance, so as to enter first into action; the cavalry in the second line following the first in echelon; the Mysore and Mogul horse on the left, thrown back, so as rather to protect the rear than enter into the fight, and opposite to the immense mass of Mahratta horse, which crowded the enemy's right wing.¹

Battle of
Argaum.
28th Nov.

As the British line advanced, the European regiments in front were received by a heavy fire from the batteries placed along the front of the enemy's line, and shortly after they were assailed in flank with the utmost fury by a large body of Persians, who engaged in a close conflict, hand to hand, with the British, in which, after a fierce struggle, the Asiatic scymitar yielded to the European bayonet, and the assailants were almost wholly destroyed. Three battalions of sepoy, however, who succeeded next in the column, no sooner came into cannon shot than they disbanded and fled; though they had advanced bravely through a much heavier fire at Assaye. Wellington, however, was at hand to repair the confusion: rallying them, and advancing at their head himself, he soon restored the day; a disorderly charge of Scindiah's horse on the left of the line was repulsed by the steadiness of another battalion of the native troops; and the British regiments in advance having carried the principal batteries which played upon their line, the whole Mahratta force went off in confusion, leaving in the hands of the victors thirty-eight pieces of cannon, and all their ammunition. Had there been an hour more of day-light, or the delay consequent on the breaking of the sepoy regiments not occurred, the whole of the enemy would have been destroyed; as it was, the pursuit was actively continued for many miles by the British cavalry, by moonlight,

and all their elephants and baggage taken. But that singular failure, even in veteran soldiers who had formerly distinguished themselves, demonstrates the necessity of a large proportion of European to native troops in all Indian campaigns; for we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that if he had not been at hand to repair the disorder, the day would have been lost.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Wellington to Major Shaw,
2d Dec.

1803.

Gurw. i.

529, 534.

On the very day after the battle Wellington marched to invest Gawilghur. This celebrated fortress is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and stands on a lofty pile of rocky eminences, surrounded by a triple circuit of walls, rising from the edge of inaccessible precipices. The entrance to this almost impregnable stronghold are by three narrow and steep paths, winding for a long ascent through the cross fire of batteries, and intersected at various points by strong iron gates. After reconnoitring the different sides of this formidable fortress, Wellington resolved to attack it on the northern front, where the ground is comparatively level, though to reach that quarter required a circuit of thirty miles, over rugged intervening mountains. Thither the heavy ordnance and stores were dragged, over heights hitherto deemed impassable for all but foot soldiers, through roads made by themselves; and, at length, after considerable exertion, a sufficient number of cannon were placed in the trenches on that side to commence battering. With such vigour was the fire sustained, though nine heavy guns only had been brought round, that by the evening of the 14th the breach in the outer wall was declared practicable. Arrangements were immediately made for the storm, which were carried into

Siege and capture of
Gawilghur.

Nov. 6.

Nov. 13.

Nov. 15.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Wellington's Despatch, 15th Dec. 1803. Gurw. i. 550, 554.

Which compels Scindiah to sue for peace. 17th Dec. 1803.

30th Dec. 1803.

Its terms.

¹ See the Trials in Gurw. i. 555, 571, and Auber, i. 323, 326.

execution on the following morning, with the most perfect success. The troops on the north side, headed by the flank companies of the 94th regiment, mounted the breach with irresistible vigour, while a false attack on the south, distracted the attention of the enemy. The inner wall was surmounted by escalade; the inner gates blow open, and, at the moment when the fugitive garrison were attempting to escape by the southern ports, they were met by the victorious British, who in that quarter also had made their way in, and all made prisoners.¹

The capture of this stronghold, deemed over all India impregnable, following such a train of disasters, at length broke the proud spirit of the Mahratta princes. Negotiations in real earnest were now resumed, and a treaty was concluded two days afterwards between Wellington and the Rajah of Berar. By this pacification it was stipulated that the Rajah should cede to the Company all the territories which he had possessed in the Deccan, the province of Cuttack, and various districts to the south of the hills of Gawilghur; while, by a subsequent treaty with Scindiah, all his territories in the Doab, between the Jumna and the Ganges; the fortresses of Baroach and Achmednuggur, with their circumjacent territory; the whole district below the Adjunttee hills and the Godavery river were made over to the Company. By these glorious treaties territories amounting to 32,000 square miles, and yielding, even under all the disadvantages of the Mahratta rule, nearly three millions sterling a-year of revenue, including Delhi, the ancient capital of the Mogul Emperors; Agra, Gwalior, and many other fortresses, were acquired by the British government,¹ and their influence ren-

dered paramount through the whole north of Hindostan.*

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

The termination of the Mahratta war, though it established the political supremacy of the British in India, and spread the fame of their valour over all Asia, yet left the government involved in considerable difficulties. The expenses of moving such large bodies of men to such immense distances was very great; and, as the English, reversing the usual principles of Indian warfare, uniformly paid for every thing which they required, their march, though hailed with blessings by the natives of the conquered provinces, proved extremely burdensome to the Company's treasury. The dangers of the Mahratta war had been strongly felt in India, and seriously exaggerated in the mother country; the Company's stock had fallen in consequence, since the commencement of hostilities, from two hundred and fifteen, to one hundred and sixty; no less than L.1,700,000 in specie had been remitted by the Court of Directors, in the course of the year; and, large as this sum was, it was exceeded by the wants of the Indian treasury. Mercantile men, unacquainted with the real state of affairs in the East, who estimated the propriety of all measures by their effect upon the value of their stock, or the amount of their dividends, and were

Pecuniary
embarrass-
ments of the
Government
on the con-
clusion of
the war.

* By these treaties, certain districts were to be ceded by the Mahratta chiefs to the Nizam. His Minister, Mohiput Ram, was most anxious to obtain information as to what particular countries or districts were likely to be ceded; and, at a secret conference, offered Wellington ten lacs of rupees (L.70,000) to obtain it.—“Can you keep a secret?” asked the English general.—“Yes,” replied Mohiput Ram.—“And so can I,” answered the general. So universal is corruption at the native courts, that they have no conception that any functionary, how high soever, is above it. The conquests of the English were mainly ascribed by them to the incorruptible integrity of their officers, and the fidelity to engagements of their government.—AUBER, ii. 325.

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

incapable of appreciating the present sacrifices requisite to produce ultimate security to so vast a dominion, murmured loudly at these effects of Lord Wellesley's administration, and the opinion became general in Great Britain, that his inordinate ambition had envolved us in endless wars, which would ultimately prove fatal to our empire in the East. So vexatious were the restrictions with which his administration was surrounded, and so disproportioned the ideas of the Directors to the grandeur or the real nature of their situation, that he tendered his resignation to government, and was only prevailed on to continue at the head of affairs in India on an assurance that, as soon as the present complicated transactions with the Mahrattas were brought to a conclusion, he would be relieved from his duties.¹

¹Auber, ii.
333, 341.
Well. Desp.
iii. 3, 24,
Introd.

Negotia-
tions and
rupture
with Hol-
kar.
27th Feb.
1804.

Mean-while, a treaty had been concluded with Scindiah, by which it was stipulated that he should cede Gualior and Gohud, and receive a subsidiary force ; in other words, become entirely dependent on the British government. These events, however, brought the English in contact with a still more formidable power, whose hostility it hitherto had been their studious care to avoid. Holkar commanded a powerful army, which was posted in a threatening position on the frontier of Scindiah's territory ; and, as he held several valuable possessions in the Doab which had recently been ceded to the British government, it was indispensable to come to some terms to accommodate the conflicting interests of the parties. Though that wily chieftain, with the characteristic dissimulation of a Mahratta, professed the utmost desire to cultivate the friendship of the Company, it soon appeared that he had resolved on the most determined hostility. Secret information reach-

ed the governor-general, that he was underhand instigating the tributaries and dependants of the English to enter into a confederacy against them; and he even wrote to General Wellesley, threatening to overrun the British provinces with an innumerable army.* At length, he openly sent an agent to Scindiah's camp to solicit that chieftain to renew hostilities with the British, and, at the same time, he began plundering the territories of their ally, the Rajah of Jypore. Justly considering these acts as equivalent to a declaration of war, the commander-in-chief advanced into Holkar's territory.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

¹ Malcolm,
315, 316.
Auber, ii.
341, 345.
Well. Desp.
iv.

General Wellesley was invested with the general direction of affairs, military as well as political, in the Deccan, and the territories of the Peishwa and Mahratta chiefs; but he had no longer any active command in the war, and the chief weight of the contest fell on General Lake in the northern provinces. Arduous as the conflict with Tippoo Sul-taun and Scindiah had been, this last strife was still more formidable, from the recurrence of the Asiatic chief to that system of warfare in which the strength of the East, from the earliest ages, has consisted. Without despising the aid of disciplined battalions and a powerful train of artillery, it was the policy

Commence-
ment of the
war with
Holkar. Its
arduous
character.

* "Countries of many hundred miles in extent shall be overrun and plundered. Lord Lake shall not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on backs of human beings in continual war by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."—*HOLKAR to GENERAL WELLESLEY, Feb. 21, 1804; MALCOLM, 315.* In his letters to the Indian chiefs, tributary of England, he uniformly styled the English "infidel Christians, the enemies of the Christian Faith;" "seditious men, whom they should be prepared to do distinguished service against;" and that "it is the object of the religion and the rule of Mussulmen, that the whole body of the faithful having assembled together, they should be employed, heart and soul, in extirpating the profligate infidels."—*See intercepted Corresp. of HOLKAR, WELL. Desp. iv. 48, 49.*

CHAP. of Holkar to trust chiefly to his cavalry ; to re-
 LII. lieve his army of those incumbrances which re-
 1803. tarder their march, and seldom failed to fall a prey
 in regular battles to the swift advance and daring
 courage of the British soldiers ; and to trust for suc-
 cess to the encompassing the European hosts, like
 the Roman legions by the Parthian cavalry, with
 clouds of light horse, who could not be reached by
 the heavy-armed European squadrons. True, these
 irregular bodies could not withstand the charge of
 the English or sepoy dragoons, any more than the
 Saracens could the shock of the steel-clad crusaders
 of Europe ; but they seldom awaited their approach,
 and, by hovering round their columns and cutting
 off their foraging and watering parties, frequently
 reduced to extreme distress bodies of men before
 whom they could not have stood a quarter of an
 hour in regular combat.¹

¹ Malcolm,
 316.
 Auber, ii.
 345.

Holkar's
 strength,
 and its
 causes.
 Defeat and
 capture of
 Mahomed
 Beg Khan.

Holkar's territories, though extensive, lay in dif-
 ferent parts of the Deccan and Hindostan ; they
 were, for the most part, in a neglected state, from
 the devastation and military license to which, from
 time immemorial, all the Mahratta provinces had
 been subjected ; he was an usurper of his brother's
 rights, his family had never risen to the rank of
 considerable potentates, and his present power was
 mainly owing to the vast concourse of predatory
 horsemen who, on the conclusion of peace by Scin-
 diah and the Rajah of Berar, flocked to his standard
 as the only one which promised a continuance of
 violence and plunder. Vast bodies of these irregular
 but formidable freebooters swarmed in all the north-
 ern parts of the Deccan and over Hindostan ; and
 the number of them, amounting to little short of an
 hundred thousand, whom Holkar had collected under

his banners, was so disproportioned to the resources of his dominions, that foreign conquest had become to him, as to Napoleon, a matter of necessity. Bands of these plunderers, before they were attracted by the reputation of the Mahratta chief, had already appeared in various quarters, spreading terror and devastation wherever they went; and one, ten thousand strong, which had passed the Kistna, burst into the British dependencies, and was making for the Toomboodra, with the design of crossing the Company's frontier, was overtaken by General Campbell, and entirely routed by a skilfully conducted surprise before sunrise, with the loss of three thousand killed and wounded. Twenty thousand head of cattle taken in their camp, demonstrated the vast extent of the depredation which in a few days these marauding horsemen could commit. Mahommed Beg Khan, the leader of the party, was wounded and made prisoner, and the whole body dispersed.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1803.

30th Dec.
1803.¹ General
Campbell's
Desp. Dec.
30, 1803.
Well. Desp.
iv. 2, 3.

Important as this early success was in arresting the destructive inroads of the Mahratta freebooters, it was attended with one bad effect, in leading the British commanders to underrate the enemy with whom they had to deal; inducing the belief that the strength of their confederacy had been broken, by the reduction of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's power, and that, by a simultaneous invasion of his territories by comparatively small bodies of troops, converging from different directions, Holkar would speedily be reduced to submission. The plan of the campaign was arranged on these principles. Lord Lake, with the army of Bengal, about ten thousand strong, was to advance from the neighbourhood of Delhi, westward into Holkar's country; while lesser bodies, acting in concert with Scindiah's forces,

Plan of the
campaign
against
Holkar. Its
errors and
early disasters.

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

23d April,
1804.

16th May.

¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret Com-
mittee,
June, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 115,
127.

pressed upon it from the Guzerat, Malwa, and the Deccan. Colonel Murray, with two European and six native regiments, about six thousand men, was to advance from Guzerat; while Colonel Monson, with the 76th regiment and four battalions of sepoy, about three thousand men, moved upon Jyenagur, in order to menace the rear of Holkar's main army, which was ravaging the country in that neighbourhood.

These movements had the effect of inducing the Mahratta chief to retreat, which he did to the westward, with extraordinary rapidity, while General

Lake, following in his footsteps, carried by assault the important fort of Rampoor, and expelled the enemy from all his possessions in that part of Hindostan. So completely was government impressed with the idea, that Holkar could nowhere face the British troops, and that a short campaign at the close of the rainy season would effectually reduce his power, that the troops on its commencement were every where withdrawn to their original stations;

General Lake returned to his cantonments near Delhi, while Colonel Monson was left at Malwa, above two hundred miles in advance, in a position which it was thought would effectually preclude the possibility of the predatory chieftain's return into Hindostan.¹ *

Holkar's conduct now demonstrated that he was intimately acquainted with the art of war; the principles of which are often as thoroughly under-

* "The necessity of repelling Holkar's banditti from the frontier of Hindostan, and of reducing him to a peaceable conduct, will not lead to any serious interruption of peace, and will probably tend to consolidate our connexion with Scindiah. The commander-in-chief, with the greater part of the main army in Hindostan, has returned to the cantonment of Cawnpore, and my attention is now directed to the desirable object of *withdrawing the whole army from the field*, and reducing the military charges."—LORD WELLESLEY to LORD CASTLEREAGH, 9th July, 1804, *Wel. Desp.* iv. 131.

stood by illiterate chieftains, to whom native sagacity and practical experience have unfolded them, as by those who have most learnedly studied the enterprises of others. Rapidly concentrating his desultory bands, he fell with an overwhelming force, as soon as the decline of the rainy season would admit of military operations, upon Colonel Monson's division; while a subordinate force, five thousand strong, made a diversion by an irruption into the province of Bundelcund. A British detachment, under Colonel Smith, of three hundred men, was there almost entirely cut off by the sudden attack of these freebooters, and with it six guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition captured; a disgrace which was the more sensibly felt, as Colonel Fawcett, who, with five battalions, lay within a few miles, and had, by imprudently separating his infantry from his artillery, brought about this disaster, instead of attempting to avenge it, commenced a retreat. Such was the consternation produced by this unwonted calamity, that it was only by the firm countenance and intrepid conduct of Captain Baillie, who commanded a small subsidiary force at Banda, the capital, in the southern portion of the province, that subordination was maintained; and the Mahrattas at length retired, finding a further advance hazardous, leaving their course every where marked by conflagration and ruin.¹

This disgrace was but the prelude to still greater misfortunes, in which, however, the high character and undaunted courage of the British troops remained untarnished. Colonel Monson, having been joined by the troops under General Don which had captured Rampoorra—which raised his force to about four thousand men, with fifteen guns, besides three thousand irregular horse—advanced through the strong

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

Holkar's
able con-
duct. De-
feat of Col.
Fawcett in
Bundel-
cund.22d May,
1804.¹ Colonel
Fawcett's
Desp. 22d
May, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 72, 73,
75, 127.Advance of
Colonel
Monson's
division.

26th June.

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

2d July.

pass of Mokundra, which commanded the entrance through the mountains into Hindostan from the westward ; and, contrary to the directions of General Lake, who had stationed him only to protect that defile, still pushing on fifty miles further, carried by assault the important fortress of Henglaisgush, a stronghold of Holkar's, though garrisoned by eleven hundred of his best troops. The Mahratta chief mean-while lay at Malwa with his whole disposable force, which exceeded forty thousand men ; and of whom twenty thousand were disciplined infantry, with one hundred and sixty guns. With this immense body he rapidly approached the English general ; and the exaggerated rumours which preceded his march as to the strength of the Mahratta host, impressed the latter with the idea that he had no chance of safety but in an immediate retreat. Colonel Murray who, with a powerful force including fifteen hundred Europeans, was to have advanced from the Guzerat into such a position as to have been able to render him assistance if required, had, instead of performing his part of the general plan, been unfortunately induced to fall back ; and thus Monson was left alone to withstand the whole shock of Holkar's force. His troops, however, though not a fourth part of the enemy in point of number, were highly disciplined, admirably equipped, and inured to victory ; and, by a daring advance upon the Mahratta chief, especially when embarrassed with getting his immense artillery across the Chumbul river, then swoln by rains, he might perhaps have achieved as decisive success, as, with a similar numerical inferiority, Wellington and Lake obtained at Assaye and Laswaree.¹

¹ Lord
Lake's
Account.

Well. Desp.
v. 288,
290. Ibid.
iv. 327,
329.

But it then appeared of what importance is mili-

tary skill and moral resolution in Indian warfare, and how much the brilliant career of Lord Wellesley's victories had been dependent on the daring energy, which, seizing the initiative, never lost it, till the enemy was destroyed. Monson was as brave as any officer in the English army; second to none in undaunted valour at storming a breach, but he wanted the rarer quality of moral intrepidity, and the power of adopting great designs on his own responsibility. On the 6th July, Holkar was engaged in crossing the Chumbul; the fortunate moment of attack never to be recalled was allowed to escape, and two days afterwards the English general commenced his retreat. He did what ordinary officers would have done at Assaye, when it was ascertained Stevenson's division could not come up; and what was the result? In a few hours the subsidiary horse, now four thousand strong, which was left to observe the enemy, was enveloped by clouds of the Mahratta cavalry, and, after a bloody struggle, cut to pieces with their gallant commander, Lieutenant Lucan, whose individual heroism long averted the disaster. The infantry and guns retired without molestation to the strong Mokundra pass; and several attacks made by Holkar on the outposts stationed there, were repulsed with great slaughter. Despairing, however, after the recent disaster, of being able to make good the pass against the enemy when his infantry and numerous artillery should come up, Monson resumed his retreat, a few days after, to Kotah, and from thence to Rampoorah, with great precipitation. Such were the obstacles presented by the horrible state of the roads and incessant rains, during the latter part of this journey,' that the whole

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

His disasters and defeat.

8th July.

9th July.

12th July.

¹ Lord Lake's Account. Well. Desp. v. 288, 290. Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, Ibid, iv. 327, 330.

CHAP. guns, fifteen in number, were abandoned, and fell into
 LII. the enemy's hands.

1804.

Desperate
 action on
 the Bannas
 river, and
 conclusion
 of the re-
 treat.

22d Aug.

24th Aug.

¹ Colonel
 Monson's
 Desp.
 Well. Desp.
 iv. 199.

No sooner was General Lake apprised of the commencement of this retreat, than he dispatched two fresh battalions and three thousand irregular horse to reinforce his lieutenant; and with such expedition did they advance, that they reached Rampoorra a few days after the retiring column had arrived there. Still Monson deemed it impossible to make a stand; and, on the 21st August, after leaving a sufficient garrison in that fortress, he resumed his march for the British frontier. On the day following, his progress was stopped by the Bannas river, which was so swelled by the rains as to be no longer fordable; and during the delay occasioned by this obstacle, the whole of the enemy's force arrived close to the British detachment. Their situation was now truly frightful: in their front was a raging torrent, in their rear twenty thousand horsemen, continually receiving fresh accessions of strength in infantry and guns, as they successively came up. The river having at length become fordable, four battalions crossed over; and the enemy, seeing his advantage, immediately commenced a furious attack on the single battalion and picquets, which now remained alone on the other side. With such heroic constancy, however, was this unequal contest maintained by these brave men, that they not only repulsed the whole attacks made upon them, but, pursuing their success, captured several of the enemy's guns; an event which clearly demonstrated what results might have followed the adoption of a vigorous offensive in the outset, when the troops were undiminished in strength and unbroken in spirit.¹ As it was, how-

ever, this little phalanx, being unsupported, was unable to follow up its success, and, in the course of falling back to the river and effecting their passage, had to sustain an arduous conflict, and experienced a frightful loss.

CHAP.
LII.
1804.

Mean-while Captain Nicholl, with the treasure of the army and six companies of sepoy, who had been first ferried across, proceeded to Khooshalghur, where they were attacked by a large body of Scindiah's troops, who with the characteristic faithlessness and rapacity of Mahrattas, assailed their allies in their distress in hope of plunder, and being beat off, openly joined Holkar's camp. Almost all the irregular horse, which had come up to Rampoor, soon after deserted to the enemy; and even some companies of sepoy, shaken by the horrors of the retreat, abandoned their colours and followed their example, though in general the conduct of these faithful troops was exemplary in the extreme. Abandoned by his horse, Colonel Monson, on his route from Khooshalghur to the British frontier, formed his whole men into an oblong square, with the ammunition and bullocks in the centre, and in that order retreated for several days, almost always fighting with the enemy, and surrounded by fifteen thousand indefatigable horsemen, who were constantly repulsed with invincible constancy by the rolling fire of the sepoy. At length, however, this vigorous pursuit was discontinued; the firm array of the British dissolved as they entered their own territories; great numbers perished of fatigue or by the sword of the pursuers, others allowed themselves to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the sad remnant of a brilliant division, which had altogether mustered, with its reinforcements on the retreat,¹ six thousand

28th Aug.

Colonel
Monson's
Desp. 2d
Sept. 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 199.
Lord Lake's
Desp. July
1, 1805.
Well. Desp.
v. 289,
292. Lord
Wellesley to
Secret
Committee,
v. 333,
343.

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

regular and as many irregular troops, now reduced to a thousand or twelve hundred men, without cannon or ammunition, arrived at Agra in a scattered and disorderly manner about the end of August.

Alarming
fermenta-
tion through
the whole
of India.

Then was seen in clear colours the precarious tenure by which our empire in India is held, and the indispensable necessity of those vigorous measures in former times, which, to an inexperienced observer, might wear the aspect of rashness. The overthrow of Monson's division resounded through Hindostan from sea to sea. Great as had been the disasters of the retreat, they were magnified by the voice of fame, ever ready to augment the extent of public and private calamity; and the sinister reports of the native powers, whose wishes, father to their thoughts, represented the British empire in Asia as tottering to its fall. The general consternation was increased by the cruelties exercised by Holkar on the prisoners of all descriptions who fell into his hands; the Europeans were immediately put to death, and the natives who refused to enter his service, mutilated in the most shocking manner. Every where an alarming fermentation was apparent. The conduct of several of the allied states was such as to afford just grounds to distrust their fidelity; that of others was verging on open hostility. Scindiah, so far from acting up to the spirit, or even letter of his alliance, was secretly intriguing, and even publicly assisting the enemy; the Rajah of Bhurtpore, already repenting of his recent treaty, was supporting him with his treasures and his arms; the spirit of disaffection was found to have spread to some of the chiefs of the British newly acquired provinces;¹ even the fidelity of the sepoy was not every where proof against the seduc-

¹ Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, July 1, 1805.

Lord Well. to General Lake, Sept. 11, 1804. Ibid. iv. 205.

tions or threats of the enemy; and that general despondency prevailed which is so often at once the forerunner and the cause of public calamity.

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

But the British government in India was at that period in the hands of men whom no reverse could daunt, whose energy and foresight were equal to any emergency. Generously resolving to take their full share in the responsibility of all the measures which had turned out so unfortunately; determining to screen the commander from all blame, even for those details of execution which were necessarily entrusted to himself; they set vigorously to stem the progress of disaster.* The causes which had led to it were obvious; it was the reversing the principles which had produced the triumphs of Delhi and Laswaree. These glorious days were the result of striking with an adequate force at the heart of the enemy's power, and suspending, or even neglecting, all minor considerations to accomplish that grand object; the present misfortunes were the consequence of attacking from four different quarters at once, with forces inadequate to victory, if singly brought into action; trusting for success to their combined operation, and advancing one column, single and unsupported, into the heart of the enemy's power. The British victories had been the result of the strategy which caused Napoleon to triumph at Ulm and Jena: their misfortunes, of the system which, for twenty years, had chained disaster to the Austrian standard. Wellesley resolved instantly to return to this enlightened plan of operations, from which, in an evil hour, under the influence of undue contempt of the enemy, he had departed.¹ "The success of your noble triumphs of last year," said he to Lord Lake, "proceeded chiefly

Generous
conduct and
able resolu-
tions of
Lord Wel-
lesley and
Lord Lake.

¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
Lord Lake,
Sept. 11,
1804.

Well. Desp.
iv. 207, and
191, 192.

* See note B.

CHAP. from your vigorous system of attack. In every war
 LII. the native states will always gain courage in propor-
 1804. tion as we shall allow them to attack us, and I know
 that you will always bear this principle in mind,
 especially against such a power as Holkar."

Proceeding on these just and manly principles,
 every exertion was made to reinforce the main army
 under Lord Lake, then lying at Cawnpore, and put
 it into a condition speedily to take the field. It was
 full time that some decisive effort should be made to
 retrieve affairs, for the British empire in Hindostan
 was, in truth, in a very critical situation. Rapidly
 following up his success, Holkar pursued the remains
 of the beaten army to the banks of the Jumna; and
 on the British cavalry under Lord Lake approaching
 his position, they drew off; the infantry and guns
 taking the direction of Delhi, while the horse engaged
 the attention of the English troops by endeavouring
 to cut off their baggage. On the 8th of October the
 enemy's main force arrived before the imperial city,
 and summoned the garrison, consisting only of one
 battalion and a half of sepoy, with a few irregulars,
 to surrender; while his emissaries used every exertion
 to excite the native chiefs in the Doab to revolt
 against their European masters, and with such suc-
 cess as seriously embarrassed the operations of the
 British army, especially in the vital article of obtain-
 ing supplies.¹

¹ Well.
 Desp. v.
 293, 297;
 iv. 343,
 348.

For seven days Holkar continued before Delhi,
 battering its extensive and ruinous walls with the
 utmost vigour; but such was the resolution of the
 little garrison under Colonels Ochterlony and Burn,
 that they not only repulsed repeated assaults, but,
 sallying forth, carried a battery which was violently
 shaking the rampart, and spiked the guns. At length

His repulse
 and retreat.

Oct. 10.

the Mahrattas, despairing of storming the city, and
 intimidated by the approach of Lord Lake with the
 Bengal army, raised the siege, and retired by slow
 marches through the hills in the direction of DIEG.
 The English general had now the fairest prospect
 of bringing the enemy's whole force to action, with
 every chance of success; for the prodigious train
 of artillery which accompanied him rendered his re-
 treat very slow; and ten thousand infantry and
 three thousand cavalry, including about two thou-
 sand five hundred Europeans, followed the British
 standards. But a total failure of supplies, arising
 from the disaffection or treachery of the native chiefs,
 by whom they were to have been furnished, rendered
 it impossible to continue the pursuit for some days;
 and during that time Holkar got out of the reach of
 immediate attack, and, crossing the Jumna with his
 whole force, proceeded to ravage the country, and
 stir up resistance to the English beyond that river.
 Suddenly recrossing it, however, with his cavalry
 alone, a few days after, he advanced by forced marches
 to attack Colonel Burn, who, with a detachment, had
 been sent to Seranhunpore, after the retreat of the
 enemy from the neighbourhood of Delhi.¹

General, now Lord Lake, upon this made a cor-
 responding division of his force. Putting himself at
 the head of the horse artillery, two thousand cavalry,
 and fifteen hundred light-armed infantry, he pur-
 sued in person, Holkar's horse on the one side of the
 river; while General Fraser, with eight thousand
 infantry, a thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns, was
 entrusted with the task of attacking his foot soldiers
 and artillery on the other. That gallant officer, hav-
 ing at length, by great exertions, obtained the requi-
 site supplies, commenced his march from Delhi, and

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

Oct. 15.

Oct. 18.

Oct. 31.

¹ Lord Lake
to Lord

Wellesley.

July, 1805.

Well. Desp.

v. 293,

297. Lord

Well. to

Secret

Committee,

Well. Desp.

iv. 345,

348.

Battle of
Dieg.

Nov. 13.

CHAP. on the 13th November came up with the Mahratta
 LII. army, consisting of twenty-four battalions of regular
 1804. infantry, a hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, and
 three thousand irregular horse, in all above twenty-
 five thousand men. This formidable force was drawn
 up with considerable skill, in a strong position, with
 their left resting on the fortress of Dieg, their right
 upon a walled village, situated on a height about two
 miles distant; an extensive morass, altogether im-
 passable, covered the greater part of their front, a
 large expanse of water protected from attack the
 whole of their rear; while their immense artillery
 was so disposed as to bear with a concentric fire on
 the narrow isthmus by which alone their line could
 be assailed.¹

¹ Monson's
 Desp. Nov.
 14, 1804.
 Well. Desp.
 iv. 233.
 Lord Lake's
 Desp. v.
 298, 301.

Noways daunted by these formidable obstacles, General Fraser resolved to make the attack on the following morning. At daybreak, the troops advanced to the charge, headed by the unconquerable 76th, led on by that General in person. They had to make a long circuit round the morass before they reached the point at which it could be passed; during the whole of which they were exposed to a galling cannonade in flank from the enemy's artillery, which, as they approached the isthmus leading to the village, became dreadfully severe. Rushing impetuously on, however, the 76th, followed by the native infantry, ascending the hill, stormed the village with irresistible gallantry. From the village, General Fraser advanced upon the main body of the enemy, who faced about, and were now posted between the morass and the lake, with the fort of Dieg in their rear, and several heights, crowned with artillery to defend the approach to it, interspersed in the intervening space. Such, however, was the vigour

of the attack led by Fraser and Monson, that, though the enormous batteries of the enemy played with a concentric fire of round, chain, and grape shot, on the advancing column, it pushed on through the awful storm, carrying every thing before it from right to left of the enemy's whole position, and, storming successfully all the batteries, drove them at length, in utter confusion, into the fortress of Dieg. Nothing but the heavy fire from its ramparts prevented the whole artillery of the enemy, in the field, from being captured; as it was, eighty-seven guns and twenty-four tumbrels were taken; two thousand fell on the field, and great numbers perished in the lake, into which they had fled to avoid the bloody sabres of the English cavalry. The British loss was about seven hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was the brave General Fraser, to whose decision and intrepidity the success was in a great degree owing; while Colonel Monson, the second in command, who succeeded to the direction of the army upon his fall, amply demonstrated by his skill and bravery, that his former misfortunes had not been owing to any want of heroic courage. Among the guns taken, were, to the inexpressible delight of the soldiers as well as of that brave man, thirteen of those which had been lost in the late calamitous retreat.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

¹ Monson's
Desp. Nov.
14, 1804.
Well. Desp.
iv. 233,
236. Lord
Lake's
Desp. Ibid.
v. 298,
301.

While this important success was gained over the infantry and artillery of Holkar, a triumph equally decisive attended the operations of Lord Lake in person against his cavalry. That enterprising chief, having, as already mentioned, crossed the Jumna with ten thousand horse, made for a ford of the Ganges near Hurdwar, with the design of carrying the war into Rohilcund, and the provinces beyond that river. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Lake,

Pursuit and
defeat of
Holkar at
Furrucka-
bad.
17th Nov.

CHAP. with a chosen body of cavalry, was marching against
 LII. him, than he suddenly changed his course, and flying
 1804. down the Doab by rapid marches, reached Furruck-
 16th Nov. abad on the evening of the 16th November. Rapid,
 however, as were the movements of the Mahratta
 chief, they were exceeded by those of the English
 general, who, having crossed the Jumna in pursuit
 on the 1st November, continued to follow his indefa-
 tigable adversary with such vigour for the next seven-
 teen days, that he not only effectually prevented him
 from devastating the country, except in the immediate
 line of retreat, but kept constantly at the distance
 only of a single march in his rear. During the whole
 of this period, both armies marched twenty-three or
 twenty-four miles daily, even under the burning sun
 of Hindostan. At length, on the evening of the 16th
 November, Lord Lake received intelligence that Hol-
 kar, after having been repulsed in an attack on Fut-
 tehghur, had encamped for the night under the walls of
 FURRUCKABAD, twenty-nine miles distant. Though
 the troops had already marched thirty miles on that
 day, Lord Lake immediately formed the resolution
 of making a forced march in the night, and surprising
 the enemy in their camp before daybreak on the
 following morning.¹

¹ Lord
 Lake's
 Desp. 18th
 Nov. 1804.
 Wel. Desp.
 iv. 240.

Nov. 17. No sooner was the order to move delivered to the
 troops at nightfall, than all fatigues were forgotten,
 and, instead of lying down to rest, they joyfully pre-
 pared to resume their march during the sultry hours
 and thick darkness of an Indian night. The fires in
 the enemy's camp, and the accurate information of
 the guides, conducted them direct to the ground
 which the Mahrattas occupied. As they approached
 the camp, the utmost silence was observed in the
 British columns; the horse artillery only were moved

CHAP.
LII.

1804.

to the front, and advanced slowly and cautiously to within range of their tents. All was buried in sleep in the Mahratta lines; the watch-fires had almost all burnt out, and a few drowsy sentinels alone were watching in the east for the first appearance of dawn. Suddenly the guns opened upon them, and the sleeping army was roused by the rattle of grape-shot falling in the tents among the horses, and through the bivouacs. So complete was the surprise, so universal the consternation, that very little resistance was attempted. Before the squadrons could be formed, or the horses in many places unpicketed, the British dragoons were upon them; and well, in that hour, did the sabres of the 8th, 27th, and 29th, avenge the savage cruelty of Holkar's followers upon the captives in Monson's retreat. The enemy were thrown into irretrievable confusion by this impetuous attack; and, rushing promiscuously out of the camp, fled in all directions, hotly pursued by the British and native horse. Great numbers were slain in the pursuit, as well as on the field, and still more abandoned their colours, and dispersed, deeming the cause of Holkar hopeless, after so decisive an overthrow. Of the mighty host which had so lately swept like a torrent over Hindostan, a few thousand horse only escaped with their leader across the Jumna, and joined the defeated remains of their infantry within the walls of Dieg. Holkar himself was on the point of falling into the hands of the British dragoons, and owed his escape entirely to the accidental explosion of an ammunition waggon, which, almost by a miracle, blew his pursuers off their horses, while he himself passed unhurt. Of the victors, the greater part had ridden seventy miles during the preceding twenty-four hours, when they took up their ground after the pursuit,¹ besides fighting the

¹ Lord Lake's Desp. 18th Nov. 1804, and July, 1805. Wel. Desp. iv. 240, 244, and v. 297, 298.

CHAP. whole of Holkar's cavalry: an achievement far ex-
 LII. ceeding any thing recorded of the boasted celerity of
 1804. Napoleon's squadrons, and which is probably unpa-
 ralleled in modern war.

Siege and
 capture of
 Dieg.

Dec. 23.

Dec. 1.

Dec. 8.

Dec. 23.

¹ Well.
 Desp. iv.
 662, 663.
 Lord Well.
 to Secret
 Committee,
 March,
 1805.
 Well. Desp.
 iv. 362.

Colonel Monson, whose vigour and bravery in the field, was far from being accompanied by a similar degree of capacity and resolution in leading an army, had formed the design of retreating after the victory of Dieg to Muttra for supplies, of which his troops stood much in need, and which were procured with extreme difficulty, owing to the hostile disposition of the inhabitants in the country, and arrived there on the 26th November. But Lord Lake, who at once perceived the prejudicial effect which such a retrograde movement after a battle would have, by giving the enemy a plausible ground to represent it as a defeat, immediately repaired to the spot, and reinforcing the infantry with his victorious cavalry, again moved forward his whole army, and proceeded in the direction of Dieg, where the broken remains of Holkar's army were now all assembled. On the 4th, the troops arrived under the walls of that fortress; and operations were commenced against it as soon as the battering train came up from Agra, which arrived on the 8th. The siege was prosecuted with the utmost activity, and a breach having been pronounced practicable, the lines around the town were first stormed by the 76th regiment, and on the day following the fortress itself surrendered at discretion. By this important blow, the whole of Holkar's remaining artillery, amounting to eighty pieces, many of them of very heavy calibre, with immense stores of ammunition, were taken; but that redoubtable chief himself escaped with four thousand horse, and took refuge in BHURTPORE,¹ the Rajah of which, Runjeet Sing, had

during the last three months treacherously embraced his cause, and deserted the British alliance.

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

Nothing remained to complete this glorious contest but the reduction of this celebrated fortress; an object become of the highest importance, both on account of the signal treachery of the Rajah, who, on the first reverse, had violated his pledged faith to the Company, by whom he had been loaded with benefits, and of its containing the person and last resources of Holkar, who had waged so desperate a contest with the British forces. Thither, accordingly, Lord Lake moved immediately after the fall of Dieg; and the battering train having speedily made a breach in the walls, the assault took place in the evening of the 9th January. The water in the ditch proved exceed-

Siege and
unsuccessful
assault of
Bhurtapore.

Jan. 9,
1805.

ingly deep, and, during the time spent in throwing in fascines, the troops were exposed to a most destructive fire from the rampart on the opposite side. At length, however, they succeeded in passing over; but all their efforts to gain the summit of the breach proved ineffectual. The wall, which was of tough mud, was imperfectly ruined; the scaling ladders were found to be too short; and, after sustaining a very heavy loss, the troops were compelled to return to their trenches. A second storm, some days after-

Jan. 21.

wards, met with still less success; the brave men reached the edge of the ditch, but it proved to be so broad and deep that all attempts to fill it up were fruitless; and, after sustaining for above an hour a

Jan. 23.

dreadful fire within pistol shot from the ramparts, the assaulting column was again obliged to retire.

¹ Lord
Lake's

An attempt was soon after made by the whole of Holkar's remaining cavalry, and that of Meer Khan,

Desp. Jan.
10, 21, 23,
1805.

another noted Mahratta freebooter,¹ to cut off a valuable convoy on its way from Muttra to the British

Well. D
iv. 264.
267.

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

Repeated
assaults on
Bhurtpore,
which are
repulsed.

Feb. 20.

camp. The convoy with its covering force was hard beset, by an immense body of cavalry, in a village, when the approach of the 27th light dragoons, and a regiment of native horse, enabled them to sally out and totally rout the assailants. Meer Khan's equipage with all his arms and a complete suit of armour fell into the hands of the victors.

The siege was now prosecuted with fresh vigour by the English army, which was reinforced by a division five thousand strong from Bombay, which raised the besieging force to twenty thousand men; while the efforts of the besieged, who were greatly elevated by their former success, were proportionally increased. It was soon discovered that the troops of the Rajah were amongst the bravest and most resolute of Hindostan, comprising, in addition to the remnant of Holkar's followers, the *Jats*, or military caste of Bhurtpore, who yielded to none in Asia the palm of resolution and valour. After a month's additional operations, the breach was deemed sufficiently wide to warrant a third assault, which was made by the 75th and 76th regiments, supported by three sepoy battalions, under Colonel Don; while two other subordinate attacks were made at the same time, one on the enemy's trenches outside the town, and another on the Beem-Narain gate, which, it was thought, might be carried by escalade. The attack on the trenches proved entirely successful, and they were carried, with all their artillery, by Captain Grant; but the other two sustained a bloody repulse. The scaling ladders of the party destined to attack the gate were found to be too short, or were destroyed by the terrible discharges of grape which issued from its defences; and, despite all their efforts, the brave 75th and 76th were forced down with dreadful slaughter

from the breach. They were ordered out again to the assault, but the troops were so staggered by the frightful scene, that they refused to leave their trenches; and the heroic 12th regiment of sepoy¹ marched past them with loud cheers to the breach. Such was the vigour of their onset, that they reached the summit in spite of every obstacle, and the British colours were seen for a few minutes waving on the bastion; while the 76th, stung with shame, again advanced to the assault. The bastion proved to be separated by a deep ditch from the body of the place, and the guns from the neighbouring ramparts enfiladed the outwork so completely, that the valiant band, after losing half their numbers, were in the end driven down the breach, weeping with generous indignation at seeing the prize of their heroic valour thus torn from them. The attempt was renewed on the following day with no better suc-
 cess. The whole of the European infantry in the army, about two thousand five hundred strong, with three battalions of native infantry, were employed in the assault, under the command of Colonel Monson. Such, however, was the height and difficulty of the breach, and such the resolute resistance opposed by the enemy, that all their efforts proved unsuccessful. A small number only could mount abreast, from the narrowness of the ruined part of the wall; and, as they pushed up, they were crushed under logs of wood, or torn in pieces by combustibles thrown among them by the besieged: while the few who reached the top were swept off by discharges of grape which poured in by a cross fire from either side.¹ After two hours employed in this murderous and fruitless contest, in which prodigies of valour were performed on both sides, the troops were drawn

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

See ante,
vii. p. 17.

Feb. 21.

¹ Lord
Lake's
Desp. 21st,
22d Feb.
1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 292,
295.

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

off; and, after six weeks of open trenches, and four desperate assaults, which cost above three thousand brave men, the native colours still waved on the walls of Bhurtpore.

Reasons on
both sides
for an ac-
commoda-
tion with
the Rajah
of Bhurt-
pore.

Although, however, the British troops had, at the close of their long career of victory, met with this unexpected check, yet many reasons concurred to recommend submission to the hitherto unsubdued Rajah. His territory was wholly occupied by the enemy; his resources cut off; his stores and magazines rapidly diminishing; and, even if he should be so fortunate as to withstand a repetition of the furious assaults from which he had so recently and narrowly escaped, he was well aware that, by the slower, but more certain process of blockade and famine, he would in the end inevitably be reduced. On the other hand, various considerations, equally forcible, concurred in recommending an accommodation with the perfidious Rajah to the English government. Though Scindiah had, in the outset of the negotiation, consented to the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, with its adjacent territory, to the Company, and even signed a treaty in which they were formally ceded to them, yet he had never been reconciled to the loss of that important fortress; and, from the first moment that hostilities commenced with Holkar, it became evident that he was waiting only for a favourable moment to come to an open rupture with the English government, or take advantage of its difficulties to obtain their restitution. Troops under his banner had openly attacked the escort of the treasure in Colonel Monson's retreat; the language of his court had been so menacing, the conduct of his government so suspicious, that not only had a long and angry negotiation taken place with the

Feb. 24,
1804.

acting Resident, but General Wellesley had been directed to move the subsidiary force in the Deccan, eight thousand strong, to the frontier of Scindiah's territories. The prince himself, who was a weak, sensual man, had fallen entirely under the government of his minister and father-in-law, Surajee Row Ghautka, a man of the most profligate character, who was indefatigable in his endeavours to embroil his master with the British government. Under the influence of these violent counsels, matters were fast approaching a crisis; the cession of Gwalior was openly required, with menaces of joining the enemy if the demand were not acceded to; and at length he announced a determination to interfere as an armed mediator between Holkar and the English, and moved a large force to the neighbourhood of Bhurtpore to support his demands during its long-protracted siege. The conduct of the Rajah of Berar had also become extremely questionable; hostilities, evidently excited by him, had already taken place in the Cuttack and Bundelcund; and symptoms began openly to appear in all quarters, of that general disposition to throw off the British authority which naturally arose from the exaggerated reports which had been spread of Holkar's successes.¹

CHAP.
LII.
1805.

¹ Lord Well.
to Secret
Committee,
March,
1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 364,
486. Do.
to do., May,
1805, v.
190, 198.

Under the influence of those concurring motives, on both sides, there was little difficulty of coming to an accommodation with the Rajah of Bhurtpore. The English government became sensible of the expediency of abandoning their declared intention of punishing him by the total loss of his dominions for his unpardonable defection, and limiting their resentment to the reduction of his military power and ability to do further mischief; while he saw the necessity of abandoning the alliance of Holkar, and expel-

Peace with
the Rajah
of Bhurt-
pore.

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

April 17.

May 2.

¹ Lord Well.
to Secret

Committee,

May, 1805.

Well. Desp.

v. 149,

151, 198,

199.

Holkar joins
Scindiah,
being ex-
pelled from
Bhurtpore.

ling him from his dominions. The terms ultimately agreed to, at the earnest suit of the enemy, were, that the Rajah should pay twenty lacs of rupees, by instalments, in four years; that he should never hold any correspondence with the enemies of the British power, whether in Europe or Asia; and that, as a security for the faithful performance of these conditions, he should forthwith surrender one of his sons as a hostage, and make over the fortress of Dieg to the British troops, and submit any difference he might have with any other power to their arbitration, and obtain from them a guarantee for his remaining possessions. These conditions appeared to the Governor-general and council to be honourable to the British arms, and to provide for the main object of the present contest, viz., the separation of the Rajah of Bhurtpore from Holkar's interests, and the severing of the latter chieftain from the resources which his fortresses and treasures afforded. The treaty was, therefore, ratified by the Governor-general, and on the day on which it was signed, the Rajah's son arrived in the British camp, and Holkar was compelled to leave Bhurtpore.¹

As the forces of this once-formidable chieftain were now reduced to three or four thousand horse, without either stores or guns, and his possessions in every part of India had been occupied by the British troops, he had no alternative but to throw himself upon the protection of his ancient enemy, Scindiah, who had recently, under his father-in-law's counsels, appeared as an armed mediator in his favour. He accordingly joined Scindiah's camp with his remaining followers immediately after his expulsion from Bhurtpore. The Mahratta horse had previously reassembled in small bodies in the vicinity of that

town, in consequence of the absence of the great bulk of the British cavalry, which had been detached from the grand army to stop the incursion of Meer Khan, who had broken into the Doab, and was committing great devastations. On the 1st April, Lord Lake, having received intelligence that a considerable body of the enemy had assembled in a position about sixty miles from Bhurtpore, made a forced march to surprise them in their camp; and he was so fortunate as to come up with, utterly rout, and disperse them, with the loss of a thousand slain, and return to his camp the same day, after a march in twelve hours of fifty miles. A few days after, four thousand of the enemy, with a few guns, were attacked by Captain Royle, in a strong position under the walls of Adaulutnaghur, and totally defeated, with the loss of their artillery and baggage. By these repeated defeats, the whole of this formidable predatory cavalry was dispersed or destroyed, with the exception of the small body which accompanied Holkar into Scindiah's camp.¹

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1805.

April 1.

April 8.

¹ Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, 13th May, 1805, v. 155, 159.

Nor had the incursion of Meer Khan into Rohilcund and the Doab, or the detached efforts of the Mahrattas, in other quarters been more successful. The Rajahs of Koorkha and Kunkha, in the Cuttack, instigated by the Rajah of Berar, made an incursion into the British dominions; but they were repulsed, pursued into their own territories, and Khoordah carried by assault, by a force under the command of Colonel Harcourt. Bundelcund was for some weeks agitated by the intrigues of Scindiah, who secretly instigated its chiefs to revolt, in order to give more weight to his armed intervention in favour of Holkar: but, though this division, in the outset, had some success, in consequence of the absence of the British

Operations in Cuttack, Bundelcund, and against Meer Khan.

Jan. and Feb. 1805.

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1805.

Feb. 15.

Feb. 18.

March 2.

March 10.

¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret Com-
mittee,
March,
1805.
Well. Desp.
v. 142.
155.

Operations
against
Scindiah,
who sues
for peace.

cavalry at the siege of Bhurtpore, yet it was of short duration. The approach of a considerable British force speedily reduced them to submission. More difficulty was experienced from the incursion of Meer Khan, who broke into Rohilcund at the head of fifteen thousand horse ; and in the middle of February, occupied its capital, Moradabad. Three regiments of British, and three of native horse, were immediately dispatched by Lord Lake, from the grand army before Bhurtpore, and marched with extraordinary expedition to arrest the enemy. They arrived in time to rescue a little garrison of three hundred sepoy, which still held good the house of Mr Leycester, the collector for the district, and compelled the enemy to retire. Meer Khan fled to the hills, closely pursued by the British horse, under General Smith, who, after a variety of painful marches, came up with the enemy in the beginning of March, and completely destroyed the flower of his army : and, on the 10th of the same month, they sustained a second defeat from Colonel Burn, at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and after traversing the Doab, re-crossed the Jumna in the end of March, having, in the course of his expedition, lost half his forces.¹

No sooner was the treaty with the Rajah of Bhurtpore signed, than Lord Lake marched with his whole force to watch Scindiah's movements, whom Holkar had joined, and effected a junction with the detachment, under the command of Colonel Martindell. This wily Rajah, finding the whole weight of the

contest likely to fall upon him, and that he had de-
 rived no solid support from Holkar's force, imme-
 diately retired from his advanced position, and ex-
 pressed an anxious and now sincere desire for an
 accommodation. A long negotiation ensued, in the
 outset of which the demands of the haughty chief-
 tain were so extravagant as to be utterly inadmissi-
 ble; and Lord Wellesley bequeathed it as his last
 advice to the East India Directors and Board of
 Control, to make no peace with him, or any of the
 Mahratta chiefs, but on such terms as might maintain
 the power and reputation of the British government,
 and deprive them of the means of continuing the
 system of plunder and devastation by which their
 confederacy had hitherto been upheld;* and Lord
 Cornwallis, his successor, having arrived, this great
 statesman was relieved from the cares of sovereignty,
 and embarked at Calcutta on his return to England,
 amidst the deep regrets of all classes of the people,
 leaving a name imperishable in the rolls alike of
 European and Asiatic fame.¹

CHAP.
LII.

1805.

Lord Wel-
lesley re-
turns to
England.July 30.
Aug. 21.
¹ Lord Wel-
lesley to
Secret Com-
mittee, July,
1805, v.
269, 270.

These principles, however, were not equally im-
 pressed by personal observation upon his successors. The East India Company and the Board of Control,
 far removed from the scene of action, mainly solicit-
 ous about the husbanding of the national resources

Second
administra-
tion, and
death of
Lord Corn-
wallis.

* "Adverting to the restless disposition and predatory habits of Holkar, it is not probable that he will be induced to consent to any arrangement which shall deprive him of the means of ranging the territories of Hindostan, at the head of a body of plunderers, except only in the last extremity of ruined fortune. Whatever might be the expedience, under other circumstances than those which at present exist, of offering to Holkar terms of accommodation, without previous submission and solicitation on his part, at present the offer of terms such as Holkar would accept, would be manifestly injurious to the reputation and ultimately hazardous to the security, of the British government."—LORD WELLESLEY to Secret Committee, 25th June, 1805; WELL. Desp. v. 269, 270.

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1805.

Arrival of
Sir G.
Barlow.

Nov. 23,
1805.

Jan. 7,
1806.

¹ Malcolm,
388, 427.
Auber, ii.
361, 461.

for the desperate contest with Napoleon in Europe, and unaware that a similar necessity existed to uphold the British supremacy in the east, had directed the succeeding Governor-general to use his utmost efforts to bring the costly and distressing contest with the Mahratta powers to an early termination. Lord Cornwallis, however, did not live to carry these instructions into effect. The health of this distinguished nobleman, which had been declining before he left England, rapidly sunk under the heat and the labours of India; and he expired at Benares, on the 5th October, without having brought the negotiations to a termination. They were resumed in the same pacific spirit by his successor, Sir George Barlow: treaties were in November concluded with Scindiah, and with Holkar in the beginning of January. These treaties were indeed honourable to the British arms; they provided an effectual barrier against the Mahratta invasions, and secured the peace of India for twelve years. But Lord Wellesley's principles proved in the end to be well founded; pacific habits were found to be inconsistent with even a nominal independence on the part of these restless chieftains; conciliation impossible, with men who had been inured to rapine by centuries of violence. The necessity of thorough subjugation was at last experienced; and it was then accomplished in the most effectual manner. It was reserved for the nobleman who had been most fierce in his invectives upon Lord Cornwallis's first war with Tippoo, to complete the conquest of the Mahratta powers; for a companion in arms of Wellington, to plant the British standard on the walls of Bhurtpore.¹

The principal articles in the treaty with Scindiah were, that all the conditions of the former treaty, except in so far as expressly altered, were to continue

in full force: that the claim of the Company to Gwalior and Gohud, should be abandoned by the British government, and the river Chumbul form the boundary of the two states, from Kotah on the west, to Gohud on the east; and Scindiah was to relinquish all claim to the countries to the northward of that river, and the British to the south. Various money payments, undertaken by the Company in the former treaty, were by this one remitted; and the British agreed not to restore to Holkar any of his possessions in the province of Malwa. Holkar, driven to the banks of the Hyphasis, and in extreme distress, sent to sue for peace, which was granted to him on the following conditions:—That he should renounce all right to the districts of Rampoorah and Boondee, on the north of the Chumbul; as well as in Koonah and Bundelcund: that he was to entertain no European in his employment, without the consent of the British government, and never admit Surajee Ghautka into his counsels or service. Contrary to the earnest advice of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow, the new governor-general, so far gratuitously modified these conditions to which the Mahratta chiefs had consented, as to restore the provinces of Rampoorah and Boondee to Holkar, and to abandon the defensive alliance which had been concluded with the Rajah of Jypore. This last measure was not adopted without the warmest remonstrances on the part, both of Lord Lake and the abandoned Rajah, who observed to the British resident, with truth, “That this was the first time, since the English government had been established in India, that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience.” But every thing announced that the master spirit had fled from the helm, when Lord Wellesley embarked for England;

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LII.

1806.

Terms of
peace with
Scindiah
and Holkar.

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LII.

1806.

¹ Malcolm,
416, 439.
Auber, ii.
395, 409.Review of
Lord Wel-
lesley's ad-
ministra-
tion.

advantages, conceded by our enemies, were gratuitously abandoned in the vain idea of conciliation, and the objects to be gained by a pacific policy ; a treaty signed, to which the illustrious statesman, who had conquered the means of dictating it, would never have consented ; and future burdensome and hazardous wars entailed upon the empire, to avoid the necessity of a suitable assertion of the British supremacy at the present moment.¹

The administration of Marquis Wellesley exceeds, in the brilliancy and importance of the events by which it was distinguished, any recorded in British history. In the space of seven years, triumphs were then accumulated, which would have given lustre to an ordinary century of success. Within that short period, a formidable French force, fourteen thousand strong, which had well-nigh subverted the British influence at the court of their ancient ally the Nizam, was disarmed ; the empire of Tippoo Sultaun, which had so often brought it to the brink of ruin, subverted ; the Peishwa restored to his hereditary rank in the Mahratta confederacy, and secured to the British interests ; the power of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar crushed, and their thrones preserved only by the magnanimity of the conqueror ; the vast force, organised by French officers, of forty thousand disciplined soldiers on the banks of the Jumna, totally destroyed ; and Holkar himself, with the last remnant of the Mahratta horse, driven entirely from his dominions, and compelled, a needy suppliant, to sue for peace, and owe the restitution of his provinces to the perhaps misplaced generosity of the conqueror. He added provinces to the British empire in India, during his short administration, larger than the kingdom of France, extended its influence over territories more

extensive than the whole of Germany ; and successively vanquished four fierce and warlike nations, who could bring three hundred thousand men into the field.

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1806.

From maintaining with difficulty a precarious footing at the foot of the Ghauts, on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, the British government was seated on the throne of Mysore ; from resting only on the banks of the Ganges, it had come to spread its influence to the Indus and the Himalaya : it numbered among its provincial towns Delhi and Agra, the once splendid capitals of Hindostan ; among its stipendiary princes, the Sultaun of Mysore and the descendant of the imperial house of Timour. These great successes were gained by an empire which never had twenty thousand European soldiers under its banners ; which was engaged at home, at the moment, in a mortal conflict with the conqueror of the greatest continental states : and found in its fidelity to its engagements, the justice of its rule, its constancy in difficulty, its magnanimity in disaster, the means of rousing the native population in its behalf, and compensating the want of British soldiers by the justice of British government, the ability of British councils, and the daring of British officers. Impressed with these ideas, future ages will dwell on this epoch as one of the most glorious in British, one of the most marvellous in European, annals ; and deem the last words of the British inhabitants of Calcutta to Lord Wellesley, on his departure for Europe, as not the florid language of panegyric, but the sober dictates of truth. “ The events of the last seven years have marked the period of your government as the most important epoch in the history of European power in India. Your discernment in seeing the exigencies of the country and of the times

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¹ Address of
Inhabitants
of Calcutta
to Lord
Wellesley,
29th July,
1805.
Well. Desp.
iv. 613.

Return of
Wellington
to Europe.
March 10,
1805.

² Gurw. ii.
457, 607.

in which you were called upon to act; the promptitude and determination with which you have seized upon the opportunities of acting; your just conception and masterly use of our intrinsic strength, have eminently contributed, in conjunction with the zeal, the discipline, and the courage of our armies, to decide upon these great events, and to establish from one extremity of this empire to the other the ascendancy of the British name and dominion.”¹

General Wellesley had, a few months before his brother, set sail for the British islands. His important duties as Governor of Mysore had prevented him from taking an active part in the war with Holkar; although the judicious distribution of troops which he had made in the Deccan, had secured the protection of the British provinces in that quarter, and contributed powerfully to overawe the southern Mahratta powers, and keep Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from breaking out into open hostility. But though not personally engaged, his active and watchful spirit observed with intense interest the progress of the contest; his counsel and experience proved of essential service both to the government and the armies; and his letters on the subject remain to this day, an enduring monument of judgment, foresight, and penetration.² His able and impartial government of Mysore and the tributary and allied states connected with it, had endeared him to the native inhabitants, while his extensive local knowledge and indefatigable activity in civil administration, had justly commanded the admiration of all ranks of European functionaries. But he was dissatisfied with the restrictions sometimes imposed upon him by the government at home, and prompted to return to Europe by that hidden law which so often makes

the temporary vexations of men, selected by Providence for special purposes, the means of turning them into their appointed theatre; he felt the influence of that mysterious yearning, which, even in the midst of honours and power, prompts the destined actors in great events to pant for higher glories, and desire the trial of more formidable dangers. Addresses showered upon him from all quarters when his approaching departure was known; the inhabitants of Calcutta voted him a splendid sword, and erected a monument in their capital to the battle of Assaye; but among all his honours none was more touching than the parting address of the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, which seemed almost inspired with a prophetic spirit. They “implored the God of all castes and of all nations to hear their constant prayer; and wherever greater affairs than the government of them might call him, to bestow on him health, happiness, and glory.”¹

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Gurw. ii.
606, 608.
Scherer, i.
66.

The progress of the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a close resemblance to that of Napoleon in Europe; and the “necessity of conquest to existence” which was so strongly felt, and forcibly expressed, by Lord Clive, Lord Cornwallis, Lord Wellesley, and Lord Hastings, should make us view with a charitable eye the corresponding invincible impulse under which the European conqueror continually acted. Both empires were founded on opinion and supported by military force; both brought a race of conquerors to supreme dominion, in opposition to the established rights and vested interests of the higher classes; both had to contend with physical force superior to their own, and prevailed chiefly by espousing the cause of one part of the native powers against the other; both were com-

Analogy of
the British
Empire in
India, and
Napoleon's
in Europe.

CHAP. LII.
 1806. pelled at first to supply inferiority of numbers by superiority in energy and rapidity of movement; both felt that the charm of invincibility once broken was for ever lost, and that the first step in serious retreat was the commencement of ruin. Both had gained their chief increase of power during periods of peace; the strength of both appeared more terrible on the first renewal of hostilities, than it had been when they last terminated; and it was hard to say whether the open hostility or withering alliance of either was most fatal to the independence of the adjoining states.

Their essential point of difference.

But while, in these respects, these two empires were remarkably analogous to each other, in one vital particular their principles of action and rules of administration were directly at variance, and it is to this difference, that the different durations of their existence is to be ascribed. The French in Europe conquered only to oppress; seducing words, indeed, preceded their approach, but cruel exactions accompanied their footsteps—desolation and suffering followed their columns; the vanquished states experienced only increased severity of rule by the sway of the tricolor flag. The English in India, on the contrary, conquered only to save; the oppression of Asiatic rule, the ferocity of authorized plunder disappeared before their banners; multitudes flocked from the adjoining states to enjoy the blessings of their protection; the advance of their frontier was marked by the smiling aspect of villages rebuilt, fields recultivated, the jungle and the forest receding before human habitations. And the difference in the practical result of the two governments has been decisively established, by the difference of the strength which they have exhibited in resisting the hocks of

adverse fortune; for while the empire of Napoleon sunk as rapidly as it rose, and was prostrated on the first serious reverse before the aroused indignation of mankind, the British dominion in Asia, like the Roman in Europe, has stood secure in the affections of its innumerable inhabitants, and, though separated by half the globe from the parent state, has risen superior during almost a century to the accumulated force of all its enemies.

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After the most attentive consideration of the circumstances attending the rise and establishment of this extraordinary dominion, under Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, and Marquis Wellesley, it seems almost inexplicable to what cause its marvellous progress has been owing. It was not to the magnitude of the forces sent out by the mother country, for they were few and furnished in the most parsimonious spirit; it was not to the weakness of the conquered states, for they were vast and opulent empires, wellnigh equalling in numbers and resources all those of Europe put together; it was not to their want of courage or discipline, for they had all the resources of European military art, and fought with a courage which sometimes rivalled even the far-famed prowess of British soldiers. The means of combating with resources at first slender, and always dependent for their existence on the capacity and energy of the Indian government, were found in the moral courage and far-seeing sagacity of our Eastern administration, and the unconquerable valour of our British officers, who brought a degenerate race into the field, and taught them, by their spirit and their example, to emulate the heroic deeds of their European brethren in arms. The history of the world can hardly exhibit a parallel to the vigour and intrepidity of that poli-

Reflections
on the rise
of the Bri-
tish power
in India.

CHAP. tical administration—the courage and daring of those
 LII. military exploits. And, perhaps, on reviewing their
 1806. achievements, the British, like the Roman annalist,
 may be induced to conclude that it is to the extra-
 ordinary virtue and talent of a few leading men, that
 these wonderful successes have been owing. “*Mihi
 multa legenti multa audienti, quæ populus Romanus
 domi militiæque, mari atque terra, præclara facinora
 fecit, forte lubuit attendere, quæ res maxime, tanta
 negotia sustinuisset. Sciebam sæpe, numero parva
 manu, cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse;
 cognoveram, parvis copiis, bella gesta cum opulentis
 regibus; ad hoc sæpe fortunæ violentiam tolerasse;
 facundia Græcos, gloria belli Gallos, ante Romanos
 fuisse. Ac mihi, multum agitati, constabat pauco-
 rum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse;
 eoque factum, ut divitias paupertas, multitudinem
 paucitas superaret.*”¹

¹ Sall. Bel.
 Cat. sec.
 32.

Causes of
 this extra-
 ordinary
 progress.

Much, however, as the strenuous virtue of individuals may have contributed to the greatness of the British empire in Asia, as it did of the Roman dominion in Europe, it will not of itself explain the phenomenon. This strenuous virtue itself is the wonder which requires solution. How did it happen that Great Britain, during the course of eighty years, should have been able to furnish a race of statesmen adequate to the conception of such mighty projects; of warriors equal to the execution of such glorious deeds; men capable of seizing with unflinching courage the moment of action, of combining with profound sagacity the means of conquest, of executing with undaunted resolution the directions of genius? Still more, how was this constellation of talent exhibited when the state was involved in bloody and arduous conflicts in the western hemisphere, and

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shone with the brightest lustre at the very moment when all the resources of the state seemed concentrated for the defence of the heart of the empire? It was the boast of the Romans that their republican constitution, by training all the citizens to civil or military duties, either as leaders or followers, provided an inexhaustible fund of virtue and ability for the service of the state; and that the loss even of the largest army or the most skilful commanders could, without difficulty, be supplied by the multitudes in every rank whom the avocations of freedom had trained to every pacific or warlike duty. In British India, equally as in ancient Rome, the influence of the same undying energy and universal capacity may be descried. The natives say that the Company has always conquered because it was *always young*; and such in truth was ever its character. In no other state of society but that in which a large mixture of the democratic element has spread energy and the spirit of exertion through every rank, is to be found for so considerable a period so large a share of the undecaying youth of the human race.

But this element has usually been found in human affairs to be inconsistent with durable greatness. It has either burnt with such fierceness as to consume, in a few years, the vitals of the state, or dwindled into a selfish or short-sighted passion for economy, to gratify the jealousy of the middle classes of society, fatal in the end to its independence. In moments of general excitement, and when danger was obvious to the senses, democratic societies have often been capable of the most extraordinary exertions; it is in previous preparation, sagacious foresight, and the power of present self-denial for future good, that they have in general proved deficient. That England, in its Eu-

It was
owing to
union of
democratic
energy with
aristocratic
foresight.

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ropean administration, has experienced throughout the contest with revolutionary France, its full share both of the strength and weakness incident to democratic societies, is evident from the consideration that, if the unforeseeing economy of the Commons had not, during the preceding peace, when danger was remote, reduced the national strength to a pitiable degree of weakness, Paris could with ease have been taken in the first campaign ; and that, if the inherent energy of democratic vigour, when danger is present, had not supported the country during its later stages, the independence of Britain and the last remnant of European freedom, notwithstanding all the efforts of the aristocracy, must have sunk beneath the arms of Napoleon. No one can doubt that, if a popular House of Commons or unbridled press, had existed at Calcutta and Madras, to coerce or restrain the Indian government in its political energy or military establishment, as was the case in the British isles, the British empire in the East must have been speedily prostrated, any more than that, if its able councils and gallant armies had not been supported by popular vigour at home, even the energy of Lord Wellesley, the daring of Lord Lake, must alike have sunk before the strength of the Asiatic dynasties.

Causes of
this extra-
ordinary
combina-
tion.

The eastern empire of England, on the other hand, has exhibited no such vicissitudes ; it has never felt the want either of aristocratic foresight in preparation, or of democratic vigour in execution ; it has ever been distinguished alike by the resolution in council, and tenacity of purpose, which characterize patrician, and the energy in action and inexhaustible resources which are produced in plebeian governments. This extraordinary combination, peculiar, in the whole history of the species, to the British empire

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in Asia and the Roman in Europe, is evidently owing to the causes which, in both, during a brief period, rendered aristocratic direction of affairs co-existent with democratic execution of its purposes; a state of things so unusual, and threatened by so many dangers; an equilibrium so unstable, that its continuance, even for the brief time it endured in both, is perhaps to be ascribed only to Divine interposition. And it is evident, that, if the same combination had existed, in uncontrolled operation, in the government at home; if the unconquerable popular energy of England had been permanently directed by foresight and resolution equal to that which was displayed in the East; if no popular jealousy or impatience had existed, to extinguish, on the termination of war, the force which had gained its triumphs, and the fleets and armies of Marlborough, Chatham, Nelson, and Wellington had been suffered to remain at the disposal of a vigilant executive, to perpetuate the ascendancy they had acquired; if the two hundred ships of the line, and three hundred thousand warriors, once belonging to England, had been permanently directed by the energetic foresight of a Chatham, a Burke, or a Wellesley, to external purposes, the British European empire in modern, must have proved as irresistible as the Roman in ancient times, and the emulation of independent states been extinguished in the slumber of universal dominion.

But no such gigantic empire was intended by providence to lull the ardent spirit of Europe, till it had performed its destined work of spreading the seeds of civilisation and religion through the habitable globe. To great Britain, a durable colonial ascendancy is given; but it will be found, not among the

Causes
which will
eventually
subvert our
Eastern
empire.

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1806.

sable inhabitants of Hindostan, but the free descendants of the Anglo-Saxon race in the American and Australian wilds. The extraordinary combination of circumstances, which gave us the empire of the east, could not remain permanent; aristocratic constancy and democratic vigour, can co-exist only for a brief space, even in the most favoured nation. Already, the great organic change of 1832, and the extension of the direct influence of British popular power upon eastern administration, have gone far to shake the splendid fabric. When the time arrives, as arrive it will, that adverse interests, ignorant philanthropy, or prejudiced feeling, in the dominant island, shall interfere with vested rights, violate existing engagements, or force on premature changes, in the East, as they have already done in the West Indies, the discontent of the inhabitants will break out into inextinguishable revolt. When the national strength is prostrated to gratify the jealousy of popular ascendancy in the Asiatic, as it has long been in the European world, the last hour of our Indian empire has struck. Distant provinces may be long ruled by a wise, vigorous, and paternal central government; but they cannot remain for any considerable time, under the sway of a remote and tyrannical democratic society. The interests of the masses are, in such a case, directly brought into collision; the prejudices, the passions of the ruling multitude, soon prove insupportable to the inhabitants of the subject realm; the very spirit which the central empire has generated, becomes the expansive force which tears its colonial dependencies asunder. Whether the existing contest between the different classes of society in the British islands, terminates in the lasting ascendant of the multitude, or the establishment, by democratic

support, of a centralised despotism; the result will be equally fatal to our eastern supremacy: in the first case, by terminating the steady rule of aristocratic foresight; in the last, by drying up the fountains of popular support.

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But whatever may be the ultimate fate of the British empire in India, it will not fall without having left an imperishable name, and bequeathed enduring benefits to the human race. First of all the Christian family, England has set its foot in the East, not to enslave but to bless; alone of all the conquering nations in the world, she has erected, amidst Asiatic bondage, the glorious fabric of European freedom. To assert that her dominion has tended only to social happiness, that justice has regulated all her measures, and equity pervaded every part of her administration, would be to assert more than ever has, or ever will be produced by human nature. But when interest has ceased to blind, or panegyric to mislead, the sober voice of impartial truth will confess, that her sway in Hindostan has contributed, in an extraordinary degree, to correct the disorders of society; to extricate from hopeless oppression the labouring, to restrain by just administration the long established tyranny of the higher orders; and that public happiness was never so equally diffused, general prosperity never so thoroughly established among all ranks, as under the British rule, since the descendants of Shem first came to sojourn on the banks of the Ganges. Already, the fame of its equitable sway and thorough protection of all classes, has spread far, and sunk deep into the mind of the East; Mahomedan prejudice has been shaken by the exhibition, amidst its severities, of Christian beneficence; and even the ancient fabric of Hindoo superstition yielded to the ascendant of European

Great and
lasting bene-
fits it has
already pro-
duced in
human
affairs.

CHAP. enterprise. Whether the appointed time has yet
LII. arrived for the conversion of the worshippers of
1806. Brahma to the precepts of a purer faith, and the
vast plains of Hindostan are to be peopled by the
followers of the Cross, as yet lies buried in the womb
of fate : but, whatever may be the destiny of Asia,
the British standard has not appeared on its plains
in vain ; the remembrance of the blessed days of its
rule will never be forgotten, and more glorious even
than the triumph of her arms, have been the seeds of
future freedom, which the justice and integrity of
English government have sown in the regions of the
sun.

CHAPTER LIII.

CAMPAIGN OF ABENSBERG, LANDSHUT, AND ECKMUHL.

ARGUMENT.

Influence of the Aristocratic and Democratic Principles on the two contending Parties in Europe—Policy of the Austrian Cabinet since the Peace of Presburg—Important Decree, ordering the Formation of the Landwehr, in June 1808—Napoleon's Remonstrances against it—Deceitful Pacific Professions of Austria at Erfurth—Intelligence of the Preparations of Austria, induces Napoleon to halt in Spain—Division of Opinion in the Austrian Cabinet on the War—Arguments for and against it—Amount and Distribution of the French Force in Germany, in Spring 1809—Efforts of Austria to obtain the Accession of Russia to the Confederacy—Prussia resolves to remain Neuter—General Effervescence in Germany in aid of the Austrian Cause—Character of Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris—Angry interchange of Notes between the French and Austrian Cabinets—Deep Umbrage taken by Austria at the Conferences of Erfurth—Measures taken for the Concentration of the French Army—Preparations and Forces of Austria—Last Diplomatic Communications at Paris—Spirit which animated all Classes in the Austrian Empire—Austrian Plan of the Campaign—Plans of Napoleon—Commencement of Hostilities by the Austrians—First Movements of the Austrians, and imminent Danger of the French—Faulty Movements of Berthier to arrest their Progress—Advance of the Austrians almost cuts in two the French Army—Movements of the two Armies towards each other—Napoleon's Plan of Operations, and its great Dangers—Action between Davoust and Hohenzollern, at Thaun—Positions of the two Armies on the night of the 19th—Napoleon's Address to the German Confederates—Combat of Abensberg—Hiller pursued to Landshut—Is again beaten by the Emperor—Operations of Davoust and the Archduke Charles in the centre—Attack and Capture of Ratisbon by the Austrians—Preparatory Movements on both sides with a view to a General Battle—Description of the Field of Battle—Battle of Eckmuhl—Victory of Napoleon—Desperate Cavalry Actions in front of Ratisbon—The Archduke Retreats across the Danube—Operations against Ratisbon by the French, and wound of Napoleon—Its Assault and Capture—Great results of these Actions—Indefatigable activity of Napoleon and his soldiers was the principal cause of these successes—Impressive Scene in the conferring of military honours at Ratisbon—Defeat of the Bavarians by Hiller—Successful Operations of the Archduke John in Italy—Total Defeat of Eugene Beauharnois at Sacile—Important effects of this Victory on the Italian Campaign—Hopes which the commencement of the Campaign afforded to the Allies.

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CHAP. As the History of Europe during the eventful year
 LIII. which succeeded the French Revolution, contains, in
 1808. the domestic transactions of every state possessing

Influence of
 the aristo-
 cratic and
 democratic
 principles
 on the con-
 tending
 parties in
 Europe.

the shadow even of free institutions, a perpetual recurrence of the strife between the aristocratic and democratic principles; so the military annals of the same period illustrate the effect of these contending powers, on the course of external events, and the issue of warlike measures. In the results of military operations, not less than the consequences of social convulsion, we perceive the influence of the same antagonist principles; the long continued successes of the one, not less than the persevering firmness of the other, clearly illustrate the action of those great antagonist powers which in every age have divided between them the government of mankind. France, buoyant with the energy, and radiant with the enthusiasm of a revolution, was for long triumphant; but the fever of passion is transient, the suggestions of interest permanent in their effects; and, in the vehement exertions which the democratic principle there made, externally and internally, to achieve success, the foundation was necessarily laid for disappointment and change within, exhaustion and ultimate disaster without. Austria, less powerfully agitated in the outset, was directed by principles calculated to be more uniform in their operation, and more effective in the end: recurring to the aid of popular enthusiasm only when driven to it by necessity, and guided throughout by aristocratic foresight, she did not so soon wear out the scorching flame which shakes the world; like a skilful combatant, she gave ground and yielded, till the strength of her antagonist had exhausted itself by exertion; and thus succeeded at last,

not only in appearing with undiminished strength on the theatre of combat, but rousing to her standard the still unexhausted vigour of popular excitation.

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Since the gallant but unsuccessful attempt made by the imperial government in 1805, the cabinet of Vienna had adhered with cautious prudence to a system of neutrality. Even the extraordinary temptation afforded by the disasters of the Polish campaign, and the opportunity, thence arising, of striking a decisive blow when the forces of the east and the west were engaged in doubtful hostility on the banks of the Alle, had not been able to rouse to immediate exertion. Austria armed, indeed, and assumed a menacing attitude, but not a sword was drawn; and the rapid termination of the contest by the disaster of Friedland, put an entire stop to any projects of hostility which a decided victory in that quarter by the Muscovite arms, or even the transfer of the war into the interior of Russia, might probably have occasioned. But during this interval the Government was not idle. Under the able guidance of the Archduke Charles, the war department assumed an extraordinary degree of activity; the vast chasms which the campaigns of Ulm and Austerlitz had occasioned in the ranks were filled up by voluntarily recruiting, or the prisoners who at length were restored by the French Government; and, with a patriotism and wisdom worthy of the very highest admiration, the treasury, at the very time when the state was overburdened with the enormous contribution of four millions sterling, imposed by the victorious French troops, purchased from their retiring armies the greater part of the immense park of two

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the Imperial
Cabinet
since the
peace of
Presburg.

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thousand pieces of cannon, which they were removing from the arsenal of Vienna. During the whole of 1806 and 1807, the efforts of the war department were incessant, without any ostentatious display, to restore the horses of the cavalry and artillery, and replenish the arsenals and magazines, which had been nearly emptied by the efforts or spoliation of the last campaign; but the attention of the Archduke was, in an especial manner, drawn to the remodeling of the infantry, the real basis of all powerful military establishments. The French organization into corps de armée, under the command of marshals, and divisions under them of generals, each with a certain proportion of cavalry and artillery, so as to render it a little army complete in itself; that admirable system, which Napoleon had adopted from the ancient conquerors of the world,¹ was introduced into the imperial service; while the younger and more ardent officers, with the Archduke John at their head, eagerly supported still more energetic steps; formed plans of national defence and internal communication; warmly recommended the adoption of measures calculated to rouse the national enthusiasm in the public defence; and already contemplated those heroic sacrifices in the event of another invasion, which afterwards, under Wellington in Portugal and Alexander in Russia, led to such memorable results.²

¹ Ante, v.
309.

² Pelet.
Guerre de,
1809, i.
36, 37.
Der Erzher-
zog Johans
Feldzug in
Jahre 1809,
8.

Important
decree
ordering the
formation of
the Land
wehr, in
June, 1808.

It was the presence of the grand army of France, two hundred thousand strong, in the north and west of Germany, which long overawed the imperial government, and prevented the adoption of any steps which could give umbrage to Napoleon; but with the transfer of a large part of that immense force to the Peninsula, after the breaking out of the war in

that direction, this oppressive load was materially diminished. The able statesman who directed the imperial councils, immediately perceived that a powerful diversion was now likely to be created in the quarter where the French Emperor least expected it, and where he was most desirous of obtaining a solid support ; and they readily anticipated that England would not be slow in availing herself of this unexpected revolution of fortune in her favour, and descending in strength upon that theatre of warfare where the sea would prove the best possible base for military operations, and the scanty internal resources of the country would render it impossible to keep the armies of France together for any length of time in sufficient strength for their expulsion. In order to be in a situation to improve any chances which might thus arise in their favour, the cabinet of Vienna no sooner heard of the breaking out of the Spanish contest, than they issued a decree by which a militia, raised by conscription, under the name of LANDWEHR, was instituted. The general enthusiasm in favour of the monarchy, about, it was hoped, to resume its place in the theatre of Europe, soon raised this admirable force from 200,000, fixed by the law for its German possessions, to 300,000 men. In addition to this, the Hungarian Diet voted twelve thousand recruits for the regular army for the year 1807, and eighty thousand for 1808 ; besides an insurrection, or levy *en masse*, of eighty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were excellent cavalry. These immense military preparations, in addition to a regular standing army now raised to 350,000 men, were sufficient to demonstrate the existence of some great national project ;¹ and they were rendered still

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9th June,
1808.

¹ Pelet, i.
37, 38.

Hard. x.
296, 297.

Archduke
John, Feld-
zug, 1809,

10, 12,
Jom. iii.
138, 141.

CHAP. more formidable by the activity which prevailed in
 LIII. completing the remounting of the cavalry and artil-
 1808. lery, and arming the fortresses, both on the frontier
 and in the interior ; as well as the enthusiastic
 feelings which this universal note of military pre-
 paration had awakened in all classes of the mo-
 narchy.

Napoleon was no sooner informed of these serious
 military changes, than he addressed the most pressing
 remonstrances to the Imperial cabinet : and, in the
 midst of the increasing intricacy of the Peninsular
 affairs, and all the whirl of a rapid journey from
 Bayonne, by Bourdeaux, to Paris, repeatedly de-
 manded a categorical explanation of armaments so
 well calculated to disturb the peace of Europe. At
 the same time, he addressed a circular to the princes
 of the confederation of the Rhine, in which he called
 on them "to make ready their contingents, and pre-
 vent a war without a pretext, as without an object,
 by showing to Austria that they were prepared for
 it." No sooner had he arrived in Paris, than he
 addressed a public remonstrance on the same subject,
 to Metternich, the Austrian ambassador, in presence
 of all the diplomatists of Europe. The Imperial Go-
 vernment made loud professions of pacific intentions,
 but did not, for an hour, discontinue their military
 preparations. Napoleon was not deceived : the coin-
 cidence of these formidable armaments with the in-
 surrection in Spain, and the disasters of Vimeira and
 Baylew, was too evident to elude the most ordinary
 sagacity ;¹ but he dissembled his resentment, and con-
 tented himself with ordering the princes of the con-
 federation to keep their contingents together, and
 strengthening, to the utmost, the armies in Germany,

Napoleon's
 remonstran-
 ces against
 these mea-
 sures.
 24th July.

15th Aug.

¹ Pelet. i.
 39, 40.
 Hard. x.
 295, 296.

so as to replace the veterans who were withdrawn in such numbers, for the war in the Peninsula.

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It was, in a great measure, to overawe Austria, that Napoleon pressed the Emperor Alexander to meet him at Erfurth; and he flattered himself, that however tempting the opportunity afforded by the Spanish insurrection might be, the cabinet of Vienna would hesitate before they engaged in hostilities with the two most powerful military states of the continent. The preparations of Austria being not yet complete, it was deemed advisable to gain time; and in order to accomplish this object, M. de Vincent was dispatched with a letter to the coalesced Emperors in that city, so full of protestations of amity,* that Napoleon authorized the princes of the confederation to dismiss their contingents, with the advice, merely, to re-assemble them as soon as ever Austria resumed her hostile attitude. To the Emperor Francis, he returned an answer, earnestly counselling moderation and pacific views;† and having thus, as he hoped, dispelled, or at least delayed, the cloud which threatened to burst in the east of Germany,¹ he, by a formal decree,

Deceitful
pacific pro-
fessions of
Austria at
Erfurth.

14th Oct.
¹ Thib. v.
200, 201.
Pelet. i. 42,

47.

* “He flattered himself, that the Emperor Napoleon had never ceased to be convinced, that if false insinuations, in regard to the organic changes which he had deemed it necessary to introduce into his monarchy, had for a moment thrown doubts on the continuance of his amicable relations, the explanations which Count Metternich had made on that subject had entirely dissipated them. The Baron Vincent was charged to confirm them, and to afford every explanation that could be desired.”—FRANCIS to NAPOLEON, 21st Sept. 1808; SCHOELL. ix. 218.

† “He could assure his Imperial majesty, that he was seriously afraid he should see hostilities renewed: the war faction had pushed Austria to the most violent measures, and misfortunes even greater than the preceding ones. If, however, the measures of the Emperor Francis were such as to indicate confidence, they would inspire it. Truth and simplicity have now become the best politicians: he had communicated to him his apprehensions, in order that they might be instantly dissipated: when he had it in his power to have dismembered the Austrian

CHAP. dissolved the grand army, and directed a considera-
 LIII. ble part of the troops composing it, particularly the
 1808. corps of Soult and Ney, with the Imperial guards, to Spain, where they achieved the successes which have already been detailed.

Intelligence of the preparations of Austria, induces Napoleon to halt in Spain and return to Paris.

Notwithstanding the disasters, however, which befell the Spaniards, the cabinet of Vienna was not discouraged. During the winter, measures evidently indicating a hostile spirit, were adopted : the harbour of Trieste was opened to the English and Spanish flag : large purchases of arms, were there made by the agents of the insurgents ; articles hostile to Napoleon began to appear in the public journals, which, being all under the control of the police, indicated more or less the disposition of Government : and the Austrian ambassador declined to accede to a proposal made at Paris by Count Romanzow, for the conclusion of a treaty, involving a triple guarantee between the courts of St Petersburg, Vienna, and the Tuileries. Secret amicable relations had been established with Great Britain ; the common refuge of all those however hostilely disposed in former times, on the continent, who found the tyranny of France growing insupportable. But though the cabinet of St James's tendered the offer of their assistance in subsidies, they strongly counselled the Imperial government not to take the irrevocable step, unless the resources of the dominions, he had not done so : he was ever ready, on the contrary, to guarantee their integrity. The last levy *en masse* would have occasioned a war, if he had believed it was raised in concert with Russia. He had just disbanded the camp of the confederation of the Rhine : one hundred thousand of his troops were about to renew their threatening attitude against England.—Let your Imperial majesty, therefore, abstain from all hostile armaments, which could give umbrage to the French cabinet, or operate as a diversion in favour of Great Britain."—THIBAUDEAU, vii, 73, 74.

monarchy were clearly equal to the struggle which awaited them. But the vigour of the English administration, notwithstanding their prudent advice, was such as eminently to inspire confidence; the spectacle of fifty thousand British soldiers taking the field, in the Peninsular campaigns, was as unusual as it was animating, and promised a diversion of a very different kind from those which had terminated in such disaster on the plains of Flanders or the bay of Quiberon. At length there appeared, in the middle of December, a declaration of the King of England, which openly alluded to the hostile preparations of Austria, and assigned the prejudicial effect of Great Britain withdrawing at such a moment from the contest, as a powerful reason for declining the mediation of France and Russia, offered at Erfurth;* and the same courier, who, on the 1st January, 1809, brought this important state paper to Napoleon, conveyed at the same time, decisive intelligence in regard to the hostile preparations and general movement in the Austrian states. He immediately halted, as already mentioned, at Astorga; returned with extraordinary expedition to Valladolid, where he shut himself up for two days with Maret, his minister for foreign affairs; dispatched eighty-four messengers in different directions,¹ with orders to concentrate his forces in Germany, and call out the full contingents of the

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16th Dec.

15th Jan.

¹ Ante, vi.
839. x.Thib. vii.
200, 202.Hard. x.
297, 298.Pelet. i. 45,
48.

* If, among the nations who maintain against France a precarious and doubtful independence, there are any who, at this moment, hesitate between the ruin which will result from a prolonged inaction and the contingent dangers which may arise from a courageous effort to escape from it, the deceitful prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be singularly disastrous. The vain hope of a return of tranquillity might suspend their preparations, or the fear of being abandoned to their own resources shake their resolution.—16th Dec, 1808, *King's Speech, Parl. Deb.*

CHAP. Rhenish confederacy; and returned, without delay,
 LIIL. himself to Paris.

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Division of
 opinion
 in the
 Austrian
 cabinet on
 the war.

The Austrian cabinet, mean-while, notwithstanding their hostile preparations, were as yet undecided as to the course which they should finally adopt. The extreme peril which the monarchy had already undergone in the wars with Napoleon, as well as the uncertain nature of the diversion which they could expect from so tumultuary a force as the Spanish insurrection, naturally excited the most anxious solicitude, and induced many of the warmest and wisest patriots to pause before they engaged in a contest, which, if unsuccessful, might prove the last which the country might ever have to sustain. Opinions were much divided, not only in the cabinet, but the nation, on the subject. At the head of the party inclined to preserve peace, was the Archduke Charles, whose great military exploits and able administration as director of the war department necessarily gave his opinion the greatest weight, and who had felt too frequently the weight of the French arms not to appreciate fully the danger of again provoking their hostility. On the other hand, the war party found an able and energetic advocate in Count Stadion, the prime minister, who was cordially seconded by the majority of the nobility, and ardently supported by the great body of the people. It was known also that the Emperor himself inclined to the same opinion. The question was vehemently argued, not only in the cabinet, but in all the private circles of the metropolis.

On the one hand, it was argued, that the military preparations of the monarchy were still incomplete, and its finances in the most deplorable state of con-

fusion; that Prussia, whatever her inclinations might be, was incapable of rendering any efficient assistance, and Russia too closely united with the French Emperor to offer any hope of co-operation; that the Spanish insurgents could not be expected long to hold out against the immense forces which Napoleon had now directed against them, and accordingly had been defeated in every encounter since he in person directed their movements; and the English auxiliaries, deprived of the solid base of Peninsular co-operation, would necessarily be driven, as on former occasions, to their ships. What madness, then, for the sake of a transient and uncertain success, to incur a certain and unavoidable danger, and expose the Austrian monarchy, as it would soon be, alone and unaided, to the blows of a conqueror too strongly irritated to allow the hope that, after disaster, moderate terms would again be allowed to the vanquished. On the other hand, it was strongly contended, that so favourable an opportunity of reinstating the empire in the rank it formerly held in Europe never could again be looked for, and was in fact more advantageous than could possibly have been expected; that the great majority of the French veteran troops had been directed to the Peninsula, and were now either buried in the mountains of Galicia, or inextricably involved in the heart of Spain; that sixty thousand French conscripts alone remained in Germany, and the Rhenish confederates could not be relied on by the stranger when the standards of the Fatherland were openly unfurled; that the confusion of the finances was of no importance, when the subsidies of England could with certainty be relied on to furnish the necessary supplies, and the incom-

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Arguments
used on
both sides.

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pleteness of the military preparations of little moment, when the now awakened fervour of the nation was attracting all ranks in crowds to the national standard; that it was in vain to refer to the long-dreaded prowess of the French armies, when the disaster of Baylew and the defeat of Cintra had dispelled the charm of their invincibility; that there could be no question that the hour of Europe's deliverance was approaching; the only question was, whether Austria was to remain passive during the strife, and bear no part either in the glories by which it was to be achieved or the spoils with which it would be attended. These considerations, speaking as they did to the generous and enthusiastic feelings of our nature, and supported by the great influence of the Emperor, the ministry, and the principal nobility, at length prevailed over the cautious reserve and prudent foresight of the Archduke Charles, and war was resolved on. In truth, the public fervour had risen to such a height, that it could no longer be delayed; and, like many other of the most important steps in the history of all nations, its consequences, be they good or be they bad, were unavoidable.¹

¹ Erzsh. John
Feld. 1809,
24, 27.
Pelet, i.
59, 61.

Amount
and distribu-
tion of the
French force
in Germany,
in spring
1809.

The French forces in Germany, when the contest was thus renewed, were far from being considerable; and it was chiefly an exaggerated impression of the extent to which they had been reduced, which induced the cabinet of Vienna, at that period, to throw off the mask. The total amount, in September 1808, on paper, was one hundred and sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were cavalry; but the number actually present with the eagles was only a hundred and forty thousand, of whom only a hundred and ten thousand were native French, the remainder

being Poles, Saxons, and Dutch. After the departure of three divisions of Soult's corps for the Peninsula in the end of October, the remainder, eighty thousand strong, assumed the name of the army of the Rhine, and were quartered at Magdeburg, Bareuth, Hanover, and Stettin, and in the fortresses on the Oder. But to this force of Imperial France there was to be added nearly one hundred thousand men from the Rhenish confederacy; so that, after making every allowance for detachments and garrisons, a hundred and fifty thousand men might be relied on for active operations on the Inn or in the valley of the Danube.¹

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¹ Stutterheim, Feld.
3. 1809,
19, 20.
Pelet, 43,
44.

The Imperial cabinet made the utmost efforts to obtain the accession of Russia to the new confederacy; and for this purpose dispatched a young officer of diplomatic talent, engaging address, and noble figure, reserved for exalted destinies in future times, PRINCE SCHWARTZENBERG, to St Petersburg. Stadion had been previously made aware, by secret communications from Baron Stein, the Duke de Serra Capriola, and others, that, notwithstanding Alexander's chivalrous admiration of Napoleon, he still retained at bottom the same opinions as to the necessity of ultimately joining in the confederacy for the deliverance of Europe; and he was not without hopes that the present opportunity, when so large a portion of the French armies were engaged in the Peninsula, would appear to the cabinet of St Petersburg a fair one for taking the lead in the great undertaking. But all the efforts of Schwartzenberg were in vain. Alexander had given his word to the French Emperor; and though capable of the utmost dissimulation so far as the mere obligations of cabinets were

Efforts of
Austria to
obtain the
accession of
Russia to
the confederacy.

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concerned, the Czar was scrupulously faithful to any personal engagements which he had undertaken. He was occupied, moreover, with great schemes of ambition both on his northern and southern frontier, and little inclined to forego present and certain conquests in Finland and Moldavia for the problematical advantages of a contest in the heart of Germany. All attempts to engage Russia in the confederacy, therefore, proved abortive; and the utmost which the Austrian envoy could obtain from the imperial cabinet, was a secret assurance, that Russia, if compelled to take a part in the strife, would not at least bring forward any formidable force against the Austrian legions.¹

¹ Hard. x.
299, 302.
Pelet, i. 67,
68. Bout.
i. 24, 58.

Prussia
resolves to
remain neu-
tral.

Prussia had no objects of present ambition to obtain by remaining quiescent during the approaching conflict; and the wrongs of Tilsit were too recent and serious not to have left the strongest desire for liberation and vengeance in every Prussian heart. No sooner, therefore, had it become manifest that Austria was arming, than public feeling became strongly excited in all the Prussian states, and the government was violently urged by a powerful party, both in and out of the cabinet, to seize the present favourable opportunity of regaining its lost province and resuming its place among the powers of Europe. Scharnhorst, the minister at war, strongly supported the bolder policy; and offered to place at the disposal of the King, by his admirable system of temporary service,² no less than one hundred and twenty thousand men, instead of the forty thousand which they were alone permitted to have under arms. But the cabinet of Berlin was restrained from giving vent to its wishes, not merely by prudential considerations, but

² Ante, vi.
453.

a sense of gratitude. The visit of the King and the Queen to St Petersburg in the preceding spring, had renewed the bonds of amity by which they were united to the Emperor Alexander ; they had obtained a considerable remission of tribute, and relaxation of the hardships of the treaty of Tilsit, from his intercession ;¹ and they felt that, not indifferent spectators of the Austrian efforts, they could not with safety take a part in them, until the intentions of Russia were declared. They resolved, therefore, to remain neuter ; and thus had Napoleon again the extraordinary good fortune, through his own address or the jealousies or timidity of the other potentates, of engaging a *fourth* time in mortal conflict with one of the great European powers while the other two were mere spectators of the strife.²

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Jan. 1809.

¹ Ante, vi.
798.² Hard. x.
299. Pelet,
i. 65, 67.

But, though refused all co-operation from the European cabinets, the court of Vienna was not without hopes of obtaining powerful succours from the Germanic people. The Tugendbund or Burschenschaft, which had spread its ramifications as far as indignation at French oppression was felt in the north and east of Germany, had already formed a secret league against the oppressor, independent of the agreements of cabinets ; and thousands of brave men in Westphalia, Cassel, Saxony, and the Prussian states, animated by the example of the Spanish patriots, were prepared to start in arms for the defence of the Fatherland, as soon as the imperial standards crossed the Inn. The peasants of Tyrol, whose ardent and hereditary attachment to the house of Hapsburg, had been rendered still more enthusiastic by the bitter experience they had had of their treatment as aliens and enemies under the Bavarian government, longed

General
effervescence
in Germany
in aid of
the Austrian
cause.

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passionately to rejoin the much-loved Austrian dominion; and the first battalion of the Imperial troops which crossed the Salzburg frontier would, it was well known, at once rouse twenty thousand brave mountaineers into desperate and formidable hostility. The cabinet of Vienna, despite its aristocratic prepossessions, was prepared to take full advantage of these favourable dispositions; and, impelled by necessity, not only maintained in secret an active correspondence with the numerous malecontents in the adjoining provinces, who panted for the moment of German deliverance, but was prepared, the moment hostilities were commenced, to call upon them by animated proclamations to repair to its standards, and determine, by a vigorous popular demonstration, the uncertainty or vacillations of their respective governments. Thus had the energy of general enthusiasm in the course of the contest already come to change sides; and while France, resting on the coalitions of cabinets and the force of disciplined armies, was sternly repressing, in every direction, the fervour of national exertion, Spain and Austria openly invoked the aid of popular enthusiasm, and loudly proclaimed the right of mankind, when oppression had reached a certain point, to redress their own wrongs, and take the lead in the achievement of their own deliverance.¹*

¹ Pelet, i.
71, 79.
Feldzug von
Erzherz.
Jom. 52,
54.

Mean-while the Austrian ambassador at Paris had the difficult task to discharge, of maintaining appa-

* Napoleon loudly accused the Cabinet of Vienna of insurrectionary iniquity, in thus fomenting popular efforts against the armies of Imperial France. "Austria," said the *Moniteur*, "has adopted the revolutionary system: she has no right now to complain of the conduct of the convention, in proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage. A plan has been organized at Vienna for a general insurrection over all

rently amicable relations with the French govern-
 ment at the time when his cabinet were openly
 preparing the means of decided hostility. But the
 BARON METTERNICH, who then filled that exalted
 situation at the court of Napoleon, was a man whose
 abilities were equal to the task. A statesman, in the
 widest acceptation of the word, gifted with a saga-
 cious intellect, a clear perception, a sound judgment;
 profoundly versed in the secrets of diplomacy, and the
 characters of the leading political men with whom he
 was brought in contact in the different European
 cabinets; persevering in his policy, far-seeing in
 his views, unrivalled in his discrimination, and at
 the same time skilful in concealing these varied
 qualities; a perfect master of dissimulation in public
 affairs, and yet honourable and candid in private
 life; capable of acquiring information from others,
 at the very moment when he was eluding all similar
 investigations from them; unbounded in applica-
 tion, richly endowed with knowledge, he also en-
 joyed the rare faculty of veiling these great acquire-
 ments under the cover of polished manners, and
 causing his superiority to be forgotten in the charms
 of a varied and intellectual conversation. These ad-
 mirable abilities were fully appreciated at Berlin,
 where he had formerly been ambassador; but they
 excited jealousy and distrust among the diplomatists
 of Paris, who, seeing in the new representative of

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Character of
 Metternich,
 the Aus-
 trian ambas-
 sador at
 Paris.

Europe, the execution of which is confided to the ardent zeal of the
 princes of the House of Austria, propagated by the proclamations of its
 generals, and diffused by its detachments at the distance of two hundred
 leagues from its armies. The leading characteristic of that system is,
 the *terror* universally spread by the Austrian generals, to excite, by main
 force, that revolution."—*Moniteur*, No. 239, année 1809; and *Pelet*. i.
 79.

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¹ Hard. x.
302, 303,
D'Abr.
xvi. 174,
175.

the Cæsars qualities which they were not accustomed to in his predecessors, and unable either to overcome his caution or divine his intentions, launched forth into invectives against his character, and put a forced or malevolent construction upon his most inconsiderable actions.¹

Angry interchange of notes between the French and Austrian Courts.

Feb. 17.

Notwithstanding all his caution and diplomatic address, however, the Austrian ambassador could not blind the French Emperor to the preparations which were going forward. In a public audience of the envoys of the principal European powers at Paris, he openly charged the cabinet of Vienna with hostile designs, and Metternich, who could not deny them, had no alternative but to protest that they were defensive only, and rendered necessary by the hostile attitude of the princes of the Rhenish confederacy, to whom Napoleon had recently transmitted orders to call out their contingents.* In truth, however, though loud complaints of hostile preparations were made on both sides, neither party were desirous to precipitate the commencement of active operations. Austria had need of every hour she could gain to complete her armament, and draw together her troops upon the frontier from the various quarters of her extensive dominions ; and Napoleon

* “ Well,” said Napoleon, “ M. Metternich ! here are fine news from Vienna. What does all this mean ? Have they been stung by scorpions ? Who threatens you ? What would you be at ? As long as I had my army in Germany you conceived no disquietude for your existence ; but the moment it was transferred to Spain you consider yourselves endangered ! What can be the end of these things ? What, but that I must arm, as you arm ; for at length I am seriously menaced ; I am rightly punished for my former caution. Have you, sir, communicated your pretended apprehensions to your court ? if you have done so, you have disturbed the peace of mine, and will probably plunge Europe into numberless calamities. I have always been the dupe of your court in diplomacy ; we must now speak out ; it is making too much noise for

had as much occasion for delay to concentrate his forces from the north and centre of Germany, in the valley of the Danube; and he was desirous not to unsheath the sword till advices from St Petersburg made him certain of the concurrence of Alexander in his designs. At length the long wished for despatches arrived, and relieved him of all anxiety by announcing the mission of Prince Schwartzemberg to St Petersburg, the refusal of the cabinet of Russia to accede to his proposals, and its determination to support Napoleon in the war with Austria which was approaching. Orders were immediately dispatched for the French ambassador to leave Vienna, who accordingly took his departure on the last day of February, leaving only a charge d'affaires to communicate intelligence till relations were finally broken off; and though Metternich still remained at Paris, his departure was hourly expected; and such was the estrangement of the Emperor, that he never addressed him a word, even in public and formal diplomatic intercourse.¹ In the course of his discussions with Champagny, the French minister for foreign affairs at this period, Metternich, with all his caution, could not disguise the deep umbrage taken by Austria at not having been invited to take part in the conferences of Erfurth; and he admitted that, if

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LIII.

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Feb. 19.

Feb. 28.

¹ Thib. vii.
205, 206.Hard. x.
303, 304.Pelet, i.
117, 119.Stat. 14,
20.Deep um-
brage taken
by Austria
at the
conference
of Erfurth.

the preservation of peace, too little for the prosecution of war. Do they suppose me dead? We shall see how their projects will succeed; and they will reproach me with being the cause of hostilities when it is their own folly which forces me to engage in them. But let them not imagine they will have war to carry on with me alone; I expect a courier from Russia; if matters turn out there as I expect, I shall give them fighting enough." How easily may Napoleon's ideas and words be always distinguished from those of all other men! At least he always lets us understand his meaning; no inconsiderable advantage, in the midst of the general studied obscurity and evasions of diplomatic language.—See THIBAUDEAU, vii. 204, 205.

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this had been done, the cabinet of Vienna would in all probability have recognised Joseph as King of Spain, and the rupture would have been entirely prevented. In truth, Austria had good reason to anticipate evil to herself from the ominous conjunction of two such bodies in her neighbourhood ; while, at the same time, the cordiality of Alexander would unquestionably have been cooled if Francis or Metternich had been admitted to their deliberations. Napoleon's favour was too precious to be divided between two potentates without exciting jealousy : like a beauty surrounded by lovers, he could not show a preference to one without producing estrangement in the other. He chose for his intimate ally the power of whose strength he had had the most convincing experience, and from whose hostility he had, from its distance, least to apprehend.¹

¹ Thib. vii.
207.

Measures
for the
concentra-
tion of the
French
army.
March 4.

Mean-while Napoleon was rapidly completing his arrangements : orders were dispatched to Davoust early in March to concentrate his immense corps at Bamberg, and establish the head-quarters of the whole army at Wurtzburg ; Massena, at the same time, received directions to repair to Strasburg, and press on with his corps to Ulm, and then unite with the army of the Rhine ; Oudinot was moved upon Augsburg ; Bernadotte dispatched to Dresden to take the command of the Saxons ; Bessieres transported by post, in all imaginable haste, with the Imperial guard, from Burgos across the Pyrenees and Rhine ; instructions were transmitted to the French ambassador at Warsaw to hasten the formation of three Polish divisions, and co-operate with the Russians in protecting the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and menacing Galicia, while the princes of the Rhenish confederacy were enjoined to collect their respective

contingents at their different rallying points, and converge towards the general rendezvous of this immense force on the Danube, at Ingolstädt, or Donauwerth. Thus, from all quarters of Europe, from the mountains of Asturias to the plains of Poland, armed men were converging in all directions to the valley of the Danube, where an hundred and fifty thousand soldiers would ere long be collected; while the provident care of the Emperor was not less actively exerted in collecting magazines upon the projected line of operations for the stupendous multitude, and providing, in the arming and replenishing of the fortresses, both a base for offensive operations, and a refuge in the improbable events of disaster.¹

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LIII.
1809.

¹ Thib. vii.
206. Pelet,
i. 119,
126. Stut.
26, 29.

On the side of the Austrians, preparations not less threatening were going rapidly forward. The regular army had been augmented to three hundred thousand infantry and above thirty thousand cavalry; besides two hundred thousand of the landwehr and Hungarian insurrection. The disposable force was divided into nine corps, besides two of reserve. Six of these, containing nominally one hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand might be relied on as able to assemble round the standards, were mustered on the frontiers of Bavaria, besides a reserve in Bohemia, under the immediate command of the Archduke Charles; the Archduke John was entrusted with the direction of two others, forty-seven thousand strong, in Italy, supported by the landwehr of Carinthia, Carniola, and Istria, at least twenty-five thousand men, who, though hardly equal to a shock in the field, were of great value in garrisoning fortresses and conducting secondary operations; the Marquis Chastillon was prepared to enter the eastern frontier of Tyrol from the Puster-

Prepara-
tions and
forces of
Austria.

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thal, with twelve thousand regular troops, where he expected to be immediately joined by twenty thousand hardy and warlike peasants; while the Archduke Ferdinand, with thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, was to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and avert the calamities of war from the Galician plains. The total number of troops, after deducting the non-effective and sick, might amount to two hundred and twenty thousand infantry and twenty-eight thousand cavalry, with eight hundred pieces of cannon: a prodigious force, when their discipline and efficiency were taken into consideration, and the support which they were to receive, not only from the immense reserves of landwehr in all the provinces, but the general spirit and unanimity of the monarchy. The commencement of hostilities at once in Bavaria, Italy, Tyrol, and Poland, might seem an imprudent dispersion of strength, especially when the tremendous blows to be anticipated from Napoleon in the valley of the Danube are duly weighed; but these, in appearance offensive, were in reality strictly defensive operations. It was well known that the moment war was declared, the French Emperor, according to his usual policy, would direct all his forces at the centre of the enemy's power; invasion from Italy, Bavaria, and Poland was immediately to be anticipated; and in maintaining the struggle in the hostile provinces adjoining the frontier, the war was in reality averted from their own vitals.¹ *

¹ Stut. 34,
40. Pelet,
i. 166, 173.
Jom. iii.
140.

The utmost efforts were at the same time made to rouse the patriotic ardour of all classes, and government in that important duty were nobly seconded by the nobles and people throughout the empire.

* See note A.

Never, indeed, since the foundation of the monarchy, had unanimity so universal prevailed through all the varied provinces of the Imperial dominions, and never had so enthusiastic a spirit animated all ranks of the people. The nobles, the clergy, the peasants, the burghers, all felt the sacred flame, and vied with each other in devotion to the common cause. The requisitions of government were instantly agreed to; the supplies of men and money cheerfully voted; the levies for the regular army anticipated by voluntary enrolment; the landwehr rapidly filled up with brave and hardy peasants. At Vienna, in particular, the patriotic ardour was unbounded; and, when the Archduke Charles, on the 6th April, marched into the city at the head of his regiment, one swell of rapture seemed to animate the whole population. That accomplished prince aided the general ardour by an address to his soldiers on the day of his entry, which deserves to be recorded for the generous sentiments which it contains, as well as the light which it throws on the general reasons for the war.¹ *

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LIII.

1809.

Spirit which
animated all
classes
of the
Austrian
empire.Stut. 34,
41. Erz.
Jom. Feld.
29, 34.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 203,
204.

While these immense military preparations were going on on both sides, the semblance of diplomatic relations was still kept up at Paris. Metternich, who remained there to the last, rather as a legitimate spy than in any other character, presented a note to the cabinet of the Tuileries, on the 10th March. He there represented it as an undoubted fact, that since the treaty which followed the evacuation of Braunau, there was no longer any subject of difference between the two powers; and that, although the Emperor of Austria might well conceive disquietude at the numerous movements which had taken place since January, he had no desire but to see Europe in peace. The

Last diplo-
matic com-
munications
at Paris.

March 10.

CHAP. French cabinet replied, that as unquestionably no
 LIII. subject of difference remained between the two
 1809. powers; and that, this being the case, the Emperor
 March 12. could not conceive, either what the Austrians would
 be at, or what occasioned their pretended disqui-
 etudes. Here terminated this diplomatic farce: it
 deceived neither party; but both had objects to gain
 by postponing, for a short time, the commencement
 of hostilities.¹

¹ Thib. vii.
 207, 208.

Austrian
 plan of the
 campaign.

The original plan of the Austrians was to invade at once Franconia, Lombardy, Tyrol, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In all these districts they had numerous and active partizans, and they confidently expected a powerful co-operation from their exertions. For this purpose they had accumulated enormous masses of troops, above a hundred thousand strong, in Bohemia, from whence, as a central point, they were in a situation to issue in any direction which might seem advisable. They were, in March, grouped around Prague, in the north-western extremity of that country, between the Elbe, the Eger, the Moldava, and the Wittawa. The object of this extraordinary concentration of troops was to advance suddenly into the country of Bareuth, lend a helping hand to the numerous ardent spirits and malecontents of that quarter of Germany, fall upon Davoust's corps, which was assembled at Wurtzburg, before it could receive the reinforcements which were hastening to its support, or be electrified by the presence of Napoleon, and, if possible, drive it back by superior forces to the Rhine. Such an event, it was well known, would at once bring to the Austrian standards a vast body of ardent recruits, whom the enormous exactions and grinding tyranny of the French armies had filled with unbounded hatred at their dominion, and

at the same time, it was hoped, would overcome the indecision of Prussia, and bring its disciplined battalions to stand by the side of the Imperialists in the great contest for European freedom. This plan was ably conceived, and if carried into execution with the requisite alacrity and vigour, might have been attended with great results; for the French armies were very much scattered in the end of February, and, by issuing suddenly from the great salient fortress of Bohemia, and pressing forward towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles might have entirely separated Oudinot, who lay in Swabia, from Davoust, who was cantoned on the banks of the Main.^{1*}

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Feb. 27.

Jom. ii.

152, 153.

Pelet, i.

189, 195.

Stut. 40,

49.

The Austrians had taken Napoleon, in a certain degree, at unawares; as not only was the flower of his veteran troops in Spain, but the forces which still remained in Germany, though extremely formidable, if once assembled together, were scattered from the Alps to the Baltic, at a great distance from each other. His plan, therefore, contrary to his usual policy, was strictly defensive in the outset, to gain time for the concentration of his troops; and, as he deemed it unfitting, that he himself should be at the head of his army before any decisive blows were struck, and where, possibly, disasters might be incurred, Berthier was dispatched early in April, to assume the command of the whole until the arrival of the Emperor; a convenient arrange-

Plans of
Napoleon.
April 1.

* The directions of the Aulic council for the war in Italy and Tyrol, were to concentrate both corps, under the command of the Archduke John, between Villach and Klagenfurth, and then advance in two columns: one by the Pusterthal into the Tyrol, and over the Brenner to Trent; the other by Ponteba to Bassano, and from thence to the Adige; while the care of observing the lower Isonzo, was intrusted to the landwehr of Istria. The cabinet of Vienna calculated with much reason upon the expected insurrection in Tyrol, to aid and support both these movements.—STUTTERHEIM, 56, 57; and *Pelet*, i. 196.

CHAP. ment, as, if his operations proved successful, they
 LIII. would, of course, be ascribed to the intelligence and
 1809. ability of his superior in command; if the reverse, the whole blame of a miscarriage might be laid upon himself. From the period of his arrival, the whole troops, both French and of the confederation of the Rhine, were formed into one army, to be called the *army of Germany*. It was divided into eight corps,* commanded by the most distinguished marshals in the French service, and mustered two hundred thousand men. The emperor was indefatigable in his efforts to provide subsistence, clothing, and ammunition, for this enormous multitude; among other things, twenty-five million ball cartridges were collected. But he enjoined that the system should be rigorously followed out of making war support war, and strictly forbade any stores or provisions being purchased in France for the use of the troops, if they could be procured by requisitions or military contributions on the other side of the Rhine. Rapid concentration of his troops was enjoined to Berthier around the Lech;¹ but no offensive operations were

¹ Thib. vii.
 214, 223.
 Jom. iii.
 152, 153.
 Stut. 58,
 64. Pelet,
 i. 197, 209.

* Second corps,	Marshall Lannes,	50,000 men
Third,	Davoust,	60,000
Fourth,	Massena,	50,000
Seventh,	Lefebvre,	34,000
Eighth,	Augereau	20,000
Ninth, Saxon confederation and French,	Bernadotte,	50,000
Tenth,	King of Westphalia,	25,000
Imperial Guard,		22,000
Reserve cavalry,	Bessieres,	14,000
		325,000, and

400 pieces of cannon.

But at least one hundred thousand of them had not yet arrived: the guard and reserve cavalry were on their march from Spain; Bernadotte's corps was still at a distance in the north of Germany; and the contingent of the confederation of the Rhine were far from being complete. Still a hundred and forty thousand French troops and sixty thousand of the confederation might be relied on for active operations in the valley of the Danube.—THIBAUDEAU, vii. 214.

to be commenced before the arrival of the Emperor, who was expected about the middle of April. To all who were acquainted with the character of his movements, it was evident, that the moment he arrived and deemed himself in sufficient strength, he would commence a furious onset, and pour in concentrated masses down the valley of the Danube.

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1809.

The cabinet of Vienna took the initiative. On the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers at once on the Inn, in Bohemia, in Tyrol, and in Italy. Had the original plan of the Aulic council been followed out, and the Archduke Charles, at the head of a hundred thousand men, debouched from Bohemia, midway between the Main and the Black Forest, and advanced towards Mannheim, this commencement of hostilities might have been attended with most important effects ; for dissatisfaction with the French rule was universal in that quarter, and, had a powerful demonstration from England, on the coast of Flanders, seconded this irruption, the seat of war might have been permanently fixed on the middle and lower Rhine.* On the 17th March,

Commence-
ment of
hostilities
by the
Austrians.]

* The instructions of the Aulic council in the outset of the campaign were, " to advance in large masses, and attack the French army wherever it might assemble, either on the Main, the Nab, or the Danube. Should a French corps enter Bavaria, *the grand Austrian army was not to swerve from its direction*, but trust to arresting the movement on Bavaria, by threatening the advancing corps on the side of Ratisbon or Donauwerth. If Marshal Davoust retired in order to avoid any engagement before the arrival of his reinforcements, the grand Austrian army was nevertheless to continue its advance with all possible expedition, and take up a *central position between the Black Forest and the Main*, and there be regulated by the forces of the enemy, and the chances of successful operations which were afforded. The issue of the war depends on this operation, and on the issue of the first battle, which will, in all probability, if successful, rouse the malecontents of Bareuth, overawe Saxony, and bring round to the standards of Austria great part of the troops of the confederation of the Rhine which are now arrayed against her."—STUTTERHEIM, 64-69 ; PELET, i. 194.

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1809.

Austria had a hundred and forty thousand men on the two banks of the Danube, within eight days' march of Ratisbon; while Davoust only broke up his cantonments in the north of Germany, on the Oder and lower Elbe, on that day; Massena was still on the Rhine, and Oudinot alone at Augsburg, the Bavarians being on the Iser. Thus the complete separation of the French corps was a matter of perfect certainty, by a rapid advance towards Mannheim at that period. But the successful execution of this well-conceived design required a vigour of determination and alacrity of execution to which the Austrians were as yet strangers; and, by hesitating till the period for striking the blow was past, and the French troops were concentrated on the Danube, Austria lost all the immense advantages of her central threatening position in Bohemia. When it was resolved to attack the French in Bavaria, the Aulic council committed a second error, still greater than the former; for, instead of permitting the Archduke Charles, from his central position in Bohemia, to fall perpendicularly on the French corps, scattered to the south along the valley of the Danube, at the distance of only six or eight days' march, they ordered him to countermarch the great body of his forces, and open the campaign on the Inn; a gratuitous fault, which gave his troops triple the distance to march, and the enemy triple the time to complete their preparations and concentrate their forces. At length, however, the toilsome and unnecessary countermarch was completed; the Austrian columns, after being transported a hundred miles back towards Vienna, and across the Danube, were arrayed in dense masses on the right bank of the Inn; and the Archduke, crossing that river in imposing strength, prepared to

April 10.

carry the seat of war into the vast and level plains which stretch from the southern bank of the Danube to the foot of the Alps. At the same moment, the long wished for signals were given from the frontiers of Styria and Salzburg, to the provinces of Tyrol. With speechless transport, the brave mountaineers beheld the bale-fires glowing on the eastern boundaries of their romantic country; instantly, a thousand beacons were kindled over all its rugged surface; the cliffs of the Brenner were reddened by the glare, the waters of the Eisach reflected its light; and long before the ascending sun had spread his rosy tint over the glaciers of the Glockner, the inhabitants of his icy steeps were warmed by the glow, which, at the voice of patriotism, called a nation of heroes to arms.¹

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

¹ Jom. i.
152, 153.
Thib. vii.
221. Pel.
i. 191, 205.
Stut. 60,
64.

The instructions of Napoleon to Berthier,* before

* "By the 1st April," said Napoleon, "the corps of Marshal Davoust, which broke up from the Oder and Lower Elbe, on the 17th March, will be established between Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Bareuth: Massena will be around Ulm: Oudinot between Augsburg and Donauwerth. From the 1st to the 15th, three French corps, 130,000 strong, besides 10,000 allies, the Bavarians in advance on the Iser, and the Wirtemburghers in reserve, may be concentrated on the Danube at Ratisbon or Ingolstadt. Strong *têtes du pont* should be thrown up at Augsburg, to secure the passage of the Lech at Ingolstadt, in order to be able to debouch to the left bank of the Danube; and above all at Passau, which should be put into a situation to hold out two or three months. The Emperor's object is to concentrate his army as soon as possible at Ratisbon: the position on the Lech is to be assumed only if it is attacked before the concentration at the former town is possible. The second corps will be at Ratisbon by the 10th, and on that day, Bessieres will also arrive with the reserve cavalry of the guard: Davoust will be at Nuremberg: Massena at Augsburg: Lefebvre at one or two marches from Ratisbon. Headquarters then may be safely established in that town, in the midst of 200,000 men, guarding the right banks of the Danube, from Ratisbon to Passau, by means of which stream, provisions and supplies of every sort will be procured in abundance. Should the Austrians debouch from Bohemia or Ratisbon, Davoust and Lefebvre should fall back on Ingolstadt or Donauwerth."—NAPOLÉON'S *Instructions to BERTHIER*, April 1, 1809; *Pelet*. i. 212, 213.

CHAP. leaving Paris, were clear and precise ; viz. that if
 LIII. the enemy commenced his attack before the 15th, by
 1809. which time, it was calculated, the bulk of his forces

First move-
 ments of the
 Austrians,
 and immi-
 nent danger
 of the
 French.

might be assembled around Ratisbon, the army was to be concentrated on the Lech around Donauwerth; if after that date, at Ratisbon, guarding the right bank of the Danube from it to Passau. On the 12th, however, by means of the telegraph which the Emperor had established in central Germany, he was apprized at Paris of the crossing of the Inn by the Archduke and the commencement of hostilities. He instantly set out ; and with such precision were the movements of the immense force, which was converging from the mountains of Galicia and the banks of the Oder to the valley of the Danube, calculated, that the last arrived at the general point of rendezvous around Ratisbon, at the very moment when the Emperor was approaching from Paris. It was high time that he should arrive to take the command of the army ; for, in the interim, Berthier had brought it, by the confession of the French themselves, to the verge of destruction.* Instead of instantly following up the Emperor's instructions, by concentrating his forces at Ratisbon or Donauwerth, he scattered them, in spite of the remonstrances of Davoust and Massena, in the dangerous view of stopping the advance of the Austrians at all points. Nothing but the tardiness of their march saved the French army from the most serious calamities. But while Berthier dispersed his troops, as if to render them the more accessible to the blows of the Imperialists, the Archduke moved forward with such slow-

* "The Emperor, on his road to the army," says Jomini, "felt the liveliest disquietude at the posture of affairs—Berthier had brought the army within a hair's-breadth of destruction."—JOMINI, iii. 159.

ness, as apparently in order to give them time to concentrate their forces before he commenced his attack. They crossed the Inn on the 10th at Braunau and other points, and on the 16th, they had only advanced as far as the Iser, a distance of twenty leagues. On the latter day, they attacked the bridge of Landshut, over that river, and at the same time, crossed a division at Dingelfing, further down its course, which threatened to cut off the communications of General Deroy, who commanded the Bavarians placed in garrison at that point, and obliged them to evacuate that important town. The whole line of the Iser was now abandoned by the Bavarians, who fell back in haste towards Ratisbon and Donauwerth; while the Austrians, in great strength, crossed that river at all points, and directed their steps on the great road to Nuremberg, evidently towards the bridges of Ratisbon, Neustadt, and Kellheim, in order to make themselves masters of both banks of the Danube. Yet, even then, when their forces were concentrated, and greatly superior to those of the enemy as yet assembled, and every thing depended on rapidity of movement, they advanced only two or three leagues a-day; so inveterate were the habits of tardiness and delay in the German character.¹

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

April 16.

¹ Jom. ii.

159, 160.

Pel. i. 225,

239. Stut.

64, 72.

The approach of the formidable masses of the Austrians, however, full a hundred and twenty thousand strong, even though advancing with the pace of a tortoise, threw Berthier into an agony of indecision. It then evidently appeared, how much the major-general of the army, was indebted for the reputation he enjoyed to the directions of the Emperor; and how different a capacious talent for the management of details, is, from the eagle glance which can

Faulty
movements
of Berthier
to arrest
their pro-
gress.

CHAP. direct the movements of the whole. Despite all his
 LIII. remonstrances, he compelled Davoust to concentrate
 1809. his corps at Ratisbon, while, at the very same mo-
 April 16. ment, he ordered Massena to defend the line of the
 Lech; separating thus the two principal corps of
 the French army by at least thirty-five leagues
 from each other, and exposing the former, with his
 magnificent corps, the flower of the army, to be
 overwhelmed by the Archduke before any adequate
 reinforcements could be brought up to his support.
 Orders were at the same time given to Lefebvre,
 Wrede, and Oudinot, placing them in three lines, one
 behind another across Bavaria, in so useless and ab-
 surd a position, that more than one of the marshals
 did not scruple to ascribe it to treachery; a charge,
 however, from which the whole character of Berthier,
 and the uninterrupted confidence he enjoyed from
 the Emperor, is sufficient to exculpate him. As it
 was, however, the scattered position which he gave
 to the army over a line of forty leagues in extent,
 with numerous undefended apertures between the
 corps, was such, that a little more activity on the part
 of the Archduke would have exposed it to certain
 destruction, and brought the Austrian columns in
 triumph to the Rhine.¹*

¹ Pelet, i.
 240, 249.
 Thib. vii.
 221, 224.
 Jom. ii.
 159, 160.
 Sav. iv. 44,
 45.

Mean-while the Archduke, notwithstanding the
 tardiness of his movements, was inundating Bavaria
 with his troops. Hiller had advanced to Mosburg;

• “You cannot imagine,” said Napoleon, “in what a condition I
 found the army on my arrival, and to what dreadful reverses it was ex-
 posed, if we had had to deal with an enterprising enemy. I shall take
 care that I am not surprised again in such a manner.” And to Berthier
 himself he wrote from Donauwerth, the moment he arrived on the 17th.
 “What you have done appears so strange, that if I was not aware of
 your friendship I should think you were betraying me; Davoust is at
 this moment more completely at the disposal of the Archduke than of
 myself.”—PELET, v. 248; THIBAudeau, vii. 224; SAVARY, iv. 44.

Jellachich had occupied Munich, from whence the King of Bavaria hastily fled to Stuttgard to meet Napoleon; the two corps left in Bohemia had crossed the frontier, and were approaching by leisurely marches towards Ratisbon; while the Archduke himself, with four corps, a hundred thousand strong, was drawing near to Abensberg, Neustadt, and Kellheim; midway between Ratisbon and Donauwerth. Berthier had gone to the former town, where Davoust was stationed with sixty thousand men; but it seemed next to impossible to extricate him from his perilous situation, as Massena was at Augsburg, thirty-five leagues to the south-west, and the centre of the Archduke was interposed in appalling strength right between them. The Bavarians under Wrede, Lefebvre, and the reserve under Oudinot, were indeed in front of the Archduke around Ingolstadt, but they could with difficulty maintain their own ground, and were in no condition to extricate Davoust, who threatened by a hundred thousand Austrians under the Archduke on the south of the Danube, and forty thousand descending from Bohemia on the north, seemed destined for no other fate than that of Mack four years before at Ulm.¹

CHAP.
LIII.
1809.

Advance of
the Aus-
trians
almost cuts
in two the
French
army.
April 17.

¹ Pelet, i.
262, 263.
Thib. vii.
225, 226.
Jom. ii.
160. Stat.
72, 80.
Sav. iv.
44, 45.

Matters were in this critical state when Napoleon, early on the morning of the 17th, arrived at Donauwerth. Instantly he began enquiring of every one concerning the position, destination, and movements of the Austrian corps; sent out officers in all directions to acquire accurate information, and next morning dispatched the most pressing orders to Massena to hasten, at least with his advanced guards and cavalry, to Plaffenhofen, a considerable town nearly half-way from Augsburg to the seat of war around Neustadt

Napoleon
instantly
reassembles
his army.

CHAP. and Kellheim.* Davoust, at the same time, received
 LIII. orders to move on the 18th in the direction of Neu-
 1809. stadt, so as to form a junction with the Bavarians
 April 18. and Wirtemburghers under Lefebvre, who had retired
 to that quarter before the Archduke Charles; so that
 in the next twenty-four hours these two Marshals
 would be twenty leagues nearer each other, and
 having the troops of the confederation in the interval
 between them, might almost be said to be in commu-
 nication. At the same time, dissembling his fears,
 the Emperor addressed to his soldiers a nervous pro-
 clamation, in which, loudly reproaching the Austrians
 with the commencement of hostilities, he promised
 to lead them to yet more glorious fields of fame.[†]

¹ Sav. iv.
 50, 51.
 Pelet, i.
 263, 267.
 Thib. vii.
 226, 227.

* "It is indispensable that Oudinot with his corps, and your three other divisions, with your cuirassiers and cavalry, should sleep at Plaffenhofen to-morrow night; those in the rear, who are still at Landsberg, should do their utmost to reach Ascha, or at least get on as far as they can on the road from Augsburg to Ascha. One word will explain to you the urgency of affairs. Prince Charles, with 80,000 men, debouched yesterday from Landshut on Ratisbon; the Bavarians contended the whole day with his advanced guard. Orders have been dispatched to Davoust to move with 60,000 in the direction of Neustadt, where he will form a junction with the Bavarians. To-morrow (19th) all your troops who can be mustered at Plaffenhofen, with the Wirtemburghers, a division of cuirassiers, and every man you can collect, should be in a condition to fall on the rear of Prince Charles. A single glance must show you that never was more pressing occasion for diligence and activity than at present. With 60,000 good troops, Davoust may indeed make head against the Archduke, but I consider him ruined without resource, if Oudinot and your three divisions are on his rear before day-break on the 19th, and you inspire the soldiers with all they should feel on so momentous an occasion. In the 18th, 19th, and 20th, the whole affairs of Germany will be decided."—NAPOLEON to MASSENA, *Donauwerth*, 18th April, 1809; SAVARY, iv. 51, 52.

† Soldiers! the territory of the confederation of the Rhine has been violated. The Austrian general supposes that we are to fly at the sight of his eagles, and abandon our allies to his mercy. I arrive with the rapidity of lightning in the midst of you. Soldiers! I was surrounded by your bayonets when the Emperor of Austria arrived at my bivouac in Moravia; you heard him implore my clemency, and swear an eternal

Notwithstanding the pressing instance of the Emperor, and their own sense of the urgency of the case, Davoust and Massena could not reach the places assigned to them so early as he had anticipated, and the former, in consequence, was exposed to the most imminent danger. The messenger ordering Davoust to draw towards the Lech, had been dispatched from Donauwerth at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th; and his instructions were to march forthwith on Ingolstadt, while Wrede with his Bavarians was stopped in his retreat at Neustadt, and ordered to concentrate with the Wirtemburghers, behind the Abens. Davoust received his orders at midnight of the 17th, but his divisions were dispersed in the villages around Ratisbon, as well as in that town, and could not be instantly put in motion; while the bulk of Massena's forces, being six or eight leagues behind Augsburg, could not be concentrated till the night of the 18th, even at that town, or reach Plaffenhofen till late on the following evening. Davoust, having collected his whole force during the 18th, commenced the evacuation of that town at daybreak on the following morning; and by mid-day on the 19th, was already approaching Neustadt; leaving only a single regiment, three thousand strong, to guard the important bridge of Ratisbon. On the same day the Archduke divided the army which he commanded in person into two parts, and while he left the Archduke Louis with fifteen thousand men to watch the troops of the confederacy on the Abens, he himself, with twenty-five thousand, moved towards Ratisbon, in friendship. Conquerors in three wars, Austria has owed every thing to our generosity: three times she has perjured herself! Our former successes are a sure guarantee for our future triumphs. Let us march, then, and at our aspect let the enemy recognise his conquerors."—*Moniteur*, 26th April, 1809; and THIBAUDEAU, vii. 224.

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Movements
of the two
armies to-
wards each
other.

April 18.

April 19.

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hopes of making himself master of that important passage over the Danube during the absence of Davoust's corps, and thus at once gain possession of both banks of that river, and open up a secure communication with his two corps under Klenau, on its opposite bank. The worst was to be apprehended for Davoust, if, in the course of his march to Neustadt, he had encountered this enormous mass, moving in a direction almost perpendicular to his flank, and not more than a few leagues distant. The two armies crossed without the bulk of the forces meeting.¹

¹ Stut. 76,
81. Sav. iv.
50. Thib.
vii. 226,
228. Pel.
i. 281, 293.

Napoleon's
plan of
operations.
Its great
dangers.

Napoleon's plan was now clearly formed: it was to concentrate his whole army as rapidly as possible on the Abens, in advance of Plaffenhofen; and, drawing back his left, to throw his right, under Massena, forward, so as to drive back the Archduke Louis; separate altogether the grand army under the Archduke Charles from Jellachich and Hiller, and force it up into the narrow space formed by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon, and there either compel it to surrender, from the impossibility of finding an egress, if that town was still held by the French troops, or at least induce the sacrifice of its artillery and baggage in the confusion of defiling in front of a victorious army over the narrow bridge which it commanded. But the execution of this plan was exceedingly hazardous, and in presence of an enterprising enemy might have led to fatal results. Abensberg was the vital point; whoever reached it first in sufficient strength gained the means of preventing the concentration of his adversary. Davoust, to reach his destination, required to traverse the defiles of Abach and Portsaal, within two leagues of Abensberg, and this defile was much nearer the camp of the Archduke Charles on the 18th at Rohr, than the point

from which Davoust set out from Ratisbon. Eighty thousand Austrians might with ease have occupied the important posts of Abensberg and Portsaal, which would have effectually barred the way to Davoust's corps, and thrown him back upon Ratisbon, and the *cul-de-sac* formed by the bend of the Danube, over which there was no other bridge; the very fate which Napoleon designed for the army of Prince Charles. When, therefore, instead of pushing on with an overwhelming force to this vital point, the Archduke Charles, when within a day's march of it, divided his army on the 18th, and bent his course with the bulk of his forces, for Ratisbon, now almost destitute of defenders, Napoleon had some reason to say that his star had not yet deserted him.^{1*}

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¹ Jom. iii.
164, 165.
Thib. vii.
227. Pel.
i. 286,
295.

The covering troops of Davoust, however, encountered and had a rude shock with those of the Archduke, near the village of Thaun. St Hilaire and Friant had arrived on the heights of Saalhaupt and Tengen, where they were stationed in order to protect the French left, and cover the march of the remainder of the corps, with its artillery and trains, through the important defile of Portsaal, when the

Actions be-
tween Da-
voust and
Hohenzol-
lern at
Thaun.
April 19.

* Napoleon's plans at this critical juncture are clearly developed in the letter which he wrote to Massena at twelve o'clock noon on the 19th. "Prince Charles, with his whole army, was this morning a day's march from Ratisbon, having his base and communications on Landshut. Davoust has evacuated Ratisbon to move upon Neustadt, and join the Bavarians; I look, therefore, for an affair every minute; nevertheless, it is now noon, and I have not heard the cannon. You will perceive at a glance that I am refusing my left to throw forward my right, which you form, and which to-day should enter into action. Push Oudinot forward to Neustadt. From thence I shall probably direct the 4th corps to Landshut; and then Prince Charles, attacked on his left, will find he has lost his line of operations upon the Iser. Every thing will be cleared up to-day; the moments are precious; hours must be counted. Twelve or fifteen thousand of such rabble as you have defeated this morning should be easily disposed of by six thousand of our people."—NAPOLEON to MASSENA, 19th April, 1809; PELET, i. 285, 286.

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light cavalry of Hohenzollern appeared in sight, whose province in like manner was to cover the left of the Austrian army, and secure their march to Ratisbon. Fresh troops were successively brought up by either party as the day advanced, and before the evening twenty thousand men were engaged on both sides. The combat soon became extremely warm; some woods on the field were successively taken and retaken, and the greatest valour was mutually displayed. At length, a violent thunder-storm, which came on at six o'clock, separated the combatants, after each had sustained a loss of three thousand men, without either being able to boast of a decisive advantage; but although both retained their positions, yet, as the French, under cover of their resistance at this point, succeeded in passing unmolested through the important defile, and before night-fall reached the vital point of Abensberg, they with reason claimed the victory.¹

¹ Pel. i.
294, 300.
Stat. 84,
89. Jom.
iii. 165.

Positions of
the two
armies on
the night of
the 19th.

Re-assured by the junction effected by Davoust with the Bavarians under Lefebvre, at this point, as to the security of his centre, Napoleon resolved to commence a vigorous offensive, and by advancing his right against Landshut, both threaten the Archduke's communications, and throw him back into the net prepared for him by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. Early on the morning of the 19th, when this bloody combat was engaged on the banks of the Danube at Thaun, Massena had encountered a body of five thousand infantry and cavalry at Plaffenhofen, and defeated it in a few minutes, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. In the course of the day, he had concentrated all his corps at that place; Oudinot was still further in advance towards Freysing, with his light troops stretching

along the Iser so as to intercept all communication between the Archduke and his left wing at Munich : CHAP.
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Davoust was grouped in the villages around Abensberg ; while Lefebvre, Wrede, and Vandamme, with the troops of the confederation, were at Neustadt and Bidourg. Thus the whole French army, at length concentrated in a line of ten leagues broad, was in a condition to take part in any general battle or in common operations on the following day. The Austrian army was assembled in the narrow space formed by the Iser as a base, and the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon as a curve ; Lichtenstein was at Eglossheim, Hohenzollern at Hausem, Rozemberg at Dinzing, and the remainder in the villages from Mainburg on the south to the neighbourhood of Ratisbon on the north ; but their principal masses were grouped around ECHMUHL. They were less prepared than the French, however, for a decisive affair on the morrow, being spread over a surface at least sixteen leagues in extent ; and what was still worse, the great mass under the Archduke was separated, by an unoccupied space four leagues in breadth, from the corps of General Hiller at Mosburg ; and two powerful corps under Klenau were uselessly lost on the northern bank of the Danube, where there was not an enemy to oppose them.¹

Being well aware, from the position of the respective armies, that a decisive affair was at hand, Napoleon adopted the generous, and at the same time prudent policy, of combating in person at the head of the troops of the confederation, leaving the native French to their inherent valour, their experienced skill, and the direction of their veteran marshals. He repaired to the head-quarters of their commanders, and, according to custom, visited at daybreak the

¹ Jom. iii.
164, 165.
Pel. i. 305,
306. Stat.
90, 92.

Napoleon's
address to
the German
confederates.

April 20.

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bivouacs of the troops, which he traversed from right to left along their whole extent, accompanied only by the officers and generals of the Bavarians. He was received with the loudest acclamations, and a transport rivalling that of his own veteran soldiers; so contagious is the feeling of military ardour, and so winning the confidence with which the mighty conqueror threw himself on the support of his new allies. Clapping the Prince Royal of Bavaria on the shoulder, he exclaimed, when the inspection was finished: "Well, Prince Royal, this is the way in which one must be King of Bavaria; when your turn comes, all the world will follow you if you do the same; but if you remain at home, every one will go to sleep; adieu empire and glory." To the Wirtemburghers, at the same time, he spoke of the glories they had acquired by combating the Austrians in the wars of the Great Frederick; and of the laurels which they had won in the last campaign in Silesia. These words translated into German by their respective officers excited great enthusiasm, which was soon raised to the very highest pitch by the proclamation read to the troops, in which the Emperor declared that, without any French to aid them, he was to combat that day at their head, and announced a glorious destiny to their countries.* Perceiving that the spirit of the troops was now roused to the highest point, the Emperor gave the signal to engage.¹

¹ Sav. iv.
49. Thib.
vii. 229,
231. Pel.
ii. 8, 10.

* "Bavarians! I do not come among you as the Emperor of the French, but as chief of the confederation of the Rhine and protector of your country. You combat to-day alone, against the Germans; not a single Frenchman is to be seen in the first line; they are only in reserve, and the enemy are not aware of their presence. I place entire confidence in your valour. I have extended the limits of your country; but I now see that I have not done enough. Hereafter, I will render you so great, that, to sustain a war against Austria, you will no longer have need of my assistance. Two hundred years the Bavarian banners, protected by

Notwithstanding, however, the deserved confidence which he placed in the German troops, Napoleon did not trust the result of the day exclusively to their exertions. Lannes, who the day before had joined the army from Saragossa, was intrusted with the command of two French divisions, drawn from Massena's corps, which formed the left of the centre, under Napoleon's immediate command, and was to advance on the great road from Kellheim to Landshut; the Wirtemburghers, under Vandamme, were in the centre; the Bavarians on the right, directly opposite to ABENSBERG, under Wrede. Had two of the Austrian corps been concentrated, they might successively have combated this aggregate of allied troops, whose total strength did not exceed sixty-five thousand men; but unfortunately, they were so much dispersed, as to be incapable of opposing any effective resistance to the enemy. Hiller, with twenty-two thousand, was in march from Mainburg to Pfaffenhhausen; the Archduke Louis, with ten thousand, guarded Sieginburg, with its bridge over the Aber; the prince of Reuss, with fifteen thousand, lay in the rear at Kirchdorf; General Thierry, with five thousand, at Offensteller. Thus, above fifty thousand were in front of the French; but scattered over a space several leagues broad, and without any centre or plan of operations. Not expecting an attack on that day, they were leisurely performing the various movements assigned to them, with a view to the concentration of their troops for the morrow, when they

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Combats of
Abensberg.
April 20.

France, resisted Austria; now we are on the march for Vienna, where we shall punish her for the mischief which she has always done to your forefathers. Austria intended to have partitioned your country into baronies, and divided you among her regiments. Bavarians, this war is the last which you will have to sustain against your enemies; attack them with the bayonet, and annihilate them."—THIBAUDEAU, vii. 230, 231.

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were simultaneously attacked by the enemy at all points, who passed at once, from cautious defensive, to furious offensive operations. They made, in consequence, but a feeble resistance; or rather, they were attacked at so many different points, and so much in detail, that no one general could take upon himself the responsibility of halting to give battle; and the day was a sort of running fight, in many detached places, rather than a regular engagement. It proved, however, very disastrous to the Austrians. Thierry, whose troops had not recovered the rout of the preceding day, assailed by Lannes with greatly superior forces, was thrown back in confusion upon Hiller's troops at Rottenburg, who, coming up in haste from Mainburg, instead of stopping, increased the general disorder, and the whole were driven across the bridge of the Laber, which Lannes traversed with bayonets fixed and colours flying; the Prince of Reuss and Bianchi, attacked in front by Lefebvre, and in flank by Vandamme, with the Wirtemburghers, deemed themselves fortunate in being able to escape to Pfaffenhausen, without any serious loss; whither they were immediately followed by the Archduke Louis, who had been driven from the bridge of Siegenburg, closely pursued by Wrede and the Bavarians, who, on this occasion, emulated the vigour and rapidity of the French troops. The Austrians were not routed at any point, and no artillery was taken; nevertheless, they had to lament the loss of eight thousand men; the line to Landshut was thrown open to the enemy; they had lost the advantage of the initiative; and, what is of incalculable importance, had been unsuccessful in the first considerable action of the campaign.¹

¹ Stat. 92,
99. Pel.
ii. 12, 23.
Thib. vii.
232. Jom.
ii. 168,
169.

Napoleon was not slow in following up the impor-

tant blow thus struck in the outset of operations. His great object was to throw himself upon the Archduke's communications; and the success thus gained, against the covering corps of his brother Louis, by opening up the great road to Landshut, rendered that undertaking an easy task. To cover the movement, and distract his attention, Davoust received orders to threaten the enemy on the side of Ratisbon, where the bulk of his forces were assembled; but the serious operations were conducted by the Emperor in person, against the retiring columns of Hiller, Bianchi, and the Archduke Louis. Uniting their shattered troops, these generals had fallen back in the direction of Landshut, in the hopes of preserving that important passage in the rear, with the immense stores of baggage and ammunition which it contained, from the attacks of the enemy. Thither, however, they were instantly followed by Napoleon, who, putting himself on horseback at daybreak on the 21st, moved every disposable bayonet and sabre in the direction of Landshut, while Massena, on his right, still further in advance, manœuvred in such a way, between Pfaffenhofen and Mosburg, as to render a retreat upon that town a matter of absolute necessity, to avoid the communications of the grand army being instantly cut off; while Davoust, on the left, was to engage the attention of the Archduke Charles so completely as to prevent him from rendering any effectual assistance.

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Hiller pursued to Landshut by Napoleon. April 21.

¹ Stut. 100, 104. Pel. ii. 35, 37.

These movements, admirably combined, and executed with uncommon vigour and precision, proved completely successful. The rear-guard of the Archduke Louis, warmly attacked on different occasions during the night, was thrown back in disorder in the morning on Furth and Arth, by roads already choked

His defeat by the Emperor.

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with baggage wagons and all the immense *materiel* of the grand Austrian army. Their confusion became altogether inextricable when they approached the valley of the Iser, and the bridges of Landshut, which are traversed only by two *chaussées*, passing for a considerable distance on the western side through low swamps, altogether impassable for artillery or chariots. To strengthen the rear-guard while the retiring columns were defiling through those perilous straits, Hiller ordered General Vincent to hold firm with the cavalry at their entrance ; but at that very moment Napoleon, accompanied by a powerful train of artillery, and the cuirassiers of Nansouty, arrived on the ground ; and instantly, under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon, the French horse thundered in a charge. Vincent's dragoons were unable to withstand the shock ; horse, foot, and cannon were thrown together in wild disorder on the *chaussées*, and a vast quantity of artillery and baggage abandoned by the Austrians, who crowded in utter disorder into Landshut. But, even behind its ramparts, they were no longer in safety ; for on the same morning Massena had gained possession of the bridge of Mosburg, and was rapidly advancing, agreeably to his orders, down the right, or eastern bank of the Iser. Alarmed by his approach, the Austrians put the torch to the long wooden bridge which leads into the town, and kept up a heavy fire upon it from the neighbouring houses and churches ; but General Moulon, at the head of the French grenadiers, advanced through a shower of balls, amidst the flames, to the portcullis, which was speedily demolished, and the heroic assailants burst into the town. Hiller no longer fought but to gain time to draw off his artillery and chariots ; but such was the rapidity

of Massena's advance, whose dense columns now covered the opposite side of the river, and had reached to within a mile of the town, that a large part of them required to be sacrificed. Hiller at length, after having made a most gallant resistance, drew off towards the Inn in the direction of Oetting, where he crossed on the following day, having lost nearly six thousand men, twenty-five pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition wagons, a pontoon train, and an enormous quantity of baggage, in this disastrous affair.^{1*}

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Stut. 101,
109. Pel.
ii. 35, 49.
Jom. iii.
170, 171.
Thib. vii.
232, 233.

The task assigned to Davoust, while Napoleon was in this manner destroying the left wing of the Imperialists, and laying bare their vital line of communications to Landshut and the Inn, was to occupy the attention of the Archduke Charles, who with the whole centre of the army had diverged to Ratisbon, in order to make himself master of the important bridge at that place, and open up the communications with the two corps of Klenau and Bellegarde on the opposite side of the Danube. Rightly judging that the best way to impose upon his adversary and inspire him with a mistaken idea of his own strength was to assume the offensive, the French marshal, early on the morning of the 21st, commenced an attack in the woody country which lies on the banks of the Laber, and after a warm contest, drove the Austrians across that river. Though their positions were strong and forces numerous, yet Hohenzollern was so much deceived by the vivacity of the French

Operations
of Davoust
and the
Archduke
Charles in
the centre.

* A singular trait of heroism occurred on this occasion, on the part of an Austrian grenadier, which is recorded with generous eulogy by the French historian Pelet. Two companies of Austrian grenadiers of Teuchmeister, were closely pursued by the French cavalry, and on the point of being surrounded. A grenadier ran to an ammunition wagon and set it on fire; he was instantly blown up with it, but, by his death, and the admiration which it inspired in the pursuers, arrested the pursuit, and saved his comrades.—STUTTERHEIM, 108; PELET, ii. 48.

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attack, and by the idea that two divisions of their army would never have ventured, unsupported, to hazard an attack upon the dense masses of his own and Rosenberg's corps, that he never doubted that it was only a part of a general movement to pierce the Imperial centre, and that he would soon have Napoleon thundering on his flank. He gave orders for them accordingly, at noon, to fall back and take up a new position facing the south, on the right or eastern bank of the Laber, between that river and Dinzing. Forty thousand Austrian foot and five thousand horse were in two hours collected there, where they were soon assailed by thirty-five thousand French and Bavarians, under Davoust, Lefebvre, and Montbrun, whom the Emperor, after the victory of Abensberg, had detached to assist in that quarter, while he himself followed up his decisive successes against Hiller at Landshut. The action was warmly contested till nightfall, when both parties maintained their positions; and though each had to lament the loss of three thousand men killed and wounded, both claimed the victory; but, as the operations of Davoust were intended rather as a feint, than a serious attack, and they had completely the desired effect, of preventing any reinforcements being sent from the centre to the left wing under Hiller, then in the act of being crushed by the overwhelming legions of the Emperor, the French with reason claimed the advantage.¹

¹ Stat. 109,
115. Pel.
ii. 49, 57.
Jom. ii.
172, 173.
Thib. vii.
233.
Davoust's
Report.
Pel. ii. 416.

Attack and
capture of
Ratisbon by
the Aus-
trians.

While these important events were shaking the Austrian left wing and centre, the Archduke Charles with the main strength of the army was pressing the attack on Ratisbon. That town, commanding the only stone bridge over the Danube below Ulm, and opening up a direct communication with the two

Austrian corps on its northern bank, was at all times a point of consequence ; but it had now become, unknown to the Austrians, of incalculable importance, as forming the only line of retreat for the army, now that its communication with the Inn was cut off by the capture of Landshut and the alarming progress of the Emperor on the left. Fully sensible of the value of such an acquisition, the Archduke, as soon as Davoust had left the town, ordered Kollowrath to attack it on the northern, and Lichtenstein on the southern side. The former quickly obeyed his orders, and appeared on the 19th in great strength in the villages at the northern extremity of the bridge, which were carried by assault. Soon after a dense column burst open the gates, and advanced by the great street to the northern end of the bridge ; but, being there stopped by the palisades, and severely galled by a cross fire from the houses, it was obliged to retire, after sustaining a severe loss. In the afternoon, however, Lichtenstein, with the advanced guard of the grand Austrian army, approached from the southern side, and attempts were made by the French garrison to destroy the bridge ; but that solid structure, the work of the Romans, composed of large blocks of stone strongly cemented by Pozzuolo cement, was still, after having stood for seventeen hundred years, so entire, that it resisted all attempts at demolition by ordinary implements ; and the powder of the garrison was so much exhausted, that they had not the means of blowing it up. Deeming resistance impracticable, and having nearly expended his ammunition, the French colonel surrendered at discretion. Thus were the successes in the shock of these two redoubtable antagonists in some degree balanced ; for, if the French had gained possession of Landshut, and the

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LIIL.

1809.

April 20.

CHAP. communications of the grand Austrian army with
 LIII. Vienna, they had lost Ratisbon, the key to both banks
 1809. of the Danube ; and, if they had five thousand pri-
 soners to exhibit, taken in the combats of Abensberg

¹ Stut. 114, and Landshut, the Austrians could point with exul-
 120. Pel. tation to the unusual spectacle of an entire regiment,
 ii. 24, 32. nearly three thousand strong, with its eagle and stan-
 Jom. ii. dards, which had fallen into their hands.¹
 169. Thib.
 vii. 232.

Preparatory
 movements
 on both
 sides.

Matters were now evidently approaching a crisis between the Archduke and Napoleon, and both these able generals concentrated their forces, to engage in it with advantage. Conceiving that the French Emperor was at a distance, following up his successes against Hiller, the Austrian general resumed the movement towards Neustadt, which he had so unhappily abandoned three days before, and having brought Kollowrath, with his whole corps, over to the southern bank of the Danube, concentrated eighty thousand men between Abensberg and Ratisbon ; Bellegarde, with his corps, above twenty-five thousand strong, was so far removed, without any assignable reason, that he could not approach nearer on that day to the scene of action than Stadt-am-Hoff, at the northern end of the bridge of Ratisbon. The eighty thousand men, however, whom he had assembled, would, in all probability, have been able to make head against all the forces which Napoleon could bring against them, were it not that, instead of grouping them together in one field, the Archduke moved Kollowrath and Lichtenstein, forty thousand strong, on the great road to Neustadt, by the defile of Abach, which Davoust had previously traversed, throwing thus the weight of his forces against the French left, and intending to menace their rear and communications, in the same way as they had done with the Austrian left, by the

capture of Landshut. But Napoleon was in too great strength to be disquieted by such a demonstration, and leaving only a curtain of light troops to retard the advance of the Austrians in that direction, he concentrated all his forces to bear down upon their centre at ECHMUHL and Laichling, the scene of such obstinate fighting on the preceding day. At day-break, on the 22d, the Emperor set out from Landshut, taking with him the whole of Lannes', and the greater part of Massena's corps, the Wirtemburghers, the reserve under Oudinot, which, coming up from the rear, received in the night that direction, and the guards and cuirassiers just arrived from Spain. Thus, one half of the Archduke's army, under Rosenberg¹ and Hohenzollern, not forty thousand strong, was to be exposed to the blows of above seventy-five thousand French, flushed by victory, and led on by the Emperor in person.¹

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¹ Stat. 115,
125. Pel.
ii. 59, 75.
Jom. ii.
173, 174.
Sav. iv. 53.

The Austrians, waiting for the arrival of Kollowrath's corps from the north of the Danube, were not in a condition to prosecute their offensive movement to the French left, till after mid-day. They had arrived at the defile of Abach, however, and were driving the light troops of Davoust before them, when a loud cannonade at the extreme left announced the arrival of the Emperor on that weakly guarded part of the line. As they arrived on the top of the hills of Lintach, which separate the valley of the Iser from that of the Laber, the French, who came up from Landshut, beheld the field of battle stretched out like a map before them. From the marshy meadows which bordered the shores of the Laber, rose a succession of hills, one above another, in the form of an amphitheatre, with their slopes cultivated, and diversified by hamlets, and beautiful forests clothing

Description
of the field
of battle.

CHAP. the higher ground. The villages of Echmuhl and
 LIIL. Laichling, separated by a large copse-wood, appeared
 1809. in view, with the great road to Ratisbon, winding up
 the acclivities behind them. The meadows were green
 with the first colours of spring; the osiers and wil-
 lows which fringed the streams that intersected them,
 were just bursting into leaf: and the trees which
 bordered the roadside, already cast an agreeable
 shade upon the dusty and beaten highway which lay
 beneath their boughs. The French soldiers involun-
 tarily paused as they arrived at the summit, to gaze
 on this varied and interesting scene; but soon, other
 emotions than those of admiration of nature, swelled
 the breasts of the warlike multitude who thronged to
 the spot. In the intervals of these woods, artillery
 was to be seen; amidst those villages, standards
 were visible; and long white lines, with the glancing
 of helmets and bayonets on the higher ground,
 showed the columns of Rosenberg and Hohenzollern
 already in battle array, in very advantageous posi-
 tions, on the opposite side of the valley. Joyfully
 the French troops descended into the low grounds;
 while the Emperor galloped to the front, and, hastily
 surveying the splendid, but intricate scene, imme-
 diately formed his plan of attack.¹

¹ Pel. ii.
 76, 77.
 Personal
 observa-
 tion.

Battle of
 Echmuhl.
 April 22.

The plan of Napoleon was to cut the Austrians off
 from their whole remaining communications with the
 Iser and Inn, and by throwing them back upon Ratis-
 bon and Bohemia, as their only line of retreat, sever
 them entirely from the support and protection of
 Vienna. With this view he began the action, advan-
 cing his right in great strength, under Lannes, who
 commanded the divisions Gudin and St Hilaire, be-
 longing to Davoust's corps, who soon commenced a
 furious attack upon the Austrian left, which his great

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LIII.

1809.

superiority of force enabled him to turn and drive back. At the same time, the Wirtemburghers were brought up to the attack of Echmuhl in the centre ; but the tremendous fire of the Austrian batteries at that point so shattered their ranks, that, though repeatedly brought again to the charge by their French officers, they were always repulsed, and sustained a very heavy loss. Finding that the village could not be carried by an attack in front, Lannes detached the division Gudin, which assailed the batteries in flank that protected it : this rendered it necessary to draw back the guns, or point them in another direction ; and, aided by this diversion, the Wirtemburghers at length dislodged their antagonists from this important post. At the same time, Davoust resumed the offensive on the side of Abach, and, by a vigorous effort, made himself master of Unter Laichling, and the woods which adjoin it, so as to prevent the enemy from drawing any support from that quarter to the left, which was principally menaced. The corps of Rosenberg, placed on the high grounds between Echmuhl and Laichling, was now hard pressed, being assailed by the Wirtemburghers under Vandamme, who issued from the former village on the one side, and the victorious troops of Davoust, who debouched with loud shouts from the latter on the other. But these brave men, fronting both ways, presented an invincible resistance to the enemy ; the repeated charges of the Bavarian horse against their batteries, were baffled by the valour of the Austrian cuirassiers ; and the battle wore a doubtful aspect in that quarter, when intelligence arrived that Lannes had made himself master of a battery of sixteen guns on the left, after sabring the cannoneers, who gloriously fell beside their pieces.¹

Stut. 139,
145. Pel.
ii. 79, 85.
Jom. ii.
174. Thib.
vii. 234.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Napoleon
gains the
victory.

Rightly supposing that the Archduke would suspend his attack on the right, in consequence of this check on the left, against which the constantly increasing masses of the enemy were now concentrating, and that a general retreat would take place, Napoleon conceived that the decisive moment had arrived, and therefore brought up the reserve cavalry, which hitherto had not taken a part in the action, and sent it forward, at a rapid pace, along the high road to Ratisbon, to harass their retreat; while a general advance took place along the whole line; Lannes on the right, Lefebvre and Vandamme in the centre, Davoust on the left, Massena and Oudinot with the Guards, in reserve. A general order to fall back was now given by the Archduke, or rather a change of front took place, the left retiring rapidly, and the whole wheeling back to a certain degree on the point of the right, which held firm at Abach, so as to present a new front oblique to the former, but still barring the great road to Ratisbon to the enemy. His troops were disposed in echelon, from Santing to Isling, in a sort of column parallel to the highway, at the distance of a mile and a half from it; while on that *chaussée*, he left only the grenadiers, who were still untouched, and in the rear of all the undaunted cuirassiers. These dispositions, though based on the abandonment of the field of battle and the victory to his antagonists, were admirably calculated to preserve the troops from disaster in the hazardous operation of retiring before a victorious enemy—the great object to which the attention of the Archduke was always directed. The movements on the part of the Imperialists were at first performed with firmness and regularity;¹ but by degrees their infantry fell into confusion, in consequence of the frequent woods which

¹ Stut. 146,
148. Pel.
ii. 85, 92.
Jom. iii.
174.

interrupted their line of march, and the close pursuit of the enemy, which prevented the ranks, once broken, from being ever thoroughly regained.

CHAP.
LIII.
1809.

The consequences might have been disastrous in the level and open plains which ensued when the retiring columns approached the Danube, had not the Archduke placed twelve squadrons of the Emperor's cuirassiers and a large body of hussars in front of Eglofsheim, which was garrisoned by six battalions of grenadiers, and supported by several powerful batteries. As the pursuing columns approached this imposing mass of cavalry, they paused till the French horse came up in sufficient strength to hazard an engagement; a variety of charges of hussars then took place on both sides, with various success; but at length the magnificent Austrian cuirassiers bore down with apparently irresistible force upon their pursuers. The French light horse could not withstand the shock, and were quickly dispersed, but their cuirassiers came up, and then two rival bodies, equally heavily armed, equally brave, equally disciplined, engaged in mortal combat. So vehement was the onset, so nearly matched the strength of the combatants, so tremendous the conflict, that both parties, as if by mutual consent, suspended their fire to await its issue; the roar of the musketry subsided, even the heavy booming of the artillery ceased, and from the *mêlée* was heard only, as from the battles of the knights of old, the loud clang of the swords ringing on the helmets and cuirasses of the dauntless antagonists. The sun set while the contest was still undecided; the moon rose on the deadly strife, and amidst her silvery rays, fire was struck on all sides by the steel upon the armour, and dazzling sparks flew around the combatants, as if a thousand anvils

Desperate
cavalry ac-
tion in
front of
Ratisbon.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

were at once ringing under the blows of the forgers. Nothing could overcome the heroic courage of the Imperialists, but their equipment was not equal to that of their opponents; and in close fight, the Austrian horsemen, whose front only was covered, were not an adequate match for the cuirassiers of Napoleon, whose armour went entirely round their body. After a desperate struggle, their numbers were so reduced that they were unable any longer to make head against the enemy, and leaving two-thirds of their number on the field, they were driven in disorder along the *chaussée* towards Ratisbon. But their heroic stand, however fatal to themselves, proved the salvation of the army: during the engagement, the artillery and infantry withdrew in safety to the rear, and Napoleon, who perceived that the Archduke had brought up the reserve under Lichtenstein, which had not yet been engaged, dreading a reverse like that which befell the Austrians in similar circumstances at Marengo, reluctantly, and against the earnest advice of Lannes, gave orders for the army to halt, and bivouac on the ground which they occupied.¹

¹ Stut. 146,
151. Pel.
ii. 85, 94.
Jom. iii.
174, 175.
Sav. iv. 54,
55.

The Arch-
duke re-
treats across
the Danube,
and Ratis-
bon is taken
by the
French.

The situation of the Archduke was now very critical; with a victorious army, headed by Napoleon, in his front, and the broad Danube, traversed only by the single bridge of Ratisbon, in his rear. By bringing up his whole forces from the opposite side of the river, and concentrating his troops from Abach and the right, he was still in a situation to compensate the losses of the day, and give battle with eighty thousand admirable troops in front of Ratisbon.* But

* He had sixty thousand men around the walls of Ratisbon the night after the battle: including Bellegarde's corps, which was still on the other side of the Danube—the total force was about eighty thousand.—STUTTERHEIM, 159; and GRUNE'S *Correspondence*.

that field was imminently hazardous; for a serious disaster there sustained might lead to total ruin; and his army was not only extremely fatigued by the constant combats and marches of five successive days, but considerably affected in its spirit by the reverses it had experienced, and seriously weakened by the loss of the reserve parks and ammunition train at Landshut. Five thousand men had been killed and wounded, and seven thousand made prisoners, in the battle which had just terminated, besides twelve standards and sixteen pieces of cannon, which had fallen into the enemy's hands; and though Lichtenstein's corps much more than supplied those losses, yet the French guards under Oudinot had just arrived on the field from Spain, and Massena's corps, which had not been engaged at all, was certain to bear the brunt of the next battle which might ensue. Influenced by these considerations, the Archduke resolved to retire during the night, and restore the spirit and recruit the losses of his army in Bohemia, before again engaging in active operations. A bridge of boats was immediately thrown over the Danube, some miles above Ratisbon, and over it and the bridge at that town the army defiled without intermission the whole night. With such expedition and order was this critical operation conducted, that before nine o'clock on the following morning, not only were almost all the soldiers, but all the guns, chariots and ammunition wagons, safely on the other side; and when the French, who, from the large watch-fires kept on the enemy's lines during the night, supposed a decisive battle was intended for the ensuing day, stood to their arms in the morning, they beheld, with astonishment, the whole plain of Ratisbon deserted,¹ except by a few broken wagons or gun car-

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

¹ Stat. 160,
164. Pel.
ii. 93, 99.
Jom. iii.
174, 175.
Thib. vii.
234, 235.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Operations
against
Ratisbon by
the French,
and wound
of Napoleon.

riages, and saw only in the extreme distance dense masses of cavalry protecting the retreat of the last trains within the walls of Ratisbon.*

No sooner did Napoleon discover that the Archduke had withdrawn the bulk of his forces during the night, than he moved forward the whole cavalry to attack the rear-guard, drawn up in front of Ratisbon. Notwithstanding all their efforts, they could not prevent great confusion occurring as the last of the carriages withdrew into the town; and nearly a thousand brave horsemen there sacrificed themselves for the safety of the rest of the army. The screen of cavalry which was drawn up around the bridge of boats, happily concealed its existence from the enemy, till the troops were all over; but the pontoons themselves were burnt, or fell into the hands of the victors. At length, the rear-guard was all withdrawn within the walls of Ratisbon, the gates closed, and the ramparts lined with infantry. Napoleon at noon arrived on the spot, and in his anxiety to press the assault, approached so near the walls, that a musket ball struck him on the right foot, and occasioned a considerable contusion. The pain obliged him to dismount from his horse; the report spread that the Emperor was wounded; and instantly the soldiers broke from their ranks, and leaving their muskets,

* The French lost in the battle of Echmuhl about six thousand men. The bulletin stated the general loss from the opening of the campaign, at twelve hundred killed, and four thousand wounded; which, according to their usual proportion of admitting only a fourth part of its real amount, would make it about twenty thousand men, which was probably very near the mark. The Austrians, in the whole five days, lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about thirty thousand, and one hundred pieces of cannon.—*See first Bulletin, 24th April, 1809; PELET, ii. 99; and GRUNE'S Correspondence; a copy of which the author obtained from the Imperial archives at Vienna, through the kindness of his valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.*

their guns, their horses, crowded round their beloved chief. Regardless of the cannon balls which fell in the dense group, fifteen thousand men of all arms hastened to the spot, every one forgetting his own danger, in the intense anxiety concerning their general's welfare. After a few minutes, the wound was found to be so inconsiderable, that the Emperor again mounted his horse; a rapturous cheer from the warlike multitude announced the joyful event to the army; and soon the rolling of the drums and clang of the trumpets recalled the soldiers in all directions to their arms.¹

CHAP.
LIII.
1809.

Sav. iv.
56, 57.
Pel. ii. 103,
105.

This perilous incident retarded only for a few minutes the progress of the attack. Lannes, who directed the operations, perceiving a large house which rested against the rampart, pointed several guns against its walls, which speedily reduced them to ruins, and formed a sort of breach, by which access might be obtained to the summit. A heavy fire, however, was kept up from the rampart, which rendered the crossing of the glacis highly dangerous; and for long, no soldiers could be found who would incur the hazard. Impatient of the delay, Marshal Lannes seized a scaling ladder, and himself ran forward over the perilous space, swept in every part with the enemy's balls. Animated by this example, the troops rushed on, cleared the glacis, leaped into the ditch, and, crowding up the breach formed by the ruined house, forced their way into the place: LABEDOYERE, reserved for a melancholy fate in future times, was the first man who was seen on the summit. The troops now followed rapidly into the town: the gates, attacked in flank, were seized and opened, and the streets filled with a ferocious multitude of assailants. Still the Hungarian grenadiers maintained

Its assault
and capture.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

¹ Stat. 162,
169. Jom.
ii. 176,
177. Pel.
ii. 103,
111. Thib.
vii. 235,
236. Sav.
iv. 57, 58.

Great re-
sults of these
actions.

their resistance : slowly retiring towards the bridge, they kept up an incessant discharge upon their pursuers ; the houses took fire in the conflict ; the ammunition wagons were only rescued from the flames by the united efforts of both friends and foes ; and, after losing half their numbers in the desperate strife, they reached the barricades of the bridge, where the cannonade of artillery from the opposite side was so violent, as to render all further pursuit impossible. The French headquarters were established for the night in the convent of Prull, under the walls ; in the course of it, the bridge was evacuated, and next day, the Austrian rear-guard was discovered beyond Stadt-am-hoff, covering the retreat of the army to the woody heights of the Bohmervald.¹

The advantages gained by these brilliant operations to Napoleon, were very great. Twelve days only had elapsed since he left Paris ; and already he had re-assembled the army after its imprudent dispersion by Berthier, combated the Austrians on four successive days, separated Hiller and the Archduke Louis from the Archduke Charles, thrown the two former back upon the Inn, in too inconsiderable strength to be able to cover Vienna, and driven the latter to an eccentric retreat into the Bohemian mountains. Thirty thousand Austrians had fallen or been made prisoners in these disastrous engagements ; a hundred pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition wagons, two pontoon trains, and an incalculable quantity of baggage taken ; and the spirit of the vanquished so thoroughly broken, as to render them incapable for some time of engaging in active operations. The road to Vienna lay open to the conqueror : it was a matter of mere convenience to him, when he should step forward and seize the capital of the monarchy, its

magnificent arsenal, and boundless resources of every kind. Twenty thousand men were lost to the French army; but what were they amongst such a host, and what such a diminution, compared to the incalculable moral influence upon his own troops and those of the allies, in consequence of such a series of successes at the very outset of the campaign? If ever the words of Cæsar, *Veni, vidi, vici*, were applicable to a modern conqueror, they might have been used by Napoleon on this occasion.¹

CHAP.
LIIL.

1809.

¹ Jom. iii.
177.

It was by indefatigable activity, and the nicest calculation of time, that these astonishing results had been obtained; and never had the Emperor displayed in a more striking manner the indefatigable energy of his character. Unwearied by a rapid journey, night and day, for six successive days from Paris, he no sooner arrived at Donauwerth, than he began the incessant questioning and correspondence, which, with him, were the invariable preludes to great achievements. His letters to his lieutenants during the next five days, would, of themselves, make a volume. His calculation of time was so exact, and the habits of precise obedience on the part of his generals so complete, that his divisions invariably arrived on the ground assigned them, at the very moment on which he relied, and when their operation was required; and generally again marched and combated on the day following, without any intermediate repose. By this means, though his forces were not, upon the whole, more numerous, at least at that period, than those of the Austrians, they were almost always greatly superior at the point of attack. Nor did the Emperor shun the fatigue which he thus imposed upon his soldiers: on the contrary, not one of them underwent any thing like the mental and bodily labour

Indefatigable activity of Napoleon and his soldiers was the principal cause of these successes.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

¹ Sav. iv.
53, 59.
Thib. vii.
234. Pel.
ii. 120,
121.

to which he subjected himself. From the morning of the 19th, when the battle of Abensberg began, till the night of the 23d, when that of Ratisbon terminated, he was on horseback, or dictating letters, at least eighteen hours a-day: he had outstripped his own saddle-horses by the rapidity of his journey, and knocked up those of the King of Bavaria, by the fatigue they had undergone; and, when all around him were ready to drop down with exhaustion, he began to read and dictate despatches, and sat up half the night receiving reports from the generals and marshals, and completing the directions for the succeeding day. He has himself told us, that his manœuvres at this period in Bavaria were the most brilliant of his life;* and without going the length of so extraordinary an eulogium, it may safely be affirmed, that they never were excelled by the operations either of himself or any other general.¹

On the day following, the Emperor reviewed a great part of his army at Ratisbon, and one of those imposing spectacles was exhibited, which, almost as

¹ O'Meara,
ii. 206.

* "The greatest military manœuvres I ever made, and those for which I give myself most credit, were performed at Echmuhl, and were infinitely superior to those at Marengo, or to any other of my actions."¹ "On this day, I heard the Emperor repeat what I had often previously heard him say, that the finest manœuvres of his life were those which preceded the battle of Echmuhl."—LAS CASES, v. 168, 169.

The details of the grounds on which this striking opinion is formed, are thus given by Pelet, and quoted by Las Cases. "In four days of combats and manœuvres, were completed the destinies of the Austrian army—of that army, recently so numerous and arrogant, the most formidable and perfectly equipped which Austria had ever sent forth. By his first dispositions, Napoleon had organized the plan of his great battle, secured his outposts, and reconnoitred the ground for a battle in front of Augsburg, according to the direction which the enemy's columns seemed disposed to take. He had corrected the false dispositions of Berthier, and collected his forces in such masses on each wing, as to preclude the danger which he had induced. On the 18th April, he arrived on the ground and made his dispositions, and announced that in

much as his military talents, contributed to his astonishing successes. As each regiment defiled before him, Napoleon demanded from the colonel who were the most deserving among the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, and in presence of the army conferred their honours and distinctions upon them. On these interesting occasions he decided alone, and often conferred the reward on a common soldier in preference to those of higher grade who were recommended. He recognised some of the veterans of Marengo or the Pyramids as they were presented to him, and when conferring the cross, gave them a signal of recognition by a slight tap on the cheek or clap on the shoulder, accompanied by a kind expression, as "I make you a baron or a chevalier." One of these veterans, on being presented, asked the Emperor if he did not recognise him. "How should I?" answered Napoleon. "It was me," replied the soldier, "who in the desert of Syria, at the moment of your utmost necessity, gave you a portion of my rations." Napoleon at once recog-

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Impressive
scene in the
conferring
of military
honours at
Ratisbon.

three days all would be accomplished : on the 19th, it commenced, and the junction of the wings took place under the cannon of the Archduke : on the 20th, he broke the enemy's centre at Abensberg, and entirely separated their left wing from their centre : on the 21st, he routed the left wing at Landshut, got possession of its magazines, park equipages and communications. Quick as lightning, he returned on the 22d to Echmuhl, to deal out his final blows to the army of the Archduke ; the remains of which with difficulty saved themselves behind the walls of Ratisbon and the mountains of Bohemia. Had Massena, as he was ordered, attacked Landshut on the 21st, on the right bank of the Iser, at the same moment when Napoleon pressed him on the left bank, the remains of Hiller's corps would have been entirely destroyed : had Ratisbon not been delivered up to the Archduke, the remains of his army, cooped up in the bend formed by the Danube at that place, would have been utterly ruined. Thus, but for these untoward incidents, the vast army of the Archduke would have been cut to pieces in these four days ; as it was, it was severed in two, and found salvation only in flight."—
LAS CASES, v. 196.

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

nised him, and said, "Oh! I recollect you perfectly, and make you a knight, with an annual endowment of twelve hundred francs" (L.50). These heart-thrilling scenes excited the usual transports among the French soldiers; but in the troops of the confederation, upon whom honours and bounties were prudently and profusely showered, and to whom they were perfectly new, they produced an unbounded impression; and it then appeared how strongly the German heart was capable of being moved by those appeals to honour and generous feeling, of which the allied sovereigns in after times so largely availed themselves. At the same time, forty of the most deserving of the 65th regiment, which had capitulated at Ratisbon, were admitted into the old guard, to show that the Emperor entertained no displeasure at that corps for that untoward event; and a proclamation was addressed to the army, which, with just pride, though in exaggerated terms, recounted their great exploits.¹*

¹ Pel. ii.
111, 112.
Thib. vii.
237.

But though these splendid triumphs attended the arms of Napoleon, where he commanded in person, the fate of war was very different in other quarters;

* "Soldiers! You have justified my anticipations; you have supplied by bravery for the want of numbers, and marked the difference which exists between the soldiers of Cæsar and the armed rabble of Xerxes. Within the space of a few days we have triumphed in the battles of Thaur, of Abensberg, and Ecmuhl, and in the combats of Peissing, Landshut, and Ratisbon: one hundred pieces of cannon, forty standards, fifty thousand prisoners, three bridge equipages, three thousand baggage wagons with their horses, all the caissons of regiments,—such are the fruits of the rapidity of your marches and of your courage. The enemy, seduced by a perjured cabinet, appeared to retain no recollection of you: his wakening has been speedy, for you have appeared more terrible than ever. Lately he crossed the Inn and invaded the territory of our allies; lately he talked of nothing less than carrying the war into the bosom of our country: now defeated, dispersed, he flies in consternation. Already my advanced guard has passed the Inn: in a month we shall be at Vienna."—*NAPOLEON to his Troops, April 24, 1809; PELET, ii. 115.*

and already were to be seen convincing proofs, from the disasters attending them under the direction of his lieutenants, that the invincible veterans of the republic were fast wearing out, that the conscripts of the empire possessed no superiority over the now improved and invigorated armies by which they were opposed, and that the successes, where he in person commanded, were owing to the talent of his combinations or the terrors of his name. Hiller, who had retired to the Inn after the disaster of Landshut, finding that he was not pursued by the French troops, and having ascertained that Napoleon had diverged with the bulk of his forces in another direction, deemed it a favourable opportunity to take vengeance on the Bavarians, by whom he had been somewhat incautiously pursued, for the losses which he had experienced. Having collected some small reinforcements on the Inn, and divided his troops, about thirty thousand strong, into three columns, he remeasured his steps, and suddenly attacked the Bavarians under WREDE, who, along with the reserve under Bessieres, were advancing beyond the defile of Neumarck, and had taken post on the heights in front of St Verti. The Bavarians made at first a stout resistance, but being outnumbered and outflanked they were soon driven back; and though Molitor came up to support them with some regiments of the Imperial guard, they too were compelled to retreat, and sustained a considerable loss. Before night the French and their allies were entirely driven off the field, with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the intelligence which Hiller received in the night of the battle of Echmuhl and retreat of the Archduke upon Ratisbon, induced him to halt in the career of victory,¹ and

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Defeat of
the Bava-
rians by
Hiller.
April 24.¹ Stut. 172,
176. Jom.
iii. 178.
Pel. ii. 166,
170.

CHAP. remeasure his steps to the Inn, in order to cover the
LIII. approach to Vienna.

1809.

Successful
operations
of the Arch-
duke John
in Italy.

A disaster of a still more serious description was sustained about the same period, by the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnois, in the Italian plains. On the same day on which the Archduke Charles crossed the Inn, his brother, the Archduke John, passed the mountain frontier of the kingdom of Italy with forty-eight thousand men, and after crossing the Isonzo at Gorizia, and passing Udina, poured down on the Italian plains, and took post in front of Passeriano, already famous in the diplomacy of Napoleon.* The Viceroy had above forty-five thousand men to oppose the invader; but they were, in great part, of Italian extraction, and could hardly be relied upon to withstand the shock of the transalpine forces. This inferiority speedily appeared in the first actions of the campaign. Eugene fell back across the Tagliamento, and established his headquarters at SACILE. The Austrians, two days after, came up in great force, and surprised the 35th French regiment at Pordenone, which, with its eagle and four pieces of cannon, fell into the enemy's hands. Stung to the quick by this disgrace, and fearful of the effect of any further retreat upon the spirit of his multifarious troops, the Viceroy determined to hold firm and give battle to the enemy. Orders accordingly were given for the whole army to suspend its retreat, and retrace its steps on the 15th; and, on the day following, he made an attack on the imperialists between Sacile and Pordenone.¹

¹ Erz. Jom.
Feld. 44,
52. Pel.
iii. 141,
152.

The field of battle, which lay between Vigo-nuova and Porcia, on the gentle slopes where the Alps of Roveredo melt into the Italian plains, was singularly favourable for the operations of cavalry, in which

* Ante, iii, 372.

arm the Austrians had considerably the advantage. So little did they anticipate, however, an attack, that at the moment when it commenced, the Archduke John was engaged in hearing mass at Pordenone, and one of his corps was considerably in the rear at Palse. The best dispositions, however, which circumstances would admit, were made to repel the enemy, and as the troops in the rear successively came up, they were passed on to the plain of Vigo-nuova, so as to menace the communication between Eugene and the bridge of Sacile. The combat was very warm, and in the first instance, before the corps of Chastellar came up, Prince Eugene had the advantage; and at the village of Porcia, in particular, and which was repeatedly taken and retaken, a frightful carnage took place. Gradually, however, the Austrians, who had outflanked their opponents, cooped up their line within very narrow limits, and at length it was driven into the space between Fontana, Freda, and Porcia, which did not exceed two miles in breadth. Fearful of the consequences of any disaster upon troops restrained within such narrow limits, Eugene gave the signal to retreat, which was effected at first by squares in echelon, which arrested their pursuers by alternate volleys as on a review day; but at the defile occasioned by the bridge of the Levinza and the marshes on either side of the stream, they fell into disorder, which was soon augmented by the intelligence that seven thousand men of the corps in reserve had passed them, and already occupied Sacile. The whole army, upon this, fell into confusion. Horse, foot, and cannon, became blended together in frightful disorder, and fled towards the Adige, without either direction or further attempt at resistance.¹ The approach of night alone saved them

CHAP.
LIII.

1809.

Total defeat
of Eugene
Beauharnois
at Sacile.
April 16.¹ Erzrh.
Joaans Feld-
zug in
Jahre 1809,
44, 52.
Pel. iii.
141, 163.
Jom. iii.
179, 180.
Stut. 164,
169.

CHAP. from a total overthrow ; but as it was, they lost four
 LIII. thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number
 1809. of prisoners, besides fifteen pieces of cannon ; while
 the Austrians had not to lament the loss of half the
 number.

Important
 effects of
 this victory
 on the Ita-
 lian cam-
 paign.

This important victory in the outset of the cam-
 paign, was likely to prove decisive, as that of Mag-
 nano in 1799,* of the fate of Italy, and would have
 been attended with not less material results upon the
 general issue of the war, had its effects not been ob-
 literated, and the career of success in the plains of
 Lombardy, arrested by the rapid and overwhelming
 advance of Napoleon to Vienna. As it was, however,
 and even though the Archduke John was far from
 following up his success with the vigour which might
 have been expected, the results of the battle were, in
 the highest degree, important. Eugene, reinforced
 by some battalions which he had left at Verona, suc-
 ceeded in at length re-organizing his army, and took
 post behind the fortified line of the Adige, already
 immortalized in the campaigns of Napoleon. The
 Archduke, though obliged to send three divisions at
 this period to observe Marmont in Dalmatia, and
 considerably weakened by the necessity of making
 large detachments to observe Venice and Palma-
 nuova, in which the enemy had large garrisons,
 followed his retreating adversary, and took post, with
 thirty thousand excellent troops, in the famous posi-
 tion of Caldiero, a few miles from Verona. But the

¹ Erz. Joan. spirit of the two armies was essentially changed ;
 Feldz. 53. the Italians, depressed and weakened by defeat, felt
 57. Pel. iii. the old superiority of the Tramontane forces, and
 163, 167. were prepared to fall back, as in the time of Suwarrow,
 Stut. 179, to the farthest verge of the Italian Peninsula ;¹ while
 182. Jom. iii. 180,
 181.

* Ante, iv. 34.

the Austrians, roused to the highest degree by their early success, confidently anticipated a repetition of the glories of Novi and the Trebbia. But the expectations of both parties were traversed by the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the valley of the Danube, which soon rendered necessary the concentration of the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the capital.*

CHAP.
LIII.
1809.

Thus, though Napoleon's successes had been great on the Bavarian plains, he had by no means gained any decided advantage; his armies had been routed, or run the most imminent hazard, wherever he did not command in person; and disasters which would have been decisive in any other warfare had been experienced by his lieutenants on the Italian frontier. It was evident that the forces of the contending parties were approaching to an equality: the wonted vehemence of the Republican armies had disappeared when led by the marshals of France; the Austrians had clearly proved their superiority to the allies who swelled their columns; and it was the consummate talents, overwhelming force, and paralysing renown of Napoleon, that alone still chained victory to the standards of the grand army. Reversing the principles of both parties in the contest, the fortunes of France had come to depend on the genius of a single man, the pyramid rested on its apex; while, driven by necessity to a more enlarged policy, Austria was reaping the fruits of popular enthusiasm, and successfully combating the revolution with the arms which itself had created. The aristocratic power, generally

Hopes
which the
commence-
ment of the
campaign
afforded to
the Allies.

* In the order of time, the war in Tyrol should be treated of immediately after the opening of the campaign in Italy; but the vast moral importance of that contest, as well as its romantic character, require a separate chapter, and will be treated of in that which follows previous to the battle of Wagram.

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successful, failed only from the want of a leader adequate to the encounter of the popular hero; the democratic, generally defeated, prevailed through the extraordinary abilities of one man. Such a state of matters might promise little for present success, but it was pregnant with hope for future deliverance. Great as may be the ascendancy, unbounded the activity of a single leader, they cannot, in the long run, compensate general disaster; and, in all prolonged contests, that power is ultimately destined to victory, which, appealing to principles which find a responsive echo in the human heart, rests upon the organized and directed efforts of the many, rather than the abilities, how splendid soever, of the few.

CHAPTER LIV.

CAMPAIGN OF ASPERN.

ARGUMENT.

Measures of Napoleon for a grand concentric Attack upon Vienna—Defensive Steps of the Archduke Charles—Napoleon Advances to the Borders of the Traun—Description of the Position of Ebersberg—And of the Austrian corps which occupied it—Massena resolves to Attack—Devoted Gallantry of the French—After a desperate Struggle they gain the Pass—Hiller falls back towards Vienna—Advance of the French army towards that Capital—Ineffectual attempt to defend it—The Archduke Maximilian abandons Vienna, which Capitulates—Position of the different Corps of the French Army in the middle of May—Movements of the Archduke Charles, and Positions of his Army—Retreat of the Archduke John in Italy—Battle of the Piave, and Defeat of the Austrians—Retreat of the Austrians from Italy into Hungary—Capture of the Mountain Forts of Styria and Carinthia by the French—Capture of the Col di Tarwis, and other Forts—Fall of Trieste, Laybach, and the whole Frontier Defences of Austria—Total Defeat of Jellachich in the Valley of the Muhr—Junction of Eugene with Napoleon at Vienna—Chances of the Conflict under its Walls to either Party—Napoleon resolves to cross the Danube and attack the Enemy—Description of its Islands near Vienna, and the different Channels of the River—Napoleon's Preparations to effect the Passage—Failure at Nussdorf—His vigorous Efforts to effect a Passage at Lobau—Passage of the River—Operations of the Archduke Charles on the Upper Danube at Lintz and Krems—He resolves to attack that portion of the French which had crossed the River—Austrian Plan and Order of Attack—Position and Dangers of the French Army—Napoleon is surprised, but resolves to give Battle—Austrian Plan of Attack, and Forces on both sides—Desperate Conflict at Aspern, which is at length Carried by the Austrians—Grand Charge of French Cavalry in the Centre—Bloody Attack on Essling, which proves unsuccessful—Feelings with which both Parties passed the night on the Field of Battle—Renewal of the Action on the 22d—Aspern and Essling are again obstinately disputed—Napoleon makes a grand Attack on the Austrian Centre, which is at first successful—Desperate Resistance of the Austrian Centre—Success of Hohenzollern, and Rupture of the Bridges of the Danube—The French retire to the Island of Lobau—Last Attack of the Austrians, and Fall of Marshal Lannes—Results of the Battle, and Loss on both Sides—Deplorable Situation of the French Army in the Island of Lobau on the night of the 22d—Council of War held in the Island, in which it is resolved to maintain the Position there—Reflections on the Conduct

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- CHAP. of Napoleon in this Battle—Observations on the French method of attack in
 LIV. column—Glorious Character of the Resistance of the Austrians at Aspern—Dis-
 1809. astrous Effect of the Archduke John's disobedience of his Orders—Immense im-
 portance of central Fortresses on the Defence of Nations—Infatuation of England
 in this respect.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Echmuhl, Na-
 Measures of poleon, clearly perceiving the expediency of striking
 Napoleon at the heart of his enemies' power before the con-
 for a grand sternation consequent on the disasters in Bavaria
 concentric attack upon had subsided, issued orders in all directions for the
 Vienna. concentration of his forces upon the Austrian capital.
 Orders were dispatched on the 24th to Eugene to
 press forward in the Italian plains; to Bernadotte,
 who had assumed the command of the Saxons at
 Dresden, without a moment's delay to enter Bohemia
 by the northern frontier; and to Poniatowski, who
 commanded the Polish army, to invade Galicia,
 and endeavour to excite an insurrection in that
 province against the Austrian dominion.* Every
 preparation was also made for moving the whole
 grand army, with the exception of Davoust's corps,
 which was left at Ratisbon to observe the Archduke,
 down the valley of the Danube, into the interior of
 the monarchy; and, by daybreak on the 26th, a
 hundred thousand men were in full march for the
 Inn and Vienna. At the same time, to impose upon

* To Eugene he wrote—"Advance in full confidence; the Emperor is about to move into the interior of Austria; the enemy will not keep their ground before you any more than they have done in Bavaria. This army, defeated in its most cherished projects, is totally demoralized."—To Bernadotte at Dresden—"Napoleon is about to march upon Vienna, and he expects, with the greatest impatience, your arrival in Bohemia, to co-operate with the grand army, which will at once render disposable the corps of Davoust, now left in observation at Ratisbon."—To Poniatowski—"That he fully relied on his zeal in the common cause, and that, as the Emperor was now to march upon Vienna, now was the moment for him to enter Galicia."—*See the original Letters in Pelet, ii. 172, 173.*

Prussia, and overawe the numerous malecontents in the north of Germany, a corps of observation was formed, under the orders first of Kellerman, and afterwards of Junot, which, though consisting only of fourteen thousand men, was pompously announced in the bulletins as numbering fifty thousand combatants.¹

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¹ Pel. ii.
171, 173.
Thib. vii.
243. Sav.
iv. 59.

The situation of the Archduke Charles was now embarrassing in the highest degree. By having been driven off from the valley of the Danube, and compelled to take refuge in the mountains of Bohemia, the approach to the capital was left unguarded, save by Hiller's corps and the Archduke Louis, thirty-five thousand strong, which were wholly inadequate to arrest the march of the mighty conqueror. An ordinary general, indeed, responsible to his superiors, would hesitate to advance into the interior of the Austrian monarchy, having seventy-five thousand men on one flank, in the Bohemian mountains, and the insurgent Tyrol, secure in inaccessible alps, on the other, to menace or cut off his lines of communication. But it was not the character of Napoleon to be deterred by such obstacles. On the contrary, it was distinctly foreseen, what the event speedily proved was the case, that the French emperor, relying on the power and terror of the army under his immediate command, would hurry forward to the capital, and trust to his never-failing resources to dissipate any assemblages on his flanks or rear by which his communication might be threatened. Impressed with these ideas, Prince Charles dispatched orders on the 23d to Hiller to retard, as much as possible, the advance of the enemy; to the Archduke John to retreat towards the hereditary states; while he himself, after forming a junction with Bellegarde, exerted himself to the

Defensive
measures of
the Arch-
duke
Charles.

April 23.

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April 28.

¹ Erz. Joan.
49. Stut.
178, 182.
Pel. ii. 173,
179.

utmost in re-organizing his army, and, with the consent of the Emperor Francis, dispatched a courier with a dignified letter proposing an exchange of prisoners, and hinting at more important negotiations to Napoleon, which arrived, however, at the French headquarters, after they had already been established in upper Austria, and too late to arrest the dreaded march of the conqueror to Vienna.^{1*}

The Emperor's dispositions being all completed, the grand army was, to a certain extent, divided:

* To his brother the Emperor, the Archduke observed—"Finding it impossible to keep my ground with a river such as the Danube in my rear against a victorious enemy in front, I have deemed it expedient to cross to the northern bank and form a junction with Count Bellegarde. You are aware that all the operations of the campaign were based on the probability of an early success, and on the co-operation of the troops of the Rhenish confederacy, who, in fact, declared against us. Would it not be expedient, then, to try the result of a negotiation, before the enemy has invaded Austria, and while, in Italy and Tyrol, there remain successes to counterbalance his advantages?" The Emperor dispatched Count Stadion with his reply, which approved of overtures by the Archduke, provided they did not compromise his dignity. The latter, accordingly, wrote to Napoleon on the 30th April; "Your Majesty has announced your arrival by a salvo of artillery; I had no time to reply to it; but though hardly informed of your presence, I speedily discovered it by the losses which I experienced. You have taken many prisoners from me, and I have taken some thousands from you in quarters where you were not personally present. I propose to your Majesty to exchange them, man for man, rank for rank; and, if that proposal proves agreeable with you, point out the place where it may be possible to carry it into effect. I feel flattered, sire, in combating the greatest captain of the age; but I should esteem myself more happy if heaven had chosen me to be the instrument in procuring for my country a durable peace. Whatever may be the events of war, or the chances of an accommodation, I pray your Majesty to believe that my desires will always outstrip your wishes, and that I am equally honoured by meeting your Majesty either with the sword or the olive branch in your hand." But all this graceful flattery was thrown away; for, before it reached Napoleon, he was far advanced in the valley of the Danube, and the terrible combat of Ebersberg had opened to him the gates of upper Austria, when nothing remained to stay his triumphant march to Vienna.—ERZH. JOAANS FELDZUG in JAHRE 1809, 55, 56; and PELET, ii. 176, 179.

Davoust, whose corps, exhausted by the fatiguing marches it had undergone, and seriously weakened by the losses of the campaign, stood in need alike of reinforcements and repose, was left at Ratisbon to guard the passage of the Danube, and watch the retiring columns of the Archduke; Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was detached into the Tyrol, to make head against the insurrection in that province, which was daily assuming a more menacing aspect; while the Emperor himself, at the head of the corps of Massena, Lannes, and Bessieres, still, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, above eighty thousand strong, proceeded direct by the great road along the southern side of the Danube to Vienna. Vandamme followed at a little distance, with the troops of the confederation, eighteen thousand more; and as soon as Bernadotte, with the Saxons, who was toiling round the external frontier of the Bohemian mountains, relieved Davoust at Ratisbon, he, too, was to follow in the same direction with his corps, still numbering forty thousand men. Every disposition being thus made to secure his rear, and station his troops in echelon, so as to ensure his communications, Napoleon left Ratisbon on the 26th, and arrived the same day at Landshut, where he found the whole guard, both horse and foot, assembled, having just come up from Spain. This veteran corps, full twenty thousand strong, proved a most important addition to his invading force; and when it is recollected that in the beginning of January it was at Astorga at the foot of the Galician mountains,* it must be admitted that few more rapid marches are on record in the whole annals of military achievement. Mean-while, the vanguard pressed on with ceaseless vigour; and

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Napoleon
advances to
the borders
of the
Traun.

April 26

* Ante, vi. 838.

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LIV.

1809.

April 28.

May 1.

¹ Jom. iii.
181. Pel.
ii. 181,
199. Sav.
iv. 60, 61.
Stut. 182,
187.

Description
of the posi-
tion of
Ebersberg.

soon the advanced posts were on the Inn. The rocky banks of that river, flanked by the ramparts of Braunau and Passau, afforded an apparently favourable situation for arresting the advance of the enemy; but the vast line, above thirty leagues in length, would have required a hundred thousand men for its defence, and the Austrian general had not above a third of that number at his disposal. For the same reason he contented himself with breaking down the bridges over the Salza, which had the effect of retarding, by two days, the advance of the French army. Napoleon arrived at Braunau on the 1st May, and pressed on with ceaseless activity the march of his troops; while Hiller, abandoning the woody range and unformed entrenchments of the Kirchbergwald, took post at the formidable position of EBERSBERG, to defend the passage of the Traun, and cover the wooden bridge, which at Mauthausen, or a little further down the Danube, formed an important line of communication with the northern bank of the river. It was of the most vital consequence to gain possession of this post; for a few hours would suffice, with a corps such as Hiller's, to put it in a posture of defence; and if the Archduke, who was following by Budweiss down the left bank, should arrive before it was forced, it might retard, or altogether defeat the projected march upon Vienna.¹

Descending from the lofty summit of the Alps by lateral branches, to the great valley of the Danube, several mountain streams between Munich and Vienna present scenes the beauty of which is for ever engraven on the mind of the traveller, and afford, at the same time, favourable positions to dispute the advance of an invading army. Of these, the most impetuous and savage in its character is the Traun,

which, issuing from the wild cliffs of the Alter and Abersees, and descending through the wooded steep of the Traunese, makes its way through narrow ravines and steep pine-clad hills, to the Danube, a little below Ebersberg.* A long wooden bridge crosses the stream in front of that place, which is commanded by the precipitous heights and old castle on its right or western bank: another bridge existed some leagues higher up, at Wels; but the road over it crossed, a little further on, another mountain torrent, the Krems Munster; and as all these bridges were of wood, which were easily destroyed, and required a considerable time for their reparation, the wing of the invader's army, which attempted the passage by that circuitous route, was liable to very serious interruption. Every thing, therefore, recommended an immediate attack upon the bridge of Ebersberg; and Massena, who commanded the advanced guard, and was perfectly alive to all these considerations, resolved to pursue the enemy with such vigour, that they would not have time to apply the torch to the combustible arches.¹

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¹ Pel. ii. 198, 203.
Stat. 176, 184. Jom. ii. 181.
Personal Observation.

The prudence of this determination, considering the vital importance of anticipating the Archduke at the bridge of Mauthausen, could not be disputed: but, when the French arrived on the left bank of the Traun, beyond Scharlantz, in front of Ebersberg, the spectacle which presented itself was sufficient to daunt the most intrepid breasts. Right in front of them lay the bed of the impetuous Traun, nearly eight hundred yards broad, intersected by many sand banks and islands, clothed with stunted wood, traversed only by a single *chaussée*, terminating in a bridge three hundred yards long, over the largest arm of the river

And of the Austrian corps which occupied it.

* See note A.

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¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Pel.
ii. 202,
205. Stut.
192, 195.

Massena
resolves to
attack.
Desperate
gallantry of
the French.

May 3.

which flows in a deep and rapid torrent, close to the right bank. The bridge, closed at its western extremity by the gate of Ebersberg, was enfiladed by the houses of the town, which were all filled with musqueteers, and commanded along its whole extent by a plentiful array of artillery, disposed on the heights above. On the summit of the whole, stood the old square castle, its walls bristling with bayonets, and artillery planted on its mouldering battlements, to command the bridge, at the distance of a hundred toises. The hills, or rather swelling eminences next the river, were covered with deep masses of infantry, interspersed with powerful batteries of cannon, who stood prepared to dispute the passage; while, immediately in their rear, rose a second range of heights, considerably more elevated than the former, clothed with pines, over which, equally with those in front, the road passed, and which afforded another position stronger than the first, to which, if driven from their original ground, the enemy might retire.¹

It required no ordinary resolution to attack with no greater force, thirty-five thousand men, supported by eighty pieces of cannon, in such a position; but Massena, who burned with desire to illustrate his name by some brilliant exploit in a campaign where hitherto he had not had an opportunity to signalize himself, and who was in hopes that, if the combat should be prolonged for any length of time, he would be aided by a flank attack from Marshal Lannes, who was to cross at Wels, and force his way across the lesser streams in his front, resolved to hazard an attack. The French troops, at that period, were in such a state of exultation from their triumphs, that, under the eye of the Emperor, at least, nothing was impracticable to their audacity. Four battalions of

Austrian grenadiers had been injudiciously left on the left bank, occupying some houses and walled inclosures, which formed a sort of *tête-du-pont* to the bridge. Upon them the attack was first made, and being speedily overwhelmed by numbers, they were driven, at the point of the bayonet, along the *chaussée*; and, in spite of a gallant resistance, all the islands and little bridges over the branches of the torrent were wrested from the enemy. But when the pursuers reached the long bridge over the principal branch of the Traun, the fire of grape and musketry from the batteries and houses on the opposite side was so violent that the head of the column hesitated, and recoiled. Instantly General Cohorn, a descendant of the illustrious engineer of the same name, is at their head, and, animated by his gallant example, the French troops return to the charge. A frightful scene, exceeding in horror even the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi, ensued; at the point of the bayonet, amidst showers of balls, the heroic French, headed by Cohorn, pursued the retiring Austrians; while the troops on the opposite bank, seeing the enemy's colours advancing through a cloud of smoke, and in the midst of a frightful contest, closed the gate at the further end, and fired incessantly with grape, round shot, and cannister, indiscriminately on friend and foe. Numbers of the Imperialists, threatened with death on both sides, threw themselves into the water, and were swept away by the impetuous torrent; others were trampled down by the advancing columns, or sought refuge in the wooded islands, and were made prisoners; several ammunition waggon blew up in the middle of the bridge, and the dauntless foemen were scattered in the air by the tremendous explosion. But nothing could withstand

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the enthusiastic gallantry of the French. Side by side, Cohorn and Campy, aide-de-camp to Massena, head the column: soon the gate and palisades flanking it are levelled by the pioneers, and the assailants penetrate into the town. Here, however, they are exposed at once to a plunging fire from the castle, and a flanking one from the houses, while fresh battalions assail them in front. Torn in pieces by the terrific discharge, to which, in the crowded streets of an ancient village, they could make no reply, they speedily fall victims to their daring valour. In a few minutes two-thirds of their number are stretched upon the pavement; the survivors are driven back in confusion to the entrance of the bridge; its barricades, hastily re-established, are closed, lest it should again fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Austrians are preparing a column to clear it of the assailants, and set fire to the combustibles already provided, which, in the suddenness of the former assault, had not been fired.¹

¹ Pel. ii.
202, 209.
Stut. 194,
199. Sav.
iv. 61, 62.
Jom. ii.
181, 182.

After a
desperate
struggle,
the French
gain the
pass.

Massena, however, who had now come up to the opposite bank, was well aware of the importance of following up the extraordinary advantage gained by the brilliant temerity of his advanced guard. He instantly, accordingly, dispatched powerful succours to Cohorn and his handful of heroes, now cooped up between the gate at the end of the bridge and the rapidly increasing forces of his assailants. Three fresh brigades, headed by Claparede, were soon passed over, and at length the division Le Grand having come up, it also was sent forward,* through a storm

* As Le Grand debouched from the bridge, the French general in command there rather officiously tendered his advice—"I want none of your advice," said he, "but room for the head of my columns;" and instantly passed on to the attack of the castle.—PELET, ii. 211.

of grape and musketry, over the bridge, and lent its powerful aid to the attacking force. Strengthened by such assistance, Claparede regained his ground in the village, and gradually forced his way up the narrow lanes leading to the castle, and stormed that stronghold itself. Hiller, however, recovered from his first surprise, renewed his efforts to regain the post: two fresh divisions came up, drove the French out of the chateau, and forced them down again into the low streets adjoining the bridge. Again the French returned to the assault: Massena ordered a division to cross over further up the river to the right, in order to attack the left of the Imperialists, while engaged with their unwearied antagonists in front. Amidst a frightful storm of shot, Le Grand swiftly passed over the narrow open space which separated the town from the castle; but even in that distance of two hundred yards, the path of every regiment was marked by a long and melancholy train of slain: arrived at the gates, they were found to be closed, and the whole head of the column was swept away by the plunging fire from the battlements. Again reinforced, Le Grand returned to the assault, under cover of a tremendous fire of all arms, which brought down every exposed limb on the castle; the sappers rushed up to the gates, which they broke through, and the heroic garrison, cut off from all external support by the columns which had got round it on the eastern side, laid down its arms.¹

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LIV.

1809.

¹ Pel. ii.
209, 213.
Stut. 203,
205, Nor.
iii. 209.

Hiller now, seeing the key of the position carried, gave the signal for retreat; but to troops so intermingled and closely engaged with the enemy, it was no easy matter to obey this order; and the division which had crossed further up the river already threatened their left flank, for in the hurry of this

Hiller falls
back to-
wards
Vienna.

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sudden attack there had not been time to break down the bridges of the Krems Munster, and other streams which discharged themselves into the Traun above Ebersberg, and which, if destroyed, would for some hours at least have secured that flank from attack. With great difficulty the Austrians withdrew to the position behind the town, where another combat not less obstinate and bloody took place. Every road, every pathway leading up the ascent was the scene of a desperate struggle; the pastures, the corn fields, the pine woods on the crest of the ridge, were all the theatre of mortal combat; while the flames of Ebersberg in the hollow behind, the trampling of horsemen over the dead and dying, the cries of the wounded, and the cheers of the soldiers who successively arrived on the opposite bank, formed a scene surpassing all but the field of Eylau in circumstances of horror. The combat, however, was too critical and violent to admit of any relaxation, and as the French cavalry of the guard came up to the opposite side, they were hastily hurried forward, and trampling under foot the dead bodies and wounded of either army, forced their way through the burning houses with loud shouts, swords glittering, banners waving, and all the animation of war, to the front of the battle. Still the Austrians, with invincible resolution, made good the post on the ridge behind; but as evening approached, the masses on their left flank which had crossed at Wels, and other places in the upper part of the stream, became so threatening that Hiller drew off his troops, and fell back in the night to Enns, where he burnt the bridge over the river of the same name, and continued his retreat towards Amstetten.

¹ Pel. ii.

209, 215.

Stut. 202,

207. Norv.

iii. 209.

Jom. ii.

182, 183.

In this terrific combat few trophies were taken by the victors;¹ the French could only boast of four guns

a nd two standards wrested from the enemy, while on each side six thousand brave men had fallen a sacrifice to their heroic sense of patriotic duty.*

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This severe loss altogether disabled Hiller from making any further resistance to the advance of the invading army to Vienna; and he accordingly fell back as fast as the encumbrance of so many wounded would permit, to the neighbourhood of the capital. Napoleon arrived on the opposite side of the Traun to Ebersberg, during the latter period of the combat, and passed through the town soon after it had ceased. How much soever inured to scenes of carnage, he was strongly impressed by the unwonted horrors which there presented themselves, where brave men by thousands lay weltering in their blood, amidst burning rafters and smoking ruins, and the first who had fallen were thrown into the river, or crushed under the feet of the horses, or by the wheels of the artillery which had since passed over them;† and testified considerable displeasure, both at Massena for provoking so desperate a contest, where a flank movement might have rendered it unnecessary, and at Lannes, whose corps was to cross at

Advance of
the French
army to
Vienna.

* The author has been the more particular in the description of this combat, not only from its peculiar and terrible character, but because the castle and bridge of Ebersberg form well-known objects to every traveller who has visited Vienna; and it is desirable that the multitude of English who frequent that capital in quest of pleasure or amusement, should be aware of the heroic deeds of which the Gothic castle, under whose walls they pass, has been the theatre.

† During this terrible action the bridge and street immediately leading from it were so encumbered with the wounded, that Massena was driven to the cruel necessity of commanding the fresh troops which came up to throw their maimed comrades into the river; and such of them as were struck down were treated in the same manner by those who next came up to the attack. There was no alternative, for else the causeway would soon have become impassable, and the division in front been entirely cut off.—See CADET de GRASSECOURT'S *Voyage en Autriche a la suite de l'Armée Française*, 1809, p. 137.

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LIV.

1809.

From 4th
to 7th May.

May 8.

May 9.

¹ Pel. ii.
220, 254.
Stut. 203,
212. Jom.
ii. 182,
186.

Wels, further up the river, for not having made his dispositions so as to be up in time to take a part in the strife by attacking the flank or rear of Hiller's corps. After passing Ebersberg, however, being uncertain of the movements of the Archduke, and fearful of advancing into the interior without being aware of the position of his principal adversary, he halted for two days at Enns, re-established the bridge there, and collected a number of boats, which he already foresaw would be required for the difficult operation of crossing the Danube in front of Vienna; while his advanced guard, under Lannes and Massena, pursued their route by the great road to the capital. Anticipating a battle on the woody ridge which lies between St Polten and Vienna, he concentrated his troops before attempting the passage of that defile; but the precaution was unnecessary. Hiller had received orders to cross the Danube, and fall back, with all his forces, to the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and occupy the islands until the arrival of the Archduke. Mean-while, the Emperor, continuing his advance along the Danube, perceived, from the Abbey of Melk, situated on a high rock, a considerable encampment of soldiers on the left bank of the river. Devoured with anxiety to know to which army they belonged, he dispatched a sergeant of the old guard and six chosen men; who soon made their way across in a boat, and brought over three Austrian soldiers, who reported that they belonged to the Archduke's army, and that he was advancing, by forced marches, in hopes of arriving at the capital before the enemy. This important intelligence made the Emperor redouble his activity; ¹ orders were given to Massena to watch, with the utmost vigilance, all the points where a passage of the Danube could be effected,

while Lannes and Bessieres were directed to advance with increased celerity to the capital. All arms accordingly pressed on with the utmost expedition ; and, on the 10th of May, being exactly a month from the time when the Austrian standards crossed the Inn, the French eagles appeared before the walls of Vienna.*

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May 10.

Though deprived, by the passage of Hiller to the northern bank of the Danube, of the corps on which it had chiefly relied for protection, Vienna was by no means destitute of resources. The external barriers, indeed, were not in a condition to make any defence ; and the Archduke Maximilian, to whom the com-

Ineffectual
attempt to
defend
Vienna.

* Riding from Melk towards St Polten, with Berthier and Lannes, the Emperor's eyes were riveted on the Gothic towers of Dierstein, the scene of the captivity of Richard Cœur de Lion, which rose in gloomy magnificence at some distance on the other side of the Danube. He could speak for long on no other subject. "He also," said Napoleon, "had been a warrior in Syria and Palestine. He was more fortunate than us at St Jean Acre, but not more valiant than you, my brave Lannes. He beat the great Saladin. And yet hardly had he returned to Europe, than he fell into the hands of persons who certainly were of a very different calibre. He was sold by a Duke of Austria to an Emperor of Germany, who has been rescued from oblivion by that act alone. The last of his court, Blondel, alone remained faithful to him ; but his nation made great sacrifices for his deliverance." Still keeping his eyes riveted on the towers, he continued,—“ These were barbarous times, which they have the folly to represent to us as so heroic ; when the father sacrificed his children, the wife her husband, the subject his sovereign, the soldier his general, and all without shame or disguise, for the mere thirst of gold or power ! How much are times changed now ! what progress has civilisation made in our time ! You have seen emperors, kings, in my power, as well as the capitals of their states, and I exacted from them neither ransom nor sacrifice of honours. And that successor of Leopold and Henry, who is already more than half in our power, will not be worse treated on this occasion than the preceding !” How deceitful is self-love. The ransom which Napoleon had exacted, on the very last occasion, on Austria (L.5,000,000) and on Prussia (L.16,000,000), exceeded all that feudal cupidity had ever extorted ; and in the dark annals of Gothic crime and treachery, nothing exceeded the cruelty of the French Revolution, or the perfidy of his own seizure of the thrones of the Spanish Peninsula.—See PELET, ii. 246, 247.

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1809.

mand was entrusted, withdrew at once from the rich and extensive suburbs into the ancient walled capital.

They were constructed, however, of solid granite, well armed with artillery, and capable of being supplied to any extent from the inexhaustible resources of the arsenal; while four thousand regular troops, and eight thousand landwehr and Milan volunteers were in arms in the city. Great efforts were made to electrify the inhabitants, and patriotic ardour was at its highest pitch. The people talked of their glorious resistance, one hundred and thirty years before, to the Turks, and loudly proclaimed their resolution to emulate the heroic defence of Saragossa in more recent times. But all history demonstrates, that there is one stage of civilisation, when the inhabitants of a metropolis are capable of such a sacrifice in defence of their country, but only one; and that when past, it is never recovered. The event has proved that the Russians were in the state of progress when such a heroic act was possible, but that the inhabitants of Vienna and Paris had passed it. Most certainly the citizens of London would never have buried themselves under the ruins of the Bank, the Treasury, or Leadenhall Street, before capitulating to Napoleon. In fact, without supposing that the members of a highly civilised and opulent community have altogether lost their patriotic spirit, it is evident that the sacrifices which are unavoidable, if obstinate resistance is attempted by a city in the later stages of society, where wealth is concentrated, credit universal, and hundreds of thousands would at once be reduced to beggary by its stoppage, are so great, that no moral courage, how intrepid soever, can be equal to the responsibility of incurring them. Napoleon wisely trusted to two methods to effect the reduction of the

city,—the cutting off its communication with the northern bank of the river, and the terrors of a bombardment. With this view, he directed Massena to make himself master of the island of Prater, while a similar attack was made on that of Jagerhaus by Lannes, so as to reach from both sides the great bridge of Spitz and Thabor. These attacks were entirely successful, for the Archduke had not forces sufficient to defend them; and such had been the confident security of the Aulic council, that they had not taken the simple precaution of connecting the works of the place with the bridges of the Danube. At the same time, a battery of twenty mortars was established nearly on the same ground from which the Turks had, a hundred and forty years before, bombarded the city, and with such vigour were they served, that in the next ten hours they discharged three thousand projectiles into the capital; and already, in the course of the night, it was in flames in several quarters.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

May 12.

¹ Pel. ii.
262, 278.Thib. vii.
255. Jom.
iii. 187.Stut. 209,
218. Sav.

iv. 65, 69.

At that period, there lay sick in the Imperial palace, directly opposite to the French batteries, and incapable of removal to a place of safety, a young princess, daughter of the illustrious house of Hapsburg. It was by the thunders of artillery, and the flaming light of bombs across the sky, that Napoleon's first addresses to the Archduchess, MARIE LOUISE, were made. Informed of the dangerous situation of the noble captive, he ordered the direction of the pieces to be changed, and while the midnight sky was incessantly streaked by burning projectiles, and conflagration was commencing in every direction around her, the future Empress of France remained secure and unharmed in the Imperial palace.¹ Strange result of those days, not less of royal

Napoleon's
first atten-
tions to the
future Em-
press, Marie
Louise.

CHAP. than national revolution! that a daughter of the
LIV. Cæsars should be wooed and won by a soldier of for-
1809. tune from Corsica: that French arms should be

exerted to place an Austrian princess on the throne
of Charlemagne: that the leader of a victorious in-
vading host should demand her for his bride, and
that the first accents of tenderness should be from
the deep booming of the mortars, which, but for his
interposition, would have consigned her father's pa-
lace to destruction.¹

¹ Pel. ii.
278. Thib.
vii. 255.
Norv. iii.
211, 212.

The Arch-
duke Max-
imilian
abandons
Vienna,
which capi-
tulates.

Aware of the danger of his situation, if cut off
from all communication with the Danube and the
powerful armies on the north bank of that river, the
Archduke Maximilian made an attempt, at one in the
morning of the following day, to regain the Lust-
haus, an important point, which would have hindered
the formation of the bridge the French were prepar-
ing from the southern bank to the first island; but
the attack, not supported with adequate force, was
speedily repulsed. Despairing, after that check, of
being able to maintain his ground in the capital, and
intimidated by the sight of the flames which were
bursting forth in many quarters, the Archduke re-
solved to abandon it to its fate. The troops of the
line, accordingly, with the exception of a few hundred
invalids, were withdrawn to the north bank by the
great bridge of Thabor which was immediately after-
wards burnt. They were just in time; for so rapid
was the progress of the French troops between the
battlements and the river, that in a few hours more
their retreat would have been irrevocably cut off, and
the bridge gained. General O'Reilly, who was left
in command, now lost no time in signifying his readi-
ness to capitulate; and the terms were soon agreed
to, and ratified early on the following morning.

May 12.

May 13.

They were the same as those granted in 1804, guaranteeing the security of private property of every description, but surrendering all public stores, and in particular, the magnificent arsenal, containing four hundred pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of every description; fifty guns in addition, which were on their route for Hungary, were captured by Massena, before they had got many miles from the capital.¹

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

¹ Stat. 217,
224. Pel. ii.
276, 289.
Jom. iii.
188. Sav.
iv. 67, 68.

The capture of Vienna was a prodigious stroke for Napoleon; affording him, as it did, a fortified post on the Danube, amply provided with military stores of every description, and which it was impossible to starve out, for fear of destroying the inhabitants of the metropolis. The French troops took possession of the gates at noon on the 13th, and at that period, the positions of the different corps of their army were as follows:—The corps of Lannes, with four divisions of cuirassiers of the reserve cavalry, and all the guards, were stationed at Vienna: Massena, between that capital and the Simmering, with his advanced posts occupying the Prater, and watching the banks of the Danube: Davoust, who had come up from Ratisbon, was advancing in echelon along the margin of that river, between Ebersberg and St Polten, with his headquarters at Melk: Vandamme, with the Wirtemburghers under his orders, guarded the important bridge of Lintz; while Bernadotte, who had at length completed his circular march round Bohemia, with the Saxons,* and other

Positions of
the different
corps of the
French
armies in
the middle
of May.

* Napoleon was exceedingly displeased at the tardy movements and inefficient condition of the Saxons during this period, and shortly before had addressed the following letter to their general, Bernadotte, on the subject. "The foot artillery of the Saxons is extremely defective: What I want is warlike troops, and experienced generals to direct their movements. The Saxons are incapable of acting by themselves. There

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

1 Pel. ii.
286. 288.
Jom. iii.
188, 190.

Movements
of the
Archduke
Charles, and
position of
his army.

troops of the confederation, about thirty thousand strong, had arrived at Passau, and was advancing to form the reserve of the grand army. Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was fully engaged in a desperate strife in the Tyrol; but independent of that corps, the Emperor had a hundred thousand men concentrated between Lintz and Vienna, besides a reserve of thirty thousand approaching to re-inforce them from the Upper Danube.¹ *

While these rapid successes were achieved by the grand army, the Archduke Charles, with a tardiness which is to this day inexplicable, was pursuing his route from Bohemia towards the capital. After his retreat from Ratisbon, on the 23d of April, he retired to Horasdiowitz, in the southern parts of that province, and was followed by Davoust as far as Straubing, who so far imposed upon the prince as to make

is not one of their generals to whom I can venture to entrust a detached operation. With Frenchmen I can rely on energy and experience in the troops, but the Saxons can do nothing. It is indispensable that they should be strengthened and stimulated by the example of troops more warlike than themselves."—PELET, ii. 241.

* On entering Vienna, Napoleon addressed the following proclamation to his troops:—"Soldiers! In a month after the enemy passed the Inn, on the same day, at the same hour, we entered Vienna. Their landwehrs, their levies *en masse*, their ramparts, created by the impotent rage of the princes of the House of Lorraine, have fallen at the first sight of you. The princes of that house have abandoned their capital, not like soldiers of honour, who yield to circumstances and the reverses of war, but as perjurers haunted by the sense of their own crimes. In flying from Vienna, their orders have been murder and conflagration: like Medea, they have, with their own hands, massacred their offspring. Soldiers! the people of Vienna, according to the expression of a deputation of the suburbs, abandoned, widowed, shall be the object of our regard. I take its good citizens under my special protection; as to the turbulent and wicked, they shall meet with exemplary justice. Let us exhibit no marks of haughtiness or pride; but regard our triumphs as a proof of the Divine justice, which punishes, by our hands, the ungrateful and the perjured."—THIBAudeau, vii. 256; *Moniteur*, 29th May, 1809.

him believe that he was pursued by the whole French army. This natural, but unfounded illusion, was attended with the most unfortunate consequences. Conceiving that Hiller would be perfectly adequate to restrain any incursion of a detached corps towards the capital, he made his dispositions so as to draw upon himself the weight of the invading army, deeming that the most effectual way to ward off the danger from the capital. No sooner was he undeceived in this particular, than he dispatched the most pressing orders to Hiller to defend his ground as long as possible, so as to give him time to join him by the bridges of Lintz or Mauthausen, and he himself set out by forced marches to join him at one or other of these points. It was to gain time for the effecting of this junction, that Hiller, who had not force sufficient to make head at Lintz, maintained so desperate a resistance at Ebersberg. But that action took place on the 3d May, and on the evening of the same day the Arch-
 duke arrived at Budweiss with the bulk of his army, about forty leagues to the north-west of Vienna. At that place he remained *for three days*; a delay which was the more inexplicable, as he heard, in the course of the 4th, of the forcing of the bridge of Ebersberg, which, in effect, opened the road to the capital to the French army. In truth, he was impressed with the idea that Napoleon would never advance to Vienna while so formidable an army menaced his line of communication; and accordingly, instead of hastening towards it, he merely pushed on Kollowrath with twenty thousand men towards the bridge of Lintz, and sent orders to the Archduke John to abandon Italy, and make for the same point; vainly hoping that the concentration of such forces in his rear would compel Napoleon to abandon his attack

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

May 3.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

May 8.

May 13.

May 16.

¹ Pel. ii.
253, 258.
Jom. iii.
183, 185.
Stut. 230,
235.

on the capital. Awakened, at length, by the pressing representations of the Archduke Maximilian, to the necessity of instantly providing for the protection of Vienna, he ordered Hiller, who, in obedience to his orders, had passed over, after the combat at Ebersberg, by the bridge of Mauthausen to the northern bank, to advance by forced marches to the metropolis; and, breaking up from Budweiss on the morning of the 8th, he himself followed in the same direction. But it was too late: the repose of three days at that place had given his indefatigable adversary the start of him by a day. Hiller received his orders on the 10th, at two in the morning, and, marching twelve leagues that day, reached, with his advanced guard, Nussdorf, a league from Vienna, before night, but found the town already invested; while the Archduke advanced by Twetel towards Krems, hoping still to be in time to throw himself between the invader and the capital. Notwithstanding all their efforts, however, they were too late. Hiller, indeed, occupied the isles of the Danube on the 11th, the day before the Archduke Maximilian withdrew from the city, but too late to prevent its complete investiture; and the advanced guard of the Archduke Charles reached the northern extremity of the bridges late on the evening of the 15th, when the enemy was already fully established in Vienna. But for the delay at Budweiss, and the order to Hiller to cross over to the northern bank, the army would have been up in time to combat for the capital; for on the 16th, the junction was fully effected with Hiller a few miles to the north of Vienna, on the left bank of the river;¹ and as from Budweiss to that place is just six days' march, Prince Charles, who arrived at this first town on the 4th, might have reached the capital

with ease on the evening of the 11th, twenty-four hours before it actually surrendered, and long before, if garrisoned by the united forces of Hiller and Maximilian, consisting of thirty thousand good troops, it could possibly have been reduced.

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

The disasters in Bavaria, and the rapid advance of Napoleon to Vienna, produced an immediate change on the aspect of affairs in the Italian plains. Cut short in the career of victory, not less by the necessity of making considerable detachments to the right and left, to watch the progress of Marmont in Dalmatia, and aid the insurrection in Tyrol, than by the peremptory orders of the Archduke Charles to draw near to the hereditary states for the defence of the capital, the Archduke John broke up from the position of Caldiero on the Adige. In order to conceal his real intentions, he made, on the 29th, several attacks on the enemy, but without effecting his object; for Eugene was aware of the events in Bavaria, and had concentrated his troops to resume the offensive, the moment that his adversary retired. Orders arrived on that day from Vienna to suspend as little as possible his offensive operations in Italy, but to open a communication with Hiller, who was to fall back to the Enns; and to be prepared to maintain himself in Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol, as a vast fortress, where he could keep his ground though detached altogether from the other Imperial armies. The Archduke John, however, was of an opposite opinion, and deeming it indispensable to concentrate all the forces of the monarchy in the centre of the hereditary states, he stated his acting differently in a despatch to the Emperor Francis on 30th April, and on the 1st May commenced his retreat by Friuli. Eugene followed the enemy leisurely,

Retreat of
the Arch-
duke John
in Italy.

April 29.

CHAP. and the Austrians reached the Brenta without sus-
 LIV. taining any loss, where Prince John was distracted
 1809. by new orders to the same effect, from the Archduke
 Charles, dated Cham, 29th April, directing him to
 co-operate with the intended movement of the gener-
 al-in-chief, from the north bank of the Danube upon
 Lintz, so as to threaten the enemy's communications.
 Jom. iii. But the progress of events both on the Danube and
 224, 225. the Italian plains disconcerted all these projects, and
 Pel. iii. rendered a retreat upon Vienna, in Prince John's
 180, 195. opinion, a matter of necessity.¹
 Erz. Joan. Feldz. 104,
 107.

Retired behind the Piave, the Archduke conceived
 it practicable to defend the course of that torrent,
 and thereby both arrest the enemy's progress in that
 quarter, and maintain a position from which either
 the projected lateral movement upon Lintz, or the
 ultimate retreat upon Vienna, might be effected. Like
 all the other streams which, in the lower parts of
 Lombardy, descend from the summits of the Alps to
 the Italian plains, this river flows in the middle of an
 immense gravelly bed, elevated for the most part
 above the adjoining meadow, and fordable in all
 parts except after heavy rains. At that season, how-
 ever, the melting of the snows in the higher Alps
 rendered the torrent swoln, and any attempt to cross
 a hazardous operation. Finding, however, that the
 spirits of his troops had been most powerfully ele-
 vated by the triumphs of the grand army, Eugene
 resolved to attempt the passage by main force; and
 hoped, by rivalling the brilliant exploit of Napoleon
 at the passage of the Tagliamento,* to wipe out the
 disgrace of his defeat at Sacile. The attempt was
 made on the 8th May at two points, viz. the fords of
 Toreillo and St Nichol, distant two miles from each

Battle of the
 Piave, and
 defeat of the
 Austrians.
 May 8.

* Ante, iii. 249.

other, in front of Lovadina. Desaix, with six battalions, crossed at the first of these points at daybreak; but he had no sooner drawn up his troops in square, on the opposite bank, than they were charged with great vigour by three thousand Austrian horse. The Imperial cavalry, notwithstanding the most gallant exertions, were unable to break that solid mass of infantry. Had a body of foot soldiers been at hand to support their attacks, or cannon to break the firm array of the enemy, without doubt their efforts would have proved successful; but the infantry, considerably behind, could not get up in time; and meanwhile, Eugene succeeded in bringing up a large body of French horse, which quickly passed over, and by charging the Imperial cavalry in their turn, relieved the grenadiers, now almost sinking under the fatigues of the continued combat, of the weight which had oppressed them. Wolfskehl, however, who commanded the Austrian dragoons, turned fiercely on these new assailants; the Imperial horsemen, the flower of their army, fought bravely; a terrible combat ensued, in which their gallant commander was slain; and it was not till half their number were stretched on the plain, and an overwhelming superiority of force had rendered further resistance unavailing, that these intrepid cavaliers fell back upon their infantry, who were slowly advancing to the charge. The foot soldiers were ridden over and thrown into confusion by the flying dragoons; disorder speedily spread in the columns; several cannon and large quantities of baggage were taken; and it was only by bringing up in person the reserve of grenadiers that the Archduke succeeded in arresting the rout. Mean-while, as the waters of the Piave still continued to rise from the melting of the snows in

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Erz. Joan.
Feldzug,
1809, 99,
110. Pel.
iii. 196,
207. Jom.
iii. 225,
227. Thib.
vii. 265.

Retreat of
the Aus-
trians from
Italy into
Hungary.
May 17.

the mountains, Eugene hastily constructed a bridge of boats, by means of which Macdonald's division was crossed over, which was soon followed by that of Grenier and the rest of the army; Desaix, with his unconquerable square, still keeping his ground in front, and covering the deploying of the columns to the right and left. At two in the afternoon, Eugene, having collected thirty thousand foot and six thousand horse on the left bank, marched forward to attack the enemy; but the Archduke was already in full retreat by the great road of Cornegliano, which was effected in excellent order, though not without much bloody fighting; the numerous canals, dykes, and hollow ways of the country affording every facility for arresting the progress of the enemy. In this disastrous affair, in which the Austrian commanders vainly attempted to defend seven leagues of a fordable river, and uselessly sacrificed their noble cavalry, by bringing it into action against infantry without the aid either of foot or cannon, the Archduke John lost nearly six thousand men, fifteen guns, and thirty caissons, while the French had not to deplore the fall of more than four thousand. But, what was far more important, he lost the whole moral influence of the victory of Sacile; and the *prestige* of success, with all its incalculable effects, had passed over to the enemy.¹

After this check, the Archduke John retired without any further struggle, and without being disquieted in his retreat to Villach, in Carinthia. The strong forts which he had constructed at Malborghetto, Tarwis, and Prediel, on the roads to that town, and at Prevald, on that to Laybach, gave him the means of effecting this movement without any molestation. Arrived at Villach, he received intelligence of the fall of Vienna, and, at the same time, a letter of the

Archduke Charles, of 15th May, directing him to move with all his forces upon Lintz.* Conceiving that these orders had now become impracticable, and that the reduction of the capital had totally extinguished the object for which they had been framed, the Archduke unfortunately thought that he must act for himself, and take counsel from the disastrous circumstances in which the monarchy was placed. Impressed with these ideas, instead of turning his face towards Lintz, he directed his march to Gratz, and sent orders to Jellachich—who had been detached in the first instance to the northward, towards Salzburg, to open up a communication with Hiller and the corps which might operate towards Lintz—to retreat in the same direction, by following the romantic defiles of the Muhr. There he arrived on the 24th, without any further engagement, and descended into the plains of Hungary; having abandoned the Tyrol with its heroic defenders, the forts on the crest of the mountains which had covered his own retreat, with their gallant garrisons, and the whole projected operations on the upper Danube, to their fate.¹

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

¹ Pel. iii.
214, 223.
Jom. iii.
227, 229.
Erz. Joan.
Feldz. 124,
135.

The French advanced guard crossed the frontier of the Austrian states on the 14th, on the Ponteba,

* The orders dated Enzersdorf, 15th May, 1809, were quite precise:—"To march from Villach by Spital and Salzburg, on the Danube; to summon to his aid the corps of Jellachich, and to lend a hand to Kollo-wrath, who, at the same period, was to be before Lintz, on the left bank of the river, and to act in unison on the rear and communications of Napoleon, now master of Vienna." It was eight days' march from Laybach to Lintz; Prince John, therefore, might have been there by the 24th or 25th, where no one remained but Bernadotte with the Saxons. Of what incalculable importance would such a concentration of 50,000 men have been on the direct line of Napoleon's communications immediately after his defeat at Aspern, which took place on the 22d!—*See* PELET, iii. 221, 222.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Capture of
the moun-
tain forts of
Carinthia
and Styria
by the
French.
May 14.

and speedily, in great strength, surrounded the fort of Malborghetto. When summoned to surrender, the commander replied, "that his orders were to defend himself, and not to negotiate;" and the intrepidity of the defence corresponded with such an announcement. The works consisted of a rampart of wood, surmounting a ditch, and enclosing a wooden tower three stories high, all of which were filled with musqueteers; and, as the assailants had only been able to bring up guns of a light calibre, they presented, when defended by brave men, very formidable obstacles. By climbing, however, to the summit of the cliffs by which they were overhung, at the same time that several regiments assailed them on the lower side, the besiegers succeeded in entirely surrounding the enemy, and exposing them to a plunging fire, to which they could make no adequate reply, from the heads of their adversaries being only seen behind the rocks. Still, however, the brave Imperialists refused to surrender; their heroic commander, Henzel, fell desperately wounded while exclaiming, "courage, my comrades;" Rauch, who succeeded him in the command, defended himself like a lion. But nothing could in the end withstand the impetuosity of the French. Irritated by the prolonged resistance and firm countenance of the enemy, they rushed headlong against the rampart, and crowding up on each other's shoulders, and mounting on the dead bodies which encumbered the ditch, at length succeeded in forcing their way in at the embrasures. Still the central tower, from its three stages, vomited forth a furious and incessant fire; but the external rampart being carried, its gates were at last forced; and it was only by the noble efforts of Eugene and his officers,¹ who were penetrated with admiration at

¹ Pel. iii.
224, 230.
Erz. Joan.
Feldz. 104,
111. Jom.
iii. 228.

the heroic defence of their antagonists, that the lives of the few survivors of this desperate conflict were spared.

CHAP.

LIV.

1809.

This brilliant success proved decisive of the fate of all these mountain fortifications. The Col di Tarwis, already the theatre of glorious strife in 1797, was defended by a long rampart running the whole way across the summit of the pass, from the mountain of Flitschel to that of Burqeeburg, strengthened by sixteen redoubts. It was attacked at the same time as the forts of Malborghetto, and Guilay successfully defended himself for two days against very superior forces; but the fall of the forts enabled the enemy to turn this strong line, and take the defenders in rear, which Eugene was already preparing to do; so that the Archduke, on the 16th, sent orders to Guilay to evacuate his post, and effect his retreat in the night down the valley of the Save. This order was promptly obeyed; but at daylight the French discovered the evacuation, and pressed on in pursuit. They overtook the retiring Austrians in front of Weissinfels, and put them to the rout, taking eighteen guns and two thousand prisoners. Another mountain fort, on the Prediel, blocked up the road from Gorizia to Tarwis, and so arrested the march of Serras with the centre of the French army. Its garrison was only three hundred men, with eight pieces of cannon; but they were commanded by a hero, Hermann, who had inspired his handful of followers with the resolution of the defenders of Thermopylæ. When summoned to surrender, and informed of the retreat of the Archduke, and the fall of Malborghetto, he replied, nothing daunted, that "he was resolved to lay down his life for his country." Nor did his defence derogate from these heroic sentiments. Though assailed

Capture of
the Col di
Tarwis and
other forts.

May 16.

May 17.

May 17.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

May 14.

May 21.

¹ Erz. Joan.
Feldz. 120,
124. Pel.
iii. 236,
239.

by forces twenty times as numerous as his own, he persevered in the most desperate resistance, made good the external rampart as long as a man was left upon it who could hold a bayonet, and, when its defenders were all maimed or slain, fell back, alone, to the block-house in the centre, and, when it was set on fire, sallied forth at the head of a band of devoted followers, and fell, gloriously pierced by innumerable wounds.* Macdonald, who, with the right wing, was to advance further to the south across the Isonzo and the mountains of Prevald, encountered a less serious opposition. On the night of the 14th, he effected the passage of the swoln torrent of the Isonzo near Gorizia, and at that place made himself master of the battering train destined for the siege of Palma-nuova. Two thousand men were stationed in the forts of the Prevald, constructed on the same plan of those of Malborghetto, and, like them, commanding entirely the summit of the pass. Several assaults were in the first instance repulsed by the garrison ; but, when the besiegers' artillery was brought up, and the occupation of the adjacent heights exposed them without resource to a plunging fire, against which their fortifications were no protection, they deemed further resistance useless, and capitulated with the whole artillery at their disposal, consisting of fifteen pieces.¹

May 20.

Mean-while, Trieste, which was unarmed, and incapable of resistance, fell an easy prey to General Schilt, with the light troops of Macdonald's division ; and the artillery taken at Gorizia and the Prevald was forthwith forwarded to that important seaport,

* The Archduke John was so impressed with the gallantry of the Austrian commander on this occasion, that he wrote a letter to Hermann's father, consoling him, as he best could, for the loss of so heroic a son.—ERZ. JOANNS FELDZUG, 129.

to place it in a posture of defence against the Eng-
 lish cruisers who were then blockading some Russian
 ships of war. Rapidly following up his advantages,
 Macdonald, immediately after making himself master
 of the Prevald, turned towards Laybach, where an
 entrenched camp, armed with fifty pieces of cannon,
 commanding the approach to the capital of Carniola,
 was garrisoned by five thousand landwehr. Joining
 conduct to vigour, the French general, at the same
 time that he approached the entrenchments with the
 bulk of his forces in front, detached Broussier, with
 two brigades, which threatened to cut off their line
 of retreat towards Croatia, while several squadrons
 on the left bank of the Save made preparations for
 crossing that river, and assailing them on the other
 side. Alarmed at the simultaneous appearance of
 the enemy's forces, in so many different directions,
 and deeming further resistance useless, now that
 Vienna had surrendered, the commander of the en-
 trenced camp laid down his arms, with nearly five
 thousand militia, and sixty pieces of cannon. This
 important success ensured the submission of all
 Carniola, and left Macdonald at liberty to follow the
 forward movement of the viceroy towards Vienna;
 while the occupation of Trieste, and the passes lead-
 ing to it, opened up a communication with Marmont
 in Dalmatia, who was already preparing to effect the
 junction, and concur in the operations of the grand
 army. By these successes, the whole frontier forti-
 fications of the hereditary states were forced, with
 the loss to the Austrians of ten thousand men, and
 ninety pieces of cannon; but they were dearly pur-
 chased, for at Malborghetto, Tarwis, and Prediel,
 nearly half that number of French had fallen.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Fall of
Trieste,
Laybach,
and the
whole fron-
tier defences
of Austria.
May 22.¹ Erz. Joan.
Feldz. 120,
129. Pel.
iii. 236,
243. Jom.
iii. 227,
229.

These disasters, however, considerable as they

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Total defeat
of Jellachich
in the valley
of the
Muhr.
May 24.

proved, were not the only, nor the greatest which befell the retreating army. Jellachich, who had advanced towards Salzburg, in order to prepare the way for the prescribed lateral movement of the Archduke John towards Linz, having received counter orders from that Prince, to descend by the valley of the Muhr towards Gratz, in order to form a junction with the bulk of the Italian army, encountered, at the bridge of St Michel, Serras with his powerful division, who, after forcing the barrier of the Prevrel, was descending the narrow defiles of the Muhr, on the road to Leoben. The Austrian general was following the lateral vale of Lessing, which unites at right angles with that of the Muhr at St Michel; and the two divisions came suddenly and unexpectedly in contact, at that romantic pass. The Imperialists at first made a vigorous resistance, and Jellachich, arranging his troops on the road at the foot of the rocks on each side of the bridge, kept up so heavy a fire, that, for two hours, all the French columns which presented themselves were swept away. Attracted to the front by the cannonade, the viceroy came up, and immediately detached several battalions on the road to Mautern, on the other side of the Muhr, who speedily scaled the mountains in the rear of the Imperialists, and commenced a plunging fire upon them from behind. Panic-struck by this unexpected apparition, which they conceived was a second army come to complete their destruction, the Austrians broke and fled: some by the road of St Michel, where they were pursued without mercy, and for the most part, either cut down, or made prisoners; some by the valley of Lessing, where they fell into the hands of a French brigade, under General Valentin. Nearly two thousand Imperialists were killed or wounded, and above three thousand

made prisoners in this disastrous affair : and such was the terror now inspired by the French armies, and such the depression arising from the fall of their capital, and their multiplied defeats, that on the road from Salzburg to Leoben, four hundred recruits, and twice that number of militia, laid down their arms to a captain, followed by a single dragoon.¹

Jellachich, having lost all his baggage and cannon, with difficulty escaped at the head of two thousand men, by cross mountain paths, to Gratz, where his arrival, and the woful condition of his troops, excited such consternation, that the Archduke forthwith set out in the direction of Kormond in Hungary, abandoning all attempt to bar access to the capital to the invader. Relieved by this retreat of all further molestation in his advance, Eugene moved on rapidly in the footsteps trod twelve years before by Napoleon, to Judenburg and Leoben ; and next day, amidst shouts of joy from both armies, his advanced posts fell in with the patriots of Lauriston, who belonged to the grand army, on the Simmering ; and on the day following, the junction of the two armies was fully effected ; while the army of the Archduke John, driven to a circuitous and eccentric retreat into Hungary, was entirely lost for the present to the forces of the monarchy.¹

The eyes of all Europe were now fixed with absorbing interest on the shores of the Danube, near Vienna, when a hundred thousand men on either shore stood prepared for mortal, and, to all appearances, decisive conflict. Defeat to either party seemed fraught with irreparable ruin ; for, if the Austrians had no other army or reserves to fall back upon if the Archduke's army were defeated in the heart of the monarchy, the French, on their side,

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Pel. iii.
242, 245.
Erz. Joan.
129, 135.

Eugene advances to Vienna, and joins Napoleon.
May 26.

May 27.

Pel. iii.
242, 247.
Erz. Joan.
Feldz. 129,
137. Jom.
iii. 229,
230. Thib.
vii. 266,
267.

Chances of the conflict under the walls of Vienna to either party.

CHAP. had a disastrous retreat to the Rhine to anticipate if
 LIV. their arms should prove unsuccessful: Prussia and
 1809. the north of Germany, it was well known, would
 start up the moment that a serious reverse befell
 their eagles; and, though the contest took place under
 the walls of the Austrian capital, it was in reality
 one of life and death for the French empire. Nor
 were the chances so unequal as they might at first
 sight appear; for, though the Austrian armies had
 been driven back, separated from each other, and
 repeatedly defeated, yet their physical strength was
 not reduced in a much greater proportion than that
 of their antagonists; and though their capital was
 taken, still this had been accomplished only by a
 bold irruption which exposed the invader to nearly
 the same peril as the invaded. Every one felt, what
 Napoleon at the time admitted to be true, that a
 single defeat on the Danube would soon bring the
 Imperialists to the Rhine;* and, though the Arch-
 duke Charles could not lay claim to the transcendent
 military talents of his opponent, yet he was second
 to none of the other generals of Europe in scientific
 ability. And it was no small military skill, which,
 after so desperate a shock on the plains of Bavaria,
 could still array a hundred thousand undiscouraged
 warriors for the defence of their country, on the
 banks of the Danube.¹

¹ Pel. iii.
 250. Stut.
 160, 162.

During the week which immediately followed the
 occupation of Vienna, the Emperor, being well aware

* In the council of war, held after the battle of Aspern, when
 some voices had been expressed for retreating, Napoleon said—"If we
 retreat, we shall admit in the face of all Europe that we have been
 defeated. Where shall we retire to? The Traun, the Inn, or the
 Lech? No! *we must fly at once to the Rhine*; for the allies, whom
 victory or fortune has given us, will all turn against our standards the
 moment we acknowledge a reverse."—PELET, iii. 331.

of the crisis which had arrived, was indefatigable in his efforts to station his troops in such a manner in echelon, along his line of communication, as to secure his rear from insult; while, at the same time, innumerable despatches in every direction provided for the supplies of the army. Titles, decorations, ribbons, crosses of honour, and pensions, were liberally distributed among the soldiers; splendid reviews reanimated the spirits of the men, which the fatigues of the campaign had somewhat depressed, while confident announcements in the bulletins, predicted the speedy destruction of the Austrian monarchy. He had now assembled around Vienna the whole corps of Massena and Lannes, the Imperial guard and reserve cavalry under Bessieres; and though their strength had been much diminished by the losses of the campaign, they could still, after deducting the sick and wounded, bring above eighty thousand veteran troops into the field; Davoust at St Polten, and Bernadotte at Ebersberg and Enns, kept up his communications, while the viceroy was hourly expected with forty thousand from Italy. Supported by the battlements of Vienna, such a force was beyond the reach of attack from any force the Imperialists could bring against them; but it was neither consistent with the Emperor's principles of war nor political policy, to remain shut up behind walls while the enemy kept the field, and was accumulating the forces of the monarchy around him, and he resolved, therefore, to attempt, by main force, the passage of the river.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Napoleon
resolves to
attack the
enemy, and
cross the
Danube.¹ Jom. iii.
189, 190.
Pel. iii.
251, 255,
259. Thib.
vii. 277.

The Danube, which, till it comes to within a few leagues of Vienna, flows in a narrow channel, there swells into a wide expanse and spreads over the plain, embracing several islands in its course. Some of these are extensive, and richly cultivated; but the

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Description
of the
islands of
the Danube
near Vienna,
and the
different
channels of
the river.

greater part are smaller, and covered with wood. The island of Prater, with its beautiful umbrageous avenues and much-loved woody recesses ; and that of Lobau, at a greater distance down the river, and varied with enclosures and cultivation, are the most considerable. The latter is two miles and a half in length, and a mile and three quarters in breadth, covered with rich meadows, swampy thickets, and verdant copsewoods ; it has been immortalized in history, from the memorable events of which it soon became the theatre. By far the most favourable point for forcing a passage from the right bank is at Nussdorf, half a league above Vienna. There the principal branch of the Danube, a hundred and eighty toises in breadth, flows in a deep and impetuous channel, separated from a smaller branch, fifty toises broad, by an island which would serve as an advantageous support for assembling and putting under cover the first troops employed in the operation. Another point for attempting the same enterprise was in front of Ebersdorf, across the great island of Lobau. This island is separated from the right bank by another isle about a mile in length, and half that distance in breadth ; while several smaller islets are scattered in the principal channel of the river. Thus, an army attempting the passage at that point has four branches of the Danube to cross, each of which may be considered as a separate river. There is, first, the channel separating the right bank from the lesser island, which is two hundred and forty toises broad ; then the main body of the stream, flowing in a deep current, a hundred and seventy toises in breadth, which separates it from Lobau, with a small island in its course dividing this main stream into two parts ; finally, the northern branch which

lies between the isle of Lobau and the banks of the Marchfeld on the left of the river; it is seventy toises in breadth, and in like manner broken in its course by several smaller islands. Thus, at Ebersdorf, many more bridges required to be constructed than at Nussdorf, and a military road across the islands was necessary to connect them together; but these disadvantages were more than compensated by the diminished weight and impetuosity of the stream, in consequence of being separated into so many channels, and the solidity given to the lengthened structure, by having such considerable abutments to support it at different points.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Personal observation. Stut. 202, 210. Pel. ii. 259, 267. Jom. ii. 192, 194.

After mature deliberation, Napoleon resolved to attempt the passage at the same time at both points, Lannes was charged with the undertaking at Nussdorf; Massena at Lobau. This double set of operations, it was hoped, would distract the attention of the enemy, and enable the Emperor to select, in the end, that one for the real passage where the least difficulties were to be overcome. Lannes, in the first instance, attempted to surprise a passage at Nussdorf, and pushed forward six hundred men to the island of Schwarze Lacken, which lies, as already mentioned, near the northern bank at that point; but this advanced guard was speedily beset by superior forces, which General Hiller dispatched from his side of the river, and before any fresh succours could arrive from the southern shore, vigorously assailed, and compelled to capitulate. This check, joined to the obvious difficulty of establishing such a force as could maintain itself in an island so near the north bank, and separated by so wide and impetuous a current from the southern,¹ induced the Emperor to relinquish all serious intentions of effecting

Napoleon's preparations to effect the passage. Failure at Nussdorf. May 13.

¹ Pel. ii. 262, 265. Jom. iii. 195. Stut. 212, 216.

CHAP. the passage there; and he, in consequence, bent all
 LIV. his attention to the island of Lobau, where Massena
 1809. was charged with the enterprise.

His vigor-
 ous efforts
 to effect a
 passage at
 Lobau.
 Nov. 13.

May 19.

¹ Pel. iii.
 270, 273.
 Stut. 222,
 224.

Passage of
 the river.
 May 19.

Indefatigable were the efforts made by all ranks, from Napoleon to the humblest soldier, for the prosecution of this great work; the inexhaustible arsenal of Vienna supplied, in abundance, all the stores and implements necessary for its success; and the prudent foresight of the Emperor had already provided a flotilla of boats, drawn from many different quarters, and transported by land carriage to the Danube, which were easily converted into the materials of a bridge. Five days were consumed in these preparations; on the sixth, every thing being in readiness, the enterprise was commenced. So anxious was the Emperor for the success of this undertaking, that he stationed himself on the southern bank as the troops were embarking, minutely examined and assigned to each the place they were to occupy in the vessel, superintended the distribution of cartridges to the soldiers, and addressed a few words to almost every individual man. With such secrecy had Massena's preparations been conducted, in the narrow channel of the Danube near Vienna, and behind the leafy screen of the Prater, that no danger was anticipated by the Austrians in that quarter; and although the posts in the island of Lobau were daily relieved, they had not been particularly strengthened on that occasion.¹

At ten at night on the 19th, all things being in readiness, the first boats pulled off from the shore, and steering round the intermediate islands, made straight for that of Lobau, where the Imperialists were first apprised of their approach by the keels of the boats striking on the shore. Instantly leaping

into the water, the tirailleurs rushed forward into the thickets, and being constantly fed by reinforcements from the rear, soon expelled the Austrians from the isle. Masses of infantry were, immediately after, passed over, who soon secured the lodgement, and rendered this important post safe from attack. At the same time, other detachments in like manner took possession of the intermediate isles; and the material points of the passage being thus secured, all hands were instantly set to the commencement of the bridges, which were to connect them with the northern bank. The depth and rapidity of the current at that period, when the melting of the Alpine snows had already commenced, presented very formidable difficulties; but all were overcome by the ardour and activity of the French engineers. Sixty-eight large boats had been collected, and nine huge rafts; they made the bridge of the most solid materials as far as Lobau; but from that island to the opposite shore of the Marchfeld, it was necessary to construct it of pontoons. With such vigour, however, was the enterprise conducted, that by noon on the following day the whole was completed, and the leading columns of Massena's corps instantly began to defile over in great strength to the opposite bank.¹

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

While this important operation was in progress in the neighbourhood of Vienna, the Archduke Charles, relying on the prescribed co-operation of the Archduke John, with the army of Italy, through the Tyrolean mountains, had made a serious attack on the bridge of Lintz, in the upper part of the Danube. Kollowrath, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, there commenced an attack on the Wirtemburghers under Vandamme, to whom that communication was entrusted. Profiting by their superiority of force,

Pel. ii.
270, 275.
Jom. iii.
196, 197.
Stut. 224,
227.
Sav. iv. 68,
71, 73.

Operations
of the
Archduke
on the
Upper Dan-
ube, at Lintz,
and Krems.
May 17.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

May 19.

the Imperialists, in the first instance, obtained considerable advantages, and that important post was on the point of falling into the hands of the enemy, when Bernadotte came up with the Saxons, nearly thirty thousand strong. The combat was no longer equal, and Kollowrath, finding himself greatly outnumbered, and having received no advices of the approach of the Archduke John from the direction of Salzburg, was compelled to desist from his enterprise, and sustained a loss of several hundred men and six guns in his retreat. Two days afterwards, preparations were made for crossing the river by the Austrians at Krems, which gave serious disquiet to Napoleon, who ordered up in haste the whole corps of Davoust, which was stationed in echelon at Melk, and along the road from thence by St Polten to Vienna. But these demonstrations against his rear, so far from diverting the Emperor from his original design of crossing at Lobau, and giving battle to the Archduke on the northern bank, only made him more intent upon the immediate prosecution of his enterprise, by showing that the enemy's army was, in part at least, removed from the scene of action, and bringing, at the same time, vividly before his mind the dangers of his situation, with a long line of communication beset by so many dangers in his rear, and the necessity of instantly bringing the war to a conclusion by a decisive victory under the walls of Vienna. He pressed the march of his troops across the bridge of Lobau with the utmost anxiety; they defiled all the 20th, and the whole of the succeeding night, without intermission; and by daybreak on the 21st, forty thousand men were already assembled in battle array on the northern side.¹

Stut. 220,
224. Pel.
ii. 268,
270. Jom.
iii. 197.
Sav. iv. 74.

Mean-while, the Archduke Charles, with the great

body of his forces, lay on the woody heights of the Bisamberg; the fires of his bivouacs illuminated at night the whole of that quarter of the heavens, and already, by revealing the magnitude of the enemy's force, inspired the French soldiers with gloomy presentiments as to the issue of the contest which was approaching. From this elevated position the plain beyond Vienna towards the Simmering appeared to be enveloped in clouds of dust; but as they at intervals cleared away, the glitter of bayonets and helmets in the sun's rays, even at that distance, all following one direction, indicated a grand movement towards Kaiser-Ebersdorf. In effect, having perceived from that lofty ridge, by means of telescopes, both the preparations made for crossing at Lobau, and the continued march of Davoust's corps along the southern bank of the river, from Melk towards the capital, the Archduke conceived, with reason, that a favourable opportunity had now occurred of falling with his concentrated forces upon half the French army, before the remainder was crossed over, and possibly reducing it to extremities, even in sight of the other portion on the opposite bank, and while yet the columns in rear were only wending their way in toilsome march towards the capital. Impressed with these ideas, orders were sent to the advanced posts on the edge of the Marchfield towards Lobau, to fall back; after a merely nominal resistance, the cavalry, which had been all advanced to the edge of the river, were recalled, while the whole strength of the army was collected on the Bisamberg, concealed from the enemy, but ready to fall with its accumulated masses upon the first corps which should be transported across. At the same time, instructions were sent to Kollowrath, Nordman, and the officers in

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

The Arch-
duke re-
solves to
attack the
French,
who had
crossed.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Archduke
Charles'
Official
Account of
Aspern.
Ann. Reg.
1809.
Chron.
382, 383.
Stut. 220,
229. Pel.
ii. 275,
277.

Austrian
plan and
order of
attack.
May 21.

command further up the river, to collect a quantity of boats to be laden with heavy materials and combustibles, and, when the proper season arrived, detached, to be borne down by the force of the swoln current against the enemy's bridges. In truth, it was evident that Napoleon's overweening confidence in his good fortune had at last brought him into a situation full of danger, and that, with fatal rashness, he had exposed himself to the most perilous chance in war, that of being attacked by greatly superior forces in an open plain, with a great river traversed by a single bridge, recently constructed and liable to destruction, in his rear.¹

Anxiety for the great events which were approaching, caused many a noble heart to throb during the night in the Austrian host; and already, as the morning dawned, thousands of aching eyes were turned in the direction of Lobau and the Marchfield, where, even at that early hour, a great accumulation of force was visible. The march of troops across the bridge continued incessant, and all the reports from the outposts announced that the lines in their front were rapidly widening and extending. With exulting hearts, the army received orders at sunrise to stand to arms: the advantages of their situation, were obvious even to the meanest sentinel: the noble array which was pouring across the bridges before them, into the plains at their feet, seemed a devoted host, blindly rushing upon destruction. The vast plain of the Marchfield, stretching from the foot of the Bisamberg to the margin of the Danube, lay spread like a carpet before the front of the line, and appeared, from the absence of every obstruction, to be the destined theatre of some great event. The officers around him urged the Archduke to commence the

attack early in the morning, and while as yet the whole of Massena's corps was not passed over: but when the enemy were making a false movement was not the moment to interrupt or warn him of his danger. Instead of acceding to their suggestions, that able commander ordered the arms to be piled, and the troops to dine: following thus the maxim of the great generals of antiquity, that, even with the bravest troops, it is of the last importance to commence a battle with the strength of the men recently recruited by food. At twelve o'clock, the movement of the enemy being sufficiently pronounced, and retreat in presence of so great a host impossible, the signal to advance was given. The men received it with loud shouts and enthusiastic acclamations; joyful war songs, accompanied by Turkish music, resounded through the air: long continued *vivats* arose on all sides, as the Archduke Charles, the saviour of Germany, rode along the lines of the second column, at whose head he had taken his station. Every breast panted with anxious desire, and deserved confidence for the decisive moment, and the finest weather favoured the awful scene. The circumstances had spread a noble ardour through every heart. Their much loved capital, the abode of their Emperor, was in sight, polluted by the eagles of the stranger; their homes were the prize of victory; before them was a splendid battlefield, where they would combat for their sovereign, their liberty, and their country, under the eyes of their wives, their parents, their children. Descending from their elevated encampment, horse, foot, and cannon rapidly and eagerly pressed forward towards the enemy;¹ and soon, to those who yet lingered on the Bisamberg, but a small space of clear green intervened between the volumes of dust which enveloped the

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Archduke Charles' Account of Aspern. Ann. Reg. 1809, 382. Chron. Stat. 230, 235. Pel. ii. 275, 276.

CHAP. LIV. 1809. extremity of the bridge of Lobau, and the moving clouds which marked the advance of the German host.

Position
and dangers
of the
French
army.

Midway between the villages of ASPERN and ESSLING, each situated at the distance of half-a-mile from the bank of the Danube, the French bridge opened upon the vast plain of the Marchfield. These villages, therefore, formed the bastions on either flank of Napoleon's army, which extended in line across the open space, a mile broad, which lay between them. Built of stone, houses, most of them two stories in height, and surrounded by enclosures and garden walls of the same durable materials, both offered valuable *points d'appui* to the bridges, under cover of which, it was hoped, Massena and Bessieres would be able to maintain themselves, till the remainder of the army could be brought over to their support. Essling had a large stone granary, three stories in height, furnished with loop-holes, capable of containing several hundred men; while Aspern, a long straggling village, above two miles in length, was strengthened, like Eylau, by a churchyard surrounded by a strong wall. A double line of trenches, intended to draw off the water, extended between these two natural bastions, and served as a wet ditch, which afforded every possible security to the troops debouching from the island of Lobau. The whole ground was perfectly level, gently sloping upwards like a vast natural glacis, towards Raschdorf; white villages alone, bosomed in tufted trees, rising above the tender green of the plain, which was covered with rich crops at that early season, broke the uniformity of the expanse, among which, on the right, the glittering pinnacles of Breitenlee, and the massy tower of Neusiedel were conspicuous;¹ while on the left, the woody heights of

¹ Personal
Observa-
tion.
Archduke
Charles'
Account.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 383.
Pel. ii. 283,
287.

the Bisamberg, resplendent with watch-fires, shut in the scene. The wide-spread light of the bivouacs, along the broad expanse of the horizon, revealed the magnitude of the force to which they were opposed, and inspired an anxious disquietude through the French army.

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

Uneasy at the situation of the troops which had crossed over, Napoleon was on horseback by break of day, and in person rode forward to the outposts to satisfy himself as to the amount of the enemy's force by whom he was likely to be assailed. Lannes, with his usual impetuosity, maintained that there was nothing but a curtain of ten thousand men in front, and that they should be attacked without delay; but Massena, instructed by long experience, and who had surveyed the fires of the enemy from the steeple of Aspern the preceding night, gave a decided opinion, that the whole Austrian army was at hand. Napoleon saw too good reason to adhere to the latter opinion, and instantly appreciating the magnitude of the danger, rode back to the bridge to hasten the passage of the troops. Orders were dispatched in every direction to assemble the forces on the right bank; the corps of Lannes was already beginning to cross over; that of Davoust, which had arrived at Vienna the evening before, was ordered up with all imaginable expedition; the cuirassiers, the guards, the reserve cavalry, the park of artillery, all received directions to hasten to the bridges. But it was too late: their narrow breadth would only permit a very limited number of soldiers to march abreast upon them; the cavalry and artillery could only be got across with considerable difficulty;¹ and the one over the main branch of the river was so much damaged by the rise and impetuosity of the stream, that by

Napoleon is surprised, but resolves to give battle.

¹ Nap. in Month. ii. 77. Arch. Charles' Account. Ann. Reg. 1809, 383, 384. Chron. Pel. ii. 283, 287. Stut. 240, 247. Jom. iii. 200.

CHAP. four o'clock in the afternoon it was almost impassable.
 LIV. Mean-while the Austrian army in great strength,
 1809. eighty thousand strong, of whom fourteen thousand
 were magnificent cavalry, with two hundred and
 eighty-eight pieces of cannon, was already upon
 them.

Austrian
 plan of at-
 tack, and
 forces on
 both sides,

¹ Archduke
 Charles'
 Account of
 Aspern,
 Ann. Reg.
 1809, 384,
 385. Pel.
 ii. 291,
 295.
 Stut. 231,
 235. Jom.
 iii. 208.

The Imperialists advanced in five massy columns, preceded by a strong cloud of horse, which concealed their direction and probable points of attack from the enemy. The first, under Hiller, next the Danube, moved by the meadows on the northern bank of that river direct upon Aspern; the second, under Bellegarde, with the generalissimo by his side, advanced upon Leopoldau, and also directed its steps towards the same village; the third, led by Hohenzollern, moved by Breitenlee also upon Aspern; the fourth, commanded by Rosenberg, was to advance by Raschdorf towards Essling; the fifth, also directed by Rosenberg, was to turn the right flank of the enemy by Enzersdorf and co-operate in the attack upon Essling; the cavalry, all massed together, was to move over the open country between Raschdorf and Breitenlee, so as to assist the head of any column which might find itself assailed by the enemy's horse. No less than eleven of the Austrian batteries were of position, which, as they drew near to the enemy's lines, sent a destructive storm of round shot through their ranks. The French were far from having an equal force at their disposal, and they were particularly inferior in the number and weight of their artillery; but, by two o'clock in the afternoon, when the opposing hosts came into collision, seven divisions* of native troops,¹ besides the guards of Wir-

* Viz. Molitor's, Le Grand, Boudet, Ferrand, Nansouty, Espagne, and La Salle. The four first were infantry, the last cavalry of the re-

temburg, Hesse Darmstadt, and Baden, in all fifty thousand men, were in line; and from the known character of the soldiers, as well as the firmness of their leaders, a desperate resistance was to be anticipated. Massena, with two strong divisions, was around Aspern; Lannes, with a third, was in Essling; the intermediate space was occupied by the remainder of Massena's corps, the Imperial guard, and German auxiliaries, with the formidable cuirassiers of Bessieres glittering in their front.

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

Aspern, into which Massena had not had time to throw an adequate garrison, was, in the first instance, carried by the advanced guard of Hiller under Guilay; but the French marshal having quickly attacked it with the whole division of Molitor, it was not only retaken, but the Imperialists pursued to a considerable distance to the northward; till the broad and deep columns of Hiller, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern advancing to their support, warned the skilful French commander of the necessity of withdrawing all his troops to the defence of the village itself. The prospect which now presented itself was capable of daunting the most intrepid hearts. On the left, three broad and deep columns were seen converging towards Aspern; at a greater distance on the right, vast clouds of dust announced that other masses were threatening Essling; while along the whole front a formidable array of artillery, vomiting forth fire and smoke, steadily advanced, rendering more awful the scene by the obscurity in which it involved all be-

Desperate
conflict at
Aspern,
which is at
length car-
ried by the
Austrians.

serve and cuirassiers. Their united strength, with the German auxiliaries, must have been at least fifty thousand men, as Molitor's and Boudet's were twelve thousand each. The French, however, will only admit that they had thirty thousand native troops in action on the first day.—See ARCHDUKE CHARLES' *Official Account of the battle of Aspern*. *Ann. Reg.* 384; *App. to Chron.* 384; and PELET, ii. 287.

CHAP. hind its traces. But this suspense was of short
LIV. duration, and in a few minutes the Austrian bat-
1809. talions of Hiller, with loud shouts, advanced to the
attack. If, however, the assault was impetuous, the
defence was not less heroic ; and never had the
experienced skill and invincible tenacity of Marshal
Massena been so conspicuously displayed. Stationed
in the cemetery of Aspern, under the boughs of the
great trees which overshadow the church, he calmly
awaited the result, directing the movements of his
troops, and giving his orders to support the points
which most required it, with the coolness and preci-
sion of veteran courage, while the crash of the
boughs above his head, and the incessant clatter of
grape-shot on the steeple, told how near the enemy's
batteries had approached. Both parties were aware
that the fate of the day mainly depended on the
possession of this important point, and incredible
efforts were made on either side to attain it. For
several hours the murderous conflict continued ;
fresh troops were brought up on both parts to supply
the place of those who had fallen, or were exhausted
in the strife : the Austrian infantry, the Hungarian
grenadiers, the volunteers of Vienna, rivalled each
other in courage and perseverance in the assault,
while the different divisions of Massena's corps nobly
in succession sustained the defence. Every street,
every house, every garden of the village, became the
theatre of mortal combat : the shouts of transient
success, the cries of despair, were heard alternately
from both parties—an incessant shower of bombs
and cannon balls from the concentric batteries of the
Imperialists spread death on all sides, alike among
friend and foe, while great part of the village took
fire, and the flames of the burning houses afforded,

as night approached, a ghastly light wherewith to continue the work of destruction, and illuminated the whole field of battle. A desperate conflict at the same time continued in the marshy plain between Aspern and the river, where the wet ditches leading to the Danube athwart their front, and the thickets of alder bushes, gave the French the advantages of a natural fortification. For long the superior numbers of the Austrians impeded each other, as the position of the French centre prevented them from attacking the village on more sides than one; but at length, at eleven at night, their line having gained ground in that quarter, a combined attack was made by Hiller in front, and Vacquant, commanding part of Bellegarde's corps, which had just repulsed a formidable charge of cavalry in flank; and in spite of the most heroic efforts on the part of Massena, Molitor, and his officers, the village was carried amidst deafening shouts, which were distinctly heard above the roar of the artillery along the whole line. The French Marshal made a gallant effort to regain his ground, and succeeded with Le Grand's division, which had succeeded Molitor's in their tremendous strife, in wresting some of the houses from the enemy; but the churchyard, and the greater part of this blood-stained village, remained through the night in the hands of the Imperialists.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Archduke
Charles'
Account,
Ann. Reg.
1809, 385,
386. Stut.
230, 239.
Pel. ii. 295,
305. Jom.
iii. 201,
202.

While this tremendous struggle was going on in Aspern, the central space between it and Essling was almost denuded of infantry; the numerous and formidable Austrian batteries in that quarter being chiefly guarded by cavalry, with Hohenzollern's infantry in their rear, while the splendid horsemen of the French Guard, concealed on the opposite side

Grand
charge of
the French
cavalry in
the centre.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

1 Pel. ii.
298, 302.
Archduke
Charles'
Account,
Ann. Reg.
1809, 387.
Jom. iii.
201.

the weakness of their infantry in the centre of the line. So severely, however, were his troops in both villages, and even in the most distant reserves, galled by the sustained and incessant discharge of this tremendous array of guns, that Napoleon ordered a grand charge of cavalry in his centre to wrest them from the enemy. Bessieres first sent forward the light horse of the guard: they made repeated charges; but were unable to withstand the terrible discharges of grape which were vomited forth by the Austrian batteries. Upon their repulse, the French Marshal ordered the cuirassiers of the guard to charge. These gallant horsemen, cased in shining armour, whose weight the English felt afterwards so severely at Waterloo, advanced at the gallop, shaking their sabres above their heads, and making the air resound with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur.*" So swift was the onset, so vehement the attack, that the Imperialists, who saw at once the danger of the artillery, had barely time to withdraw the guns, and throw the foot soldiers in their rear into squares when the clattering tempest was upon them. In vain, however, Bessieres, D'Espagne, and Lasalle, at the head of these indomitable cavaliers, swept round the now insulated foot, routed the Austrian cavalry of the reserve under Lichtenstein, which was brought up to oppose them, and enveloping the infantry formed in squares of battalions on all sides, summoned them in the pride of irresistible strength to surrender. Cut off from all other support, the brave Hungarians stood firm back to back in their squares, and kept up so vigorous and so sustained a fire on all sides, that after having half their numbers, including the gallant D'Espagne, stretched on the plain,¹ the French

cuirassiers were obliged, shattered and defeated, to retire to their own lines, and both parties at this point slept upon the field of battle.

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

Rosenberg's columns followed the course prescribed to them ; but, as the fifth corps, which was to make the circuit towards Enzersdorf and attack Essling on the extreme flank, necessarily required more time for its movement than the fourth, which advanced direct by Raschdorf upon the same point, the latter retarded their march, and the combined attack did not take place till five in the afternoon. Enzersdorf was evacuated by the enemy upon the approach of the Imperialists ; and Lannes, at the head only of a single division, was threatened with an attack by forces more than double his own, both in front and flank. The fourth column, which attacked the village on the western side, was vigorously charged in flank in its advance by a large body of French horse, detached by Bessieres from the centre of the line ; and the necessity of forming squares, to resist these attacks, retarded considerably the assault on that side. At length, however, the unsuccessful charge on the Austrian central batteries having thrown back the French cuirassiers in that quarter, and the reserve dragoons of Lichtenstein having been re-formed, and brought up in great strength to the support of the centre, the Archduke ordered a general advance of the whole line, at the same time that a combined attack of Rosenberg's two columns, now perfectly able to co-operate, was made on Essling. In spite of the utmost efforts of Napoleon, the centre of the Austrians sensibly gained ground, and it was only by the most devoted gallantry on the part of the French cuirassiers, who, again and again, though with diminished numbers, renewed the combat, that

Bloody at-
tack on
Essling,
which
proves un-
successful.

CHAP. he was able to prevent that part of his line from
 LIV. being entirely broken through. The violence of the
 1809. flanking fire of grape and musquetry, however, which

issued from Essling, was such as to arrest the Imperialists when they came abreast of that village; and, although many assaults were made upon it by Rosenberg's columns, and it was repeatedly set on fire by the Austrian's shells, yet, such was the intrepid resistance of Lannes, with his heroic division, who defended with invincible obstinacy every house and every garden, that all the assailants could do was to drive them entirely within its walls; and, when darkness suspended the combat, it was still in the hands of the French.¹

¹ Stat. 239,
 250.
 Archduke
 Charles'
 Account.
 Ann. Reg.
 1809. 388,
 389. Pel.
 ii. 296,
 299. Jom.
 iii. 202.

Feelings
 with which
 both parties
 passed the
 night on the
 field of
 battle.

The night which followed this desperate conflict was spent with very different feelings in the two armies. On both sides, indeed, the most strenuous efforts were made to repair the losses which had been sustained, and prepare for the conflict on the morrow; but it was with very different emotions that the soldiers' breasts were agitated in the opposite hosts. On the side of the French, to the proud confidence of victory had succeeded the chill of disappointment, the anticipation of disaster; the wonted shouts of the men were no longer heard; a dark feeling of anxiety oppressed every breast; the brilliant meteor of the empire seemed about to be extinguished in blood. They could not conceal from themselves that they had been worsted in the preceding day's fight. Aspern was lost; Essling was surrounded; the line in the centre had been forced back; the enemy slept among the dead bodies of the French, while the multitude of slain, even in the farthest reserves of their own lines, showed how completely the enemy's batteries had reached every part of their position. The

Austrians, on the other hand, were justly elated by their unwonted and glorious success ; for the first time, Napoleon had sustained a decided defeat in the field ; his best troops had been baffled in a pitched battle ; his position was critical beyond example, and the well known hazard of the bridges diffused the hope that, on the morrow, a decisive victory would rescue this country from the oppressor, and at one blow work out the deliverance of Germany. But, though anxiety chilled the hopes, it no ways daunted the courage of the French. Stretched amidst the dead bodies of their comrades, they sternly resolved to combat to the last man on the morrow, for their beloved Emperor and the glory of their country. Sleep, induced by extraordinary fatigue, soon closed the eyes of the soldiers ; the sentinels of either host were within a few yards of each other ; Napoleon lay down in his cloak on the sand of the Danube, within half a mile of the Austrian batteries. But no rest was taken by the chiefs of either army ; both made the most strenuous efforts to improve their chances of success for the following day. During the night, or early in the morning, the infantry of the Imperial guard, the corps of Lannes, and the troops of Oudinot, were, with much difficulty, got across the bridges, so as to give Napoleon, even after all the losses of the preceding day, full seventy thousand men in line ; while Davoust, with thirty thousand more,* was just commencing the

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1809.

* These numbers are ascertained in an authentic manner. Napoleon admits that "the French army on the second day, on the two banks of the Danube, was 20,000 *men superior to that of the Archduke*, who had 100,000 men in the field." Davoust's corps was, at the utmost, not above 40,000 men after the losses it had undergone ; at this rate, therefore, the French army, which was all across excepting that marshal's corps, would have been 80,000 ; and, deducting 10,000 for the losses of the preceding day, 70,000 must have remained in the field on the 22d.—See *NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON*, ii. 78.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

1 Tacit.

Hist. v. 15.

Archduke

Charles.

Ann. Reg.

1809, 389.

Pel. ii. 308,

309. Sav.

iv. 75, 76.

passage of the bridges. The Archduke, on his side, brought up the reserve, consisting of the grenadier corps of the Prince of Reuss, from the Bisamberg to Breitenlee, a mile in the rear of the field of battle.

“Ejus prælii eventus utrumque ducem, diversis animi motibus, ad maturandum summæ rei discrimen erexit. Civilis instare fortunæ; Cerialis abolere ignominiam. Germani prosperis feroces; Romanos pudor excitaverat.”¹

Renewal of
the action
on the 22d.
Aspern and
Essling are
again obsti-
nately dis-
puted.

Short as the night was at that season on the banks of the Danube, that period of rest was not allowed to the wearied soldiers. Long before sunrise, the moment that the first grey of the summer's dawn shed a doubtful light over the field of battle, the Austrian columns of Rosenberg again assailed Essling in front and flank, and Massena, with strong reinforcements, renewed his attacks on the churchyard of Aspern. Both assaults proved successful. Essling for the first time was carried by the Archduke's regiment of grenadiers in the early twilight, and the Imperialists, following up their success, forced the French lines on their left back towards the Danube, and straitened them considerably in that quarter: but this important success was counterbalanced by the loss of Aspern, which at the same moment was taken, with the battalion in the churchyard, and four pieces of cannon, by the French division of Cara St Cyr. Both parties made the utmost efforts to retrieve these momentous losses. St Hilaire came up with his division of Lannes' corps to the assistance of that gallant Marshal, who was now driven out of all parts of Essling, except the great granary, and, by a sudden effort, expelled the Austrians, who were never able again to recover their footing in that important village, though the most desperate conflict, both of

foot and horse, went on the whole day in its immediate neighbourhood. The regiment of Klebeck rushed about the same time with fixed bayonets into the burning ruins of Aspern; the French of St Cyr were expelled by the violence of the shock, but they returned to the charge reinforced by several battalions of the Imperial guard, and after a struggle of an hour's duration, again drove out the Imperialists, and got possession of the churchyard, which by this time was literally covered with the dead. Hiller, however, was not to be outdone in this tremendous struggle. Again forming a column of attack, in conjunction with part of Bellegarde's corps, he himself led on the charge at the head of the regiment Benjossky: trampling under foot the dead and the dying, these heroic assailants advanced through burning houses and a storm of shot, and by great exertions succeeded in driving the French entirely out of the village. The Austrian commander instantly ordered the pioneers to pull down the walls of the churchyard, and burn the church and parsonage-house, so as to prevent these important points from being again rendered a shelter to the enemy. Some additional regiments were soon after brought up under General Bianchi, which enabled the Imperialists, not only to maintain themselves till the close of the battle in this obstinately contested village, but to advance in the evening somewhat beyond its limits, and direct the fire of their artillery upon the flank of the French lines, drawn up between it and Essling, which played till nightfall with tremendous effect upon the dense masses, who were there accumulated on a space of little more than a mile in extent.¹

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

¹ Archduke's Account.
Ann. Reg. 1809, 390, 391. Chron. Stat. 250, 261. Jom. iii. 203, 204. Pel. ii. 310, 311. Nap. in Month. ii. 78, 79.

These bloody contests in the villages were not such as by any means suited the ardent and impetuous

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1809.

Napoleon
makes a
grand at-
tack on the
Austrian's
centre,
which is at
first suc-
cessful.

mind of Napoleon. Relieved from the necessity of remaining on the defensive, by the important accessions of force which he had obtained during the night, he was preparing a grand attack in the centre. For this purpose, instructions were sent to Massena, who had not yet been expelled from Aspern, to maintain himself in that village; Davoust was to debouch from the bridges, in the direction of Essling; while Oudinot and Lannes, supported by the infantry and cavalry of the guard, were to make an united attack on the Archduke's centre, which it was hoped might be thus driven back, and entirely separated from the wings engaged in the combats around the villages. From his station behind the centre of the French line, Napoleon pointed out with his finger, at seven in the morning, to Lannes, who was on horseback beside him, the direction which his corps should follow in their advance, which was where the Austrian line appeared weakest, between the left of Hohenzollern and the right of Rosenberg. The Emperor soon after rode through the lines of the troops who were to advance, and was received with enthusiastic shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*. Attracted by the sound, the enemy's cannon concentrated their fire in that direction, though the fog which still lingered on the banks of the Danube concealed him from their sight, and General Monthion was killed by his side. Instantly the necessary orders were given, and in a few minutes the whole of Lannes' corps were thrown into open column, which advanced at a rapid pace, the right in front, the cavalry in reserve, immediately behind the infantry, while two hundred pieces of cannon arrayed in the front of the whole line, distracted the attention of the enemy, by a fire of unprecedented severity. As soon as Lannes, on the right,

had made some progress, the remainder of the French centre, to the left, also advanced: Oudinot's troops formed the first columns, with the cuirassiers immediately behind them, and the Imperial guard in reserve; so that the whole French line between Essling and Aspern moved forward in echelon, the right in front, and preceded by a tremendous array of artillery. The shock was irresistible: the heads of Lannes' columns, skilfully directed against the weakest part of the Austrian line, soon forced their way through, and threw some battalions into disorder: into the opening thus formed, the cavalry rushed with appalling fury, and soon a huge gap appeared between Rosenberg and Hohenzollern, and the foremost of the squadrons penetrated even to Breitenlee, where the Austrian reserve of the Prince of Reuss was stationed, while the fugitives from the broken battalions spread in all directions the report that the battle was lost.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Pel. ii.
310, 316.
Jom. iii.
204. Stut.
241, 250.
Archduke
Charles'
Account of
Aspern.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 391,
392. App.
to Chron.
Sav. iv. 75.
Nap. in
Month. ii.
78, 80.

The Archduke now felt that the decisive moment had arrived; the battle, the monarchy were at stake. In this extremity that gallant Prince displayed alike the skill of a consummate commander, and the heroism of a common soldier. The reserve grenadiers, under the Prince of Reuss, were hastily thrown into square, and brought up to the menaced point; the numerous dragoons of Prince Lichtenstein advanced immediately behind them; and the Archduke himself, seizing the standard of Zach's corps, which had begun to give way, addressed a few energetic words to the men, and led them back against the enemy. The generals around him emulated the noble example, but most of them were killed or wounded at this dreadful moment; General Colloredo received a ball in the head, close by the Archduke's side, and

Desperate
resistance of
the Austrian
centre.

CHAP.
LIV.
1809.

the diminished numbers of his personal staff showed how desperate was the strife in which the generalissimo was engaged. But these heroic efforts restored the battle: re-animated by the heart-stirring example of their chiefs, the soldiers stood their ground; the dreadful column of Lannes was arrested in its advance, and the squares among which it had penetrated, pouring in destructive volleys on all sides, soon occasioned hesitation and anxiety through the dense array. The Austrian batteries, playing at half musket-shot, occasioned a frightful carnage in the deep masses of Napoleon's troops, which, unable either to deploy under so terrific a fire, or return it to advantage from the edges only of their columns, were swept away without making any serious resistance. From the moment that the irruption of Lannes' column was stopped, and the regiments behind were compelled to halt, the French soldiers felt that the day was lost.* In vain the cuirassiers were brought forward, who dashed, as at Waterloo, through the intervals of the squares; in vain those brave horsemen rode round the steady battalions, and charged them repeatedly to the bayonets' points;¹ not one square was broken, not one

¹ Sav. iv.
77. Stut.
249, 251.
Pel. ii. 318,
320.

* "We persisted," says Savary, an eye-witness, "in penetrating into the checquer of squares which formed the enemy's line, when the extreme severity of the fire of grape and musketry obliged us to halt, and begin exchanging volleys with our antagonists under very disadvantageous circumstances. Every quarter of an hour which we passed in that position rendered our disadvantage greater. Our troops were all in mass or column, and could not deploy to return the fire with which they were assailed. From that moment it was easy to foresee, not only that the day could not have a favourable issue, but even that it would probably terminate in some disaster. They tried in vain to restore these disadvantages by charges of cuirassiers, which took place in several directions, but they had hardly pierced through the openings of the enemy's squares, when they were assailed by the Austrian horse, three times more numerous, and driven back upon our infantry." This was *before* the rupture of the bridges which is afterwards mentioned by the Duke of Rovigo.—See SAVARY, iv. 77.

column gave way, and the horsemen, grievously shattered by the terrible fire, were soon after charged by the enemy's reserve cavalry, under Lichtenstein, who came up with loud shouts from the rear, and driven back in disorder to their own infantry.

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LIV.
1809.

At this critical moment, Hohenzollern, perceiving a considerable opening on the right of the French line, occasioned by the unequal advance of some of their regiments, seized the favourable opportunity to dash in with Troluk's regiment, and occupy the space; it sustained itself there against all the attacks of the enemy, till the Archduke, who at once saw the importance of this movement, supported that gallant corps, when almost overwhelmed by fatigue and numbers, by six regiments of Hungarian grenadiers. These fresh troops pressed forward, intersecting the whole French line, overthrowing every thing which opposed them, and even reached the batteries in the rear, near Essling, where they were assailed by such a destructive fire from that village, that nothing but the presence of the Archduke, who hastened to the spot, enabled them to maintain their ground. At the same time, the want of ammunition began to be sensibly felt in the French army, especially by the artillery, the supplies of which were nearly exhausted by the incessant firing of two days; and accounts began to circulate, and soon spread like wildfire through the ranks, that the bridges were broken down, and all communication with the reserve posts, and two-thirds of Davoust's corps, still on the southern bank, cut off. In effect, at half past eight, the alarming intelligence reached the Emperor that the fire-ships and heavy barks laden with stones, sent down by the Archduke, had, with the swelling of the river, produced the desired effect,¹ and that a considerable

Success of
Hohenzol-
lern, and
rupture of
the bridges.

¹ Sav. iv.
77. Stut.
251, 255.
Jom. iii.
205, 206.
Pel. ii. 318,
320. Arch.
Charles'
Account.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 391,
392.

CHAP. part of the bridge over the main stream of the
LIV. Danube had been swept away.

1809.

The French
retire to
the island
of Lobau.

In this terrible moment Napoleon's courage did not forsake him. Grave and thoughtful, but collected, he allayed by the calmness of his manner the alarm of those around him, and immediately gave the necessary orders to suspend the attacks at all points, and fall back towards the island of Lobau. Before they could reach the columns in front, however, the advance was already arrested by the violence of the enemy's fire, and several battalions, melting away under the destructive storm, had already begun to recede, or stood in a state of hesitation, unable to go on, unwilling to retire. The Austrians, perceiving those symptoms of vacillation, resumed the offensive at all points, and forming two fresh columns of attack under Dedowich and Hohenlohe, made a sudden assault on Essling, which was carried, with the exception of the great granary, at the very moment that the French centre, slowly retiring, re-entered the narrow plain between that village and Aspern, from which they had issued in all the confidence of victory in the morning. This important success rendered the situation of Napoleon well-nigh desperate, and disorder was rapidly spreading through the ranks; for Aspern, in spite of the most heroic efforts of Massena and Le Grand, was in great part already lost, and the capture of the second village precluded almost entirely the possibility of a retreat to the river side. He made the utmost exertions, therefore, to regain it, and General Mouton, at the head of a brigade of the Imperial guard, being intrusted with the attack, advanced in double quick time, and drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Again the Austrians returned, and pushing up to the very

foot of the granary, fired, and thrust their bayonets into the loopholes from which the deadly fire issued which thinned their ranks. In the tumult, the upper part of the building took fire, but still the invincible French soldiers maintained themselves in the lower stories, amidst the roar of musketry, and the crash of burning rafters. Five times did the Hungarian grenadiers rush up to the flaming walls, and five times were they repulsed by the unconquerable firmness of the old guard. At length, Rosenberg, finding that the enemy was resolved to maintain himself in that post at all hazards, and that the combat there was constantly fed by fresh reinforcements of the flower of the French army, drew off his troops; and desisting from all further attack on the village, confined himself to an incessant fire of grape and round shot upon the French columns, which, now in full retreat, were massed together in such extraordinary numbers at the entrance of the bridges leading to Lobau, that every shot told with fatal effect on men or horses.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Nap. in
Month. ii.
77, 79.
Sav. iv.
78, 79.
Pel. ii. 318,
325, 326.
Stut. 260,
268. Arch.
Charles.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 392,
393.

Anxious to crown his glorious efforts by a decisive attack, the Archduke now brought forward his last reserves of Hungarian grenadiers, and, putting himself at their head, advanced with an intrepid step against the retreating French columns, while the whole artillery, rapidly advancing in front and rear, contracting into a semicircle round the diminished host, kept up an incessant and destructive fire. The most vivid disquietude seized the French generals when they beheld their wearied bands assailed by fresh troops, which seemed to spring up from the earth at the conclusion of this fight of giants. But Lannes arranged his best men in the rear of the columns, and supporting them by the infantry and

Last attack
of the Aus-
trians, and
fall of Mar-
shal Lannes.

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

cuirassiers whom Napoleon sent up to his assistance, prepared to resist the attack; while Massena, on his side, sometimes on foot, sometimes on horseback, with his sword in his hand and fire in his countenance, seemed to multiply as necessity required his presence. Reserving their fire to the last moment, the French veterans, when the Hungarians were within pistol shot, poured in so close and destructive a volley, that the advance of the enemy was checked, and a close combat with fire-arms commenced. At that moment, Lannes, who had dismounted from his horse to avoid the dreadful fire of the artillery, which swept off every thing above the heads of the soldiers, was struck by a cannon ball, which carried away both his legs. As Napoleon was engaged in the island of Lobau in directing the position of some batteries to protect the passage into that island from the field of battle, he saw a litter approaching, on which, when it came up, he beheld the heroic marshal, his early companion in arms in Italy, extended in the agonies of death. Lannes seized his hand, and said, with a voice tremulous only from loss of blood—"Adieu, Sire! Live for the world; but bestow a few thoughts on one of your best friends, who in a few hours will be no more." On his knees, beside the rude couch of the dying hero, Napoleon wept: "Lannes, do you not know me: it is the Emperor—it is Buonaparte, your friend—you will yet be preserved to us." "I would wish to live," replied Lannes, "to serve you and my country; but in an hour I will be no more." Napoleon was deeply affected; he had never before evinced such emotion. "Nothing," said he to Massena, "but so terrible a stroke could have withdrawn me for a moment from the care of the army." Shortly after,

Lannes was relieved from his sufferings by a faint, which, after some days, terminated in death. St Hilaire, at the same time, was brought in mortally wounded.* It was time that this terrible carnage should cease : the generals and superior officers were in great part struck down ; the artillery horses were almost all killed, and the guns drawn by the foot soldiers ; the infantry and cannon had exhausted almost all their ammunition ; the cavalry were already all withdrawn into the island of Lobau ; but still the rear-guard, with unconquerable resolution, maintained the combat. The Austrians were nearly as much exhausted as their opponents ; and, desisting from all further attacks, maintained only a tremendous fire from all the batteries till midnight, when, the last of the enemy having withdrawn from the field of battle into the island, exhausted by fatigue, the artillerymen sunk into sleep beside their guns.¹

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

¹ Pel. ii.
326, 327,
338. Sav.
iv. 79, 80.
Thib. vii.
289, 290.
Stut. 272,
281. Nap.
in Month.
ii. 78, 79.

Such was the famous battle of Aspern, the most glorious in the Austrian annals—for ever memorable

* These officers were among the most esteemed of all Napoleon's generals :—" ' Lannes,' said he, ' was wise, prudent, and withal audacious, gifted with imperturbable *sang froid* in presence of the enemy. He had received little education ; all his qualities were derived from nature.' Napoleon, who witnessed from his outset in the Italian campaigns, the extension of his understanding, often remarked it with surprise. He was superior to all the French generals on the field of battle, in directing the movements of twenty-five thousand infantry. He was still young when he had thus risen to perfection ; perhaps he would have ultimately risen to the same eminence in strategy, which he did not as yet comprehend. St Hilaire was remarkable, ever since the battle of Castiglione in 1796, by his chivalrous character ; he was a good brother and parent, and was devoted to the Emperor ever since the siege of Toulon. He was called, in the army, the chevalier without fear and without reproach. Napoleon shed bitter tears at his death and that of Lannes. They would not have been wanting in constancy in misfortune, nor have been faithless to the glory of France."—NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON, ii. 83, 84.

CHAP.
LIV.

1819.

Results of
the battle,
and loss on
both sides.

in the annals of military fame. It was the first great action in which Napoleon had been defeated; for at Eylau, though, as the event ultimately proved, he had been worsted, yet, in the first instance, he remained master of the field of battle. The loss on both sides was enormous, but that of the French was much greater than that of their opponents, owing to their decided inferiority in numbers, and especially artillery, on the first day, and the tremendous effect of the concentric fire of three hundred pieces of cannon on the second, upon the dense columns of attack, whom the narrow extent of the ground, the awful cannonade, and obstinate resistance of the Imperial squares, prevented from deploying into line. Eighty-seven superior officers and four thousand two hundred privates were killed, besides sixteen thousand three hundred wounded on the side of the Imperialists: a loss which, how great soever, the Archduke, with true German honesty, had the magnanimity at once to admit in his official account of the battle. The French lost above thirty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were buried by the Austrians on the field; a few guns and some hundred prisoners were taken on both sides: five thousand wounded fell into the hands of the Imperialists. For several days after the battle, the Austrians were constantly occupied in burying the dead; innumerable corpses were found in the smaller channels of the Danube; the waters even of that mighty stream were for some days poisoned by the multitude of slain which encumbered its banks, and a pestilential air was wafted down the theatre of death.¹ *

¹ Archduke Charles.
Ann. Reg. 1809.
Chron. 394.
Pel. ii. 358.
Thib. vii. 295.

* The tenth bulletin acknowledged a loss daily of fifteen hundred killed and three thousand wounded; a list of casualties so obviously disproportioned to the magnitude and obstinacy of the conflict, as to excite the ridicule of all Europe. Subsequently Napoleon admitted he had four

Driven back with all his army into an island in the Danube, after sustaining this frightful loss, the French Emperor, at ten at night, hastily called a council of war on the margin of the river. Seated under a tree which overhung the stream, Napoleon beheld the great bridge in the central channel entirely swept away, and the lesser one of pontoons to the intermediate island of Reduit also in ruins. Retreat to the southern bank from the island of Lobau was evidently impossible ; for the Danube, which had risen fourteen feet during the three preceding days, from the melting of the snows in the Alps of Tyrol, was rolling impetuously in a raging flood, which had carried down every boat in the main channel, overflowed the whole low grounds in the island, and rendered even the narrow branch which separated them from the Marchfield, usually only a few feet deep, a rapid and dangerous torrent. Never was an army assembled under more disastrous circumstances than the French on that memorable night. To the deep roar of artillery, the shouts of the combatants, and the incessant clang of musketry, had succeeded a silence yet more awful, interrupted only by the

CHAP.
LIV.

1809.

Deplorable
situation of
the French
army in the
island of
Lobau, on
the night of
the 22d.

thousand killed, which would imply a total loss of above twenty thousand. The Austrian official account, which derives credit from the candour with which it admitted their own casualties, estimates the French loss at thirty-six thousand, on the authentic grounds that seven thousand French were buried on the field of battle, and twenty-nine thousand seven hundred and seventy-three wounded were carried to the hospitals at Vienna. The experience of the British in the Peninsular war, especially at Talavera and Albuera, warrants the assertion that two armies of from sixty thousand to eighty thousand on each side, could not combat in so obstinate a manner for two days under the fire of five hundred pieces of cannon, all crossing each other, without a loss of above twenty thousand to the victorious and superior, and thirty thousand to the vanquished and weaker party.—See *10th Bulletin* ; *Moniteur*, June 6, 1809 ; ARCHDUKE CHARLES' *Official Account* ; *Ann. Reg.* 1809, 394 ; *App. to Chronicle* ; THIBAUDEAU, vii. 295.

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1809.

¹ Sav. ii.
81. Pel. ii.
337, 339.

Council of
war in the
island of
Lobau, in
which it is
resolved by
Napoleon to
maintain
himself in
that island.

challenges of the sentinels, as they paced their melancholy rounds, or the groans of the wounded, who, without covering or shelter of any kind, lay scattered on the humid surface. Above twenty thousand brave men were there, weltering in their blood, or murmuring in their last moments a prayer for their mother, their children, their country. Gloom had seized on every mind, despair had penetrated the bravest hearts. It was universally known that the artillery ammunition was exhausted, and the communication with the southern bank cut off; and it was difficult to see how an attack from the enemy, on the succeeding day, could be resisted with any prospect of success. Nearly half the combatants had fallen: every one, even though unhurt himself, had to deplore the death of a friend, a comrade, a benefactor. Provisions there were none in the island; succour for the wounded, burial for the dead, were alike beyond the strength of the wearied survivors. A few were still buoyant with hope, and protesting they had not been defeated, vociferously demanded a renewal of the combat on the morrow; but the great majority, in gloomy silence, mused upon their fate, and not a few openly murmured against the chief, whose imprudence and obstinacy had brought them into a situation where victory was hopeless and retreat impossible.¹

The influence of these gloomy feelings strongly appeared in the opinions of the chiefs who attended Napoleon at his council of war on the banks of the island of Lobau. The bravest marshals of the army, Massena, Davoust, Berthier, Oudinot, were there; but they unanimously and strongly expressed the opinion that it was necessary to retire entirely to the right bank of the river. Napoleon heard them all, and then observed: "But, gentlemen, when you

advise me to withdraw across the river, it is the same thing as desiring me to retreat to Strasburg. We can no longer cross but in boats, and that is to say, it is nearly impracticable, and could not be effected without abandoning the wounded, the artillery, the horses, which would entirely disorganise the army. Shall we abandon the wounded? Shall twenty thousand brave men add to the trophies of the enemy? Shall we thus openly proclaim, in the face of Europe, that we have been vanquished? If we repass the Danube, the enemy will instantly do the same, and then we shall never find rest till we are under the cannon of Strasburg. Is it on the Traun, the Inn, or the Lech, that we can make a stand? No, we shall speedily be driven behind the Rhine, and all the allies whom victory has given us, will at once pass over to the enemy. Shall we add to the losses of these two days that of the men who are now dispersed among the woods of these islands? If I retire to Vienna, the Archduke will pass the Danube at Lintz, and I shall be under the necessity of marching to meet him, and sacrificing twenty thousand more in the hospitals, one half of whom, if I remain here, will rejoin their standards in a month. In a few days Eugene will descend from the Alps of Styria; the half of Lefebvre's corps will be disposable from the Tyrol; and even if the enemy, by passing at Lintz, should menace our existing retreat, we will have a clear route open into Italy, where, with eight corps assembled,* we shall speedily regain our ascendancy. We must therefore remain at Lobau: you, Massena, will complete what you have so glo-

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1809.

* Viz. Eugene, Marmont, Macdonald, Lefebvre, Bernadotte, Davoust, Oudinot, Massena, beside the guard and reserve; in all, notwithstanding their losses, a hundred and forty thousand men.—JOMINI, iii. 213.

CHAP. riously begun ; you can alone restrain the Archduke,
 LIV. and prevent his advancing, during the few days which
 1809. are necessary to re-establish our communications."

The marshals, struck by the justice as well as fortitude of these remarks, all assented to the Emperor's opinions ; and it was resolved to defend the isle of Lobau to the last extremity. The whole engineers and sappers in the island were immediately embarked for the right bank, and at midnight the Emperor committed himself to a frail bark with Berthier and Savary, and was ferried across the roaring flood to Ebersdorf. He leant on Savary's arm in passing from the bark to the village ; but though his mind laboured, he was not agitated. Exhausted by fatigue, he threw himself on some straw, and took a few hours' sleep ; but shortly after daybreak he was again on horseback, actively organising the transmission of provisions to the troops in the island, and preparing the means of re-establishing the bridges.¹*

¹ Sav. iv.
81, 83.
Pel. ii. 330,
333. Jom.
iii. 213.

Reflections
on the con-
duct of Na-
poleon in
the battle of
Aspern.

² See Nap.
in Month.
ii. 71, 83.
Pelet, ii.
358, 364.
Jom. iii.
217, 220.

The conduct of Napoleon in provoking an engagement with inferior forces in so hazardous a situation as the Marchfield, with a single and insecure bridge in his rear, has been the subject of keen discussion by the French military writers ; and three of the most distinguished of them have undertaken its defence, and pleaded it with all their wonted ability.² But there are some questions so plain, that in discussing them the strength of a child is equal to that of a giant ; and if Napoleon, Cæsar, and Hannibal, were to concur in justifying that extraordinary step, they would fail in producing any impression upon the common sense of mankind. The military is not, any more than politics, at least in its leading prin-

* See note B.

ciple, an abstruse art ; whatever directs the proceedings of large masses of mankind must be founded on maxims obvious to every capacity. Napoleon himself has told us that the leading object in strategy is, with a force inferior upon the whole, to be always superior at the point of attack ; and that the greatest fault a commander can commit is to fight with no other retreat than by a narrow defile. His main charge against the generalship of Wellington is founded upon the fact of his having fought at Waterloo with a single highway traversing the forest of Soignies in his rear.* Judging by these principles, which are recommended not less by the weight of his authority than their intrinsic justice and sense, what are we to say to the general who, though inferior by twenty thousand men upon the whole to his adversary, on the first day, according to his own account of the matter, exposed thirty-five thousand men† to a hopeless contest with eighty thousand ; and, on the second, precipitated seventy thousand, in close columns, against a semicircle of batteries containing three hundred guns, every shot from which fell with the certainty of destruction upon their crowded ranks, and that, too, when a vast river, traversed only by a tottering bridge, connected the troops in advance with the reserve of the army, and served as the only possible retreat to either in case of disaster ? It is in vain that his defenders argue that eight divisions on the field of battle, with four under Davoust on the right bank, were equal to any force the Austrians could bring against them.

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1809.

* "The position of Mount St John," said Napoleon, "was *ill-chosen*. The first requisite of a field of battle is to have no defiles in its rear. The injudicious choice of the field of battle rendered to the English army all retreat impossible."—*Ninth Book of Memoirs of NAPOLEON*, 207.

† See note C.

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Granted, provided always the communication between them was secure: but what is to be said to hazarding two-thirds of the army on the left bank, when a narrow bridge, a mile in length, shaking under the flood, separated that portion from the remaining third on the other bank? Napoleon has himself told us that "*twice*, on the 21st, the bridges were carried away by the flood, and that the Austrian boats were already dashing against the pontoons. At midnight the Danube rose in the most frightful manner, and the passage was a third time interrupted, and not restored till next morning, when the guard and Oudinot's corps commenced their passage." ¹ What temerity, then, in such circumstances, to hazard a decisive action on the day following with the whole Austrian army, and precipitate Lannes into the centre of their batteries, early in the morning, before either the bulk of Davoust's corps or the reserve parks of ammunition had crossed the perilous passage!

¹ Nap. in
Month. ii.
77.

Observa-
tions on the
French me-
thod of
attacking in
columns.

Nor is this all; the result of the battle of Aspern clearly demonstrates, that the method of attacking in column in a narrow field, and against a brave enemy, is essentially defective; and that the prodigious loss sustained by Napoleon was owing to his persisting in it under circumstances where it had obviously become inexpedient. The observations of a distinguished French military writer on this subject are convincing and unanswerable. "The battle of Essling was lost," says General Rogniat, "in consequence of our having attacked in *column* the centre of the Austrian line. That centre skilfully gave ground as the French columns of Lannes and Oudinot advanced, while their wings insensibly approached our flanks. By means of that skilful

manœuvre we soon found ourselves in the centre of a semicircle of artillery and musketry, the whole fire of which converged on our unhappy columns. Cannon-balls, musket-shots, shells, grape, bombs, crossed each other in every line over our heads, and fell on our ranks like a hail-storm. Every thing was struck or overturned, and our leading columns were literally destroyed: in the end we were obliged to fall back and yield to that frightful tempest, till we again came abreast of Aspern and Essling, the bulwarks of our wings.”¹ It was by a system of tactics precisely similar that Hannibal crushed the Roman centre, and gained the battle of Cannæ. “Cuneus Gallorum ut pulsus æquavit frontem primum, deinde nitendo etiam sinum in medio dedit, Afri circa jam cornua fecerant, *irruentibusque incaute in medium Romanis, circumdedere alas*. Mox cornua extendendo, clausere et ab tergo hostes.”² The military art is in its fundamental principles the same in all ages: and it is highly interesting to see Hannibal’s triumph, and Napoleon’s defeat, arise, under the greatest possible difference of ground, arms, and contending nations, from the same simple and obvious cause.*

The Austrians, indeed, had not yet attained to the incomparable discipline and firmness which en-

* Napoleon saw these principles clearly, when judging of the conduct of other generals:—“Sempronius,” says he, “was conquered at the Trebia and Varro at Cannæ, though they commanded armies more numerous than Hannibal, because, in conformity with the Roman practice, they arranged their troops in a column of three lines, while Hannibal drew up his in a single line. The Carthaginian cavalry was superior in number and quality; the Roman legions were attacked in front, flank, and rear, and in consequence defeated. If the two consuls had adopted an order of battle more conformable to circumstances, they would probably have conquered.” What a luminous commentary on his own conduct and defeat at Aspern!—See NAPOLEON in MONTH. i. 282, *Melange*.

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1809.

¹Jom. Viede
Nap. iii.
201.

abled Wellington with British troops so often to repel with prodigious slaughter the French attack in column by a single line, three or four deep; but they did on this occasion, as well as at Wagram, successfully resist it by receiving the column in a chequer of squares; a disposition extremely similar to that adopted by the British commander at Waterloo, and which the Archduke then adopted for the first time, after having read a few weeks before the chapter on the principles of war, by General Jomini, where it was strenuously recommended.¹ The dreadful carnage sustained by the French troops in subsequent battles, especially at Albuera, Borodino, and Waterloo, were mainly owing to the same cause. Doubtless, the attack in column is most formidable, and it requires great firmness in a single line to resist a mass to which weight and numbers have given so much momentum; but its success depends entirely on the courage of the leading and flanking files; its concentrated ranks present an unerring mark for the enemy's fire, if they will only stand to deliver it; confusion is apt to arise in the centre from the losses sustained or witnessed by men not warmed by the heat of action, and if it is exposed to a concentric discharge, or meets with opponents as resolute as itself, it becomes liable to a bloody reverse. The same principle applies to breaking the line at sea: that system has done admirably with the French and Spaniards; but let the British admirals consider well before they adopt it in combating the Russians or Americans.

In truth, nothing can be more apparent than that, considered merely in a military point of view, the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to the battle of Aspern, was altogether inexcusable, and that

it was the peculiarity and hazard of his political situation, which made him persist in so perilous an undertaking. He has told us so himself—
 “At Aspern, at Jena, at Austerlitz, where I have been accused of acting rashly, I had no option: I was placed in the alternative of victory or ruin.” ¹ Las Cases, vi. 41; vii. 125.
 He felt that his situation, as head of a military republic, required continual excitement for its maintenance; that he must fascinate the minds of men by rapid and dazzling successes; and that the first pause in the career of victory was the commencement of ruin. Though in possession of the Austrian capital, military resources, and the finest provinces, he still felt that the war must not be protracted, and that to keep up his character for invincibility, he must cross the Danube, and finish the war by a clap of thunder. Undue contempt for the Austrian troops, or ignorance of the magnitude of the host which they had at hand, led him to hazard the engagement of the 21st, with a most unequal force; and having once engaged, however imprudently, in the contest, he felt that he must at all hazards carry it on, and, despite of an army divided by the Danube and a precarious retreat, fight for life or death in the plain of the Marchfield. It is the invariable characteristic of revolutionary power, whether political or military, to be perpetually exposed to this necessity, from the want of any lasting support in the interest and affection of the industrious classes of the people; and it is in the experience of that necessity, not any oblivion of the rules of the military art, that the true explanation and best vindication of Napoleon's conduct, both at Aspern, Moscow, and Dresden, is to be found.

The resolute stand made by the Austrians at As-

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1809.

Glorious
character of
the Austrian
resistance at
Aspern.

pern, is one of the most glorious instances of patriotic resistance which the history of the world exhibits. Driven back by an overwhelming force into the heart of the monarchy, with their fortresses taken, their arsenals pillaged, their armies defeated, they still continued the contest; boldly fronted the invader in the plenitude of his power; and, with unshaken resolution, advanced, alone and unsupported, to drive the conqueror of Europe from the capital he had subdued. Contrary to what has usually been experienced in similar cases, they showed the world that the fall of the metropolis did not necessarily draw after it the submission of the empire; but that a brave and patriotic people can find their capital in the general's headquarters, and reduce the invader to the extremity of peril, in consequence of the very success which he had deemed decisive of the contest. The British historian can hardly hope that similar resolution would have been displayed by the citizens of his own country; or that a battle of Waterloo would have been fought by the English after London and Woolwich had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Contrasting the heroic battles of Aspern and Wagram, after Vienna had fallen, with the unbounded terror inspired at Paris by the advance of the Duke of Brunswick to Valmy in 1792, a hundred and twenty miles from the capital, even when the people were in the highest state of democratic excitement, it is impossible to avoid the inference, that as much in the conduct of a nation, under such circumstances, depends on the national institutions as on the stage at which they have arrived in social advancement; and in the invincible tenacity and far-seeing sagacity of an aristocratic government is to be found the only guarantee, from the days of Cannæ to those

of Aspern, of such an unshaken resolution, under calamities generally considered as utterly destructive of political independence.

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1809.

Nor would this heroic constancy have failed in obtaining its appropriate reward, if the admirable directions of the Archduke Charles for the conduct of the campaign had been implicitly obeyed. It was the disobedience of his orders by the Archduke John, which deprived the Austrians of all the results of the battle of Aspern, and enabled Napoleon to extricate himself with success, from the most perilous situation in which he had yet been placed since ascending the consular throne. Had that prince obeyed the instructions which he received from the generalissimo on the 17th May, and marched direct from Carinthia to Lintz, he would, in conjunction with Kollowrath, who was in that neighbourhood some days before, have formed an imposing mass, at least sixty thousand strong, even on the 23d, to which Bernadotte, with his inefficient corps of Saxons, could have opposed no sort of resistance. Can there be a doubt that the concentration of such a force, directly in his rear, and on his principal line of communication, at the very moment when he was driven with a defeated army into the island of Lobau, would have compelled Napoleon to retreat; and that the battle of Aspern would have been the commencement of a series of disasters, which would speedily have brought the Imperial eagles back to the Rhine? The instantaneous effect which a similar concentration of force, from the north and the south at Borissow, produced on Napoleon at Moscow, three years afterwards, affords the clearest illustration, both of the importance of this movement, and the prodigious effects which it was fitted to have had, if properly executed, upon the

Disastrous
effects of
the Arch-
duke John's
disobedience
of orders.

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issue of the campaign. No hazard was incurred by such a direction, to part of the Imperial forces; for the Tyrol afforded a vast fortress, in which, aided by its gallant mountaineers, the detached corps, though separated from the main forces of the monarchy, might have long maintained themselves against all the efforts of the enemy. And it is impossible to estimate too highly the fortitude and talent of the illustrious general, who, when still reeking with the slaughter of a recent defeat, could conceive so admirable a plan for the circumvention of the enemy, and, undismayed by the fall of the capital, see in that catastrophe only the lure which was to seduce the invader to his ultimate ruin.

Immense
importance
of central
fortresses on
the defence
of nations.

From the important consequences which followed the occupation of Vienna, and the seizure of its immense military resources by the French, may be derived one conclusion of lasting value to every independent state. This is the incalculable importance of every metropolis either being adequately fortified, or possessing, in its immediate vicinity, a citadel of approved strength, capable of containing twenty or thirty thousand soldiers, and of serving as a place of secure deposit for the national archives, stores, wealth, and government, till the national strength can be fairly roused for their rescue. Had Austria possessed such a fortress, either in or near adjoining to Vienna, the invasions of 1805 and 1809 would have terminated in the invaders' ruin; had the heights of Belleville and Montmartre been strongly fortified, the invasions of 1814 and 1815 would have been attended with nothing but disaster to the allied armies. Had Berlin been of as great strength as Dantzic, the French armies, after the disaster of Jena, would have been detained round its walls till the Russian hosts ad-

vanced, and six years of bondage saved to the Prussian monarchy. Had the Kremlin been a citadel capable of holding out six weeks, the terrible sacrifice of Moscow would not have been required; had Vienna not been impregnable to the Mussulman arms, the monarchy would have sunk in the dust before the standards of Sobieski gleamed on the Bisamberg; had the lines of Torres Vedras not formed an impassable barrier to Massena, the germ of patriotic resistance in the Peninsula, would have been extinguished in the bud; had the walls of Rome not deterred the Carthaginian hero from a siege, the fortunes of the republic would have sunk after the disaster of Cannæ. It is by no means necessary for these important ends, that the whole metropolis should be confined by fortifications; it is enough that a citadel of great strength is at hand to contain all the warlike and civil resources of the kingdom.

Let no nation imagine that the magnitude of its resources relieves it from this necessity, or that the effulgence of its glory will secure it from ultimate danger: it was *after* the battle of Austerlitz that Napoleon first felt the necessity of fortifying Paris; it was in five short years afterwards that the bitter consequences of the national vanity, which prevented his design from being carried into effect, were experienced by the Parisians. England now slumbers secure under the shadow of Trafalgar and Waterloo; but let not her infatuated children suppose that they are for ever removed from the chances of disaster, or that the want of citadels to surround the vast arsenals of Woolwich, Chatham, and the Tower, will not, ere long, be bitterly felt either against foreign or domestic enemies. These ideas, indeed, are not popular with the present age, with whom foresight

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1809.

Infatuation
of England
in this
respect.

1 Nap. in
Month. ii.
278, 280.
Ante, v.
161, 162.

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1809.

is the least cultivated of national virtues, and in which the democratic character of the legislature has tinged the government with that disregard of remote consequences, which is the invariable characteristic of the masses of mankind ; and, doubtless, if any minister were now to propose the expenditure of one or two millions on such central fortifications, it would raise such a storm as would speedily prove fatal to the administration. It does by no means, however, follow from this circumstance, that it is not a measure which wisdom dictates and national security enjoins ; and in despair of effecting, at present at least, any change on public opinion on this particular, the historian has only to bequeath this counsel, as Bacon did his reputation, to the generation after the next, and mark these words, if they should live so long, for the judgment of the world at the expiration of two centuries.

CHAPTER LV.

WAR IN TYROL, NORTHERN GERMANY, AND POLAND.

ARGUMENT.

Extraordinary interest of the Tyrolese War—Description of Tyrol—Opposite Character of the Northern and Southern Sides of the Mountains—Description of the great Valleys and Rivers of the Country—Castles of Tyrol—Superstitions of the Country—Their Religious Feelings and Impressions—Omens which were observed on the approach of the War—Powerful Religious Feelings of the People—Practical Utility of the Priests—Remarkable difference in this respect of ancient and modern times—Influence of Religion in producing it—National Character of the Swiss compared with that of the Tyrolese—Love of Freedom which animates the People—Their Character and Manners—Practical Freedom which the People have always enjoyed under the Austrian government—The Peasants are all owners of their land—Its great Influence on their Character—Astonishing Industry of the People—Discontent of the Inhabitants under the Bavarian government—Preparations of Austria to take advantage of these discontents—Military description of the Country—Character of Hofer—Of Spechbacher—Of Joseph Haspinger—Of Martin Teimer—Brave preparations of the People for the Contest—Insurrection in Tyrol—Its early and complete Success—Successes in the Pustertal—Defeat of the Bavarians at Sterzing Moos by Hofer—Capture of Innsbruck by the Peasants of the Upper Innthal—Striking incidents which occurred on its Capture—Arrival, Defeat, and Surrender of Bisson's division from Sterzing—Capture of Hall by Spechbacher—Result of these Successes—Entire deliverance of the Tyrol—Measures of Napoleon and Chastellar in the Country—Actions in the Southern Tyrol, which is evacuated by the French—Combats at Feuer Singer and Worgl—Innsbruck is retaken by the Bavarians—Desperate State of Affairs in Tyrol and Firmness of the Peasantry—Preparations for the Battle of Innsbruck—Battle there, and total Defeat of the Bavarians—Bloody Actions of Spechbacher and Haspinger—Results of these Actions, and the entire deliverance of the Tyrol—Rise of the Insurrection in the North of Germany—Its first outbreak on the approach of the Austrian Grand Army—Enterprise and early Success of Schill—Fails in his attempt on Magdeburg—Retires to Stralsund—His prospects there—He is defeated and killed—Movement of the Duke of Brunswick—Operations in Poland, and their object, by the Archduke Ferdinand—Forces of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to oppose him—Success of Ferdinand and Fall of Warsaw—Skilful Measures of Poniatowsky to prolong the contest in the Grand Duchy—Discovery of the secret leaning of the Russians towards Austria—Secret Negotiation between Austria and Prussia—Particulars of its Progress—The exorbitant demands of Prussia cause it to fail—Operations in Italy, and Diversion from Sicily, and in the North of Europe—Situation and prospects of Napoleon after the Battle of Aspern—Duke of Brunswick takes Dresden, and threatens all the North of Germany.

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LV.

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Extraordi-
nary interest
of the
Tyrolese
war.

IT is neither on the greatest fields of battle, nor places where the most calamitous bloodshed has taken place, that the recollection of future ages is chiefly rivetted. The vast theatres of Asiatic conflict are forgotten; the slaughtered myriads of Timour and Genghis Khan lie in undistinguished graves; hardly a pilgrim visits the scenes where, on the fields of Chalons and Tours, the destinies of civilisation and Christendom were fixed by the skill of Aetius or the valour of Charles Martel. It is moral grandeur which produces a durable impression; it is patriotic heroism which permanently attracts the admiration of mankind. The pass of Thermopylæ, the graves of Marathon, will warm the hearts of men through every succeeding age: the chapel of Tell, the field of Morgarten, still attract the generous and brave from every civilized state: the name of Wallace, the plain of Bannockburn, have rendered Scottish story immortal in the annals of the world. The time may come when the vast and desolating wars of the French Revolution are dimmed by the obscurity of revolving years; when the great name of Napoleon is recollected only as a shadow of ancient days, and the fields of his fame are buried in the waves of succeeding change; but even then, the siege of Saragossa will stand forth, in undecaying lustre, amidst the wreck of ages; and the war in Tyrol, the strife of La Vendee, survive unshaken above the floods of time.

Description
of Tyrol.

The country now immortalized under the name of Tyrol, the land of Hofer and Spechbacher, lies on the southern frontier of Germany, and is composed of the mountains which, stretching eastward from the Alps of Switzerland, are interposed between the Bavarian plains and the fields of Italy. Less ele-

vated than those of the Helvetian cantons, without the awful sublimity of the Alps of the Oberland, those of Tyrol are still more romantic, from the wild and savage character which they in general bear, and the matchless beauty of the narrow valleys, or rather clefts, which are interspersed around their feet. Their summits, though sometimes little inferior to the Jungfrau or Titlis,* are more rugged than those of Switzerland, from being, in general, somewhat lower, and in consequence less charged with snow, and exhibiting their various strata, ravines, and peaks, in more undisguised grandeur than where a silver mantle has been for ever thrown over the higher regions. The general level of the country is less elevated than the central parts of Helvetia, and hence it is often more beautiful: the pine and larch do not appear in such monotonous masses; but noble forests of beech and oak clothe the mountain sides to a greater height than any hills in Britain, and a dark zone of pine separates their brilliant hues from the grey piles of rock, or snow-besprinkled peaks which repose in undisturbed serenity on the azure firmament.¹

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LV.

1809.

¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Malte
Brun, vii.
510, 511.
Inglis' Ty-
rol, i. 241.

The northern and southern slopes of the Alps exhibit here, as elsewhere on the sides of the great stony girdle of the globe, the same remarkable difference in the productions of nature, the character of the landscape and the disposition of the human species. To the north of the central chain of the Brenner, every thing wears a frigid aspect; vast forests of pine and fir clothe the middle regions of the mountains;

Opposite
character of
the north-
ern and
southern
sides of the
Mountains.

* The gross Glochner is 12,400, and Orteler-Pitz 14,500 feet high: those on the frontiers of Salzburg of little less elevation.—MALTE BRUN, vii. 511; and INGLIS' *Tyrol*, ii. 250.

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1809.

naked rock or masses of snow compose their highest peaks ; extensive pastures afford nourishment to numerous flocks and herds ; barley and oats constitute the principal food of the inhabitants, and Indian corn is cultivated only in the rich and sheltered vale of the Inn. The inhabitants, like all those of Germanic descent, are brave, impetuous, and honest ; tenacious of custom, fearless of danger, addicted to intemperance. But to the south of the range these rigid features insensibly melt away under the increasing warmth of a more genial climate ; maize and wheat are reared with assiduous care in the few level spots which are interspersed among the rocks ; walnut and cherry-trees next give token of the approach of a milder atmosphere ; beech and sweet chesnut succeed to the sable pine in the woody region above ; the vine and the mulberry are found in the sheltered bosoms of the valleys ; and at length the olive and the pomegranate nestle in the sunny nooks, where, on the margin of the lake of Garda, the blasts of winter are averted by a leafy skreen of almost perpetual verdure. But, if the gifts of nature improve as the traveller descends to the plains of Lombardy, the character of man declines ; with the sweet accents of the Italian tongue, the vices of civilisation, the craft of the south, have sensibly spread : the cities are more opulent, the churches more costly, the edifices more sumptuous ; but the native virtues of the German population are no longer conspicuous ; the love of freedom, the obligation of truth, the sanctity of an oath, are more faintly discerned ; iron bars on the windows of the poor, tell but too clearly, that the fearless security of general virtue is no longer felt, and the multiplication of criminals and police,¹

¹ Inglis' Tyrol, ii. 240, 290. Personal Observation.

bespeak at once the vices and necessities of a corrupted society.¹ *

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Switzerland contains some spacious and fertile plains; and extensive lakes diversify the generally rugged aspect of nature; but the Tyrol is a country of mountains, intersected only by a few long and spacious valleys. Of these, those of the Inn, the Eisach, the Adige, and the Pusterthal, are the most considerable. The first is formed by the river Inn, which, rising on the eastern slope of the mountains of Grisons, flows nearly a hundred miles almost in a straight line, in a north-easterly direction, and under the successive names of the Engadine, the Upper and the Lower Inn. That extends from Funsterminz on the frontiers of Switzerland to Kufstein at the opening of the Bavarian plains. It is at first a cold and desolate pastoral glen, gradually opening into a cultivated vale, shut in by pine-clad hills, of savage character, and for the last fifty miles, expands into a spacious valley, varying from two to six miles in breadth, whose fertile bottom, perfectly flat, shut in on either side by precipitous mountains, seven or eight thousand feet in height, is adorned with numerous villages, churches, and towns, and maintains a dense and industrious population. The valley of the Eisach, formed by the confluence, at Brixen, of the torrents which descend from the snowy summits of the Brenner and the Grosse Terner on the one side, and the mountains of the Pusterthal on the other, descends beside an impetuous stream, through the narrow passes and chesnut-clad steeps

Description
of the great
valleys and
rivers of
Tyrol.

* Out of eighty prisoners in Innspruck jail in 1832, fifty-five were from the Italian Tyrol, though its population is only one hundred and sixty-three thousand, while that of the German portion is five hundred and ninety-eight thousand.—INGLIS' *Tyrol*, i. 185; and MALTE BRUN, vii. 550.

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between Brixen and Bolsano, and is lost, at the latter place, in the larger valley of the Adige, which, stretching out to the south in a wide expanse between piles of fir-clad mountains to Trent and Roveredo, gradually warms under the Italian sun, till, after passing the frightful gorge of the Italian Chinsa, it opens into the smiling hills and vine-clad slopes of Verona.* The valley of the Etch; or Adige, descending from the cold and shivering Alps of Glarus, widens into the Passeyrthal, the original seat of the counts of Tyrol, still containing their venerable castle, and which has been immortalized by the birth-place of Hofer. It is distinguished by an awful rapid, which, more nearly than any thing in Europe, resembles those of the great American rivers, equalling even the fall of Schaffhausen in sublimity and terror;†

* This noble scene, one of the most striking gorges in the Alps, has been immortalized in the lines of Dante.

Era lo loco ove a scinder la riva,
Venimmo, Alpestro, e per quel ch'iv'er anco
Tal ch'ogni vista ne sarebbe schiva.
Qual 'e quella ruina che nel franco.
Di qua da Trento, l'Adice pereosse,
O per tremuoto o per sostegno manco;
Che da cima del monte, onde se mosse,
Al piano e si la roccia discosesa
Ch' alcuna via darebbe a che su fosse."

DANTE, *Inferno*, Canto xii.

† This remarkable rapid, the only one which conveys to an European traveller an idea of this striking feature of Transatlantic scenery, is thus described with graphic power and perfect fidelity by a distinguished traveller now unfortunately no more:—"At this spot the river Adige presents one of the most magnificent spectacles that are to be met with in Europe—a rapid, almost a cataract, nearly a mile in length—one continued sheet of foam, rushing with a deafening noise and resistless force between green pastoral banks more resembling the shores of a gentle lake than of a cataract. There is no fall of water in Switzerland that will bear a comparison with this; it is not, indeed, strictly a cataract, but a waterfall of the most stupendous and imposing kind, more striking, even, than the celebrated falls of Schaffhausen."—INGLIS' *Tyrol*, ii. 240. On a miniature scale, the falls of Kilmorag, beyond Inverness, somewhat resemble these sublime rapids.—*Personal Observation*.

after descending this foaming declivity, and forcing its way through stupendous rocks, the Adige joins the vale of the Eisach at Bolsano. These are the principal valleys of Tyrol; but the upper parts of several others belong to the same country; in particular, those of the Drave, the Salza, and the Brenta, the two first of which, descending from opposite sides of the Gross Glochner, find their way into the open country through long defiles of matchless beauty; the former, after washing the battlements of Klagenfurt, to the Hungarian plains; the latter, beneath the towers of Salzburg, to the waters of the Danube; while the Brenta, after struggling through the narrow clefts and romantic peaks of the Val Susana, emerges in still serenity into the Italian fields under the mouldering walls of Bassano.¹

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¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Inglis'
Tyrol, i.
289, 290.
Malte Bruu,
vii. 511.

With the exception of the Grisons, Switzerland contains few ruined castles; the moral earthquake which five centuries ago overthrew the feudal power of Austria in the forest cantons, cast down, in its subsequent shocks, the authority of the barons in its simple valleys. But the case is otherwise in Tyrol. Though enjoying, practically speaking, popular privileges of the most extensive kind, and yielding in no respect to the descendants of Tell in the ardent love of freedom, the Tyrolese have never gone so far as to expel the great proprietors; and, though few of them are still resident in the country, the remains of their immense castles constitute one of its most peculiar and characteristic features. In every valley they are to be seen, rising in imposing majesty on wooded heights, perched on crags overhanging the floods, or resting on cliffs to all appearance inaccessible to human approach. The effect of these venerable and mouldering remains, surmounting the beautiful

Castles of
Tyrol.

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¹ Personal
Observa-
tion.

Supersti-
tions of the
country.

woods, and throwing an air of Gothic interest over the wildest ranges of the mountains, is inexpressibly charming; and they go far to compensate the absence of lakes, which are alone wanting to render the scenery of this country the most enchanting in Europe.* Almost all of these castles have their legends or romantic incidents, many of them connected with the Holy Wars, which are fondly dwelt on by the inhabitants; in several, the weapons and armour of the heroes of the crusades are still preserved; and the traveller, in treading their long-deserted halls, feels himself suddenly transported to the age of Godfrey of Bouillon, or Richard of England, and all the pomp and interest of chivalrous exploits.¹†

In every part of the world, mountainous regions have been the nursery of superstitious feeling. The greatest works of man there appear as nothing compared to the magnificence of nature, and the individual is left, in solitude, to receive the impressions which the sublime scenery in which he is placed is

* Tyrol proper has no lakes, though the adjoining countries of Styria, Salzburg, and Bavaria have several. Two most beautiful ones, the Kochel-see and Walchen-see, adjoin the great road from Munich to Innspruck, and give token to the enraptured traveller of his approach to the mountain region. The first, which much resembles, though on a grander and more perfect scale, Loch Katrine in Scotland, is described by an author who has transferred into romance the hues and colouring of nature, Mr JAMES in *Attila*, vol. ii. 374.

† Eight-and-twenty colossal bronze statues of princes and paladins of the dark ages, in armour, stand around the tomb of Maximilian I. in the Church of Holycross in Innspruck, and the effect of the group is extremely impressive; though hardly equal to that of the simple tomb of Hofer, which it also contains, whose remains were brought there from his grave at Mantua in 1823. The castle of Ambras, near Innspruck, formerly contained an unique collection of ancient armour, which, when the author visited it in 1816, was one of the most interesting spectacles in Europe; but the greater part of these precious remains have now been removed to the Imperial museum at Vienna.—See INGLIS' *Tyrol*, i. 200, 219; and EUSTACE'S *Italy*, i. 91.

fitted to produce. Upon minds so circumstanced, the changes of external nature come to be considered as the immediate work of some invisible power; the shadows that fall on the lakes at sunrise are interpreted as the approach of hostile bands; the howl of the wind through the forests is thought to be the lamentations of the dead, who are expiating their sins; and the mists that flit over the summits of the mountains seem to be the distant skirts of vast armies, borne on the whirlwind and treading on the storm. The influence of these feelings is strongly felt in Tyrol; and the savage mountains or ruined castles with which it abounds have become peopled with the phantoms of a romantic superstition. Lights are said to have been often observed at night in towers which have been uninhabited for centuries, and bloody figures distinctly seen to flit through their deserted halls. The armour which still hangs on the walls in many of the greater castles has been observed to move, and the plumes to wave, when the Tyrolese arms were victorious in war. Groans, they affirm, are still heard in the neighbourhood of the dungeons, where the victims of feudal tyranny were formally sacrificed; and the cruel baron, who persecuted his people in his savage passion for the chase, is often heard to shriek in the forests of the Unterberg,* and to howl as he flies from the dogs whom he had trained to the scent of human blood.¹

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1809.

¹ Barth.
Krieg von
1809. Per-
sonal infor-
mation.
Gesch.
And. Hofer,
32, 36.

Superstitions, too, of a gentler and more holy kind, have arisen from the devout feelings of the people, and the associations connected with particular spots, where persons of extraordinary sanctity have dwelt. In many of the farthest recesses of the mountains, on

Their reli-
gious feel-
ings and
impress-
ions.

* A romantic mountain, six miles from Salzburg, at the entrance of the beautiful valley of Berchtolsgadden.

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the verge of perpetual desolation, hermits in former times had fixed their abode; and the imagination of the peasant still fancies that their spirits hover around the spots where their earthly trials were endured. Shepherds, who have passed in the gloom of the evening by the cell where the bones of a saint are laid, relate that they distinctly heard his voice, as he repeated his vesper prayers, and saw his form, as he knelt before the crucifix which the piety of succeeding ages had erected in his hermitage. The image of many a patron saint has been seen to shed tears when a reverse has happened to the Tyrolese arms; and the garlands which are hung round the crosses of the Virgin wither when the hand which raised them has fallen in battle. Peasants who have been driven by a storm to take shelter in the little chapels which are scattered over the country, have seen the crucifix bow its head, and solemn music is heard at vespers in the higher places of worship of the mountains. The distant pealing of the organ, and the chant of innumerable voices, are there distinctly heard; and the peasant, when returning at night from the chase, often trembles when he beholds funeral processions clothed in white, marching in silence through the gloom of the forests, or slowly moving on the clouds that float over the summits of the mountains.¹

¹ Barth. Krieg von 1809, 382, 394. Personal information.

Omens which were observed on the approach of the war.

It may easily be imagined how strongly these feelings were excited by the approach of the war of deliverance in 1809. The emissaries of Austria had long before prepared the people for revolt; foreign oppression had led them to desire it with passionate ardour; unknown to Bavaria, the whole population were impatiently expecting the signal to rise. During this period of anxious expectation, the excited

minds of the people clothed the air with an unusual number of imaginary appearances. In the gloom of the evening, endless files of visionary soldiers, clad in the Austrian uniform, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, were seen to traverse the mountain tops. The creaking of the wheels, the tramp of the horses, the heavy tread of marching columns, intermingled with wild bursts of laughter and shouts of triumph, were distinctly heard; but all was hushed, and the spectres melted into mist and vapour, when the anxiety of the spectators inclined them to approach too nearly. The Tyrolese, nay, the Bavarian sentinels themselves, often beheld the Emperor's tower in the fortress of Kufstein surrounded with lambent fire; and the Austrian banners, wrapt in flames, were seen to wave at night over the towers of Sterzing. Withered arms were seen to stretch themselves from the rocks in the most secluded recesses of the mountains; vast armies of visionary soldiers, with banners flying, and all the splendour of military triumph, were seen at sunrise reflected in the lakes which lay on the Salzburg and Bavarian frontiers; and when the widows and orphans of the fallen warriors knelt before the Virgin, the flowers and garlands placed round the image, according to the amiable custom of Catholic countries, and which had remained there till they had withered, burst forth in renovated beauty, and spread their fragrance around the altar, as if to mark the joy of the dead for the approaching deliverance of their country.¹

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1809.

¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Barth.
Krieg von
1809, 474,
482. Gesch.
And. Hofer,
17, 32.

The most remarkable feature in the national character of the Tyrolese is their uniform piety: a principle which is nowhere more universally diffused than in their sequestered valleys. The most cursory view of the country is sufficient to demonstrate the

a Powerful
religious
feelings of
the people.

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strong hold which religion has taken of the minds of the peasantry. Chapels are built almost at every half mile, on the principal roads, in which the traveller may perform his devotions, or which may awaken his thoughts to a recollection of his spiritual duties. The rude efforts of art there have been exerted to portray the events of our Saviour's life, and innumerable figures, carved in wood, attest in every part of the country, both the barbarous taste of the people and the fervour of their religious impressions. Even in the higher parts of the mountains, where hardly any vestiges of human cultivation are to be found, in the depths of untrodden forests, or on the summit of seemingly inaccessible cliffs, the symbols of devotion are to be found, and the cross rises every where amidst the wilderness, as if to mark the triumph of religion over the greatest obstacles of nature. Nor is it only in the solitudes or deserts that the proofs of their devotions are to be found. In the valleys and in the cities it still preserves its ancient sway over the people. On the exterior of most houses, the legend of some favourite saint, or the sufferings of some popular martyr, are delineated ; and the poor inhabitant deems himself secure from the greater evils of life under the guardianship of such heavenly aid. In every valley numerous spires are to be seen, rising amidst the beauty of the surrounding scene, and reminding the traveller on the eastern frontier and in the Styrian fields, by the cupola form in which they are constructed, of his approach to the regions of the East. On Sunday, the whole people flock to church in their neatest and gayest attire ; and so great is the number who thus frequent these places of worship, that it is not unfrequent to see the peasants kneeling on the turf in the church-

yard where mass is performed, from being unable to find a place within its walls. Regularly in the evening prayers are read in every family; and the traveller who passes through the villages at the hour of twilight, often sees through their latticed windows the young and the old kneeling together round their humble fire, or is warned of his approach to human habitation by hearing their hymns stealing through the silence and solitude of the forest.¹

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1809.

¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Barth.
Krieg du
Tyroler
Landleute,
64, 72.

Nor has their religion become corrupted by many of the errors which, in more advanced civilisation, have dimmed the light, or perverted the usefulness of the Catholic church. Mingled, indeed, with a large intermixture of superstition, and interwoven as it is with innumerable legends and visionary tales, it yet preserves enough of the pure spirit of its divine origin to influence, in a great degree, the conduct of their private lives. The Tyrolese have not yet learned that immorality in private may be absolved by ceremony in public, or that the profession of faith can win a dispensation from the rules of obedience. The purchase of absolution by money is there almost unknown: it is never conferred, unless accompanied, according to the true Catholic principle, by the profession at least of genuine repentance. In no part of the world are the domestic or conjugal duties more strictly or faithfully performed: "*Nec corrumpere et corrumpi, seculum vocatur.*"² In none do the parish priests exercise a stricter or more conscientious control over the conduct of their flocks. Their influence is not weakened, as in a more advanced state of society, by a discordance of religious tenets; nor is the consideration due to their sacred function lost in the homage paid to rank, opulence, or power. Placed in the midst of a people who acknowledge no superiors,

Practical
utility of
the priests.

² Tacitus
De Mor.
Germ.

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¹ Personal
Observa-
tion. Barth.
Krieg von
1809, 24,
31.

and who live almost universally on the produce of their little domains ; strangers alike to the arts of luxury and the seductions of fashion, the parish priests are equally removed from temptation themselves, and relieved from the necessity of guarding against the great sources of wickedness in others. Each pastor is at once the priest and the judge of his parishioners, the infallible criterion in matters of faith, and the general umpire in the occasional disputes which occur among them. Hence has arisen that remarkable veneration for their spiritual guides by which the peasantry are distinguished ; and it is to this cause that we are to ascribe the fact, common to Tyrol with La Vendee, that, while their nobles were generally absent or lukewarm in the cause, the people followed with alacrity the call of their pastors to take up arms in behalf of their religion and ancient princes.¹

Remarkable
difference in
this respect
of ancient
and modern
times.

² Liv. lib.
xxi.

In ancient times the Alps were inhabited by fierce and barbarous tribes,—and the classical writers have exhausted their eloquence in painting the horrors of the climate and savage manners of the inhabitants of those unexplored regions. “*Nivesque cœlo prope immixtae, tecta informia imposita rupibus, pecora jumentaque torrida frigore, homines intonsi et inculti, animalia inanimaque omnia rigentia gelu ; cetera visu, quam dictu, foediora, terrorem renovârunt.*”² Many Roman legions were impeded in their progress, some thinned in their numbers by these cruel barbarians ; and even after the mountaineers of the Rhaetian Alps had been reduced to subjection by the expedition of Drusus, it was still esteemed a service of the utmost danger to deviate from the highways, and even an affair of considerable peril to traverse the passes by the great roads themselves.

Almost all the inscriptions on the votive offerings which have been discovered in such numbers, around the ruins of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, on the Great St Bernard, and which come down to the latest periods of the empire, are filled with warm expressions of gratitude for having escaped the extraordinary perils of the passage. Hence the singular fact, almost incredible in modern times, that even in the days of Pliny, several hundred years after the first passage of the Alps by the Roman troops, the sources both of the Rhine and the Iser were unknown ; and that the naturalist of Rome was content to state, a century after the establishment of a Roman station at Sion, in the Vallais, that “ the Rhine took its rise in the most hidden parts of the earth, in the region of perpetual night, amidst forests forever inaccessible to human approach.” Few attempts appear to have been made by any of the Romans in later times to explore the remoter recesses of the mountains, now so familiar to every traveller, none to reclaim or humanize their inhabitants : their reduction, even by the legions, is enumerated with pride, as one of the greatest exploits of the Emperors.¹ Magnificent highways, constructed across their summits, connected Italy with the northern provinces of the empire ; but they suffered the valleys on either side to remain in their pristine state of barbarism, and the Roman colonists hastened into more distant regions to spread that cultivation, of which the Alps, with their rude inhabitants, seemed to them incapable. This inability to civilize a vast amphitheatre of mountains in the heart of their empire, would appear inconceivable in so great a people as the Romans, did we not perceive the counterpart of it in the present condition of the

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1809.

¹ Plin. iii.
24.

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Caucasian range, the inhabitants of which maintain a savage independence, in the midst of all the civilisation and power of the Russian empire, and whose predatory habits are sufficiently evinced by their proverbial expressions, notwithstanding all the efforts of modern enthusiasm or credulity to represent them in more interesting colours.*

Influence of
religion in
producing
the Tyrolese
character.

What is it, then, which has wrought so surprising a change in the manners and habits in Europe of the inhabitants of the great mountain girdle of the earth? What is it which has spread cultivation through wastes deemed, in ancient times, inaccessible to improvement, and humanized the manners of a people remarkable only, under the Roman sway, for the ferocity and barbarism of their customs? What but the influence of religion; of that faith which has calmed the savage passions of the human mind, and spread its beneficial influence among the remotest habitations of men, and which prompted its disciples to leave the luxuries and comforts of southern civilisation to diffuse knowledge and humanity through inhospitable realms, and spread, even amidst the regions of

* See SPENCER'S *Circassia*, *passim*. The eloquent author of these interesting travels, has given a glowing account of the virtues and character of the tribes who dwell in the recesses of the Caucasus; but it is evident, even from what he says, that they are nothing better than gallant robbers. The common expression which he tells us is used by a Circassian maiden to a lover whom she despises, "Him! he has never yet stole a Tchernemorsky cow," speaks volumes as to the real character of this people, and corroborates the unfavourable picture of their customs, drawn by a much more experienced and judicious observer, Clarke, who describes them as a nest of freebooters. "The Circassians are almost all robbers by profession. The descriptions given of natives in the South Seas do not represent human nature in a more savage state, than its condition exhibits among the Caucasians. Instructed from their infancy to consider war and plunder not only as a necessary but as an honourable occupation, they bear in their countenances the most striking expressions of ferocious valour and of duplicity."—See CLARKE'S *Travels*, chap. 1, vol. ii. 34, 35.

desolation, the light of knowledge and the blessings of Christianity. Impressed with these ideas, the traveller, in crossing the St Bernard, and comparing the perfect safety with which he now can explore the most solitary parts of these mountains, with the perils of the passage attested by the votive offerings, even in the days of Adrian and the Antonines, will think with thankfulness of the religion by which this wonderful change has been effected, and with veneration of the saint whose name has for a thousand years been affixed to the pass where his influence first reclaimed the people from their barbarous life: and in crossing the defile of Mount Brenner, where the abbey of Wilten first offered an asylum to the pilgrim, he will feel with a late amiable and eloquent writer, "how fortunate it is that religion has penetrated these fastnesses, impervious to human power, and, where precautions are impossible and resistance useless, spread her invisible ægis over the traveller, and conducts him secure under her protection through all the dangers of his way. When in such situations he reflects upon his security, and recollects that these mountains, so savage and so well adapted to the purposes of murderers and banditti, have not in the memory of man been stained with human blood, he ought to do justice to the cause, and gratefully to acknowledge the influence of religion. Impressed with these ideas, he will behold with indulgence, perhaps even with interest, the crosses which frequently mark the brow of a precipice, and the little chapels hollowed out of the rock where the road is narrowed; he will consider them as so many pledges of security, and rest assured that so long as the pious mountaineer continues to adore the 'good Shepherd,' and to implore the prayer of the afflicted mother,' he

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1809.

Eustace's
Travels, i.

98.

CHAP. will never cease to befriend the traveller nor to dis-
 LV. charge the duties of hospitality." *

1809.

National
 character of
 the Tyrolese
 compared
 with the
 Swiss.

Though inhabiting the same mountain range, and under the influence of the same climate as the Swiss, the Tyrolese are distinguished by a totally different national character: a striking example of the undying influence of that difference of race which appears to stamp indelible features on the remotest generations of men. Both have the usual qualities of mountaineers, a bold and intrepid character, a frame fitted to endure toil, a soul capable of despising danger; both are distinguished by their uniform and enthusiastic love of freedom, and both have been illustrated in every age by their heroic and martial exploits. But, nevertheless, the fundamental principles of their life are different. The Tyrolese is animated with an ardent and enthusiastic loyalty; attachment to the house of Austria has ever distinguished him; he mingles prayers for his beloved Kaiser with his supplications for his family and his country; the Swiss, nursed in republican ideas, abhors the very name or emblems of royalty: the Tyrolese is ardent, impetuous, sometimes inconsiderate; the Swiss grave, reflecting, always tenacious: the former seldom quits his native valleys, and has never sold his blood in mercenary bands; the latter is to be found in the remotest countries of Europe, and has in every age prostituted his valour for foreign gold:¹ patriotic devotion strongly animates both; but in the Tyrolese

¹ Personal
 Observa-
 tion.

* It is to the unceasing efforts of the clergy, during the many centuries that elapsed between the fall of the Roman empire and the revival of knowledge, that the judicious historian of Switzerland ascribes the early civilisation and humane disposition in modern times of the Helvetic tribes, and invariably the first traces of order and industry appeared in the immediate neighbourhood of the religious establishments.—See PLANTA'S *Switzerland*, i. 17, *et seq.*

it is dignified by disinterested attachment to the throne; in the Swiss, somewhat dimmed by its union with the thirst for individual aggrandisement.

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LV.
1809.

Notwithstanding, however, the long established and hereditary loyalty of the Tyrolese, there is no part of Europe where the love of freedom is more strongly felt, or its practical blessings have been more uninterruptedly enjoyed. In every part of the country, the bold and martial air of the peasantry, their athletic form and fearless eye, bespeak the liberty and independence which they enjoy. Often the people carry arms, universally they possess them; on Sundays or holidays they usually appear with costly weapons in their belts or slung around their shoulders, as a mark at once of their wealth and privileges. Frequent exercise of the chase, and the universal practice of firing at targets and serving in the militia or trained bands, have given them an extraordinary proficiency in the use of fire-arms; of which the French and Bavarians, in the course of the war, had ample experience. It was in a great degree in consequence of the extraordinary perfection of the Tyrolese marksmen, that the inhabitants of the province, with little aid from the Austrian armies, were enabled for so long a period to make head against the united force of France and Bavaria. Their dress is singularly calculated to add to this impression. That of the men consists, for the most part, of a broad-brimmed hat, sometimes ornamented by a feather; a jacket, tight to the shape, but generally worn open, and exhibiting a red or green waistcoat; a broad girdle, richly ornamented, fastened in front by a large buckle of costly workmanship; embossed braces worn over the waistcoat, and supporting tight breeches, which, with gaiters up to the knee, are invariably

Love of
freedom
which ani-
mates the
people.
Their cha-
racter and
manners.

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1809.

made of black leather. The colours of the attire, especially about the breast, are brilliant and varied, and, with the pistols or knife stuck in the girdle, bespeak a degree of opulence rarely to be met with in the actual cultivators of any other country. But every thing about them indicates a general and long established well-being, and demonstrates that the opulence which industry had won, has been fearlessly and habitually displayed by the possessors. They are courteous and hospitable in their manner towards strangers; but they expect a similar treatment on their part, and in no country of Europe is an insult more likely to be avenged, or is the peasant more ready to redress with his own hands, any wrong, whether real or imaginary, which he may have received. Honest, sincere, and brave, the people are yet warm in their temperament; and acknowledging no superiors and being but little habituated to gradation of rank, they expect to be treated on all occasions on the footing of respect and equality. But, if this is done, in no part of the world will the foreigner experience more courteous reception, or can he repose with more perfect security on the honesty and fidelity of the inhabitants.¹

¹ Malte Brun, vii. 516. Personal Observation. Inglis' Tyrol, i. 162, 164.

Practical freedom which the people have always enjoyed under the Austrian government.

The two circumstances which have mainly contributed to nourish these independent and masculine feelings in the Tyrolese peasantry, are the practical freedom of their government, and the circumstance of their being, in general, proprietors of the lands which they cultivate. Though forming part, ever since their acquisition by Austria, by inheritance in 1363, of a despotic monarchy, the Tyrolese have uniformly been in the practical possession of all the blessings of freedom; and from the earliest times they have enjoyed the two grand privileges of representative

assemblies, and not being taxed without their own consent.* Impressed with the bold and impetuous character of these fearless mountaineers, as well as the vast importance, in a military point of view, of their country to the defence of the hereditary states, the Austrians not only never made any attempt to infringe their privileges, but treated the inhabitants with such lenity, that they knew government only by the protection and benefits which it afforded. The taxes were so light, as to be almost imperceptible; civil appointments were almost all filled by natives; municipal officers were elected by the people; custom-house restraints were hardly felt; the conscription was unknown. Four battalions of light armed troops were all that was required by government from the province, though it contained seven hundred thousand souls—a requisition rather felt as a privilege than a burden, as it afforded a vent to their numerous and warlike youth—and were always filled with volunteers. But the whole male inhabitants were enrolled in the militia, and regularly instructed in the rudiments of military art and ball practice; twenty thousand men, capable of being augmented to double that force in case of need, were at all times ready to defend their mountains, and often, by their hardihood and valour,¹ rendered essential service to

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¹ Malte
Brun, vii:
516, 517.
Gesch.
And. Ho-
fer, 14, 15.
Barth. 64,
72.

* In Tyrol, as in Sweden, the four orders of nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants, met in a general convocation at Innspruck, where the president was chosen by the suffrages of the united body. The Bishops of Trente and Brixen were usually elected alternately for that situation. In these assemblies, all matters relative to taxation, as well as the calling out the militia were settled; and in order to facilitate the latter, a sort of conscription was established, and the days of service, being in general forty-two, fixed upon. These days were a period of festivity and recreation to the youth upon whom the lot fell. To the latest times, previous to the cession of the province to Bavaria in 1805, these privileges had been religiously observed by the Austrian government.—MUL-
LER'S *Gesch*

CHAP. the monarchy in the most critical periods of its his-
 LV. tory.

1809.

The pea-
sants are
all owners
of their
land. Its
great influ-
ence on
their cha-
racter.

In the German Tyrol, the peasantry are almost all owners of the land they cultivate; a state of things of all others the most favourable to social happiness, when not brought about by the spoliation of others, and accompanied by a tolerable administration of government. It is much less so on the Italian side of the mountains: there, great proprietors, with their attendant evils of non-resident gentry and resident middlemen, are to be found. Hence, in a great degree, as well as in the original difference of race, the wide distinction between these two great divisions of the country in the character and independence of the people. Their look, their customs, their character, are essentially distinct; in the German Tyrol are to be seen a national dress, primitive usages, early hours, independent character, intrepid resolution; in the Italian, polished manners, an harmonious accent, opulent cities, selfish craft, enervating luxury. The line between the two, however, is not to be drawn merely according to the flow of the waters into the Danube or the Po; the German population has overspread the crest of the mountains, and come far down towards the Italian plains; all the valleys of the Adige and the Eisach above Bolsano are inhabited by the northern brood, who, with the harsh language and fair hair, have preserved the virtues and customs of their fathers. The population of German is nearly four times that of Italian descent; and in all struggles for freedom or independence, though the latter has not been wanting in energetic characters, the weight of the contest has fallen upon the Gothic race.¹

¹ Malte
Brun, vii.
550.
Inglis, i.
164, 167.
Personal
Observa-
tion.

To complete the picture of this highly interesting people, it is only necessary to observe, that they are

all frugal and industrious, that domestic manufactures are to be found in many of their cottages, and valuable salt mines at Hall, on the lower Inn ; but that the great reliance of the people is on the resources of agriculture. The wonderful effect of a general diffusion of property in stimulating the efforts of individual industry, is nowhere more conspicuous ; the grass which grows on the sides of declivities too steep for pasture, is carefully cut for the cattle ; the atmospheric action on rocks is rendered serviceable by conveying their debris to cultivated fields, and the stranger sometimes observes with astonishment a Tyrolese peasant, with a basket in his hand, descending inaccessible rocks, by means of a rope, in order that he may gain a few feet of land at the bottom, and devote it to agriculture. All the family labour at the little paternal estate ; the daughters tend the cows, or bring in the grass ; the sons work with the father in the field, or carry on some species of manufacture within doors. Notwithstanding this universal industry, however, the country is too sterile to maintain, from its own resources, its numerous inhabitants ; a large proportion of it is covered with forest, a still larger is desert rock or snow, tenanted only by the chamois and the marmot ; and a considerable portion of the people are yearly induced to seek the means of bettering their condition in the neighbouring and richer countries, from whence such of them as prosper return, after many years of absence, to purchase a little domain in their beloved valleys.*

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Astonishing
industry of
the people.¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 21.
Malte Brun,
vii. 514,
515. Barth.
Krieg von
1809, 74,
78.

To a people of such a character, and enjoying such advantages under the paternal government of their ancient princes, the forcible transference to the rule of Bavaria by the treaty of Presburg had been the

* See note A

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1809.
Discontent of the people under the Bavarian government.

subject of inextinguishable aversion. The cabinet of Munich, little acquainted with the character of the inhabitants, ignorant of the delicacy requisite in the management of free-born mountaineers, and relying on the powerful military aid of France and the Rhenish confederacy, adopted the dangerous policy of coercing their discontents by force. Though all their privileges were solemnly guaranteed by Bavaria, in the treaty of Presburg in 1805,* yet no sooner were the Bavarian authorities established in the country, than all these stipulations were basely violated. The court of Munich seemed intent only on making the utmost of their new acquisition, as if under a presentiment, that their tenure of it was not destined to be of very long duration. The constitution, which had subsisted for ages, was overthrown by a royal edict, the representative estates were suppressed, and the provincial funds seized. No less than eight new and oppressive taxes were imposed, and levied with the utmost rigour: the very name of the country was abolished; and, after the model of revolutionary France, Tyrol was divided into the departments of the Inn, the Etch, and the Eisach: the dramatized legends which formed so large a part of the amusement of the people, were prohibited; all pilgrimages to chapels or places of extraordinary sanctity forbid. The convents and monasteries were confiscated, and their estates sold; the church plate and holy vessels melted down and disposed of; the royal property was all brought into the market; even the ancient castle of Tyrol in the Passeyrthal

* "The above-mentioned countries (Tyrol and Vorarlberg) shall be enjoyed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria in the same manner, and with the same rights and prerogatives, as the Emperor of Germany and Austria and the princes of his house enjoyed them, and no otherwise."—*Treaty of Presburg, Dec. 26, 1805, Art. 8; MARTEN'S Sup. iv. 215.*

was not spared. New imposts were daily exacted without any consultation with the estates of the people; specie became scarce, from the quantity of it which was drawn off to the royal treasury; the Austrian notes were reduced to half their value, and the feelings of the people irritated, almost to madness, by the compulsory levy of men to serve in the ranks of their oppressors. It was even attempted to change the very name of the country, and incorporate it with the Bavarian provinces; and the use of their mother tongue was only to be permitted to the southern provinces for a few years.*

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¹ Muller's
Gesch.

671.

Gesch. A.
Hofer, 17.

Introd.

Berth. 24,
32.

The existence and wide diffusion of these discontents was well known to the Austrian Government, by whom a constant correspondence with the disaffected leaders had been maintained in secret, ever since that valuable province had been reft from their dominion. Sensible of the immense error committed in 1805, in stripping the country of regular troops, at the very time when the advance of the French to Vienna rendered it of the last importance that this great natural fortress should be strengthened on their flank, the cabinet of Vienna resolved not to fall a second time into the same mistake, and made every preparation for turning to the best account the martial qualities and excited feelings of the people. The

Prepara-
tions of
Austria to
take advan-
tage of this
discontent.

* Beauharnois, by an order dated *Moscow*, September 24, 1812, only permitted to some of the southern districts the use of their mother tongue for six years longer.—*Quarterly Review*, xvii. 351. The date is singular and ominous. Napoleon afterwards was well aware of how much the Tyrolese revolt was owing to the mismanagement of the Bavarians, and said to Count Bubna, “The Bavarians did not know how to govern the Tyrolese, and were unworthy to rule that noble country.”—GESCH. AND. HOFER, 16. In truth, however, it was the magnitude and weight of his own exactions, in men and money, from that subject power, which drove the cabinet of Munich to the severe measures which had so powerful an effect in bringing about the insurrection.

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¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 19.
Inglis'
Tyrol, ii.
163, 164.
Barth. 52,
54.

Military
description
of the
country.

Archduke John, who commanded the army destined for the Italian campaign, and then stationed at Villach and Klagenfurth, had made frequent excursions in former years through the Tyrol; and in the course of his rambles had become as much attached to those spirited mountaineers as they had acquired confidence in his patriotism and ardour. An active correspondence was carried on between the Archduke and the Tyrolese leaders, from the moment that war had been resolved on by the cabinet of Vienna, till it actually broke out: but although that accomplished prince was thus, in a great degree instrumental, in producing that general insurrection in the province which afterwards took place; yet he was fated never to return to it till the contest was over, nor to take part in a struggle in which he would willingly have pledged his fortune and his life.¹

The Tyrol, notwithstanding its rugged aspect, is, in a military or strategical point of view, a very simple country. There are very few practicable roads. The great chain of mountains which forms the southern barrier of the valley of the Inn, and which, beginning with the snowy peaks of the Orteler Pitz, stretches through the Gefron to the huge mass of the Gross Glochner, is traversed only by one road, which, from time immemorial, has formed the chief communication between Germany and Italy. Setting out from Munich, it crosses the northern barrier of the Innthal by the gorge of Scharnitz; descends to Innspruck, and, after crossing the southern bulwarks of the valley by the pass of the Brenner, descends the course of the Eisach to Sterzing, Brixen, Botzen, Trent, and Roveredo, below which it emerges at Verona into the Italian plains. From Trent, branch out two lateral roads: the first, after sur-

mounting an inconsiderable ridge, descends, by the waters of the Brenta, through the romantic defiles of the Val Sugana to Primolano, and loses itself in the plains of Verona at Bassano; the second, after crossing the high Sarea, winds down by Chiesa and the lake of Idir to the Brescian fields. From Botzen, or Bolsano, a great road ascends the whole course of the Adige, called, in its upper or German parts, the Etch, and penetrates into the cold and cheerless pastures of the Engadine, in Switzerland, at Nauders. From Brixen branches off the great road to Carinthia and Klagenfurth, through the Pusterthal and down the valley of the Drave; and the route communicates with Salzburg by a cross road, which surmounts the great central ridge by St Michel and Tauern, till it reaches Rastadt and the waters of the Salza. Another great road crosses Tyrol in its whole breadth, along the valley of the Inn; communicating on the west with Switzerland by Feldkirch and Bregentz; on the east by Rattenburg to Salzburg, Enns, and Vienna. The Brenner is thus by far the most important position in Tyrol, because whoever has the command of it, is the master of the only communication from Germany and the northern, to Italy and the southern Tyrol, and the bridge of Laditch, at the junction of roads leading to Innspruck, Carinthia, and Verona. Rude fortifications are erected on the principal passes leading into the province on all sides from the adjoining states; but they were of no great strength, and incapable of holding out against a numerous and enterprising enemy. The true defence of the Tyrol consisted in its rugged and inaccessible surface, which rendered it for the most part wholly impervious to cavalry; in the number of woods and defensible positions which it contains,

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LV.

1809.

¹ Pel. iii.
375, 382;
and Personal
Observation.

CHAP. and, above all, the indomitable spirit of its inhabi-
 LV. tants.

1809.

Character of
 Hofer—His
 birth and
 descent.

When the peasantry of Tyrol, at the summons of Austria, took up arms, they had no fixed or authorized leaders; but several persons had acquired such consideration among them as naturally placed them at the head of affairs. The first of these was ANDREW HOFER, a native of St Leonard, in the valley of Passeyr; a name, like that of Tell and Wallace, now become immortal in the history of the world. Like his ancestors for many generations, he carried on the business of an inn-keeper on his paternal property on the banks of the Adige; a profession which is one of the most respectable among that simple people, from the intercourse with strangers and wealth with which it is commonly attended. He was born on the 22d November, 1767, so that he was in the forty-second year of his age when the insurrection broke out. His frame was herculean, his shoulders broad, his strength surpassing; but, like most persons long habituated to climbing mountains, his carriage was somewhat impaired by an habitual stoop. His education and means of improvement had been superior to those of most persons in his rank of life, from his frequent intercourse with travellers, as well as the traffic which he carried on in wine and horses, in the course of which he had visited most of the principal cities on the southern side of the mountains, and become a fluent master of the Italian language, though in the low Venetian dialect. His dress was the common habit of the country, with some trifling variation: a large black hat, with a broad brim, black ribbons, and a dark curling feather, a green jacket, red waistcoat, green braces, black leathern girdle, short black breeches of the same material, and red or black

stockings. About his neck was always to be seen a crucifix and a silver medal of St George, to which was afterwards added a gold medal and chain, sent him by the Emperor. He never, however, obtained any rank in the Austrian army, and was indebted for his influence among his countrymen to his well known probity of character and disinterested disposition, as well as the secret connexion which he maintained with the Archduke John, with whom he had formed an acquaintance in the course of that prince's scientific rambles in the Tyrol, which led to his being chosen as a deputy from his native valley to confer with him at Brunecken, in November, 1805, and Vienna in January, 1809. His talents and acquirements were of a superior order, as was sufficiently evinced by his having been selected by that discerning prince on occasions of such importance for the discharge of difficult duties; but his parts were solid, rather than brilliant, and he evinced, in its merits equally as its defects, the true German character. Honest, sincere, and confiding, tenacious of custom, attached to antiquity, ignorant of present times, benevolent in disposition, he was at the same time pious and patriotic, and ready to lay down the last drop of his blood in defence of his religion and Emperor. It was easy to excite him to severe measures; but, when their execution commenced, he was readily diverted from his purpose, and his native gentleness of disposition speedily caused the sterner mood to relent. His attachment to the Catholic faith, and his patriotic ardour, were unbounded; and the bare recital of a victory gained by Austria in former times, or allusion to the classical days of Tyrol, a word in favour of the sacred person of the Emperor, or the Archduke John were sufficient to fill his eyes with

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¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 44,
52, 53.
Barth.
42, 47.
Inglis, ii.
165, 166.

Of Spech-
bacher.

tears. Though slow, and sometimes vacillating in decision, he was capable, when he applied to a subject, of just discrimination; and when invested, during a few months in autumn, 1809, with the entire government of the province, his measures were judicious to a degree that could hardly have been expected from his limited means of information. Fond of conviviality, sometimes addicted to intemperance, he was often carousing with his friends when the troops were engaged in action; and, though repeatedly victorious, and fearless in danger, he was only once under a hot fire during the war, though then he acted with the utmost gallantry. But his energy in conduct, and well known patriotic ardour, obtained for him the attachment of his countrymen, whom he constantly led to victory; and the intrepidity of his conduct in his last moments, has secured for him a lasting mausoleum in the hearts of his countrymen.¹

Inferior to Hofer in general government, and unversed in the threads of political negotiation, SPECHBACHER was greatly his superior in the energy and conduct of actual warfare. He was a substantial yeoman, having inherited from his father a farm of some value in the village of Gnadenwald, in the Lower Innthal. Born in the year 1768, he was left an orphan at the age of seven years; and though his relations bestowed all the care upon his education which circumstances would admit, he showed little disposition for study or any sedentary pursuit. From an early age he was found from morning till night among the mountains, with his rifle over his shoulder, pursuing the roe or engaging the lammergeyer. As he advanced in years, these pursuits had such attractions for him, that, abandoning altogether his paternal estate, he associated with a

band of hunters, who set the forest laws at defiance, and ranged the mountains of the Upper and Lower Innthal, the Oetzthal, and the rugged forests of the Bavarian Tyrol. By this wandering mode of life, as he afterwards himself admitted, he became acquainted with every pass and glen on the frontiers of Tyrol and Bavaria, from Feldkirch to Kufstein—a species of knowledge which was of essential importance in the conduct of the partisan warfare with which he was afterwards intrusted, while at the same time it nourished in his mind that inextinguishable hatred towards Bavaria, which is felt more or less by every inhabitant of the northern Tyrol. His grandfather had distinguished himself in the war against the Bavarians, under Maximilian Emanuel; “and when I was a child,” said Spechbacher in after days, “and listened to him as he told us the history of those times, I longed to have an opportunity of fighting against them as he had done.” He was diverted, however, from this dangerous course of life, by the impression produced by seeing one of his companions shot in a rencontre with a band of chasseurs; and returning at the age of twenty-eight to his native village, he married a young woman with some property, entered into a contract to supply the salt-works of Hall with wood, made himself master of the elements of education,¹ and continued for twelve years to lead a laborious,^{42. Inglis, ii. 179,} inoffensive life, till the trumpet of war from Austria^{180.} roused him to danger, and glory, and immortality.¹

JOSEPH HASPINGER, was a Capuchin friar, and buried in the seclusion of a monastery till the war broke out. Though reckoned with justice one of the most formidable of the Tyrolese leaders, he carried with him into the field of battle only the spiritual

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¹ Barth, 36,
^{42.} Inglis,
ii. 179,

180.

Of Joseph
Haspinger,
the friar.

CHAP. weapons which he brought from the cloister.
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1809.

¹ Barth. i.
52, 54.
Inglis, ii.
180, 181.

Clothed in his brown garment and rope girdle, he bore in his hand a large ebony crucifix, with which, it is said, in close combat, he sometimes exchanged blows with the enemy; and being endowed with prodigious strength, nearly as many wonders are recounted of his personal feats, as miracles won by his faith and devotion. When a student in the faculty of theology, he had borne arms against the French, and won a silver medal, which he consecrated, on entering the order of St Francis, to the miraculous crucifix at Eppen near Bolsano. He was distinguished by a flowing beard of a red colour, which gave him the surname of *Rothbard*: and often the massy crucifix and animated voice of the friar restored the combat, when his countrymen were sinking under numbers or fatigue.¹

Of Martin
Teimer, and
Baron Hofer-
mayer.

MARTIN TEIMER, though a brave and active leader, was not so celebrated as the other chiefs, among the peasantry; but, from his military talents, skill in negotiations, and a certain degree of aristocratic favour which it induced, he received marks of distinction from the Emperor which the others never enjoyed, and was made a baron, with the cross of Maria Theresa, to which Hofer never attained. Teimer, however, was Hofer's superior in conduct and understanding, though, from not being so great a favourite with the people, he never enjoyed the same influence or celebrity. He was born on the 14th August, 1778, at Schlanders, in the Visitschgau; and had a countenance, in which the prominent forehead and sparkling eye clearly indicated the ascendant of talent. He served in the militia in the war of 1796, and raised himself, by his abilities, from the ranks to the station of major; having dis-

tinguished himself in several actions under Laudon in that year, and Bellegarde in 1799. In 1805, he was again made captain in the militia, and subsequently kept a shop at Klagenfurth. Like Hofer, his disposition was phlegmatic, and he was fond of conviviality; but, when roused by danger and placed at the head of his troops, he displayed equal courage and capacity, and contributed with the peasants of the Upper Innthal, whom he commanded, to some of the greatest successes of the war. It was only unfortunate that the favour of the Emperor occasioned a certain jealousy between him and Hofer, which in some degree dimmed the glory and impaired the usefulness of both. Baron Hormayer, one of the few nobility of the country who appeared in arms for their country, was early appointed by the Austrian cabinet governor of the province; and he showed his judgment by delegating his authority at a very early period to Hofer, by whom the movements of the peasants were practically directed till the close of the contest.¹

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1809.

¹ Barth. 82,
84.
Inglis, ii.
181, Gesch.
A. Hofer,
59, 60.

Such were the simple leaders under whose guidance the Tyrolese engaged in the formidable contest with the united power of France and Bavaria. It was from no ignorance of the perils which awaited them, but a brave determination to disregard them, that they stood forth with such unanimous gallantry for their country's deliverance. In former wars, they had both witnessed and felt the weight of the French arms; in 1796, they had seen it roll past them in the Italian, in 1805, on the Bavarian plains; in 1797, their valleys had been penetrated from the south by Joubert,* in 1805, invaded from the north by Marshal Ney;† and they were well aware, that the pro-

Brave preparations of the people for the contest.

* Ante, iii. 255.

† Ante, v. 435.

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babilities were, that if a serious reverse happened to the Imperial arms, the forces of the empire would, as on former occasions, be concentrated for the defence of the capital, and they would be left without external aid to make head against their numerous and disciplined enemies. Still they unanimously stood forth in the contest. Every man took leave of his family and his friends as those who might never meet again. They prepared themselves, after the manner of their country, for what they deemed a pious warfare, by the most solemn rites of their religion. The priest, in many parishes, assembled those who were to join the army, and animated them by his exhortations, and blessed those who might die in defence of their country. Every family assembled together, and prayed that the youths who were to leave it, might support their good name in the hour of danger, and die rather than dishonour their native land. In many instances even the sacrament was administered as for the last time in life, and accompanied with the solemnities which the Catholic Church enjoins for the welfare of a departing soul. It was with such holy rites, and by such exercises of family devotion, that these brave men prepared themselves for the fearful warfare on which they were entering; and it was the spirit which they thus inhaled that supported them when they were left to their own resources, and enabled them, even amidst all the depression arising from the desertion of their allies, to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.¹

¹ Personal
Informa-
tion.
Barth. 86,
90.

All things being in readiness, and the Austrian troops, under the Archduke Charles, having crossed the Inn, the signal of insurrection was given by the Archduke John, in a spirited proclamation, from

his headquarters at Klagenfurth, from whence the Marquis Chastellar set out, to take the command of the regular troops which were to enter the province to direct and support the operations of the peasants.* So unanimous, however, was the feeling with which the country was animated, that at the first intelligence of hostilities having commenced, it burst forth at once with uncontrollable fury in all quarters. The night of the 8th April was fixed for the event on which the destinies of the Tyrol were to depend. The signal agreed on was throwing saw-dust into the Inn, which floated down, and was soon discovered and understood by the peasants. In addition to this, a plank with a little pennon affixed to it was launched in the upper Innthal, and safely borne down the stream, amidst the throbbing hearts of all who witnessed it. Bale-fires at the same time were lighted on a hundred hills; and many a ruined castle blazed with a long-unwonted glow. The peasantry of the Innthal were warned, besides, by women and children, who carried from house to house little balls of paper, upon which were written the words "*s'ist zeit*:" it is time. Roused by these various methods, the inhabitants every where rose on the 8th April as one man, and with their redoubted rifles on their shoulders descended every lateral glen and ravine, till their accumulated force, gaining strength at every step as it advanced, rolled in an impetuous torrent down the great valleys of the Inn, the Eisach, and the Adige.¹

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* Insurrection
in Tyrol,
its early
and com-
plete suc-
cess.
April 8.¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 77,
80. Inglis,
ii. 168,
169. Barth.
82, 84.

Marquis Chastellar with the regular troops under his command, about ten thousand strong, but very deficient in cavalry, was on the Klagenfurth frontier, to take advantage of, and support these enthusiastic

Successes in
the Puster-
thal.

* See note B.

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April 9.

April 10.

movements ; and crossed the frontier at daybreak on the 9th. Their march through the Pusterthal resembled rather the triumph of a victorious, than the advance of an invading army : mothers brought their children out to look at them ; blind old men were led out of their cottages that they might hear and bless their gallant countrymen ; all endeavoured to get near, that they might touch their clothes, or even kiss their horses. But more serious occupation awaited them. On arriving in the neighbourhood of St Lawrence, in their way down towards Brixen, they found the peasants in considerable numbers already engaged with the enemy. The rising there had been precipitated two days before the time agreed on, by an attempt of the Bavarians on the important bridge at that place, which commanded the communication between Brunecken and the upper part of the valley : the peasants rose to prevent its destruction, and Wrede, aware of the importance of suppressing such a revolt in the outset, immediately marched to the spot, with two thousand men and three guns, from Brixen. With these, however, he made no impression on the assembled peasants stationed in the woods and rocks ; but being joined on the day following by a reinforcement of a thousand foot soldiers and six hundred horse, he renewed his attacks with better success, and the Tyrolese, unable to block up the main road against such formidable odds, were beginning to give way, when the arrival of seventy light horse, and a few companies of chasseurs, the advanced guard of Chastellar, who instantly charged with loud shouts, changed the fate of the day. The Tyrolese, suspending the combat, fell on their knees to return thanks, or embraced the Austrians with tears of joy ; while the Bavarians, thun-

der-struck at this unexpected apparition, fled in disorder down the valley, and when they arrived at the tremendous bridge of Laditch,* broke into two divisions, the first of which, under Bisson, hotly pursued by the peasants, ascended the Eisach towards Sterzing, while the second, two thousand strong, under General Lemoine, followed the course of that river down to Bolsano. Here, however, they were met by the landsturm of the valley of the Adige, which had descended to that place in great strength, from the upper part of the Etchthal; and though some forced their way through to Trent, the greater part, with the general himself, were made prisoners.¹

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¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 79,
81. Barth.
92, 96.
Pel. iii. 86,
87.

While these events were going on below Brixen, the Bavarian regiments which had ascended to Sterzing, encountered Hofer with the landsturm of the Passeyrthal and the Vinchtgau, on the plain of Sterzing Moos, near the town and castle of that name. The Bavarians advanced in good order and with an intrepid air over the open ground which lay between them and the enemy; but as they approached the Tyrolese, who were posted on rocks and in thickets around its outer circumference, they were staggered by the close and deadly fire of the rifles, and fell back in confusion. The guns were next brought up; but they could produce little impression on the peasants scattered among, and in great part concealed in, the broken ground and woods; and the gunners were soon laid prostrate by the unerring aim of the mountain sharpshooters. Encouraged by this success, the Tyrolese now burst from their covert, and rushing forward, like the La Vendée peasants, in loose array, but with

Defeat of
the Bava-
rians by
Hofer at
Sterzing
Moos.

* A well-known bridge, composed of a single arch, between tremendous rocks, at the point where the road from Innspruck over the Brenner, from Carinthia by the Pusterthal, and from Italy up the Eisach, unite.
—GESCH. AND. HOFER, p. 64, 78; and *Personal Observation*.

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desperate resolution, using their spears, halberts, and the butt ends of their muskets, fell with loud shouts upon the enemy. After a violent struggle of a few minutes' duration, the Bavarians gave way, and being enveloped on all sides, laid down their arms to the number of three hundred and ninety, besides two hundred and forty who were killed or wounded in this sanguinary combat. The column which succeeded, however, under Bisson and Wrede, contrived to force its way by a circuitous route, up the pass of the Brenner: but it was grievously harassed in the defile of Lueg by the peasants, who broke down bridges, and barricaded the highway, by heaps of trees thrown across the road; and only penetrated through to the neighbourhood of Innspruck, after sustaining a heavy loss. All these columns in their retreat, committed the greatest excesses, burning houses, and massacring the peasantry wherever they had it in their power; while the Austrian authorities exhibited, at the same time, the noble contrast of a proclamation, issued expressly to restrain the feelings of revenge arising in the breasts of the people.¹*

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 81,
82. Pel. iii.
87. Barth.
98, 100.

April 10.

On the same day, the peasantry of the Upper and Lower Innthal, rose in arms; and so active

* "Tyroleans! you have proved yourselves worthy to be free, and of that constitution which the Bavarians promised to respect, but have violated. You have proved yourselves worthy of liberty: do not, therefore, give way to your indignation, and become ungovernable, but act with unanimity and coolness, determined to die or be free. To injure the feeble is contemptible: no real Tyrolese will allow himself to be accused of such a deed. To follow the example of those who have nothing to lose, who molest and plunder the peaceful and inoffensive, would inevitably sow the seeds of dissension among us, and cause our ruin. Without discipline, order, and obedience, nothing will prosper: in the name of the Emperor and the Archduke, I will punish every one who disobeys his orders, and treat every one who commits excesses as an enemy to his country."—JOSEPH BARON HORMAYER.—See GESCHICHTE, AND, HOFER, 87, 88.

were the exertions made, that early on the morning of the 11th, twenty thousand armed men, directed by Teimer, were assembled on the heights around Innsbruck. In no condition to resist so formidable an assemblage, the Bavarians, who had only fifteen hundred men and a few guns in the place, withdrew into the town; but there they were speedily assailed by a furious crowd of peasants, who carried successively the external barriers, the bridge of the Inn, the artillery, and finally penetrated into the principal square, shouting out, "Long live the Emperor Francis—down with the Bavarians!" and made themselves masters of the place. A frightful scene ensued: the Bavarians in some places surrendered, and begged for quarter; in others, continued the combat with undaunted resolution; and in the *mêlée*, several bloody deeds were committed, which, in their cooler moments, the Tyrolese would have been the first to condemn. General Kinkel, after making a brave resistance, was slain: Colonel Dietfurth, who atoned for his former conduct by the gallantry of his last hours, desperately wounded, was made prisoner, and soon after died; and the whole garrison of Innsbruck, consisting of one entire regiment, four guns, a few cavalry, and several depots of battalions, either taken or slain.

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Capture of
Innsbruck
by the peasants of the
Upper Innthal.

April 11.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 88,
91. Barth.
100, 106.
Pel. iii. 87,
88.

An event here took place which strongly marked the peculiar character of the warfare which had commenced. Dietfurth, the Bavarian colonel, had made himself peculiarly obnoxious in the province, by the severity of his public, and licentiousness of his private conduct, as well as the contemptuous expressions which he had used towards the people.* As he lay

Striking incidents
which occurred on
the capture
of Innsbruck.

* He had publicly boasted at Munich, "that with his regiment and two squadrons, he would disperse the ragged mob;" and had been promoted instead of reprov'd, for his oppressive and licentious conduct.—

GESCH. A. HOFER, 90-91.

CHAP. half fainting from loss of blood in the guard-house
 LV. of Innspruck, he asked who had been the leader of
 1809. the peasants. "No one," they replied, "we fought
 equally for God, the Emperor, and our native coun-
 try." "That is surprising," said Dietfurth, "for I
 saw him frequently pass me on a white horse." The
 report of this incident produced an extraordinary
 impression upon the peasants, by whom it was uni-
 versally believed, thenceforth, that St James, the pa-
 tron of the town of Innspruck, and who was always
 represented, in the battles with the Moors, mounted
 on a white horse, had combated at their head. The
 cavalry which escaped from Innspruck took refuge
 in a convent near the bridge of Volders; but Spech-
 bacher, having assembled a body of peasants from the
 Lower Innthal, burst open the gates on the day fol-
 lowing, by means of an immense fir-tree which was
 rolled up on wheels to the massy portal by fifty of
 his strongest peasants, and every man was made pri-
 soner. The Tyrolese, after these brilliant successes,
 set no bounds to their rejoicings: the great Imperial
 eagle was taken down from the tomb of Maximilian
 in the High Church of Innspruck, decorated with
 red ribbons, and carried amidst deafening acclama-
 tions through the streets, the peasants flocking in
 crowds to gaze at and kiss it; while the pictures of
 the Archduke John and the Emperor were placed on
 a triumphal arch, surrounded by candles kept con-
 stantly burning, every one that passed stopping an
 instant, bending the knee, and exclaiming, "Long
 live the Emperor!"¹

¹ Gesch. A.
 Hofer, 92,
 93. Inglis,
 ii. 169,
 172, Barth.
 104, 106.

In the midst of these rejoicings the Tyrolese were called to more serious duties. The victorious peasants, who had fallen asleep in the streets or in the orchards around the town, were alarmed at three

o'clock in the morning of the 12th, by the intelligence that the enemy were approaching. It proved to be the division of Bisson, which, having forced its way through the pass of Lueg and over the Brenner, from Sterzing and the valley of the Eisach, had reached Mount Isel and the neighbourhood of the Abbey of Wilten, on its way to the northern Tyrol and Bavaria. The gates were immediately barricaded with casks, waggon, carts, and every thing that could be found for that purpose, and the approaches to the city filled with armed men, ready to give the enemy a warm reception. But the Bavarians, who were descending the Brenner, were in still greater consternation than their opponents at the circumstances of their situation. With difficulty, and constantly harassed by a cloud of peasants in their rear, they had reached the heights of Mount Isel, and now they found Innspruck, their sole point of retreat, where they expected to find succour, rest, and security, occupied by twenty thousand peasants. General Kinkel, who perceived the hopelessness of their situation, wrote to General Bisson, urging him to send some confidential person into the town who might report the state of affairs; and, in pursuance of this advice, Wrede, with a large escort, soon made his appearance, and they were immediately taken into custody. Wrede was detained, the remainder being allowed to return to their comrades. The situation of the French and Bavarians was now almost desperate. Chastellar with a body of armed peasants, as well as a few regular troops, was descending the Brenner, and already menaced their rear, while the rocks and thickets in their front and flanks were bristling with the peasants of the Innthal, who, in great strength, obstructed their advance. After some unsuccessful

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Arrival, defeat, and
surrender
of Bisson's
division
from Ster-
zing.
April 12.

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parleying, in the course of which, Bisson expressed the utmost dread of the vengeance of Napoleon if he laid down his arms, the fire began, and a close discharge, admirably directed, thinned the ranks of the French grenadiers, while the shouts with which the mountains resounded on all sides were so tremendous that they were completely panic-struck, and compelled their commander to consent to an unconditional surrender. Bisson laid down his arms with all his troops, including the division at Schwatz, which was to be delivered up to the Austrians there: nearly three thousand men, on this occasion, fell in all into the hands of the enemy.¹ *

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 97,
99. Pel.
iii. 90.
Barth. 106,
108.

Capture of
Hall by
Spechbacher.

The only post of importance in the Tyrol now occupied by the Bavarians, was Hall in the Lower Innthal, and it soon yielded to the enterprise and skill of Spechbacher. The women and children who remained on the left bank of the Inn, lighted fires on all the hills bounding the valley on that side; and this stratagem induced the Bavarian garrison to believe, that if the town were attacked at all, it would be from the northern quarter. Thither, accordingly, they all crowded, carefully manning the ramparts and watching the approaches. Mean-while, Spechbacher with his men silently advanced in ambush to the other side, and, when the drawbridge was let down, and the gate opened, upon the bell ringing for matins,

* Upon signing this capitulation, Bisson exclaimed:—"This day will be my last; the grave of my honour and military reputation. Never will Napoleon believe that this disaster might not have been averted; even were I merely unfortunate, he would impute it to me as a crime." In this, however, the French general was mistaken; it was for the interest of the Emperor to conceal this check, and the lustre of subsequent events enabled him to accomplish this object; Bisson was not disgraced, and, by a singular revolution of fortune, was the governor of Mantua when Hofer was shot in that fortress.—GESCH. A. HOFER, 97, 98.

they rushed in, overpowered the guard, and made themselves masters of the town. The Bavarian prisoners, about four hundred in number, were immediately marched off under an escort consisting chiefly of women. Considering this as a studied insult, the captives were exceedingly indignant; but, in truth, it was the result of necessity; the whole male population having been marched off towards Innspruck; and for the same reason, a similar service was often assigned to the female sex during the war.¹

CHAP.

LV.

1809.

Barth.

116, 120.

Gesch. A.

Hofer, 101,

102.

Thus did the Tyrolese, in one week after the insurrection broke out, by means solely of their own valour and patriotism, aided by the natural strength of the country, entirely deliver the province from the enemy; recover all the fortresses, except Kufstein, which were in the hands of their oppressors; and entirely destroy above ten thousand regular troops of the enemy, of whom six thousand were made prisoners! These extraordinary successes, too, were gained almost exclusively by the unaided efforts of the people; for though the Austrian regulars came up most opportunely in the first contest, at the bridge of San Lorenzo, yet they had no share in the subsequent triumphs, which were achieved long before their arrival at the scene of action, by the assembled peasantry: a memorable instance of what may be effected by unanimity and vigour, even in opposition to a formidable military force. The effect of the victories of the peasantry was to liberate the southern as well as northern Tyrol; for the French troops were so much discouraged by their reverses, that they evacuated both Trent and Roveredo, and fell back to the neighbourhood of Verona. The insurrection gained all the Italian Tyrol, and even spread into the valleys of the Oglio and the Mella, where the people were

Results of
these suc-
cesses. En-
tire deliver-
ance of the
Tyrol.

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

¹ Pel. iii.
91, 95.

Gesch. A.
Hofer, 100,
101, 102.

Measures of
Napoleon
and Chastel-
lar in Tyrol.

May 5.

highly discontented with the government of the kingdom of Italy. Numerous bodies of partizans appeared to the north, in the Bavarian plains, and the Swabian hills, and on the south, in the neighbourhood of Brescia and Verona; they communicated with the Archduke John, whose victory at Sacile excited extraordinary enthusiasm, by the vale of the Piave; and symptoms of revolt were already manifesting themselves in all the southern valleys of the Alps as far as Piedmont, where the people only waited for the Austrian standards to cross the Adige to break out into open insurrection. Nor was it the least honourable circumstance in this glorious contest, that though the population were strongly excited by a long course of previous injuries, and almost entirely destitute of military officers to restrain their impetuosity, they were as much distinguished by their humanity as their valour, and, with a few exceptions, originating in the heat of assault, conducted their hostilities with as much moderation as regular soldiers.¹

Mean-while Napoleon, who was exceedingly irritated at this unlooked-for series of disasters in the Tyrol, and, notwithstanding all his power, was not able altogether to conceal them even from his own subjects, let his exasperation exhale in furious invectives against the Marquis Chastellar, to whom he ascribed both the exciting of the revolt in Tyrol, and the cruelties which he alleged had been committed by the peasantry. The latter charge, founded upon some isolated acts of revenge perpetrated in the assault of Innspruck, was wholly unfounded as against the Tyrolese in general; and against Chastellar, in particular, was, in an especial manner, false, as at the time of the acts complained of on the banks of the Inn, he was still at Brixen, sixty miles distant,

to the south of the Brenner, and even ignorant of the whole operations to the north of that mountain. But this sentence of outlawry against Chastellar and Hormayer, both of whom were ordered to be delivered to a military commission as soon as taken, and shot within twenty-four hours, was of a piece with the invariable policy of Napoleon in such circumstances. Whenever a disaster had occurred to his arms, or an event had taken place likely to rouse an enthusiastic moral feeling against his government, he instantly propagated some falsehood against its authors, or exaggerated some trifling incident into a mighty enormity; and by the vehement abuse of the persons by whom his power had thus been assailed, often succeeded, at least with his own benighted subjects, in withdrawing public attention altogether from the calamities on his own part, or virtues on those of others which he sought to conceal.¹

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1809.

¹ Pel. iii.
95, 96.
Gesch. A.
Hofer, 105,
106.

Chastellar, for a fortnight after the Tyrol was evacuated by the enemy, laboured assiduously to give something like military consistency to the tumultuary efforts of the peasantry. He succeeded in equipping a small body of cavalry, to whom he gave arms; a species of force of which these poor mountaineers stood much in need, and organized several battalions of excellent foot soldiers; and having put matters in a train to the north of the mountains, recrossed the Brenner with his regular troops, and descending the valley of the Eisach and Adige, came up with the enemy in front of the famous defile of La Pietra, between Roveredo and Trent. The French, under Baraguay D'Hilliers, six thousand strong, were there posted in a well known position of uncommon strength, and held firm, to give the main body of their army under Eugene time to retreat in order, to the

Actions in
the South-
ern Tyrol,
which is
evacuated
by the
French.

April 23.

CHAP. banks of the Adige, after the disastrous battle of
 LV. Sacile. The Austrians, having imprudently com-
 1809. menced an attack when worn out with the fatigue
 April 24. of a long march, were worsted and driven out of the
 defile with loss; but the French, notwithstanding,
 continued their retreat to the neighbourhood of Ve-
 rona, and Chastellar took up his quarters in Rovere-
 do. From thence, however, he was soon recalled to
 the north of the Brenner, by the threatened invasion
 of the province by the French troops after the dis-
 astrous battles in Bavaria.¹

¹ Pel. iii.
 169, 171.
 Barth. 132,
 136. Gesch.
 A. Hofer,
 114, 121,
 128, 136.

Jellachich, as already noticed,* after the defeat of
 Hiller at Landshut, had retired from Munich towards
 Salzburg on the 24th April. Thither he was fol-
 lowed by Marshal Lefebvre with his corps, consist-
 ing chiefly of Bavarians. The Austrian general
 took up a strong position in front of Salzburg, where
 he endeavoured to arrest the advance of the French
 troops; but the numbers of the French were so
 superior that he was unable to effect his object, and
 driven into the town with the loss of several hundred
 prisoners and three guns. The victors entered pell-
 mell with the vanquished; and Jellachich, continu-
 ing his retreat in great disorder to the south, ascended
 the valley of the Salza, and crossing the mountains
 behind Rastadt, made the best of his way towards
 Villach and Carinthia, abandoning the eastern dis-
 tricts of Tyrol to their fate. Thither Lefebvre short-
 ly after bent his steps, having remained in Salzburg
 only long enough to put the town in a sufficient pos-
 ture of defence, and establish the magazines neces-
 sary for the operations in that quarter. On the
 10th May he broke up and advanced to Riechenhall,
 a considerable burgh still in the open country, but

Actions on
 the Salz-
 burg fron-
 tier.
 April 29.

May 10.

* Ante, vii. 262.

within a mile of the mountains, which there rise in awful majesty abrupt and sheer from the plain, to all appearance impervious to human approach. On the day following, the French in great force advanced to the entrance of the passes. Notwithstanding their immense superiority of numbers, such was the natural strength of the defiles,* that it is doubtful if they would have succeeded in making good their entrance had the Tyrolese guards been all at their stations ; but it was Ascension-day, and a large proportion of the peasants were absent at church, or engaged in their devotions or sports on the holiday : so that the contest fell on four hundred regular troops, and a few companies of sharpshooters, who, notwithstanding, for several hours kept at bay a whole Bavarian division. At length the barricades and

CHAP.

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1809.

May 11.

* No defiles in Europe exceed in romantic interest those which lie between Reichenhall and Worgl, through which the high road passes. Winding by the side of torrents, through narrow ravines shut in by walls of rocks, which barely leave room for a carriage-way ; often blown out of the mass, between precipices a thousand or fifteen hundred feet high ; scaling heights to appearance almost perpendicular, by an angle of elevation unknown in any other European road ; descending break-neck declivities by the side of roaring streams, in the midst of forests of matchless beauty, surmounted by romantic peaks, starting up into endless fantastic forms, six or seven thousand feet in height, they possess a degree of interest to the lover of the picturesque, exceeding even the far-famed passage of the Simplon. The most ardent imagination, furnished with the widest recollection of romantic scenery, can figure nothing approaching to the sublimity of the defile of Strub, where the road, apparently blocked up by a wall of rock two thousand feet in height, is cut through a narrow passage beside the roaring stream, and then winds its devious way amidst overhanging forests of dark pine, intermingled with huge crags of brilliant colours, and surmounted by bare peaks silvered with snow. The most beautiful points in the vast amphitheatre of the Alps, as the author can testify, after having visited most parts of them, are the valley of Berchtolsgaden ; the Konigsee and defile of Strub, near Salzburg ; the Via Mala in the Grisons ; the defile of Gondo on the route of the Simplon ; the valley of Gasteren and Oeschinen in the vale of Kandersteg, near the Gemmi ; and the approach to the Grande Chartreuse in Savoy.—*Personal Observation.*

CHAP. formidable defences in the tremendous defile of Strub
LV.

1809. were forced, and the Tyrolese driven, combating all the way up the frightful gorges of the Achen, back to the neighbourhood of Worgl. There they stood firm, as they were reinforced by Chastellar with a few thousand regular troops; but on the same day, intelligence arrived that the passes of the Inn, at the entrance of the plain, had been forced by Deroy with another Bavarian division, the Thierseebach crossed, and that the enemy's outposts had already appeared before Kufstein.¹

¹ Pel. iii.
99, 100.
Barth. 138,
142. Gesch.
A. Hofer,
157, 159.

Combats at
Feuer Sin-
ger and
Worgl.

Finding himself thus threatened both from the side of Salzburg and Kufstein, Chastellar, who had only three thousand regular troops at his disposal, the remainder being a body of as many Tyrolese peasants, without any other discipline than what they had acquired in their native valleys, resolved to take the initiative, and combat Lefebvre in the first instance, before Deroy came up. With this view, he occupied the defile of Feuer Singer, which lies between the ravines of the Achen and the pass of Strub, and strengthened the gorge with some rude field-works: but the impetuous attack of the Bavarians, flushed with the victory of Abensberg, overcame every obstacle, and the Austrians, after a bloody struggle, were driven back at the point of the bayonet to their reserves, posted at the important position of Worgl. Stationed there behind a rivulet, in a situation which commanded the junction of the roads from Kufstein and Salzburg, and barred the only access to Innspruck, Chastellar stood firm, and, with four thousand regular troops and six thousand peasants, gave battle to the enemy. The open and desolate plain of Worgl, however, was unfavourable to the operations of the new levies,

who were dispirited at finding themselves driven into the open country from the fastnesses which they had deemed impregnable; and their total want of cavalry rendered them incapable of opposing with success the numerous and powerful squadrons of Linange. The Bavarians were greatly superior in number, being eighteen thousand strong, with thirty pieces of cannon, while the united Tyrolese and Austrians did not amount to half that number. After a short combat, the Austrians were entirely defeated, with the loss of all their baggage, ammunition, and guns, seven in number; which, with five hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the enemy.

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1809.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 157,
159. Pel.
iii. 101,
102. Barth.
¹ 142, 148.

Nothing now remained to prevent the conquest of the Lower Innthal by the Bavarians; and if they had pushed on with vigour and rapidity, they might have struck a seasonable terror into the insurgents by the capture of their principal leaders and magazines at Innsbruck. But they advanced so tardily that they gave the Tyrolese time to recover from their consternation; reinforcements poured down from the Brenner, and the mountains of Scharnitz, to the fugitives from Worgl; and Chastellar, who narrowly escaped being made prisoner by the enemy, met with Hormayer at Steinach, and concerted measures for future operations. Slowly moving up the valley of the Inn, Lefebvre found the resistance of the people increase with every step he advanced: Schwatz was only carried by assault after a desperate resistance, and burnt, in the struggle, to the ground. Frightful atrocities marked the steps of the invaders; the Bavarians wreaking their vengeance on the unhappy peasants, for the real or imaginary injuries they had received, by the perpetration of the most revolting military cruelties. Old men, women, and

Innsbruck
taken by
the Bava-
rians.
May 19.

- CHAP. LV.
1809.
- children, were massacred indiscriminately; and every village, from which a shot had issued, committed to the flames. Mean-while, Chastellar, who had been strongly irritated at the Tyrolese, on account of the furious conduct of some drunken peasants at Hall, who tried to pull him from his horse from indignation at his retreat, had repassed the Brenner, and the Innthal was again reduced to its own resources.
- May 14.
- May 19.
- ¹ Moniteur, June 8, 1809. Pel. iii. 104, 106. Gesch. A. Hofer, 158, 165.
- On the 19th, Lefebvre appeared before Innspruck, which submitted without resistance; the minds even of the heroic leaders of the insurrection being stunned by the misfortunes which were now accumulating around them on all sides; and justly considering a prolonged resistance hopeless after Vienna had opened its gates to the enemy, and the Archduke John had evacuated the Carinthian mountains.^{1*}

Affairs in Tyrol were now well-nigh desperate; for, at the very time when these disasters were accu-

* The Archduke John, on occasion of his first disaster on the Piave, on 30th April, wrote to Hofer in these words:—"Do not allow the misfortunes of Germany to make you uneasy: we have done our duty, and will defend the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Salzburg, to the last drop of our blood. It is in that fortress, aided by our brave mountaineers, that we ought to conquer or die, for the glory of our ancestors and our arms—*I shall not retire to Hungary.*" And on 3d May he wrote to Chastellar:—"Our misfortunes in Germany have obliged me to abandon the offensive, and to direct my attention to the provinces, which are of so much consequence to Austria. Do not be alarmed: the Tyrol shall never be forsaken: *I will defend it and the interior of Austria to the last extremity.*" It would have been well for the Archduke John, and the Austrian monarchy, if he had adhered to these resolutions, and thrown himself into Tyrol, when obliged to evacuate Italy by the disasters at Bavaria; as in that case he would have been in a situation to have taken part in the important and probably decisive operation projected by the Archduke Charles at Lintz, on the 22d May, and protected the interior of the monarchy as effectually as under the ramparts of Vienna. Instead of this, he at once disobeyed his brother's orders, and those of the Aulic Council, and violated his own promises by retiring into Hungary, and thereby not only caused the whole fruits of the battle of Aspern to be lost, but saved Napoleon from a disastrous retreat.¹

¹ Gesch. A. Hofer, 140, 141.

mulating on the north of the Brenner, a strong French force of fifteen thousand men, under Baraguay D'Hilliers, and Rusca, detached by Eugene after his victory on the Piave, to which the peasants, now stript of the regular troops for the defence of the Innthal, had nothing to oppose, was rapidly advancing up the valley of the Adige, and had already occupied Roveredo and menaced Trent. Chastellar, despairing of success, had made arrangements for leaving the country; and Hormayer, who, with unshaken resolution, was still endeavouring to rouse the peasantry in the lateral valleys of the Innthal, found them in most places indignant at the retreat of the Austrians, and fast returning to their homes. General Buol, indeed, with two thousand five hundred men and six guns, still occupied the crest of the Brenner: but he was in a wretched condition, starving with cold, destitute of ammunition, and almost without provisions. In these mournful circumstances, it was the invincible tenacity of the peasantry in the upper Innthal, and elevated parts of the Brenner and Scharnitz ranges of mountains, which restored the fortunes of the campaign. Eisensticken, aide-de-camp to Hofer, Spechbacher, and Friar Haspinger, vied with each other in the indefatigable ardour with which they roused the people; and even the first fell himself on his knees to General Buol, when he was preparing to abandon the Brenner, and by the vehemence of his entreaties, prevailed upon him to keep his ground on that important position. Hofer, who, in the first instance, was thrown into the deepest dejection by the misfortunes impending over his country, and rendered incapable of active exertion, was roused by their example to nobler efforts, and appearing at the head of his peasants, forced the

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

Desperate
state of
affairs in
Tyrol, and
firmness of
the peasant-
try.

CHAP. Passeyrthal, commenced a fierce attack on the Ba-
 LV. varians at Presberg, near Mount Isel, which, al-
 1809. though unsuccessful, struck no small alarm into the
 May 25. enemy, from the gallantry with which it was con-
 ducted. This combat renewed the warlike ardour
 of the Tyrolese, who flocked from all quarters in
 great strength to the general place of gathering on
 Mount Isel, which ancient prophecy led them to
 expect was to be the theatre of great events to the
 Tyrol: while Lefebvre, who deemed the affairs of
 the provinces settled by the capture of Innspruck,
 and submission of the authorities in that place, had
 set out for Salzburg, leaving Deroy at the capital
 with eight thousand foot, eight hundred horse, and
 twenty piece of cannon.¹

¹ Pel. iii.
 106, 107;
 iv. 31, 32.
 Gesch. A.
 Hofer, 217,
 229. Barth.
 138, 150.

Prepara-
 tions for
 the battle
 of Inn-
 spruck.
 May 28.

¹ Pel. iv.
 31. Gesch.
 A. Hofer,
 231, 232.
 Schoell.
 Hist. des
 Trait. de
 Paix, 9, 257.
 Erz. Johan.
 Feldzug,
 1809, 162.

The forces engaged on the 29th May, on the
 heights of Mount Isel, were, in numerical strength,
 very unequal: the Tyrolese having nine hundred
 infantry, seventy horse, and five guns of the Aus-
 trian troops, besides a motley assemblage of peasants,
 to the number of twenty thousand men; individually
 brave and skilled in the use of arms, but altogether
 undisciplined and unaccustomed to act together in
 large masses; while the Bavarians had only eight
 thousand foot, eight hundred horse, and twenty-five
 guns. The numerical superiority, however, of the
 former was fully counterbalanced by their great in-
 feriority in discipline, cavalry, and artillery, so that
 the real military strength of both sides might be
 considered as very nearly equal. Hofer did his best
 to compensate his weakness in cavalry, by stationing
 his followers, as much as possible, in the wooded
 heights at the foot of Mount Isel, where horsemen
 could not penetrate:¹ but the town was not to be car-
 ried by such a blockade, and the impetuous spirit of

the peasantry led them to demand an immediate assault. Their spirits had been elevated to the highest degree by the intelligence of the battle of Aspern, which had been communicated with extraordinary rapidity to the most secluded valleys, and by a proclamation issued by the Emperor Francis the day after that glorious event, dated Breitenlee, 23d May, in which he solemnly engaged "never to lay down his arms till Tyrol was reunited to the Austrian monarchy." *

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1809.

The attack on Innspruck was combined with more military skill than could have been anticipated from the untutored character of the leaders by whom it was conducted. Spechbacher, who, in spite of the utmost vigilance of the Bavarians, had contrived to warn the peasants on both sides of the Inn of the approaching gathering,† menaced the bridge of Hall, and the line of retreat down the valley of the Inn from the northern side, while Colonel Ressenfels co-operated in the same direction from the southern valleys, by a descent along the right bank of the Sill and attack on the castle of Ambras; Hofer descended with all the strength of the southern and central

Battle of
Innspruck,
and total
defeat of the
Bavarians.
May 29.

* Hofer addressed the following characteristic letter to the inhabitants of the Upper Innthal:—"Dear brethren of the Upper Innthal! For God, the Emperor, and our Fatherland! To-morrow, early in the morning, is fixed for the attack. With the help of the blessed Virgin we will seize and destroy the Bavarians, and confide ourselves to the beloved Jesus. Come to our assistance: but if you fancy yourselves wiser than Divine Providence, we will do without you.—ANDREW HOFER."—GESCH. A. HOFER, 238.

The proclamation of the Emperor Francis to the Tyrolese, dated 1st June, 1809, bore—"Operations at all points are about to recommence: I will send you a helping hand. We will combat together for our country and our religion. Your noble conduct has sunk deep into my heart: *I will never abandon you.* The Archduke John will speedily be amongst you, and put himself at your head."—ERZHER. JOHANNES *Feldzug in Jahre 1809*, 162.

† See note C.

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

valleys of Tyrol, from the Brenner and Mount Isel ; while Teimer, with a small band of six hundred resolute followers, was sent by a circuitous route to the heights of Hottingen on the north of the town, and in the rear of the Bavarians, to make his appearance in the middle of the action, and spread terror among the enemy, from the belief that they were beset on all sides. Thus the battle consisted of a variety of detached combats in different directions around Innspruck, contemporary with the now furious struggle at the foot of Mount Isel, between the main body of the combatants on either side. By daybreak, Spechbacher was at the post assigned to him, and amidst loud shouts, carried the important bridge of Hall with such vigour, that it gained for him the surname of "*Der Feur-Teufel*," the *Fire Devil*. The castle of Ambras soon after yielded to the impetuous assault of Reissenfels, and the whole right bank of the Sill was cleared of the enemy ; but they long held their ground at the bridge of Passberg, commanding the passage of that torrent by the great road on the south of the Inn. From this position, however, they were at length driven about noon, by the more skilled attacks of Captain Dobrawa ; and the left flank of the enemy being thus completely turned, and their retreat down the Inn cut off, they were thrown back in great disorder to the village and abbey of Wilten.¹

¹ Gesch. A. Hofer, 240, 245. Barth. 192, 196. Inglis, ii. 183.

Bloody
action of
Spech-
bacher and
Haspinger.

While affairs were proceeding so prosperously on the east of Innspruck, a more dubious conflict was raging in the centre and on the left, at the foot of Mount Isel. Haspinger, with a huge wooden cross in his hand, here led on the attack, and animated his followers not less by his example, than the assurances of Divine protection which he held forth ; he was

followed by Colonel Ertel with the most disciplined part of the Tyrolese, two thousand strong; while Hofer, with the peasants of the Passeyrthal, descended from Mount Isel by the great road direct upon Innspruck; his brave but tumultuous array shouting aloud,—for God, and the Emperor, and our Fatherland! * The outposts of the enemy were speedily driven in by the superior numbers and unerring aim of the Tyrolese riflemen; but when they advanced out of the woods and broken knolls to the open ground in front of the town, where the Bavarians were drawn up in line in admirable order, the usual superiority of discipline and organization became apparent, and the peasants were driven back. Rallying, however, among the rocks and thickets, they again poured down a destructive shower of balls on their assailants, and both sides maintained the contest with the most undaunted resolution. The ammunition of the Tyrolese, with which they were very scantily provided, at length began to fail; they were compelled to reserve their fire till it could be given with decisive effect; and balls could be obtained only by the women and children,† who picked up those of the enemy which fell in the rear of the

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1809.

* “Fur Gott, den Kaiser, und Vaterland.”

† Spechbacher was attended in the battle by his little son Andrew, a boy of ten years of age. When the fire grew warm, his father ordered him to quit the field; the boy did so, but soon returned, and was again at his side. Irritated at this disobedience, Spechbacher struck him, and ordered him to withdraw. He did so; but, without retiring out of reach of the shot, observed where they struck the ground, and bringing his hat full of them next morning to his father, begged that they might be used against the enemy. The wounded in this battle refused to be carried from the field, lest those who conveyed them to a place of safety should weaken the combatants; and numbers of women throughout the day were to be seen behind the ranks, bringing up ammunition, water, and refreshments to the wearied men. See BARTH, *Krieg* 1809, 204–216; GESCH. A. HOFER, 248.

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combatants. In this anxious moment, Teimer's bands appeared on the heights of Hottingen in the rear of the Bavarians ; and though their attack was restrained by the troops which Deroy sent to oppose his progress, yet this circumstance, joined to the disastrous accounts of the progress of Spechbacher on the left, determined Deroy to retreat. At four in the afternoon, a sort of suspension of arms was agreed to by the leaders on both sides ; and as soon as it was dark the Bavarians commenced their retreat by the left bank of the Inn, and evacuating Innspruck and the great road, withdrew by mountain paths amidst rocks and forests to Kufstein, from whence they continued their march to Rosenheim in the Bavarian plains.¹

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 238,
249.

Barth. 202,
212. Inglis,
ii. 183,

184. Pel.
iv. 34, 36.

Bavarian
Account of
battle,
Moniteur,
June 22,
1809.

Results of
these vic-
tories in the
entire de-
liverance of
Tyrol.

In this battle the Bavarians lost four thousand men ; but, what was of still more importance, they were deprived by it of the possession of the whole Tyrol. Intoxicated with joy, the peasants crowded into Innspruck in such numbers, that they were an oppression, rather than a source of strength, to the Austrian commanders, who were totally destitute of ammunition or military arms for the ardent multitude. A proclamation was immediately issued, calling on all persons to bring forth their little stores of money and powder for the use of the troops, and considerable supplies were obtained in this way, though in no degree proportionate to the wants of the people. The desperate struggle in the heart of Austria required every sabre and bayonet around the walls of Vienna ; the intervening country was all in the hands of the enemy, and not a dollar or a gun could be obtained from that quarter. Such, however, was the native vigour of the inhabitants, that without any external aid, or the support of regular troops, they

not only cleared their territory of the enemy, but carried their incursions into the adjoining provinces of Swabia, Bavaria, and Lombardy. On the west, the peasantry of the Vorarlberg repulsed a body of French and Wirtemburghers who attempted to penetrate into Bregentz; on the east, Chastellar, who had collected four thousand regular troops, raised the blockade of Sachsenburg, and drove the enemy back to Villach; in the south, Leinengen cleared the whole valley of Trent of the enemy, and then turning to the left, descended the defile of the Val Sugana, and made himself master of Bassano at the entrance of the plains of Treviso. Returning from thence to the banks of the Adige, he threw himself into the castle of Trent, where he was soon besieged by a division of Eugene's Italian army. The landsturm of the upper Adige, however, flew to his relief; the Italians, overwhelmed by numbers, retired with considerable loss to Dolce, and the whole valley of the Adige, as far as Verona, was cleared of the enemy. The Vorarlberg followed the example of Tyrol; all the valleys took up arms, and seven thousand well-armed marksmen, besides a landsturm of equal force, carried terror and devastation over all the adjacent provinces of Germany. Moeskirch and Memmingen were successively occupied, and laid under contribution; Constance fell into their hands; their victorious bands appeared even at the gates of Munich and Augsburg; and, in conjunction with the inhabitants of Swabia, who were highly discontented with the exactions and tyranny of the French troops, delivered no less than seventeen thousand of the prisoners taken at Echmuhl, Ebersberg, and Vienna, who found refuge in the valleys of Tyrol, and were speedily formed into fresh battalions. To the south of the

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June 3.

June 6.

June 9.

June 29.

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¹ Pel. iv.
38, 39.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 218.
Gesch. A.
Hofer, 259,
277. Barth.
212, 220.

Alps, Bassano, Belluno, Feltre, were repeatedly in their possession ; they communicated with the Austrian regulars in Carniola ; levied contributions to the gates of Verona, Brescia, and Como ; and, spreading the flame of insurrection from the Black Forest to the plains of Lombardy, and from Salzburg to the Grisons, soon had twenty thousand infantry and eight hundred horse, regularly organized and equipped, under arms, besides a still greater number of brave men, undisciplined, indeed, but skilled in the use of arms, ready, in case of invasion, to defend their native valleys.¹

While this heroic contest was going forward in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the generous flame had extended to the north of Germany, and the indignant feelings of an insulted people had well-nigh induced a general revolt against the French authority in Saxony and Westphalia.

Rise of the
insurrection
in the north
of Ger-
many.

It has been already mentioned with what ardent though inconsiderate enthusiasm the people of Prussia had rushed into the contest in 1806, and what oppressive burdens were laid upon them after its disastrous termination.* Since that time the continued presence of the French troops, and the enormous plunder levied by their command under the name of contributions, had still further spread the flame of discontent : dear bought experience had dispelled all the illusion in favour of French principles, and the people were no where so ready to throw off the yoke as in those principalities where separate thrones had been erected in favour of members of the Buonaparte family. Such was the weight of the oppression under which they laboured, that the rami-

* Ante, v. 708, and vi. 445.

fications of a secret and most formidable insurrection were spread over all the north of Germany. The ancient Gothic blood, slow to warm, but enduring in purpose, was everywhere inflamed; the feeling of patriotism, a sense of duty, the precepts of religion, all concurred to rouse a disposition to resistance; the selfish mourned over the visible decrease of their substance under the withering contributions of Napoleon; the generous over the degradation of their country, and the slavery of the human race. Everywhere the Tugendbund was in activity: Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Westphalia, in an especial manner, were agitated from the enormous weight of the burdens imposed on their inhabitants by the French government. Twenty thousand disbanded soldiers were scattered over the former dominions of England in the German empire, ready, at the first signal, to compose an army; as many ardent and discontented spirits existed in Cassel and Westphalia, awaiting only the first success of the Austrian arms to declare openly in their behalf. From the Thuringian forest to the banks of the Vistula, from the Bohemian mountains to the shores of the Baltic, the threads of a vast association existed, held together by the sacred bond of patriotism, to devote themselves to their fatherland. Though the court of Berlin did not venture openly to fan the flame, yet in secret they could not but wish for its success; and several of the most energetic members of the cabinet awaited only the advance of the Austrian banners to urge Frederic William to join the great confederacy for European freedom.¹

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¹ Hard. x.

325, 326.

Pel. iii. 10,

13. Ann.

Reg. 1809,

212, 213.

It was chiefly with a view to give support and consistency to this enthusiastic spirit that the grand Austrian army, in the opening of the campaign, ad-

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Its first out-
break on the
approach of
the Austrian
grand army.

April 3.

April 23.

vanced towards Bareuth and Franconia ; and it was owing to the unfortunate abandonment of that design, and the return of great part of these troops, when already on the borders of Franconia, to the banks of the Inn, that the early disasters of the campaign, as already noticed, were owing.* Two of the Arch-duke's corps were far advanced towards the Rhine, and could not be recalled in time to share in the battles of Abensberg and Echmuhl ; while the concentrated masses of Napoleon were thrown upon the Imperial army, weakened in the centre by the advance of the van in one direction, and the retreat of the rear in another. But this early irruption of the Austrians towards Franconia and Saxony excited a prodigious sensation in the adjoining provinces under the immediate control of the French authorities ; and early in April, a spark blew up the flame on the banks of the Elbe. Katt, a Prussian officer, had the honour of first raising the standard of independence in the north of Germany ; but the effort was premature, and having failed in an attempt upon Magdeburg, he was compelled, by the active pursuit of the Westphalian horse, to take refuge in the Prussian states. The next outbreak took place three weeks after, when Dornberg, the colonel of a regiment of Westphalian horse, was commanded by King Jerome to march against a body of insurgents. Conceiving himself discovered, he left his colours and put himself at their head. Evincing, in these critical circumstances, a spirit worthy of his family, though far beyond his ordinary character, Jerome assembled his guards, two thousand strong, and assuring them that he confided in their honour, and threw himself upon their support, succeeded in attaching even the most

* Ante, vii. 240.

disaffected, by the bond of military honour, to his cause. Eble, the minister at war, and Rewbell, governor of Cassel, displayed the greatest vigour and firmness of character; and by their energetic measures saved the kingdom when on the verge of destruction, and prevented a general insurrection breaking out in the north of Germany. Dornberg, at the head of several thousand insurgents, marched upon the capital; but having been encountered near its gates by a part of the garrison, whom he was unable to bring to a parley, his undisciplined followers were dispersed by a few discharges of cannon, and he himself fled with a few followers to the Hartz mountains. His papers were seized at Homberg, and among them were some which compromised several persons in the service of other powers, particularly SCHILL, at that time a colonel in the Prussian army.¹

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¹ Pel. iii.
14, 19.
Hard. x.
326. Jom.
iii. 232.

This enthusiastic officer, an ardent member of the Tugendbund, and heart and soul devoted to his fatherland, was the first Prussian officer who had entered Berlin, at the head of a native force, after its evacuation by the French troops; and the impression made upon his mind by the universal transports which prevailed on that occasion had never been effaced. His intentions were fixed; but the ardour of his disposition was tempered by a rare prudence, and but for the accidental discovery of his name among the papers of Dornberg, his enterprise would in all probability have been delayed till the period for its successful prosecution had arrived. Almost every day he led his regiment out of Berlin, in full marching order, to reviews, marches, and mock fights, which so completely imposed upon the ministers of Russia, France, and Westphalia, that with all their

Enterprise
and early
success of
Schill.

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April 29.

vigilance, they never suspected him of being engaged in any sinister design, while his engaging manners and martial qualities rendered him the idol of the soldiers under his command. Denounced, at length, by the King of Westphalia to the King of Prussia, who was then at Königsberg, he was summoned by the latter to the royal presence to give an account of his conduct. Perceiving now that he was discovered, he boldly threw off the mask; marched at the head of six hundred men out of Berlin, under pretence of going to manœuvre, and at once erected the standard of war against France. He was speedily reinforced by three hundred more, who joined him during the night; the whole inhabitants of the capital applauded his conduct; and such was the ferment in the garrison, that it was with the utmost difficulty that they could be prevented from proceeding in a body to his standard. The cabinet of Berlin, whatever may have been their secret wishes, were too much overawed by the influence of Napoleon, and the intelligence recently received of his astonishing victories in Bavaria, to sanction this hazardous proceeding. Schill was indicted for disobedience of orders, and outlawed for non-appearance; and Lestocq, Tauenzien, and Scharnhorst, who were known to be at the head of the war party, sent in their resignation. The two former were brought to trial, but acquitted; there being no evidence to connect them with Schill's enterprise.¹

¹ Hard. x.
327, 328.
Pel. iii. 17,
23. Jom.
iii. 233,
234. Thib.
vii. 274.

Mean-while, Schill, having collected about twelve hundred men, presented himself before Wittemberg, where there was known to be a considerable magazine of arms and ammunition; but he was refused admittance by the governor. He next moved towards Magdeburg, which, at that period, was garrisoned

Fails in his
attempt on
Magdeburg
—retires to
Stralsund.

only by two companies of French, and three of Westphalian voltigeurs. Had he succeeded in gaining possession of that important fortress, all the north of Germany would have been in a blaze; for it contained five hundred pieces of cannon and a hundred and twenty thousand stand of arms, besides ammunition in proportion; and the news of so vast an acquisition would speedily have brought thirty thousand men to his standards, whom its impregnable ramparts would have given the means of disciplining in security. It is the more to be regretted that he did not attempt a *coup de main* against it, as the urban guards would speedily have given him the means of defending its walls, and numerous partisans within the town were already prepared to favour his entrance. Ignorant, however, of these propitious circumstances, he turned aside upon the first appearance of resistance, at the distance of a mile from the glacis, and retired to Domitz on the other side of the Elbe; having by an equally unfortunate accident diverged from the Hartz mountains, where he would have united with the remains of Dornberg's corps, which had taken refuge in their fastnesses, and together, formed a body of disciplined men, adequate to the encounter of the whole forces of Westphalia, which, at that period, contained hardly two thousand regular soldiers. His unfortunate direction, however, down the Elbe, deluded by the hope of obtaining succour from the English cruisers on the coast, led him faraway from all assistance; and, at length, being pursued, though slowly, and at a respectful distance, by a considerable body of Dutch and Westphalian troops, he threw himself into Stralsund, of which he gained possession without much resistance, the greater part of the garrison having joined his standard.¹

CHAP.
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1809.

May 7.

May 25.

Pel. iii.

23, 31.

Jom. iii.

234. Hard.

x. 330,

331. Ann.

Reg. 1809,

213.

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1809.

His pro-
spects there.

He was now at length in a renowned fortress, abundantly provided with provisions, and communicating with the sea ; the isle of Rugen seemed to offer a secure asylum in case of disaster, and he had the good fortune, the day after his arrival, to capture a convoy of seven hundred barrels of powder, on its road to Denmark. But its defences had been almost entirely dismantled, by order of Napoleon : only twenty rusty guns were mounted on the ramparts ; the palisades were levelled with the ground ; and the ditches, half choked up by luxuriant vegetation, presented hardly any obstacle to an enemy. Still Schill had considerable means of resistance at his disposal : his troops had swelled to two thousand infantry and twelve squadrons of cavalry ; two companies had been formed of students from the universities, armed, as yet, only with pikes ; and the landwehr of Pomerania, five thousand strong, might be expected to augment his forces, if he could hold out for a few days, in order to give them time to assemble. Where, where was England then ? A single brig, with her pendant, would have inspired such spirit into the garrison, as would have rendered them invincible : three thousand men, and a few frigates, would have rendered Stralsund the base of an insurrection which would speedily have spread over the whole of northern Germany, determined the irresolution of Prussia, thrown eighty thousand men on Napoleon's line of communication, and driven him to a disastrous retreat from Aspern to the Rhine. But the English government, as usual, insensible to the value of time in war, had made no preparation to turn to good account this universal demonstration in their favour in the north of Germany ; and, as with the Vendéans at Grandville,*

* Ante ii. 242.

in 1793, did not appear on the theatre till the standards of their allies had sunk in the conflict. In vain all eyes were turned towards the ocean : in vain every steeple was crowded with gazers, anxiously surveying with telescopes, the distant main : not a friendly sail appeared, not a pendant of England brought hope and consolation to the besieged.¹

Deprived of the hoped-for succour, on which he had mainly relied in directing his steps to the sea-coast, Schill did all that prudence and energy could effect to strengthen his position. Palisades were hastily erected ; the vicinity of the gates armed ; barricades thrown up behind the breaches, and in the streets ; and the external defences put in some sort of order. But, before his preparations could be completed, the hand of fate was upon him. The French authorities, now every where thoroughly alive to the dangers of this insurrection, made the most vigorous efforts to crush it in the bud : troops marched from all sides to the neighbourhood of Stralsund ; the Dutch and Danish soldiers were united to all the French who could be hastily drawn together ; and, on the 31st May, General Gratien, with six thousand men, commenced the assault. The patriots made a gallant defence ; but the dismantled walls presented huge breaches on all sides, through which, despite the utmost resistance, the assailants penetrated, and the interior barricades were forced. Still every street was obstinately contested. The result was yet doubtful, when Schill was killed, and his heroic band disheartened, and, without a leader after his loss, dispersed. The insurrection in the north of Germany was extinguished ; and, on the same day on which General Gratien had hoisted the French colours on the walls, the English cruisers approached the harbour.¹ Ar-

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

¹ Pel. iii.

34. Hard.

x. 330.

Jom. iii.

234.

His defeat
and death.

May 31.

¹ Pel. iii.

35. Hard.

x. 330,

331. Jom.

iii. 234.

Ann. Reg.

1809, 213.

CHAP. rived a few hours sooner, the place had been secured,
 LV. the insurrection spread over the whole north of Ger-
 1809. many, and Wagram had been Leipsic! Such is the
 value of time in war.

Movement
 of the Duke
 of Brunsw-
 wick.
 May 4.

May 22.

¹ Ann. Reg.
 1809, 213.
 Pel. iii. 26.
 Jom. 235.

The Duke of Brunswick Oels, who, at the same time that Schill left Berlin, had, with a small Austrian force, advanced out of the Bohemian frontier, and made himself master of Leipsic and other considerable towns in Saxony, being unable to effect a junction, either with Schill or Dornberg, and surrounded by superior forces, was obliged to retire by Zittau into Bohemia, from whence, after the battle of Wagram, he contrived to make his way across all the north of Germany, and was ultimately taken on board the English cruisers, and conveyed, with his black legion, still two thousand strong, to the British shores. The insurrection was thus every where suppressed: but such was the impression which it produced upon Napoleon, that the whole corps of Kellerman, thirty thousand strong, which otherwise would have been called up to the support of the grand army, was directed to the north of Germany.¹

Operations
 in Poland,
 and their
 object, by
 the Arch-
 duke Fer-
 dinand.

This gigantic contest stained also the waters of the Vistula with blood. It has been already mentioned,* that the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of a corps of the Austrian army, mustering in all thirty-two thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, with ninety-six guns, was destined to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, at the same time that the Archduke Charles crossed the Inn, and the Archduke John descended from the Carinthian mountains into the Italian plains. The direction of so considerable a portion of the Imperial troops to a quarter, where

* Ante, vii. 240.

their operations could have no immediate effect upon the issue of the campaign, at a time when it might easily have been foreseen that the whole force of Napoleon would be hurled at once at the heart of the monarchy, might justly be stigmatized as a serious fault on the part of the Austrian cabinet, if military operations and consequences alone were taken into consideration. But this was very far indeed from being the case. Throughout the whole contest, the military preparations of the cabinet of Vienna were justly considered as subordinate to their political measures; and it was chiefly in consequence of the former being unsuccessful that the latter miscarried. The monarchy was well aware that the moment they threw down the gauntlet, the whole military force which Napoleon could command would be directed with consummate skill against the centre of their power. They could not hope, even with the aid of English subsidies, to be successful in the crippled state of the monarchy, in resisting so formidable an invasion, unless they succeeded in rousing other nations to engage with them in the contest. To effect this, early and imposing success was requisite; something which should counterbalance the prevailing and far spread terror of the French arms, and induce neutral or semi-hostile cabinets to forget their divisions, and incur the risk of venturing boldly for the cause of general freedom. It was to attain this object that all the military demonstrations of the cabinet of Vienna at that period were directed: the march of the Archduke Charles towards Franconia and Bareuth was intended to determine the hesitation of the Rhenish confederacy, and rouse the numerous malecontents of Westphalia, Hanover, and Cassel, into action; that

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1809.

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¹ Jom. iii.
237, 238.
Pel. iii. 46,
48. Thib.
vii. 310.

Forces of
the Grand
Duchy of
Warsaw.
Success of
Ferdinand,
and fall of
Warsaw.

of the Archduke John and Chastellar, to spread the flame of insurrection through the plains of Italy and the mountains of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Not less important than either of these, in its political consequences, the advance of the Archduke Ferdinand, with an imposing force to Warsaw, would, it was hoped, at once paralyse the strength of Saxony, the only sincere ally of Napoleon among the native German powers, by depriving it of all aid from its Polish possessions; offer a rallying point to the numerous discontented in that kingdom; afford an inducement to Prussia to join the common cause, by securing its rear and holding out the prospect of regaining its valuable Polish provinces; and, at the same time, give Russia a decent pretence for avoiding any active part in the contest by the apparent necessity of providing against hostilities on her own frontier; a pretext, of which there was reason to hope the cabinet of St Peterburg, despite the French alliance, would not be unwilling to take advantage.¹

The army, of which PRINCE PONIATOWSKY had the direction, in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was not equal to the encounter of so considerable a force as the Austrians now directed against him. Great activity, indeed, had been displayed since the peace of Tilsit, in organizing an effective force in that recently acquired possession of the house of Saxony, and three legions of infantry, commanded by Poniatowsky, Zayoncheck, and Dombrowsky, formed a total force of twenty-two thousand men, including nearly six thousand excellent cavalry. But great part of these troops were newly levied, and had not yet acquired an adequate degree of military efficiency; the territory they had to guard, extending from Dantzic to Cracow, was extensive; and the flower

of the Polish troops were in Napoleon's Imperial guard, or in distant hostilities in the Spanish Peninsula. The French Emperor, moreover, relying on the invasion of the Austrian province of Galicia by the Russian forces, had not only made no dispositions to support the Grand Duchy with external aid, but retained the Saxons under Bernadotte for immediate support to the grand army on the Bohemian frontier, so that Poniatowsky found himself with not more than twelve thousand disposable troops in front of Warsaw, exposed to the attacks of triple that number of enemies. That renowned leader, however, who, to an ardent love of his country, united the most profound hatred of the strangers by whom it had been despoiled, and military talents of no ordinary kind, matured in the best school, that of misfortune, resolved to stand firm with this inconsiderable body, and without invoking or trusting to the aid of the Russians, more hateful as allies than the Austrians as enemies, to rely on their own valour alone for the defence of the capital. He drew up his little army at Raszyn with considerable skill, and for four hours opposed a gallant resistance to the enemy; but the contest was too unequal, between thirty thousand regular soldiers and twelve thousand men in great part recently levied; and he was at length obliged to retire, with the loss of five hundred killed, a thousand wounded, and four pieces of cannon. Warsaw was now uncovered; and as Poniatowsky found himself unable to man the extensive works which had been begun for its defence, he was compelled, with bitter regret, to sign a capitulation, in virtue of which he was permitted to evacuate the capital, which, two days afterwards, was occupied by the Austrian troops.¹

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

April 19.

April 21.

April 23.

Pel. iii.

55, 63.

Jom. iii.

237, 238.

Ogintha, ii.

358.

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1809.

Skilful mea-
sures of
Poniatow-
sky to pro-
long the
contest in
the Grand
Duchy.

May 15.

May 14.

Accompanied by the senate, authorities, and principal inhabitants of Warsaw, Poniatowsky retired to the right bank of the Vistula, and took up a position between Modlin and Sicrock, on the Bug. The capital presented a mournful appearance on the entrance of the Imperialists; and in the melancholy countenances of the citizens, might be seen how deep seated was the national feeling, which, notwithstanding all the political insanity of the people which had subverted their independence, still longed for that first of blessings. This direction of the march of Poniatowsky was conceived with considerable skill, and had a powerful influence upon the fate of the campaign; for the Austrians had calculated upon his retiring to Saxony and abandoning the Grand Duchy to its fate; whereas the continuance of the Polish troops in the centre of that country, both evinced a determination to defend to the last extremity, and kept alive the spirit of the inhabitants, by the assurance which it held out that they would not be deserted. The first care of Poniatowsky was to put these two important fortresses in a respectable posture of defence; and having done so, he boldly, by the directions of Napoleon, left the enemy in possession of the capital and three-fourths of the territory of the Grand Duchy, and threw himself upon the right bank of the Vistula, remounting that stream, towards Gallicia, whither Prince Gallitzin, at the head of twenty thousand auxiliary Russians, was slowly bending his steps. Mean-while, the Archduke Ferdinand more rapidly descended the left bank, and in the middle of May appeared before Thorn. In the course of this movement, Poniatowsky obtained intelligence that an Austrian division had crossed over to the right bank of the Vistula,¹ and lay unsupported

at Ostroweck in front of Gora. Rapidly concentrating a superior force, he suddenly attacked the enemy, routed him, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. Thus the opposing armies mutually passed and crossed each other: Poniatowsky, relying on the support of the Russians, menaced Gallicia and the Austrian provinces, while the Austrians penetrated to the lower Vistula, raised the standard of insurrection in the old Prussian provinces, and threatened Dantzic itself.¹

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LV.

1809.

¹ Pel. iii.

63, 71.

Thib. vii.

309, 310.

Jom. iv.

238.

An event occurred, in the course of this expedition of the Archduke Ferdinand's light troops across the Vistula, attended in the end with more important consequences than any other in the Polish campaign. In pursuing the Austrians on the right flank of the river, a courier was taken by the Poles with despatches from the Russian general Gortchakoff, who lay with his division at Brzysc, to the Archduke, in which he congratulated him on his victory at Raszyn, and capture of Warsaw, expressed hopes for his ulterior success, and breathed a wish that he might soon join his arms to the Austrian eagles. This letter was immediately forwarded to Napoleon, who received it at Schoenbrunn in the end of May. He was highly indignant at the discovery, and transmitted the letter without delay to St Petersburg, accompanied by a peremptory demand for an explanation. The Russian cabinet hastened to make every reparation in their power; Gortchakoff's letter was disavowed, and he himself re-called from his command, while CZERNICHEFF, aide-de-camp to Alexander, who was the military charge d'affaires for the Czar at the headquarters of the French Emperor, exerted all his skill to remove the unfavourable impression produced by this unlucky discovery. Napoleon, who, after the

Discovery
of the
secret lean-
ing of the
Russians
towards
Austria.

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

¹ Sav. iv.
92, 93.
Pel. iii. 71,
72. Thib.
vii. 310.

battle of Aspern, had no need of another powerful enemy on his hands, feigned to be satisfied, and the approach of the Russian troops to the theatre of war soon after, caused the affair to be hushed up; but the impression made on his mind was never effaced: he saw that the ascendant of Tilsit was at an end, and frequently repeated to those in his immediate confidence, "I see that after all I must make war on Alexander."¹*

Secret nego-
tiation
between
Austria and
Prussia.

The most important political effect, however, which flowed from the battle of Aspern was the commencement of a secret negotiation between Austria and Prussia, which, though from the tardiness of England unsuccessful at that juncture, was not without its effect in future times, and showed that the ancient jealousies which had wrought such wonders for French supremacy, were fast giving way under the pressure of common danger.

Particulars
of its pro-
gress.

Even before that great event, a vague correspondence had been kept up between the two courts; and in consequence of distant overtures transmitted first

* Conversing with Savary on this subject at Ebersdorf, who was, in a peculiar manner, admitted to his inmost thoughts from having been formerly ambassador at St Petersburg, he said, "I was perfectly in the right not to trust to such allies. What worse could have happened if I had not made peace with the Russians? What have I gained by their alliance? It is more than probable that they would have declared openly against me, if a remnant of regard to the faith of treaties had not prevented them. We must not deceive ourselves; they have all fixed a rendezvous on my tomb; but they have not courage openly to set out thither. That the Emperor Alexander should not come to my assistance, is conceivable; but that he should permit Warsaw to be taken in presence almost of his army, is indeed hardly credible; it is plain that I can no longer reckon on an alliance in that quarter. Perhaps he thinks he does me a great favour by not declaring war; by my faith, if I had entertained any doubt on that subject before engaging in the affairs of Spain, I should have cared very little for the part which he took. And yet, after all, they will probably say that I am wanting to my engagements, and cannot remain at peace."—SAVARY, iv. 92, 93.

through the Count de Goltz, and subsequently the Prince of Orange, Colonel Steigenstes¹ had been sent by the cabinet of Vienna to Königsberg, where the King of Prussia then was, with a letter from the Emperor of Austria, in which he earnestly invited that Monarch to declare openly for the common cause, and enter upon a concerted plan of military operations. Early in June, the Emperor of Austria, in reply to a letter of the King of Prussia, wrote to the cabinet of Berlin, announcing that "the bearer was authorized to regulate the proportions of the forces to be employed on both sides, and the other arrangements not less salutary than indispensable for the security of the two states, in conformity with the overtures made by Count de Goltz." The proposals of Colonel Steigenstes² were, that as the war in which they were now engaged was of such a kind as to decide for ever the fate of the respective monarchies, they should mutually support each other by their whole forces; that the general directions of the campaign should be intrusted to the Imperial generalissimo; that they should mutually engage not to conclude a separate negotiation; and that the peace to be ultimately concluded should embrace not only their own but the interests of the adjoining states. These propositions were warmly supported by Scharnhorst and Blücher, and the whole war or patriotic party in the Prussian dominions. The former offered, in a fortnight's time, to have fifty, in a month, a hundred and twenty thousand disciplined soldiers under arms; he assured the King of secret intelligences which would secure for him, on the first signal of hostilities, Magdeburg and several other important fortresses; and strongly supported the justice of Count Stadion's opinion, so clearly expressed in his despatch,³ that the fate of

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

June 8.

¹ Stadion to
Wusserberg,June 9,
1809.

Hard. x.

321, 325.
Thib. vii.

306, 307.

CHAP. Prussia was inseparably wound up with that of
 LV. Austria, and that the two monarchies must stand
 1809. or fall together.

The exorbi-
 tant de-
 mands of
 Prussia
 cause it to
 fail.

On this occasion, the cupidity and exorbitant demands of the Prussian cabinet again marred the prospect of an European alliance, and prolonged, for four years longer, the chains and misery of their country. Still clinging to the idea that victory must be clearly pronounced before they declared themselves, and that they might turn to some good account the dangers and distresses of Austria, the Prussian government replied, that they had every disposition to assist Austria, but that they were in want alike of arms, ammunition, and money; that they could not take a part in the contest till the views of Russia in regard to it were known; and that they must have the guarantee of a treaty for the intentions of Austria, in the event of success, before they took a place by her side. To the envoy of the Imperial government, however, it was insinuated that "a great stroke would determine the irresolutions of the cabinet of Berlin;" but that, in that event, they would expect not merely the restoration of all the Prussian provinces of Poland, but also the *Austrian's share in the partition*, Anspach, Bareuth, a part of Saxony, and various lesser provinces, ceded at different times to France or other powers. It was, of course, beyond Colonel Steigenstes's powers to accede to such extravagant demands; they were referred, with the proposal for a separate treaty, to the cabinet of Vienna; and mean-while, the negotiation, notwithstanding all the care of those engaged in it, to a certain degree transpired;¹ a joint requisition was made by the Ministers of France and Russia for a communication of the proposals of Austria, and although

June 23.

¹Hard. x.

this inconvenient demand was eluded at the moment, Steigenstesch was obliged to quit Berlin, and before diplomatic relations could be established in any other channel, of which the King of Prussia still held out the prospect, the battle of Wagram had taken place, and Austria, beset on all sides, and unsupported by any continental power, was driven to a separate accommodation.¹

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

¹ Theb. vii.

308, 309.

Jom. ii. 41.

Hard. x.

326.

Affairs wore a menacing aspect for the interests of Napoleon in more distant parts of his vast dominions. England, seeming to rise in vigour and resources as the contest advanced, was making her giant strength be felt in more than one quarter of Europe. Wellington had again landed in Portugal; the consternation produced by the Corunna retreat had passed away; and Soult, defeated on the banks of the Duoro, had with difficulty escaped from the north of Lusitania by the sacrifice of all his artillery and baggage. The Spanish armies were again assembling in the south of Castile; large forces were collecting in the plains of La Mancha; and every thing indicated that, ere long, a formidable demonstration against the Spanish capital would be made by the united English and Peninsular forces. A considerable expedition was preparing in the harbours of Sicily to transport a large body of English and Sicilian troops into the south of Italy, where it was well known their presence would speedily produce a general insurrection; which was the more to be dreaded, notwithstanding the well-known imbecility of the Italians in military operations, that the recent annexation of the whole ecclesiastical states to the French empire had aroused, as might have been expected, the most vehement hostility on the part of the Roman see and its numerous adherents in the Italian states; while General Miollis,

Operations
in Italy,
and diver-
sion from
Sicily.

May 17.

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

the French governor of Rome, had so small a force at his command that it would be compelled, in all probability, to yield to the first summons of the Anglo-Sicilian forces. Lastly, the English, not content with their exertions in other quarters, were, it was well known, preparing an expedition of unprecedented magnitude in the harbours of the channel: fame had magnified to a hundred thousand armed men and forty sail of the line the forces to be employed on the occasion; the Scheldt, the Elbe, the Seine itself were alternately assigned as the probable destination of this gigantic armament; and Napoleon, with all his resources, was too clear-sighted not to perceive, that he might ere long be overmatched by the strength of a more formidable confederacy than he had yet encountered; that the English standards would soon rouse the might of northern Germany into mortal hostility; and that a second reverse on the shores of the Danube, would at once dissolve his splendid dominion, and bring the forces of Europe in appalling strength to the banks of the Rhine.*

Situation
and pro-
spects of
Napoleon
after the
battle of
Aspern.
Duke of
Brunswick
takes Dres-
den.

The impression produced over the continent by the battle of Aspern was immense: it dissipated in a great degree the charm of Napoleon's invincibility, and, more even than the battle of Eylau, diffused a general hope that the miseries of foreign domination were approaching their termination, and that a second victory over the remains of the French army, now shut up in the island of Lobau, would at once restore freedom to an injured world. While the English nation abandoned themselves to transports of joy at the prospects which were thus dawning upon Europe, active endeavours were made by Austria to turn to the best account the extraordinary

* See chap. lvii. and lviii. *infra*, where these events are narrated.

prosperous change which had taken place in their fortunes. Not discouraged by the failure of former attempts to rouse the north of Germany, the Duke of Brunswick Oels again advanced from Zittau, at the head of his gallant band of volunteers, towards Westphalia; while a considerable body of Imperial landwehr from Bohemia, under General Amende invaded Saxony, and another, under Radivojivich, five thousand strong, overran Franconia and penetrated to Bareuth. The forces of that kingdom, chiefly drawn under Bernadotte to the banks of the Danube, were in no condition to oppose this irruption; and the royal family, flying from their dominions, took refuge in France. Dresden and Leipsic were occupied by the Austrian troops; Bareuth and Bamberg fell into their hands; insurrections spread over all Franconia and Swabia; symptoms of disaffection were breaking out in Saxony and Westphalia; and a chain of Austrian posts, extending from the Elbe, by Nuremberg and Stockach, to the mountains of Tyrol, entirely cut off the communication between France and the grand army. Meanwhile, the most energetic appeals were every where made by the Austrian commanders to the people of their own and all the adjoining countries,* to take up arms; while Napoleon, weakened by a disastrous battle on the banks of the Danube, could maintain himself only by a concentration of all his forces under the walls of Vienna.¹

CHAP.
LV.

1809.

June 1.

June 12.

June 22.

Pel. iv.

18, 22, 26.

Hard. x.

393, 394.

* See note D.

CHAPTER LVI.

CAMPAIGN OF WAGRAM.

ARGUMENT.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

Views and Policy of Napoleon at this juncture—Forces he had assembled in the Island of Lobau—Forces and Views of the Archduke Charles, at the same period—Napoleon's Projects for passing the River—Prodigious Works executed in the Island of Lobau, by the French Emperor—Hidden real Designs of Napoleon as to the Point of Passage—Defensive Preparations of the Austrians—Measures of Napoleon to clear his Rear and Flanks—The Austrians are checked in their Attempt to Force a Passage at Presburg—Retreat of the Archduke John to Raab, and Position he took up there—Battle of Raab—Varied Success, but final Victory of the Viceroy—Defeat and Losses of the Austrians—Siege and Capture of Raab—Operations of Marmont and Macdonald in Illyria, Carinthia, and Carniola—Extraordinary Difficulties which they Encountered—Operations of Giulay in Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria—Attack on Broussierre near Gratz—Junction of Eugene to the Grand Army, and Re-occupation of Croatia by the Austrians—Operations in Poland, and Successes of the Polish Detachments at Sandomir and Zamosc—Re-capture of Warsaw by the Poles, and Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand—Concluding Operations of the Campaign in Poland—Extraordinary Concentration of the French Force in the Island of Lobau—Force and Disposition of the Austrian Army—False Preparations for a Passage in front of Aspern—Extraordinary Passage of the Danube by Napoleon—Vast Advantages gained by this Manœuvre to the French—Retreat of the Austrians to the Position of Wagram—Its Description—Advance of the French over the Marchfield—Their Unsuccessful Attack on the Plateau of Wagram—Position and Plan of Napoleon for the Battle on the Following Day—The Archduke resolves to assume the Offensive—His Plan of Attack—Commencement of the Battle of Wagram—Defeat of Massena in the Centre—Napoleon's Measures to Arrest the Disorder—Splendid Progress of the Austrian Right towards Essling—Success of Davoust against the Austrian Left Wing—Neusiedel is taken, and the Austrian Left Wing driven back—Grand Attack by Napoleon from the Centre—Decisive Advance of Macdonald in that Quarter—Measures of Napoleon to Support that Attack—Retreat of the Archduke, and Bloody Encounters in the Course of it—Tardy approach of the Archduke John—Vital Importance of his Co-operation—Results of the Battle—Loss of the Battle was owing to the Archduke John's neglect of Orders—Napoleon visits the Field of Battle, and makes Macdonald a Marshal—Appointment of Oudinot also a Marshal—Disgrace of Bernadotte—The Austrians retire towards Bohemia—Retreat of the Archduke to Znaym, and his Position there—Combat of Znaym—Advance of Marmont, and Conclusion of the Army's Retreat to Znaym—Motives which led the Austrians to this Step—Arguments for and against

the Amnesties, at the French Headquarters—Limits assigned to the two Armies by the Amnesties—Hesitation of the Emperor of Austria to sign it, which is only done on the 18th—Heavy Contribution levied on the Imperial Dominions—Comparison of Wagram, Cannæ, and Waterloo—Reflections on the Campaign, and its glorious character to Austria—Proof thereby afforded of the Practical goodness of the Austrian Government—Causes of the extraordinary Public Virtue exhibited by Austria at this time—Remarkable Contrast afterwards exhibited by France—Elevation of the Austrian Character from past Calamities.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

BOTH the military and political position of Napoleon was now full of peril ; and it was obvious to all the world, that a single false step, one additional defeat, would expose him to certain ruin. But it was precisely in such circumstances that his genius shone forth with the brightest lustre, and that he was most likely by a sudden blow to reinstate his affairs, and overturn all the calculations of his enemies. No man ever saw so clearly where was the decisive point of the campaign, or so firmly made up his mind to relinquish all minor advantages, in order to accumulate his forces upon that vital quarter, where defeat to his antagonists would prove certain ruin. In doing so, he followed the natural bent of his genius, which was never inclined to owe to combination what could be effected by audacity : but he was powerfully aided by the despotic nature of the authority which he wielded, and the irresponsible character of the command with which he was invested ; for many other generals might have seen equally clearly the policy of concentrating all their strength for a blow at their adversary's heart, without possessing either the power to effect such a concentration, or the independence of others necessary to incur its responsibility. In the present instance, he saw at once that the vital point of the war was to be found under the walls of Vienna ; and that if he could succeed in defeating the Archduke Charles on the plain of the

Views and
policy of
Napoleon at
this juncture.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
76, 77.
Sav. iv.
94. Jom.
iii. 246,
247.

Forces of
Napoleon in
the island of
Lobau.
May 25.

Marchfield, he need not disquiet himself either about the victories of the Tyrolese in their Alpine valleys, the insurrection of the Germans on the banks of the Elbe, or the distant thunder of the English on the shores of the Scheldt. Fixing all his attention, therefore, upon the restoration of his bridges, the concentration of his forces, and the re-animating of his soldiers in the centre, he gave himself little disquiet about the tardy movements of the coalitions in the vast circumference of hostilities; and wrote to his lieutenants, only to keep open the communications of the grand army with the Rhine, and he would soon find the means of dissipating the host of enemies who were accumulating round his extremities.*

The force which remained at the disposal of the French Emperor, even after the very serious losses of the battle of Aspern, was still immense. The chasms produced by that disastrous engagement had been more than supplied by the opportune arrival of Eugene's army at the Imperial headquarters; while the corresponding forces of the Archduke John were, for the time at least, lost to the Austrian generals by the eccentric retreat of that prince to the Hungarian plains, instead of obeying his instructions and menacing the French communications from the Tyrolese mountains.† From the confidential correspondence of Napoleon with Berthier at this period, which has since been published, it appears that, in the beginning

* On the 6th June, Napoleon wrote from Schoenbrunn to Marshal Kellerman, who commanded the army of reserve in the north of Germany: "Before the enemy can have accomplished any thing of essential importance in Saxony, the Emperor will have passed the Danube, and be on their rear. But a corps which should approach the line of communication of the grand army might really prove dangerous: far more so, than any thing which could occur in the north of Germany."—*NAPOLÉON to KELLERMAN, 6th June, 1809; PELET, iv. 77, 78.*

† Ante, vii. 316, 317.

of June, the grand army numbered, present with the eagles, no less than one hundred and ten thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand horse, with four hundred pieces of cannon; in all, at least a hundred and fifty thousand combatants. This was independent of the corps of Marmont in Dalmatia, of Vandamme in echelon, in the rear towards Bavaria, of Lefebvre in Tyrol, and of Macdonald in Styria. After making every deduction for the portions of these different corps which might be requisite to keep open the rear, and maintain communications, at least fifty thousand men might be ordered up to support the grand army; and thus, after deducting for the sick and absent, a hundred and eighty thousand men could be assembled in a month's time under the walls of Vienna, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry, with six hundred pieces of cannon: a greater force, if the quality and equipment of the troops is taken into consideration, than had ever in the world before been assembled in a single battle. Nor was this all: immediately in their rear they had a fortified capital amply stored with provisions, and containing abundant supplies of all sorts for the use of the army; and the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, overflowing with artillery, arms, ammunition, pontoons, and every species of equipment that could be desired for the most extensive military operations.¹

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
77, 78.
Jom. ii.
246. Stut.
233, 236.

The inhabitants of the other countries of Europe, electrified by the intelligence of the battle of Aspern, and the retreat of the French army into the island of Lobau, entertained the most sanguine hopes that they would immediately be assailed there by the victorious Austrians, and either driven to the right bank of the Danube, and forced to evacuate the

Forces and
views of the
Archduke
Charles at
the same
juncture.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

capital, or compelled to lay down their arms in that crowded and untenable position. Possibly, if the Archduke Charles had been aware of the magnitude of the losses which the French army had sustained, and the almost total exhaustion of their ammunition, he might, on the day after the battle, have made good a descent upon the island, and achieved the most glorious success. Such an enterprise, however, would at best have been attended with considerable hazard; for, although the French actually in the island the morning after the battle did not exceed forty thousand men, yet an equal force was under the command of Davoust on the right bank around Vienna, and thirty thousand more under Vandamme and Bernadotte were only a few marches in the rear from St Polten to Lintz. On the other hand, the Imperialists, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of two days' duration of unexampled severity, and weakened by the loss of nearly twenty-five thousand killed and wounded in the strife, were too happy to have escaped without destruction from so dreadful a contest, to think of immediately recommencing active operations. The force at the command of the Archduke, though rapidly augmenting, was not at first, after the battle, very considerable. Fifty thousand of the warriors who had borne a part in the glorious strife, alone remained unhurt; Kollowrath might soon bring up twenty thousand more from Lintz, and, when the fatal detour of the Archduke John was completed, he, it was hoped, would be able to add thirty thousand veteran troops from the Hungarian plains. Thus a hundred thousand regular troops, of which about twenty thousand were cavalry, might be reckoned on for the decisive battle which was to decide the fate of the monarchy; and, as this force would pro-

bably be swelled by fifty thousand landwehr, or reserves from the eastern and northern provinces of the monarchy before the end of June, the forces on the opposite sides were not materially different, so far as numerical strength went; and the superior number of regular and veteran soldiers in the French ranks might be considered as compensated by the advantage which the German host derived from the homogeneous quality of its troops, the animation with which they were inspired in behalf of their country, and the enthusiasm which they generally felt at the glorious result of the late memorable battle in which they had been engaged.¹

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
78, and
Appendix,
table 2d.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
127. Jom.
iii. 245.

While remaining in a state of apparent inactivity at Schoenbrunn, Napoleon's attention was chiefly directed to three objects; first, to convert the island of Lobau into a vast fortress, rendered impregnable to attack by a plentiful array of heavy artillery, and connected with the right bank by strong bridges, from whence he might at any moment issue forth to attack the Archduke Charles, and, at the same time, find a secure refuge in case of disaster. Next, to secure and keep open his communication with the Rhine by means of a chain of posts, occupied by strong detachments, and a skilful disposition of the troops of the Rhenish confederacy, under Lefebvre, Bernadotte, and Vandamme, all along the menaced districts in the valley of the Danube. Lastly, to clear his right flank of the enemy, drive the Archduke John still further into the Hungarian plains, and throw back upon the left flank the corps which the Austrian generalissimo was pushing forward to endeavour to open up a communication with the Italian army. To accomplish these various objects, however, and at the same time retain a sufficient

Napoleon's
projects for
crossing the
Danube.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
77, 78.
Stut. 240,
242. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 126.

Prodigious
works exe-
cuted in the
island of
Lobau by
the French
Emperor.

number of troops at headquarters to keep the great and rapidly increasing army of the Archduke Charles in check, required an immense accumulation of forces. Every effort, therefore, was made to strengthen the grand army: Marmont received orders to hasten his march from Dalmatia with his whole corps; Macdonald, with his numerous divisions of the Italian army, was directed to advance from Styria, and the most pressing instructions were sent to the rear to order up every man and horse which could be spared from the depots and garrisons in the interior, to the headquarters of the grand army.¹*

The works in the island of Lobau were of the most gigantic description, and still remain an enduring monument of the great designs of the Emperor Napoleon, and the persevering energy and skill of his engineers. Never, since the days of the Romans, had works so vast been erected in the field in presence of the enemy. Three solid bridges connected the island of Lobau with the right bank of the Danube; and, in addition to this, a fourth which ran across all the islands from shore to shore, over an extent of two hundred and forty fathoms. The most extraordinary pains were taken to render this bridge secure against the misfortune which had befallen the last: immediately above the bridge of boats, was one on piles which served as a barrier both against the violence of the current, and the machinations of the enemy; and close adjoining to it on the other side, one on pontoons, which also contributed to the

* To such perfection were the movements of these distant and numerous bodies brought, that on each despatch was marked the hour and minute when the courier set out, with the hour when the troops were required to be at the general rendezvous in the island of Lobau; and they all arrived, many from the distance of some hundred miles, at the precise time assigned to them.—SAVARY, iv. 99.

strength of the whole, and served as an additional line of passage for the columns of infantry and light chariots. Both extremities of these bridges were fortified by strong *têtes-du-pont*; that on the northern extremity, where it was exposed to the attacks of the enemy, soon became a complete fortress, with rampart, wet ditches, ravelins, and lunettes, armed with eighty pieces of heavy cannon, drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. All the prominent points of the intermediate islands were also fortified and mounted with artillery, and boats collected and manned with marines brought from Brest by the provident foresight of the Emperor, before the opening of the campaign, to be in readiness to intercept and turn aside any fire-ships or loaded barks that might be directed against it by the enemy. The Emperor was indefatigable in urging forward these important operations; every day, for the first fortnight, he was to be seen in the island of Lobau, animating the men, conversing with the engineers directing the works; and such was the vigour which his presence and exertions inspired into his followers, that, in a fortnight after the battle of Aspern, the works were beyond the reach of the enemy's attack, and in a month they were entirely finished.¹*

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xix.
199. Pel.
iv. 79, 80.
Sav. iv. 98,
99.

* During this momentous period, the care of the Emperor extended, in an especial manner, to the comfort and interests of his soldiers. Walking one day with his marshals on the shores of the isle of Lobau, he passed a company of grenadiers seated at their dinner. "Well, my friends," said Napoleon, "I hope you find the wine good." "It will not make us drunk," replied one of their number; "there is our cellar," pointing to the Danube. The Emperor, who had ordered a distribution of a bottle of wine to each man, was surprised, and promised an immediate enquiry. Berthier instantly set it on foot, and it turned out that forty thousand bottles, sent by the Emperor, a few days before, for the army, had been purloined and sold by the commissaries. They were immediately brought to trial, and condemned to be shot.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xix. 200.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

Hidden real
designs of
the Em-
peror as to
the point of
passage.

Immense as these preparations were, it was not to them that the Emperor alone trusted for the grand operation of crossing the river. He was well aware that such gigantic works would speedily fix the attention of the enemy ; and he daily beheld rising before his eyes vast entrenchments running through Essling and Enzersdorf, by which the Austrians hoped to bar the entrance to the Marchfeld from the bridge, and confine the enemy within the fortifications they had constructed. Like the vast armament of armed gun-boats collected in 1805 on the shores of the channel, these great operations were intended only to mask his hidden designs, and conceal from the enemy the real point of attack. While these prodigious bridges and fortifications attracted all the attention of the Austrians, to the anticipated passage in front of Essling, there were secretly collected in one of the narrow channels behind the Island of Lobau, in a situation entirely concealed from the enemy, the materials for three other bridges over the narrow arm of the river which separated that island from the northern bank, and which were so constructed that they could be transported and put together with extraordinary celerity. One of these bridges was composed of a single piece, sixty fathoms in length ; the second, of the materials of the old bridge which had given way on the 22d May, reconstructed with more skill ; the third, of boats and pontoons drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. The first of these bridges was justly considered so wonderful a piece of art, that a model of it is still preserved in Paris in the hall of the Conservatory of Objects of Art. The intention of the Emperor was, that these bridges should be thrown across the arm of the Danube which separates Lobau from the opposite shore, considerably

further down than the great bridge in front of Essling, and in such a situation as to take all the Austrian defence in rear. Thus the three fixed bridges from the southern bank to the island of Lobau, secured the passage of the troops and artillery into that important station; the great bridge from thence to the *tête-du-pont*, on the northern bank, attracted all the attention of the enemy to that point, while the movable bridges, prepared in secret in the channels behind, were calculated to throw the troops speedily across, in a situation where they were not expected, and where they would find themselves in the rear of the whole Austrian entrenchments. To cover the latter design, and, at the same time distract the attention of the enemy, preparations as if for a passage, were made both at Nussdorf and Spitz, on the upper part of the river above the islands; while the whole semicircular shore of the island of Lobau, fronting the northern bank, was lined with heavy artillery drawn from the arsenal of Vienna, and a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, disposed on every headland along the wide circumference, were prepared to cover the formation of the new bridges, and bewilder the Imperialists by their wide-extended fire.¹

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

1 Sav. iv.
99. Pel. iv.
79, 83.
Stut. 240,
246.

While Napoleon was engaged in these great undertakings, the Austrians on their part were not idle. Directly opposite to the end of the main bridge, where the attack was anticipated, the Archduke Charles erected a vast line of entrenchments, which, running from Aspern across the former field of battle, and through Essling, terminated in the banks of the Danube at Enzersdorf. These immense works, consisting of field redoubts and ravelins, united by a curtain, were strengthened by palisades all along their

Defensive
preparations
of the
Austrians.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

front, and armed with a hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery. The bulk of the Austrian army was stationed about a league in the rear, along the course of the little stream, the Russbach, which provided water for the prodigious multitude. Tranquil behind his formidable entrenchments, the Archduke quietly awaited the course of events, while his army hourly received accessions of strength, and improved in discipline and efficiency. The veterans recovered from their fatigues, burnished their arms, and instructed the young soldiers, who were daily flocking to the camp, in the rudiments of the military art: the chasms in the cavalry and artillery were filled up by numerous supplies from Hungary and Transylvania, where vast public establishments for the breeding of horses had been brought to the highest perfection; * the wounded in great numbers rejoined their ranks; the artillery were augmented to a degree hitherto unheard of in war; and, before the end of June a hundred and forty thousand men, of whom twenty-five thousand were splendid cavalry, with seven hundred pieces of cannon, were assembled round the Austrian standards, all animated by their recent victory with a degree of spirit and enthusiasm never before witnessed in the Imperial armies.¹

The situation of the respective parties required that the principal attention of the French should be turned to the preservation of their communications clear with the Rhine, and the Germans to the maintenance of their connexion with the eastern provinces

Efforts of
Napoleon to
clear his
rear and
flanks.

* A very interesting account of these vast establishments is given in the first volume of Marshal Marmont's Travels in Hungary and Turkey: a work which proves that that veteran commander unites the eye of an experienced observer to the warmth of a philanthropist and the judgment of a practised statesman.—See MARMONT—*Voyage dans l'Orient*, i. 232, and ii. 116.

of the empire, where the forces of the monarchy were still untouched, and the great armament called the Hungarian insurrection was daily acquiring a more complete consistency. For this purpose, Napoleon issued the most pressing orders to Bourcier and Rouyer to re-open, with all the forces of the confederation which they could assemble, the great road to the Rhine, and neglecting all minor objects to concentrate their whole troops upon that vital line of communication; while Kellerman, who was soon afterwards succeeded by Junot, was directed to strain every nerve for the accumulation of an imposing force, under the denomination of the army of observation of the Elbe at Frankfort, and drive the Imperialists from their threatening positions at Bareuth and Nuremberg. These directions were promptly obeyed: early in July, Junot advanced into Fran-
CHAP. LVI.
1809.
July 2.
 conia and Saxony on the one side, while Jerome, relieved by the destruction of Schill's corps from domestic danger, threatened them on the other; and the Duke of Brunswick, with the Austrian commanders, were obliged to retire into the Bohemian mountains; while Augsburg and Ratisbon were
July 7.
1 Pel. iv.
83, 89.
Jom. iii.
246. Stut.
260, 262.
 retaken by the national guard of Wirtemberg and Baden, and the line of communication both with Strasburg and Frankfort re-opened to the grand army.¹

More important operations followed the attempts of the Austrians to regain, by the circuitous route of Presburg and the east, their communication with the Archduke John and the Hungarian insurrection. The Archduke Charles occupied, with the corps of Bianchi, the town of Presburg, situated six leagues below Vienna, on the left bank of the river, with a *tête-du-pont* commanding the bridge at that place
The Austrians are checked in their attempts to force a passage at Presburg.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 3.

¹ Pel. iv.
87, 89.
Jom. iii.
246. Stut.
246, 248.

over the Danube. Desirous of dislodging the enemy from this important post, which gave them the means of manœuvring on both banks of the river, and of turning his right flank, Napoleon directed Davoust to march against it. He found the *tête-du-pont* unfinished, and his troops tried to carry it by a *coup-de-main* ; but the sustained fire of the Austrian works repulsed them with loss ; while the arm of the Danube, twenty toises in breadth, which separated them from the isles occupied by the Imperialists, flowing in a rapid current, rendered it impossible for them to dislodge the enemy from his advanced posts in the river. However, by occupying in force with two strong divisions, the village of Engerau, immediately opposite to the southern extremity of the bridge, he rendered the possession of it unavailing to his antagonists ; and soon after the rapid succession of more important events in other quarters, deprived this point of the importance which apparently belonged to it.¹

Retreat of
the Arch-
duke John
to Raab,
and position
which he
took up
there.

The Archduke John, in retiring from Carniola into Hungary, had taken with him part of the landwehr of that province, and detached Giulay into Croatia, where it was hoped he could maintain himself, lest these detached bodies should fall into the enemy's hands, who had now overrun those provinces. With these forces united to his own, he retired to Kormond in Hungary, which is on the right bank of the Danube, so that he was in the disadvantageous situation of being separated by that river from the main Austrian army, and exposed to any accumulations of force which Napoleon, on his side of the river, might choose to direct against him. He had the advantage, however, of having the communication open in his rear with the reinforcements which were expected

from the Hungarian insurrection ; and, in the middle of June, he formed a junction with his brother the Archduke Palatine, who commanded that irregular force at RAAB. Their united forces amounted to twenty-two thousand regular troops and eighteen thousand of the insurrection ; and they took post in a strong position, on the ridges which lie in front of that town. Their right rested on the village of Szabadhegi, and the heights of the same name ; their left was covered by a morass ; their centre ran through the farm of Kismeyger : numerous light horse were disposed along the front of the line, while a thousand chosen troops occupied a square stone edifice still farther in advance of the centre, which was loop-holed, and strengthened by a few works, besides a deep rivulet, which formed a sort of natural fosse to the post. In this position, the Archduke John resolved to give battle to the enemy, under Eugene Beauharnois, who were now coming up in great strength from the west ; although he had just received a despatch from his brother, the generalissimo, containing the sage instructions, by no means to fight in the open plain, but to throw himself into the entrenched camp in his rear, under the cannon of Raab ; to blend the inexperienced levies with the veteran troops ; accustom them to military discipline, before he trusted them against the enemy ; to keep open his communication with the main army at Essling ; and detach seven thousand men to Presburg for that purpose ; and fight only in the event of the enemy forcing the passage of the Raab, and menacing the left of the entrenched camp. These wise counsels and express injunctions were alike disregarded ; the officers of the Archduke John's staff being unwilling to forego the brilliant results which they anticipated

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 13.

Pel. iv.

90, 95.

Jom. iv.

247, 248.

Vict. et

Conq. xix.

172, 173.

Stut. 250,

256.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

Battle of
Raab.
June 14.

from a battle, and he himself reluctant, by placing his force under the immediate direction of his brother, to lose the lustre of a special command.

The day following, being the 14th June, was the anniversary of the battle of Marengo: the Viceroy was naturally anxious to combat on that auspicious occasion, and the Austrian generals made no attempt to frustrate his designs. At ten o'clock, the signal for battle was given, and the French advanced with enthusiasm to the attack. Grenier commanded the centre; Baraguay D'Hilliers the left; Montbrun, with the light cavalry, Grouchy, with the heavy dragoons, were on the right; Pacthod, with his numerous division in reserve, behind the centre and left. Eugene formed his troops in columns of division in echelon, the right in advance; but, before the action had become serious, that order was abandoned by the rapid advance of the centre and left, and the battle became general in parallel lines. His forces were about thirty-five thousand in number, inferior by five thousand to those of the enemy; but this disadvantage was more than compensated by the experienced quality of the men, while nearly half of those opposed to them were raw levies or volunteers who had never encountered a hostile fire. The first troops which came into action were those of Serras, which attacked the square building in advance of Reimegger; the Austrians were speedily driven within the walls, but there they made a desperate resistance, and, while numbers of the assailants fell under the fatal fire from the loop-holes, others sunk in the deep marshes of the rivulet, which on three sides encircled the building. In a few minutes seven hundred men, perished in this disastrous manner, without one of the defences of the place being carried by

the assailants. But while success was thus arrested around this formidable post, the village of Kismeyer in its rear was menaced by Durutte, who, with a chosen division of infantry, had advanced through the open ground between its houses and the buildings of Szabadhegy, and had already got abreast of the former. But he was there met by the fire of a battery of twelve pieces, the grape shot from which made wide chasms in his line; and the Austrians, profiting by the hesitation occasioned by this unexpected discharge, made a vigorous onset, which drove back the whole centre in disorder, while at the same time, Baraguay D'Hilliers, with his Italian division on the left, checked by the murderous fire which issued from the village of Szabadhegy, was also forced to give ground, and already the cries of victory were on the whole of that part of the Austrian line.¹

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

¹ 19th Bull.
Monit, 23.
June 1809.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
175, 176.
Jom. iii.
248, 249.
Pelet. iv.
95, 105.

Eugene saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and he hastened to the spot to arrest the disorder. He instantly addressed a few words to the flying Italians, exhorted them to remember their victories and their glory, and, what was still more to the purpose, brought forward the reserve, under General Pacthod, consisting almost entirely of French troops, to their support. The arrival of these veterans changed the face of the day: the Italians, re-animating by this seasonable support, returned to the charge, the centre and right of the enemy were forced, and Szabadhegy carried. Upon this the Archduke John brought up his reserve, consisting of the flower of his army; Szabadhegy was re-captured, and the Italians driven back in confusion: again Durutte and Pacthod made good their entrance, and a third time the Imperialists expelled them at the point of the bayonet.

Varied
success, but
final victory
of the
Viceroy.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

In following up this last attack, however, the Hungarian new levies extended themselves too far, deeming victory secure, and thinking to outflank their opponents : the experienced French generals saw their error, and returned to the charge with their troops in column, carried, and finally possessed the village which had been so obstinately contested, and threw the whole centre and right of the enemy into confusion. Mean-while, a furious combat of horse was going on, on the Austrian left, where Montbrun and Grouchy were opposed to the whole weight of the Hungarian horse. This formidable body of cavalry, seven thousand strong, in the first instance overwhelmed Montbrun with his division, who had advanced to support the brigade of Colbert, which was endeavouring to turn the square from a house in front, which still prolonged its defence ; but Grouchy came up with his terrible cuirassiers, and charged the enemy, when blown by their pursuit, with such vigour, that they were driven back so far as to leave the heroic defenders of that now isolated post entirely to their own resources.¹

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xix.
175, 176.
Pel. iv. 97,
99. Jom.
iii. 248,
249. Stut.
258, 264.
Monit. 23.
June, 1809.

Defeat and
losses of
the Aus-
trians.

Though thus left in the middle, as it were, of the French army, Hammel and the heroic defenders of the farm house abated nothing of their resolution. Irritated at this prolonged opposition, Serras combined a new attack : he himself, with his whole division, assailed it on one side, while Roussel, with a fresh brigade, re-commenced the attack in front. Nothing could resist this last assault : surrounded on all sides, the walls of the building were carried by escalade the doors cut down with redoubled strokes of the hatchet, and an infuriated soldiery rushed into the building. A frightful massacre commenced. In the tumult the beams took fire ; the flames spread with

extraordinary rapidity, and, amidst the death-struggle between the French and Austrians, the roof fell in with a tremendous crash, and all within, friends and foes, perished. This decisive success established Eugene in a solid manner in the village of Kismeyer and centre of the enemy, who now fought only to secure his retreat. It was conducted with more order than could have been expected after so desperate a struggle, and the Archduke took refuge under the cannon of Komorn, abandoning the entrenched camp of Raab, which was immediately evacuated by some battalions of the Hungarian insurrection, by whom it was occupied. In this disastrous contest the Archduke John lost six thousand men, of whom above three thousand were made prisoners, and two pieces of cannon. The loss of the French was not more than half that amount; for, though those who fell were nearly as numerous, they lost few prisoners.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xix.
179, 180.
Jom. iii.
249. Pel.
iv. 102,
103. Stut.
¹ 262, 264.

The battle of Raab, notwithstanding its calamitous result, was in the highest degree honourable to the troops of the Hungarian insurrection, who composed so large a portion of the Imperial army, and who, though brought into fire for the first time, for hours disputed the palm of victory with veteran troops. It was attended, however, by very disastrous consequences. Not only was the moral impression of the battle of Aspern sensibly weakened by the loss of the very next serious engagement which took place between the two powers, but the force of the Hungarian insurrection was irrecoverably broken by the ill success of its first essay in arms, and the loss of the fortress and entrenched camp of Raab, which shortly after took place. The former was evacuated immediately after the battle; the latter was shortly after besieged by Lauriston, with heavy cannon drawn

Siege and
capture of
Raab.

- CHAP. LVI.
1809.
June 24.
- from the arsenal of Vienna, and taken, with its garrison of two thousand men, chiefly militia. The possession of this fortress, though armed only with eighteen guns, was a material advantage to the French, not only as depriving the enemy of a fortified post on the right bank of the Danube, from which they were likely to derive important advantages in the progress of the campaign, but destroying the shelter of the entrenched camp where the Hungarian insurrection might have been further trained in the military art, and brought to render the most valuable service as light troops to the regular forces; while it gave a solid *point d'appui* to the right flank of Napoleon, and put it in his power to call up almost the whole force of Eugene to his own standard in the decisive action which was approaching on the plains of the Marchfeld.¹
- ¹ 21st Bull. Monit.
June 30,
1809.
Jom. iii.
251. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 179,
180. Pel.
iv. 103,
104, 142.

Operations
of Marmont
and Mac-
donald in
Illyria and
Carinthia.

- While these important events were securing the right wing of the French army in the Hungarian plains, Marmont and Macdonald, after severally overcoming every obstacle, were rapidly approaching with its reserves from the Dalmatian shores and the mountains of Styria. The first of these generals, who had remained in command of the Illyrian provinces ever since the treaty of Tilsit, found himself, in the early part of the campaign, entirely isolated from the French armies by the advance of the Archduke John through Carniola and Styria to the banks of the Adige.
- April 23. In the end of April, the Austrian general Stoickewich had been detached by that prince with eight thousand men to aid the insurrectionary movements which were preparing in the mountains of Dalmatia against the French authorities; and some skirmishes had taken place between the advanced posts of the opposite parties, in which he had the advantage, and
- April, 26,
27.

the Imperialists had already descended from the hills and made themselves masters of a considerable extent of sea-coast, including the fort of Lusin Picolo, which brought them into contact with the English cruisers in the Adriatic, when the intelligence of the retreat of the Archduke from Italy, and the near approach of Macdonald by Laybach towards their line of communication with Austria, rendered it necessary to commence a retreat. Marmont lost no time in following the retiring corps of the enemy, and a severe action took place on the 23d, on the banks of the Lika, without any decisive advantage to either party. In obedience to the orders they had received, the Imperialists continued their retreat; and Marmont, being now summoned up with his whole corps, to the support of the grand army, pressed on in pursuit. A few days after, he arrived at Fiume, which was abandoned without opposition, and remained there two days to rest his troops after the laborious mountain marches they had undergone. On the 3d June he entered Laybach, which was evacuated on his approach; while the corps of Giulay and Chastellar, which had abandoned the Tyrol by orders from the Archduke John, in order to the concentration of the forces of the monarchy in its vitals, were painfully, and by cross roads, traversing the mountains in his front, in their march towards Gratz and the Hungarian plains.¹

These retiring generals had a most perilous task to perform in their marching eastward through Styria and Carniola, where Marmont, established at Laybach, was ready to fall perpendicularly on their flank; and Macdonald, who was hastening up from Villach in Carinthia, on the traces of Eugene, threatened their rear. It appeared almost impossible that they could escape so many dangers: but such was

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

May 9

May 14.

May 23.

May 28.

¹ Pel. iv.

108, 117.

Jom. iii.

253, 254.

Barth. 264,

267.

Extraordi-
nary diffi-
cultieswhich they
encoun-
tered.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 1.

the skill of the Imperial commanders, and the activity of their troops, that they not only extricated themselves without any serious loss from this hazardous situation, but very nearly inflicted an important blow upon their opponents. Chastellar, obliged to evacuate the Tyrol, had descended the valley of the Drave, and assembled his troops at Villach; from thence he made a demonstration against Klagenfurth, where the Italian General Rusca, had collected a few battalions, and after some sharp fighting he reached the right bank of the Drave, and succeeded, by throwing that river between him and his pursuers, in extricating himself from his dangers. He would have been utterly destroyed if Marmont had been a little more expeditious in his movements; for had that general arrived two days sooner at Nakles, where the two roads from Klagenfurth and Villach unite, he would have interrupted the only route by which the enemy could have descended the Drave; and if Chastellar had thrown himself across the mountains into the defiles of the Muhr, he would have fallen into the hands of Macdonald, who was descending the rocky banks of that romantic stream. But every thing in war depends upon precision of calculation and rapidity of movement, and the most active and vigilant generals are frequently ignorant of what is passing on the enemy's part, within a few leagues of their headquarters.¹

¹ Pel. iv.
117, 119.
Jom. iii.
254. Erz.
Joan. Feld.
232, 237.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
183.

Operations
of Giulay in
Carniola
and Styria.
May 3.

Giulay, who formed part of the army of the Archduke John, had been detached by that prince with seventeen thousand regular troops into Croatia, of which he was the Ban, to raise the landwehr of that warlike province and of Carniola, and await ulterior orders. Subsequently, the disasters and continued retreat of the Italian army, rendered it

necessary for the Archduke to recall him to his standards; and Giulay had turned to such good account the few weeks which he had spent in his province, that he was prepared now to take the field at the head of twenty thousand men, of whom eight thousand were regulars. With this imposing force he broke up on the beginning of June from Ram and Agram on the Save, and began his march northward for Marburg, with the design of joining the Archduke, whom he conceived to be still at Gratz in Styria. He moved, however, so slowly that he did not reach Marburg till the 15th, the day after the battle of Raab, though the distance was only eighteen leagues, being not five miles a-day. Had he exerted himself as his strength permitted and the crisis required, he might have been on the 14th at Radkersburg in Hungary, which was forty-two leagues from Ram, in direct communication with that prince, and in time to share in the battle. This only required him to march ten or eleven miles a-day, no great undertaking for veteran troops and hardy mountaineers; and had he done so, the battle of Raab would either not have been fought or been converted into a victory, and the Archduke John, with sixty thousand undiscouraged troops, would have appeared with decisive effect on the field of Wagram. The first care of a general should be to accustom his soldiers to march: Napoleon's grenadiers were perfectly right when they said it was by their legs, more than their arms, that he gained his victories.¹

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

June 3.

June 15.

June 15.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xix.
184. Pel.
iv. 120,
121. Erz.
Joan. Feld.
238, 240.

A brilliant enterprise, however, though of a subordinate character, awaited the Austrian general. General Broussier, with a French brigade, had been left to besiege the fort of Schlossberg, at Gratz, after

Attack on
Broussier,
near Gratz.
June 24.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 22.

June 23.

June 25.

June 26.

Macdonald had left that town, and proceeded onward in the trace of the viceroy towards the grand army; and Giulay, having learned as he came up from the southward the exposed situation of the besiegers, conceived the design of surrounding and making them prisoners. On the 24th, his advanced posts were at the gates of Gratz; and Broussier, justly apprehensive of being cut off, had, two days before, raised the siege of the castle, and retired to the bridge of Weinzittel over the Muhr, at the entrance of the valley of Bruck. Having received intelligence, however, in the course of the same day, of the real position of the main body of the enemy's forces, which he conceived to be unable to take any part in the action which was approaching, he sent back four battalions under Colonel Gambier, who resumed his former position around the fort, and renewed the bombardment. In this situation the besiegers were attacked by a greatly superior force under Giulay, and being entirely separated from the remainder of the troops under Broussier, their destruction appeared inevitable. The heroism of Colonels Gambier and Neagle, however, joined to the intrepidity of their troops, extricated them from their dangerous situation; the Croatian landwehr were no match in close fight for the French veterans; a decisive charge of the bayonet checked the Imperialists in the first onset; when their cartridges were exhausted, the French threw themselves into a churchyard which they defended with invincible resolution, and though weakened by the loss of half their numbers, they were still gloriously combating round their eagles, when Broussier with his remaining four battalions arrived, and cut his way through to his heroic followers. In this memorable action the French lost eight, the Austrians

twelve hundred men; and Napoleon, in just testi-
 mony of his sense of the conduct of the troops
 engaged, made Colonel Gambier a count of the empire,
 and gave to his regiment, the 84th, the motto "Un
 contre Dix." Marmont, who had been summoned by
 Broussier to his assistance, arrived on the evening of
 the 26th before the walls of Gratz, and immediately
 made preparations, in concert with Giulay, for a
 general assault on the town and suburbs on the
 following day; but the Imperialists, in no condition
 to withstand so formidable an attack, withdrew in
 the night, and the junction of the French generals
 was effected next day without opposition. They left
 merely a few battalions to continue the siege of the
 castle, and, pressing on with great rapidity, arrived in
 the island of Lobau on the 3d July, where the whole
 forces of Napoleon were now assembled for the deci-
 sive battle which was approaching.¹

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 27.
July 3.

¹ 24th Bull.
Monit. 10th
July, 1809.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
185, 195.
Jom. iii.
255, 256.
Erz. Joan.
Feld. 284,
302. Pel.
iv. 122,
129.

The French Emperor, at the same time, had called
 Prince Eugene and the Italian army to his standards.
 On the 2d July, he received orders to repair without
 delay to the general rendezvous in the island of Lo-
 bau, whither Napoleon had transferred his headquar-
 ters from the palace of Schoenbrunn, three days before.
 Skilfully masking his design by a large body of
 heavy cavalry, pushed forward to the advanced posts
 before Komorn, he withdrew his artillery, stores, and
 infantry, unperceived by the enemy, and late on the
 evening of the 5th, reached the island of Lobau,
 where his arrival swelled the host to a hundred and
 eighty thousand men, with seven hundred pieces of
 cannon; while, by an unhappy fatality, the Archduke
 John, though entirely on the left bank of the Danube,
 still remained in presence of a deserted camp in the
 plains of Hungary. This general concentration of

Junction of
Eugene to
the grand
army, and
re-occupa-
tion of
Croatia by
the Aus-
trians.
July 5.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
128, 131.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
194, 197.
Stut. 326,
330.

Operations
in Poland,
and suc-
cesses of the
Polish de-
tachments
at Sandomir
and Zamosc.

the French troops in front of Essling was attended with one secondary but important effect, in restoring the southern provinces of the empire to the dominion of Austria, and opening up a direct communication with the English cruisers in the Adriatic. In proportion as Croatia and Carniola were evacuated by the advance of Marmont to the Danube, those two important provinces were regained by Giulay's troops : several French detachments and depots fell into the hands of the Imperialists ; Laybach, with some hundred prisoners, was taken ; and the communication with the coast having been restored, a subsidy from England was disembarked in Dalmatia, and after traversing the mountains, arrived in safety in Hungary, to the amount of three hundred and twenty thousand pounds.¹

Before the decisive struggle on the Danube commenced, affairs had taken a more propitious turn for the French arms on the shores of the Vistula. The bold stroke of Poniatowsky in throwing himself into the eastern parts of Poland and menacing Galicia, after Warsaw was taken, joined to the tardy but at length serious approach of the Russian forces arrested the Archduke Ferdinand in his victorious career on the southern Vistula. His advanced guard had already reached Thorn, fifty leagues below the capital, when the intelligence of the march of Poniatowsky in the direction of Cracow, joined to the alarming progress of the insurrection excited by Dombrowsky in the neighbourhood of Posen, the indisposition of Prussia to take any decisive part, and the approach of Prince Gallitzin, with thirty thousand Russians towards Lemberg and the Gallician frontiers, warned him of the necessity of retreat. Advancing to Lemberg, Poniatowsky had spread his

May 24.

light troops over the whole of Austrian Poland, exciting every where the national enthusiasm, and producing an alarming fermentation by the sight of the much-loved uniforms; his advanced posts had even crossed the Carpathian range, and carried consternation to within a few leagues of the Hungarian frontier; while another of his divisions, under Sokolniki, had boldly crossed the Vistula, and surprised fifteen hundred Austrians (besides eighteen pieces of cannon), at Sandomir, who were all either slain or made prisoners; and General Pelletier, with a third, by a brilliant *coup de main*, made himself master, by escalade, of Zamosc, though defended by a lofty rampart and deep ditch, and captured two thousand men and an arsenal of fifty pieces of cannon.¹

This succession of disasters, and still more, perhaps, the approach of the Russians under Prince Gallitzin, to the frontiers of Galicia, determined the Archduke Ferdinand to retreat. His generals had, by a sudden attack, made themselves masters of the *tête-du-pont* at Thorn, on the right bank of the Vistula; but the garrison, retiring to the body of the place on the left, burnt a part of the bridge, and the Imperialists had neither the means of crossing that ample stream, nor of commencing a siege in form of that fortress. This was the extreme point of their advance. On the following day they commenced their retreat, severely harassed by the light troops which the indefatigable Dombrowski had raised in the Duchy of Posen. The Austrian garrison being withdrawn from Warsaw on the 30th May, the Polish militia, under Zayonschesk, recovered possession of that capital; and Ferdinand slowly retired towards the Austrian frontier. The indecision and procrastination of Russia were now at an

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

May 19.

May 20.

Vict. et

Conq. xix.

128, 129.

Pel. iv.

55, 58.

Jom. iii.

238.

Re-capture
of Warsaw
by thePoles, and
retreat ofthe Arch-
duke Ferdi-
nand.

May 24.

May 30.

June 2.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 15.

June 17.

¹ Pel. iv.

Jom. iii.

239. Vict.

et Conq.

xix. 130,

132.

Concluding
operations of
the cam-
paign in
Poland.

end ; and Alexander professed himself prepared in good earnest to adhere to his engagements at Tilsit and Erfurth. General Schauroth commanded the advanced division of the Austrians ; and Ferdinand, with reason, conceived that he might, in his retreat, avenge the check received at Sandomir, by making prisoners the Polish garrison in that town. Detaching Schauroth, therefore, as a corps of observation, towards Lemberg, he himself, with his main body and heavy artillery, suddenly appeared before it ; and having brought up his guns, burst open the gates, and his grenadiers penetrated into the streets. The Poles, however, under Sokolniki, rallied with admirable courage, and for eight hours kept up an obstinate resistance from street to street, and from house to house, until the Austrians, wearied out and sensible the place could not long hold out, retired, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, and four hundred prisoners. Finding his ammunition exhausted, however, Sokolniki, two days afterwards, entered into a treaty with the Austrian general, in virtue of which, he evacuated the place, and retired to the Polish army.¹

Alarmed at the capture of a place of such importance, Poniatowsky now made the most vigorous remonstrances to Prince Gallitzin, and urged the immediate adoption of concerted measures : but, though the Russian general was now so near as materially to influence the fate of the campaign, he could not be prevailed on to take an active part, and exhibited an order of the Emperor Alexander, which forbade him to cross the Vistula. He consented, however, to occupy the country on the right bank of that river, so as to leave the Poles at liberty to prosecute their operations on the left. Relieved to a certain degree

by their presence in that quarter, Poniatowsky suddenly changed his line of operations, and descended the Vistula on the right, in order to connect himself with Zayonscheck and Dombrowsky. Mean-while, the Archduke Ferdinand received orders to direct his steps a second time towards the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in order to support the efforts which the cabinet of Vienna at that period were making to rouse Prussia to join the alliance. Having dismantled Sandomir, accordingly, he concentrated his forces, and, while Poniatowsky moved down the right bank of the Vistula, he descended the left, and, with twenty-five thousand men, advanced to Petrikau, on the Pilica. This offensive movement, however, was not of long duration; the Archduke Ferdinand had prepared an entrenched camp near the sources of that river, at a point where two roads to Austria branch off, the one by Cracow, the other by Olkusz, and was slowly advancing to occupy it, when hostilities were interrupted by the intelligence of the armistice of Znaym. Mean-while, the Russians advanced to Cracow, and their van-guard had already occupied its gates, when Poniatowsky, jealous of the acquisition of the second city of old Poland by its most inveterate enemy, summoned all his forces to his standards, and hastened, with twenty-five thousand men, to anticipate Prince Gallitzin in that important conquest. The road was blocked up by Russian troops, who prohibited all further passage; the Poles insisted on their right to advance; the old and ill-concealed animosity of the two nations was ready to break out, and the advanced posts were already coming to blows, when Prince Gallitzin deemed it prudent to yield, and permitted the occupation of the city by the Polish troops. There they

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

June 19.

July 8.

July 6.

July 9.

CHAP. remained during the whole of the armistice, but the
 LVI. military ardour of the Poles was strongly excited by
 1809. this brilliant termination of the campaign; hopes
 long smothered began to revive of the possibility of
 a national restoration; recruits flocked in from all
 quarters to the national standards, and, before the
 peace of Vienna, Poniatowsky had forty-eight thou-
 sand men on his muster rolls, besides the troops who
 were combating under the standards of Napoleon in
 the Spanish peninsula.^{1*}

¹ Pel. iv.
 70, 75.
 Jom. iv.
 239, 240.
 21st Bull.
 Monit. 29,
 30th June,
 and 8th
 July, 1809.

Extraordi-
 nary con-
 centration of
 the French
 forces in the
 island of
 Lobau.
 July 2.

These successes, however, had only a remote and
 inconsiderable influence on the fate of the campaign:
 the decisive blows were to be dealt out from the
 island of Lobau. There, in the first week of July,
 a prodigious armament was collected, and the French
 officers, how much soever inured to military prodi-
 gies, were never weary of admiring the immense
 array which the activity and foresight of the Em-
 peror had collected for the final struggle. On the
 2d July he mounted on horseback at Schœnbrunn,
 and rode to Lobau, where headquarters were thence-
 forward established: and at two o'clock on the after-
 noon of that day, the reinforcements began to arrive
 there from all quarters; and never in modern times,
 probably never in the history of the world, was such
 precision witnessed in the movements of corps con-
 verging together from such distant quarters. Hardly
 had Bernadotte arrived with the Saxons from the
 banks of the Elbe, when Vandamme appeared with
 the Wirtemburghers and troops of the confederation
 from Swabia and the Rhenish provinces; Wrede with
 the Bavarians from the banks of the Lech; Macdo-
 nald and Broussier next arrived over the Alpine
 ridges from Carinthia and Carniola: no sooner had

* See note A.

they taken the places assigned them, than Mar-
mont's leading columns began to appear from the
Dalmatian shores ; and, when they had found room
in the crowded isle, the veterans of Eugene came up
from the Hungarian plains and the neighbourhood
of Presburg. By the evening of the 4th the whole
were assembled : horse, foot, cannon, and ammuni-
tion waggons had traversed in safety the bridges
which connected the island with the southern shore ;
and a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, thirty
thousand cavalry, with seven hundred and fifty
pieces of cannon, were collected in a space not ex-
ceeding two miles and a half in length, by one and
three-quarters in breadth.* This extraordinary con-
centration of force had inspired the troops with more
than their wonted ardour : none doubted of the issue
when the military strength of half of Europe was
there accumulated on a single point under the guid-
ance of Napoleon : the lines literally touched each
other, and each regiment acquired fresh confidence
from the animating story of its neighbour's achieve-
ments. Never since the grand army broke up in
1805 from the shores of the Channel had it been so
collected together ; many there met who had not
shaken hands since they parted on the heights of
Boulogne ; and many more hearts then glowed with
the joy of newly-awakened friendship,¹ which were

CHAP.

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July 4.

¹ Pel. iv.

153, 154.

Sav. iv.

100, 102.

Jom. iii.

258, 259.

* The French military historians give 150,000 men and 400 pieces of cannon for the total strength of the grand army before the battle of Wagram : but we have the authority of Savary (iv. 100, c. 12) for the assertion, that they amounted to the number stated in the text ; and Napoleon said, on the evening of the 4th July, to the Austrian general sent with a flag of truce—" Sir, I have no doubt why you have been sent here. So much the worse for your general if he does not know that to-morrow I shall pass the Danube with the whole force you see here : there are 180,000 men ; the days are long : wo to the vanquished." —SAVARY, iv. 101. See also *Kausler Atlas der Schlachten*, 379.

CHAP. destined in a few hours to be for ever severed from
LVI. each other in this world.*

1809.

Force and
disposition
of the Aus-
trian army.

The Austrian army, though not equally reinforced, had received considerable accessions of strength since the battle of Aspern, and was animated by a still more profound feeling. The twenty-five thousand brave men who had fallen, or been disabled in that glorious strife, were in part recovered, or had been compensated by the corps of Kollowrath, which had come up from the vicinity of Lintz; twenty thousand more had been drawn from the depots in the interior; and fifty thousand landwehr were incorporated with the regular soldiers, and, from their constant exercise with veteran troops, had acquired a considerable degree of efficiency. Thus, above a

* The utmost pains had been taken by the French Emperor, during the interval of hostilities at Vienna, to restore the spirit and enthusiasm of the soldiers, which had been severely weakened by the result of the battle of Aspern. Gratuities to a large extent were awarded to the soldier's widows, under circumstances the most likely to affect the imagination of the receivers and all who witnessed it. Not only did the Emperor himself frequently visit the hospitals, but he made his aides-de-camp regularly inspect them; at stated intervals, and after the recovery of the greater part was in some degree effected, he distributed with great pomp a considerable gratuity to all the soldiers who had suffered. Every private received sixty francs (L.2, 10s.), and every officer, in proportion to his rank, from 150 to 1500 francs (from L.6 to L.60). For several days the Emperor and his staff were exclusively engaged in this pious duty; and it was accompanied by circumstances which increased the effect which the gratuity, already so considerable, produced upon the mind of the men. The splendid cortége proceeded to the distribution in full uniform, and traversed the long galleries of the hospitals, preceded by the records of the regiments, in which the deeds of each were minutely entered, and followed by servants in full livery, carrying large baskets, in which the money was placed. Twelve or twenty crown pieces were deposited by the bedside of each man, taken not from the regimental funds, but the private purse of the Emperor. Tears rolled down the cheeks of the mutilated veterans, as they witnessed the touching scene: many wept with joy who were destined to sink under their wounds before an opportunity of expending their little treasure could arrive.—*See SAVARY, iv. 88, 89.*

hundred and forty thousand men were assembled for the decisive struggle, besides the Archduke John, who, with eighteen thousand regulars and an equal number of the Hungarian insurrection, was at Presburg, ten leagues from the field of battle. If they could all have been brought to bear upon the enemy, their numbers would have equalled even the gigantic host of Napoleon : but they were far from being equally concentrated ; and the Archduke Charles was by no means prepared for the extraordinary rapidity and energy which was about to be infused into their movements. On the evening of the 4th, when the whole array of the French Emperor was accumulated in Lobau, and the ranks of so many distant armies stood almost in close column on its meadows, the Generalissimo had little more than half his force ready for immediate operation. The Prince of Reuss was watching the banks of the Danube, from Stockerau to Vienna, with his headquarters at Stammersdorf ; Kollowrath was at Hagenbrunn, on the north-western slope of the Bisamberg ; the reserve of grenadiers were at Gerarsdorf ; Klenau at Essling, and in the entrenchments opposite to the bridge of Aspern ; while Nordman, with the advanced guard, lay at Enzersdorff, and guarded the course of the Danube as far as Presburg. Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, and Rosenberg, were at WAGRAM, or along the course of the Russbach, while the reserve cavalry was at Breitenlee, Aderklaa, and the villages in that neighbourhood. Thus, the Archduke's army was arrayed in two lines—the first stretching twenty leagues along the course of the Danube : the second, two leagues in the rear, on the plateau of Wagram and the heights of the Russbach. A courier was dispatched

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

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¹ Kauzler
Schlacht
von Neues
Zeit, 381.
Jom. iii.
258, 259.
Pel. iv.
155, 157,
162. Stut.
348, 350.
M. de
Grünne's
Corresp.
officiel.

False prepa-
rations for a
passage in
front of
Aspern.

on the evening of the 4th, to summon up the Archduke John to the decisive point: but the distance was so great that he could not be expected to arrive at the scene of action till late on the following evening. Seven hundred pieces of cannon attended the army: but the cavalry had never recovered the fatal ravages of the preceding battles, and the equipment of the artillery was far from being in the perfect state in which it was at the commencement of the campaign, or as the French had become from the resources of the arsenal of Vienna. Never was more clearly demonstrated in war the vital importance of central fortifications: many of the enthusiastic recruits of Austria were now deficient in the most necessary equipments, while the French troops found all their losses amply supplied from the stores of the capital: had Vienna still held out, or its magnificent arsenal been secure from attack, the fate of the campaign would probably have been different, and Wagram had been Leipsic. But the whole warlike multitude were animated by an heroic spirit; every one felt that the crisis of the monarchy was at hand, and the glorious result of the battle of Aspern had inspired them all with the most sanguine hopes as to the ultimate issue of the struggle.¹

The better to conceal his real designs, Napoleon had some days before made preparations as if for forcing a passage over the great bridge, and through the entrenchments of Aspern and Essling. On the 2d July, five hundred voltigeurs were embarked, and transported across to the small island which lay in the middle of the northern branch of the Danube, between these two villages, the Imperialists dispossessed, and the bridge commenced. The Archduke, upon the first alarm, hastened to the spot, and a vio-

lent fire was opened by the Austrian batteries on the French engineers engaged in its construction: above two hundred cannon-balls fell in the middle of the boats without arresting these brave men. The bridge was soon completed as far as the island from Lobau: nothing but a fordable branch, thirty yards broad, now separated the French from the northern bank. Such was the importance which Napoleon attached to this demonstration, that on the following morning he came himself to the spot, and in his anxiety to reconnoitre the opposite coast, ascended on the summit of the parapet, and remained there for some minutes, within pistol-shot of the Croatian outposts on the northern bank. He ordered a lunette to be constructed on the western part of this little island, capable of affording protection to a bridge of rafts, which was kept in readiness to be thrown over the last shallow branch of the river, under cover of the parapet.* Thus the French were masters of two bridges leading from the salient angle of the island of Lobau into the field of Aspern; and the Imperialists were so impressed with the idea that the passage was to be attempted at the same point as the former one, that, by daybreak on the morning of the 4th, their massy columns were in motion from the plateau of Wagram, and, in two hours after, the works, along their whole extent, were gleaming with helmets and bayonets.¹

Napoleon, however, had no intention of forcing the

* Massena accompanied the Emperor on this occasion, and as he withdrew from the front was grievously bruised by a fall of his horse. The army were fearful that they would be deprived of his powerful aid on the field of battle: but he appeared there on the following day in an open calèche. Napoleon exclaimed, when he saw him struggling with pain and exposed to the fire, "Who would fear death, when he sees how the brave are prepared to die!"—PELET. iv. 152, note.

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LVI.

1809.

Extraordi-
nary passage
of the
Danube by
Napoleon.
July 4.

passage at this point, and these preparations, so serious in appearance, were but a stratagem to conceal the real point of attack from the enemy. Nothing of importance was attempted during the remainder of the 4th ; but, towards evening, the troops being all collected, burning with ardour, and the preparations completed, Oudinot commenced the embarkation. The Emperor took his station himself on horseback, on the margin of the branch, where the passage was to be attempted, and, with indefatigable energy, urged on the movements. With such vigour were they conducted, that in a quarter of an hour, the bridge destined for the passage of that corps, was thrown across : all hands were immediately turned to the three bridges which had been secretly prepared in the covered channel of the Danube, and the first, composed of a single timber frame, was brought out of its place of concealment, thrown across, and made fast to the opposite shore, in the short space of ten minutes. The transporting and fastening of the other two, required a little more time ; but with such vigour were the operations conducted, under the immediate inspection of the Emperor, who never ceased an instant during the whole night to direct and animate the men, that by three o'clock in the following morning six were completed, and the troops of all arms were in full march across them. A violent fire was, during the whole time, kept up from a hundred and nine pieces of heavy cannon, disposed along each side of the salient angle formed by the northern extremity of the island of Lobau, on the Austrian lines, which fell with unprecedented fury on the village of Enzersdorf, and induced the enemy to open from all their batteries on the bridge of Aspern, in the idea that it was there the passage was going forward.

Both shores soon formed a line of flame ; the heavens were illuminated by the ceaseless flight of bombs : seldom fewer than twelve of these flaming projectiles were seen at once traversing the air in opposite directions. Vehement, however, as was the contest of men, it was surpassed by the elemental strife on that awful night. A tempest arose soon after it was dark ; the wind blew with terrific violence ; torrents of rain fell without intermission ; the thunder rolled above the loudest roar of the artillery ; and the frequent glare of the lightning outshone even the flames of Enzersdorf, which, set on fire by the French bombardment, burned with inextinguishable fury from the gales of the tempest. During this terrible scene, however, the cool judgment of Napoleon never for an instant lost sight of the main object in view ; for several hours he walked incessantly amidst mud and water, from one bridge to the other ; the passage of the troops was pressed on with indefatigable activity ; numerous boats which incessantly plied to and fro, facilitated the transportation of the foot soldiers ; and such was the unprecedented vigour of all concerned in the operation, that by six o'clock in the following morning, not only were all the bridges firmly established, but a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, thirty thousand cavalry, and six hundred pieces of cannon, were grouped in dense array on the northern shore, between Enzersdorf and the margin of the Danube.¹

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

Sav. iv.
102, 103.
Pel. iv.
167, 173.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
202, 203.
Stut. 302,
309.
Larrey, iii.
347.

Great was the surprise of the Imperialists, at day-break on the 5th, to see not a man passed over by the bridge opposite to Aspern, but the plain further down, opposite to Enzersdorf, covered with an enormous black mass of troops, drawn up in close column, in the finest array, in such numbers as almost to

Vast advantages gained by this manœuvre to the French.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
172, 175.
Sav. iv.
103, 104.
Jom. iii.
260, 261.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
202, 203.

defy calculation. The tempest had ceased : the mists rolled away as day approached ; the sky was serene, and the sun of Austerlitz shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. His rays revealed a matchless spectacle : the shores of the Danube were resplendent with arms ; cuirasses, helmets, and bayonets glittered on every side : the bridges, the isle of Lobau, the southern shore, were covered with a countless array of men, drawn up in admirable order, or pressing on in ceaseless march, while long files of artillery presented on the northern bank apparently an irresistible force to the enemy. Then appeared, in the clearest manner, the vast advantage which the French Emperor had gained by the unexampled manœuvre of the preceding night ; the river was passed, the communications with the opposite shore secured, the left flank of the Austrian position turned, all the entrenchments intended to bar the passage taken in reverse, the labour of six weeks rendered useless, the enemy cut off from his communication with Hungary and the remaining resources of the monarchy, and thrown back, with his face to the east, towards the Bohemian mountains. The activity and genius of Napoleon had, in a few hours, defeated all the long-meditated designs of the Austrian generals ; the plateau of Wagram, chosen, with provident foresight, as the most advantageous central position from whence to fall upon the leading corps which had effected the passage, had lost much of its peculiar value by the river having been crossed in a single night by the whole army ; and the rival hosts were reduced to combat on equal terms in the vast plain of the Marchfeld, under circumstances which promised but a doubtful chance of success to the Imperial forces.¹ The French soldiers, rapid beyond any others in Europe at apprehending the

chances and dangers of their situation, at once appreciated the advantage they had gained, and casting a look of admiration at the bridges, the *chaussées*, the entrenchments, by which the dangers of the passage had been surmounted, turned in joyous confidence towards the enemy; while their chief had already commenced the formation of gigantic field works to protect the army upon the northern shore.¹ *

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LVI.
1809.

Having lost, through the unparalleled activity of their opponents, the favourable opportunity of attacking the French army in the moment of passing the bridges, nothing remained to the Austrians but to retire to the position in the rear of Aspern and Essling, which had been selected, after mature deliberation, by the Imperial generals, as the most favourable ground whereon to throw the last die for the independence of the monarchy. All their outposts accordingly were called in, the whole entrenchments constructed at so vast a cost of labour in front of the bridge of Aspern were abandoned, and the army retired to its chosen and last field, on the plateau of WAGRAM. The strength of this position justified the choice of the Archduke, and did credit to the prophetic anticipations of the Aulic council. It consists of an elevated plain, in the form of a vast parallelogram, which rises at the distance of four

Retreat of
the Aus-
trians to the
position of
Wagram.
July 5.

* The Austrian generals had, after long consideration, selected the plateau of Wagram as the most favourable ground whereon to throw their last stake for the independence of the monarchy. In the Imperial cabinet, the French found, after the battle, a valuable military work on the environs of Vienna, in which the second camp to be taken, in the event of the river being crossed, was precisely that which the Archduke occupied on the plateau of Wagram. The chances of both parties were ably calculated; but the skilful engineer had never discovered the vast military importance of the island of Lobau, nor contemplated the possibility of the enemy throwing six bridges from it to the opposite side, and crossing one hundred and eighty thousand men over in a single night.—See SAVARY, iv. 105.

CHAP. miles from the Danube, at the northern extremity
 LVI. of the plain of the Marchfield. This plateau is
 1809. bounded, along its southern front, by the stream of
 Its descrip- the Russbach, which, descending at first through the
 tion. high grounds which form the northern boundary of
 the valley, perpendicularly to the Danube, from north
 to south, turns sharp round towards the east at
 Deutch Wagram, and flows along the whole front of
 the position to Neusiedel, at the foot of the heights
 which form its southern rampart. This stream is
 six or eight feet broad, and though every where
 fordable by infantry, can be traversed by cavalry and
 artillery only at the bridges in the villages, which
 were carefully guarded. From Neusiedel, the pla-
 teau turns sharp to the northward, and has its eastern
 face clearly defined by a steep ridge descending to the
 low grounds in that direction for several miles to the
 north. Thus this plateau formed a great square
 redoubt, rising on the north of the plain, with a wet
 ditch running along its front, and strengthened by
 the villages of Wagram and Neusiedel at each angle.
 The village of Baumersdorf, situated half a mile to
 the south of the Russbach, about the centre of the
 southern front, formed an outwork beyond the wet
 ditch. Though this important plateau, however,
 constituted the strength, it was by no means the
 whole of the Austrian position. Their lines extended
 also to the westward far beyond Deutch Wagram,
 along a ridge of heights, arranged as it were by na-
 ture for the defensive position of a vast army, as far
 as Stammersdorf and the eastern slope of the fir-clad
 Bisamberg; forming altogether an elevated position,
 about fifteen miles in length, on a series of heights
 facing and slightly curved towards the south.¹ From
 their feet to the Danube, distant about nine miles,

¹ Personal
 Observa-
 tion. Pel.
 iv. 168,
 169, 184.
 Kausler,
 54. Jom.
 iii. 264.

stretched out the vast and level plain of the Marchfield. In the concave space included in this curve, at the foot of the heights, about their centre, is the village of Gerarsdorf; and a few miles further, in the level surface of the Marchfield, the villages of Aderklaa and Sussenbrunn, which thus lay about midway between the two armies, and became important points of attack, and the theatre of desperate conflict in the battle which followed.

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LVI.
1809.

The Archduke, in consequence of the dispersed state of his army, rendered unavoidable by the uncertainty which prevailed as to the place where the passage would be attempted, had only the grenadiers and corps of Rosenberg, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern, sixty thousand strong, on the plateau of Wagram and village of the same name; Klenau and Kollowrath being at a distance on the Bisamberg with the right wing; and the left, under the Archduke John, twenty-five miles off, stretching towards Presburg. No serious resistance, in consequence, was made to the advance of the French over the plain; the Austrian outposts retiring as the French approached towards their central position on the hills. Napoleon's army, after the passage was effected, was drawn up between Lobau and Enzersdorf, perpendicular to the river, with its left touching the water; the concentration of the troops was such, that it resembled an immense close column, nearly two hundred thousand strong. Presently, however, the order to march was given, and the different corps advanced in a semicircular direction, like the folds of a fan, to the north, east, and west, towards Enzersdorf, Essling, Breitenlee, and Raschdorf. Massena was on the left towards Essling and Aspern; Bernadotte, with the Saxons, towards Aderklaa; Eugene and

Advance of
the French
over the
Marchfield.
July 5.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Jom. iii.
265. Pel.
iv. 174,
182. Sav.
iv. 104,
105.

Unsuccess-
ful attack
of the
French on
the plateau
of Wagram.

Oudinot between Wagram and Baumersdorf; Davoust and Grouchy on the right, in the direction of Glinzendorf; while the Imperial guards, Marmont's corps, Wrede, with the Bavarians, and the heavy cavalry, were in reserve under the Emperor in person. Partial combats took place as the Imperialists fell back before this enormous force, both at Enzersdorf and Raschdorf, but no serious resistance was attempted, and the two corps of the Austrians which were in advance in the entrenchments on the banks of the Danube, fell back leisurely on the road to Gerarsdorf and Neusiedel. The vast field-works between Aspern and Essling were abandoned; the Imperialists retired to the heights in the rear on which the main body of their forces were stationed; and the French army, spreading out like rays from a centre, overspread as far as the margin of the Russbach the immense plain of the Marchfield.¹

At six o'clock Napoleon had come up to the plain between Raschdorf and Baumersdorf, in front of the plateau of Wagram; and he then ascertained that the Archduke John had not yet arrived, and could not appear on the field that day. He immediately resolved to profit by his great superiority, and commence an attack: for he had a hundred thousand men grouped in his centre, ready for instant operations; while on the plateau beyond the Russbach, between Wagram and Neusiedel, the Austrians had not more than sixty thousand, under Hohenzollern, Bellegarde, and Rosenberg, to oppose them. Powerful batteries were accordingly brought up, which speedily opened a heavy fire upon the Imperialists' position, to which the Archduke's guns, arrayed along the front of the plateau, replied from higher ground, and with more effect. Oudinot's corps came first

into action in the centre. He attacked Baumersdorf at the foot of the plateau, which was gallantly defended by General Hardegg ; but such was the obstinacy of the resistance, that he was unable either to force the village, carry the bridges, or make his way across the stream in its rear on either side. Eugene was stationed opposite to Wagram : his leading divisions commenced the attack with great spirit, and, fording the Russbach, ascended the heights in gallant style ; but, when they arrived at the summit, they were staggered by a murderous discharge of grape from sixty Austrian guns, within half musket-shot, to which the French had nothing but musketry to oppose, as their guns had not been able to get across the stream. Macdonald, Dupas, and Lamarque, who commanded the divisions engaged, kept their ground, and bringing up their reserves, the action became extremely warm ; and at length the Austrian front line was broken, and thrown back in confusion upon their second. It was now the Austrian turn to feel alarmed ; the enemy had broken in upon their position in its strongest part, and his irruption, if promptly supported, promised to pierce the centre of their extensive line. Several Austrian regiments soon after broke, and the French divisions, continuing their triumphant advance, took five standards and two thousand prisoners. In this extremity the Archduke Charles hastened in person to the spot, at the head of the regiments of Zach, Vogelsang, and D'Erbach, whose steadiness had stemmed a similar torrent on the field of Aspern, and succeeded, by a determined resistance in front, in arresting the advance of the column : at the same time, Hohenzollern, who had repulsed the attack of Oudinot, charged

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
185, 195.
Sav. iv.
106. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 204,
205. Jom.
iii. 266.
25th Bull.
Monit. 15th
July, 1809.

them vigorously on the right flank with a chosen body of hussars; and Bellegarde poured in destructive volleys from his grenadiers, abreast of whom the French had now arrived, on the left. The struggle was terrible for a few minutes, in the course of which the Archduke was wounded; but it terminated in the repulse of the French, which was speedily converted into a rout, as they were driven headlong down the steep, and fled in wild confusion across the stream of Russbach. The Saxons under Bernadotte, who were advancing to their support, in the darkness mistook the retreating host for enemies, and fired upon it; they, in their turn, were overthrown by the torrent of fugitives; the contagious panic communicated itself to the Saxon troops, which suffered most severely both from friends and enemies; one of their battalions disappeared entirely in the confusion, and was never seen again;* and the three French divisions, which had so nearly penetrated the Austrian line, disbanded and flying over the plain beyond Raschdorf, spread an indescribable alarm through the French centre as far as the tents of the Emperor. In the general confusion the whole prisoners escaped; the taken standards were regained; two French eagles were captured; and, had the Imperialists been aware of the disorder which prevailed, and followed up their success with fresh troops, the consequences might have been fatal to the French army. Ignorant, however, of the prodigious effect produced by this nocturnal irruption, the Austrian generals at eleven o'clock sounded a retreat; their troops fell back to their original positions at Baumersdorf, Wagram, and the crest of the plateau;¹

* Expression in General Dupas's official report.

while the French army, wearied with the fatigues of that eventful day, lay down to rest in the vast plain around Raschdorf, and were soon buried in sleep.

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1809.

So destitute was the Marchfield, at that period, both of trees and habitation, that there was hardly a fire in the whole French army, from the extreme right to the left of the line. At midnight it became intensely cold, and it was with great difficulty that a few parcels of straw and pieces of wood could be got to make a fire for the Emperor. He had advanced with his guard to the front of the first line, during the panic consequent on the rout of the Saxons and Eugene's corps, and his tent for the night was pitched in the middle of the grenadiers and *vieux moustaches*. Though all around were buried in sleep, Napoleon sat up during the whole night, conversing with the marshals and generals of division, receiving reports from the different corps, and impressing upon his lieutenants the designs which he had formed. His army occupied a great right-angled triangle, of which the base rested on Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf; one front faced Stammersdorf, Sussenbrunn, and the slopes of the Bisamberg; the other the plateau of Wagram and Neusiedel; while the apex, pointing directly at the Austrian centre, was in front of Aderklaa. The project of the Emperor was founded on this concentration on his side, and the scattered position of his opponents on the semicircular range of heights, above fifteen miles long, from the Bisamberg to Neusiedel. Refusing and weakening his left, he determined to throw the weight of his attack upon the centre and left of the Austrians; hoping, thereby, to break their line in the point where it was weakest, by an enormous mass of assailants, and cut off the Archduke Charles from the army which,

Position and
plan of
Napoleon
for the
battle on
the follow-
ing day.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
197, 199.
Jom. iii.
266. Sav.
iv. 106,
107. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 205.

he was well aware, would speedily come up, under the Archduke John, from the neighbourhood of Presburg. With this view, a considerable dislocation of troops took place during the night; Massena, who lay on the left around Essling and Aspern, was moved at two in the morning by his right towards Aderklaa, in front of the plateau of Wagram, leaving the single division of Boudet to guard Aspern and the bridges. Thus the whole strength of the French army was concentrated in the centre and right: Davoust being on the extreme right; Massena next to him in front of Aderklaa; Marmont, Oudinot, Eugene, and Bernadotte, in front of the plateau of Wagram; and Bessieres, with the Imperial guards and reserve cavalry, in the rear of the centre around Raschdorf.¹

The Arch-
duke re-
solves to
assume the
offensive.
His plan of
attack.
July 6.

The brilliant success which had crowned the action on the night of the 5th, made an important change in the dispositions of the Archduke. Perceiving the determined resolution of his troops, and encouraged by the important check which they had given to the enemy, even when possessed of a considerable superiority of force, he resolved to resume the offensive, and anticipate the designs of the French Emperor by a general attack with all his forces. This resolution was taken at midnight on the 5th, and at two in the following morning, orders were dispatched to the Archduke John to hasten up with all his disposable force to the scene of action. He was understood to be at Marchegg, thirteen miles from the right flank of the French army; but he might with ease arrive on the field by one o'clock in the afternoon, when it was hoped his appearance with thirty thousand fresh troops would be attended with the most important effects. Foreseeing, from the attack of the preceding

evening, that the principal efforts of the enemy would be directed against the plateau of Wagram, where the ground was naturally strong, the Archduke resolved to make his chief effort on his right against Aspern and Essling, in order to menace the bridges and communications of the French army. Success in this direction, combined with the attack of the Archduke John on the same important points from the left, promised entirely to neutralize any advantage which the enemy might gain in front of Wagram; and, in fact, threatened as he would thus be in the rear and on either flank, an imprudent advance in the centre would only augment the dangers of his situation, by withdrawing the main body of the army farther from the means of retreat. With these views, Kollowrath and Klenau were concentrated on the left, on the eastern slope of the Bisamberg, and reinforced to fifty thousand men the troops of Lichtenstein and Hiller; Rosenberg, on the left, received orders to descend towards Glinzendorf, in order to form a junction with, and co-operate in the decisive attack of the Archduke John on the left; Bellegarde, during the night, was pushed on to Aderklaa, which the Saxons evacuated in disorder on his approach; while Hohenzollern, and the reserve grenadiers and cavalry, occupied the line of the Russbach and the crest of the plateau, having strong parties both in Wagram and Baumersdorf. Thus, the Imperialists, when the shock commenced in the morning, formed an immense semicircle, with their strength thrown into the two wings; the French, an interior convex quadrant, with their columns issuing, like the folds of a fan, from its centre.¹ The forces of the former were overwhelming on the right, and their left was almost impregnable, from the strength of the plateau

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¹ Pel. iv.
199, 200.

Vict. et

Conq. xix.
205, 206.

Sav. iv.

109. Jom.

iii. 267.

Kausler,
385. Stut.

324, 329.

CHAP. of Wagram, so fatally experienced on the preceding
LVI. evening; but their centre, towards Sussenbrunn, na-
1809. turally weak, was not so strongly defended by troops
as to promise an effectual resistance to the great
French force which was concentrated in its front.

Commence- It was intended by the Archduke, that Kollowrath
ment of the and Klenau, with the right wing, should first commence
battle of the attack: but the difficulty of conveying the orders
Wagram, in time to the extreme points of so extensive a line,
July 6. was such, that before these distant generals could
arrive at the scene of action, it had already commen-
ced in the centre and left. At daybreak Napoleon was
not yet on horseback, but only preparing the grand
attack which he meditated on the enemy's centre, when
suddenly the discharge of cannon was heard on his
right; and soon after, the increasing roar and advanc-
ing smoke in that direction indicated that the Austrian
right wing was seriously engaged, and making rapid
progress. Immediately after, intelligence arrived that
the Russbach was passed, and Glinzendorf threaten-
ed by Rosenberg on the right, and Aderklaa, aban-
doned by Bernadotte on the preceding night, occu-
pied in force by Bellegarde in the centre. Notwith-
standing all his activity, the French Emperor was
anticipated in the offensive, and the direction in which
the Imperialists had commenced their attack, ren-
dered him apprehensive that the Archduke John had
come up during the night, and that his right flank
was about to be turned by an overwhelming force.
Instantly appreciating the importance of such a com-
bined attack, Napoleon hastened with his guards and
reserves of cuirassiers; and drew up the artillery of
the guard in such a position as to command the right
of Rosenberg's corps, which had now advanced near
to Glinzendorf; but hardly had these powerful rein-

CHAP. LVL
 1809.
 1 Sav. iv. 108, 109.
 Pel. iv. 203, 207.
 Jom. iii. 267.
 Kausler, 385, 386.

reinforcements arrived near that village, when the Austrian advance was arrested. In effect, Prince Charles, finding that the Archduke John had not yet arrived, and that the enemy had moved an overwhelming force in that direction, ordered Rosenberg to suspend his attack, and soon after, he withdrew his troops behind the Russbach ; but they sustained a considerable loss in their retreat, from the charges of the French cuirassiers, and the cannonade of the artillery of the guard on their flank.¹

Hardly was this alarm dispelled on his right, when Napoleon received still more disquieting intelligence from his centre and left. The first rays of the sun had glittered on the bayonets of Klenau and Kollowrath's corps, as they descended the verdant slopes behind Stammersdorf, and joined Hiller and Lichtenstein near Leopoldau, and already the sound of their cannon towards Breitenlee and Aspern told but too clearly the progress they were making to turn the left flank of the French army. But the danger in the centre was still more pressing. Massena, in executing his prescribed movements from the left to the right of the field of battle, had attacked Aderklaa with his leading division under Cara St Cyr : the village was speedily carried by the gallantry of the 24th regiment ; but instead of merely occupying the houses, and strengthening himself in so important a point, St Cyr pushed through to the opposite side, and brought his troops within range of a terrible fire of grape and musketry from Bellegarde's corps, drawn up in force on the plain betwixt that and Wagram. The French, breathless with their advance, were so shattered by the discharge that they suddenly recoiled, and being at the same time charged in flank by the Austrian cavalry, were

Defeat of Massena in the centre.

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pushed back in confusion into Aderklaa. At the same time the Archduke Charles, who felt the full value of this post, hastened to the spot with the grenadiers of Aspre, and charged the assailants with such vigour that they were driven out of the village at the point of the bayonet, broken in the plain beyond, and thrown back in utter disorder upon the Saxon, Baden, and Darmstadt contingents, who disbanded and fled in such confusion that they overwhelmed Massena, who, although severely bruised by a fall off his horse, was in the field in his caleche, to such a degree that he made the dragoons about his person charge them as if they had been enemies.* Transported by the animation of the charge, the Archduke Charles pushed forward, at the head of his brave grenadiers, a considerable way in front of Aderklaa, where he found himself, almost alone, so near the enemy that he heard a French officer command his voltigeurs to make him prisoner, and received a ball in the shoulder before he could regain the breathless ranks of his followers.¹

¹ Sav. iv.
109, 110.
Pel. iv. 210,
212. Jom.
iii. 268.
Kausler,
386. Arch.
Charles'
Account.

Napoleon's
measures to
arrest the
disorder.

Napoleon perceived from afar the disorder of the left of his centre, and instantly hastened to the spot to arrest it. Directing Davoust to attack Neusiedel, and press the Austrian left, and ordering his guards to countermarch as rapidly as possible from right to left across the whole field, which they had so lately

• A young Saxon colonel, during the rout of the corps, finding his efforts, prayers, and menaces alike ineffectual to prevent his men from dispersing, advanced with his standard in his hand to a regiment of the French Imperial guard which had just come up, and throwing himself into their ranks, said, "Frenchmen, I trust to you this standard: you, I am sure, will defend it: my regiment is to be found wherever courageous resistance is made to the enemy." How many instances of heroism in all nations did the Revolutionary war bring forth! What elevation of soul did they occasion!—See *Victoires et Conquêtes*, xix. 218.

traversed in the opposite direction, he himself set out at the gallop, followed by the thundering squadrons of his cuirassiers and horse artillery of the guard, and soon arrived at the spot, where Massena, almost alone in his chariot in the midst of the fugitives who overspread the plain, was making brave efforts to arrest the disorder. He instantly alighted from his horse, mounted into the chariot beside the marshal, conversed a few seconds with him, and pointing to the tower of Neusiedel, the steeples of Wagram, Sussenbrunn and Aspern, made all around him comprehend that a grand movement was in preparation to check the enemy. Order was in some degree restored, by the presence of the Emperor and the powerful reinforcement which he brought with him, and immediately the prescribed alteration in the order of battle commenced: Massena's corps, which had almost all broken, was re-formed under cover of the artillery and cavalry of the guard, and commenced a countermarch by battalions in close column towards Aspern; while the cuirassiers of St Sulpice, by repeated charges, kept at a distance the threatening columns of the enemy. The French infantry, restored to order by the efforts of the Emperor, executed the prescribed movements athwart the field of battle with the most perfect regularity, though torn in pieces all the way by a terrible fire of artillery from the Austrian right wing on their flank; but their departure from the neighbourhood of Aderklaa, before the infantry of the guard and the reserves had come up from Neusiedel, weakened seriously the French line, which was reduced to the defensive at the most important point of the whole field, the salient angle running into the Austrian position, and compelled to remain stationary under a tremendous

CHAP.

LVI.

1809.

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¹ Sav. iv.
110, 111.
Pel. iv. 210,
212. Jom.
iii. 268.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
208.

Splendid
progress of
the Aus-
trian right
towards
Easling.

cross fire of artillery from the hostile batteries on either side of the angle. The courage of the soldiers quivered under this dreadful trial, where war exhibited all its dangers with none of its excitement, and several battalions disbanded and fled; but Napoleon, calm and collected in the midst of the general disquietude, rode backwards and forwards for an hour amidst a storm of cannon-balls, unmoved by personal danger, but casting a frequent and anxious look towards Neusiedel, where the prescribed attack by Davoust was every moment expected to appear, from the advancing cannonade and smoke in that direction. He was mounted on a snow-white charger called Euphrates, a present of the King of Persia; and when the firing was most vehement, he rode in front of the line, which was too far distant to return a shot. His suite expected every moment to see him struck down by a cannon-ball: but, albeit noways insensible to the disastrous consequences which would in all likelihood attend his fall, he felt too strongly the necessity of his presence to preserve order at that important point, to shrink even for a moment from the scene of danger.¹

It was not surprising that Napoleon exposed himself so much to maintain this salient angle of his position, without recalling Massena, or weakening his corps on the right, for the danger had become so pressing from the progress of the Austrians on the left, that the battle appeared irrecoverably lost. At ten o'clock, Kollowrath and Klenau, preceded by sixty pieces of cannon, had swept the whole field of battle: after occupying Breitenlee and Neuwerthaus, they had fallen with an overwhelming superiority of force on Boudet and Le Grand, who, with eighteen thousand men, had been left to keep their ground against

such fearful odds, put them to the rout, captured all their artillery and four thousand prisoners, and drove them through Aspern into the French *tête-du-pont*, on the edge of the Danube. Following up this important success, the Austrians re-entered the entrenchments in front of the island of Lobau, regained all the redoubts evacuated on the preceding day, occupied Essling, and pushed their advanced posts so near to the bridges leading to Enzersdorf, that the French heavy guns, on the shores of the island, opened their fire to protect the retreat of the army, with as much vehemence as they had done forty hours before to cover the passage of the river. Driving the enemy before them, like chaff before the wind, the whole Austrian right, with loud shouts, pressed on towards Enzersdorf. Startled by the unexpected sound, which was soon heard even above the thunder of the artillery in front, the French reserve parks and baggage trains were seized with an universal panic; fugitives on all sides overspread the rear of the army, and fled to the bridges, which were speedily choked up by the throng; cries of "all is lost, the bridges are taken," were already heard in the ranks; while the anxious crowds who thronged the steeples of Vienna, and with beating hearts and speechless emotion, watched the advancing fire of their columns, above all the roar of the artillery heard the Austrian cheers, and already the thrilling voice was heard in the capital, "the country is saved."¹

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Archduke
Charles'
Official
Account of
Wagram.
Ann. Reg.
1809. App.
to Chron.
Sav. iv.
110. Pel.
iv. 213,
214. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 208.

But Providence had decreed it otherwise; and four years more of misery and bondage were destined to punish the faults and unite the hearts of Germany. While this splendid success attended the efforts of the Austrian right, their left, against which Napoleon

Success of
Davoust
against the
Austrian
left wing.

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1809.

had accumulated his forces under Davoust, had undergone a serious reverse. This illustrious chief, who had fifty thousand admirable troops at his command, including three divisions of the reserve cavalry, had no sooner received Napoleon's directions to attack the Austrians on the plateau, than he dispatched Friant and Morand with the veterans who had gained the day at Auerstadt, to cross the Russbach below Glinzendorf, ascend the valley above Neusiedel, and turn the extreme left of the enemy; while he himself, with the two other divisions, attacked that village in front; and Oudinot was ordered to keep Hohenzollern in check, in the centre of the plateau behind Baumersdorf. It required some time to execute, out of the range of the enemy's cannon, this sweep round the extremity of his position; for sixty pieces of cannon, disposed along the front and eastern face of the plateau, swept the whole level ground at its feet, as far as the guns would carry. At ten o'clock, however, the two divisions of Friant and Morand had crossed the Russbach, supported by a numerous artillery and ten thousand horse, under Grouchy, Montbrun, and Arighi. Rosenberg, meanwhile, perceiving the danger with which he was threatened, had accumulated his forces in strength at Neusiedel and the angle of the plateau behind it; and with his troops drawn up, facing outwards, on the two sides of a right-angled triangle, was prepared to maintain his important position against the formidable odds which was about to assail him; while the guns on the crest of the plateau behind his lines replied to the more numerous batteries of the enemy in the plain below with vigour and effect. Morand's division came first into action, and boldly mounted the heights; but, notwithstanding the gallantry of

their attack, they were driven back in disorder by the destructive fire of the Austrian cannon, and the rapid discharges of their musketry ; but Friant came up to his support, and Morand, rallying under cover of his lines, recommenced a furious assault on the enemy, and after a desperate resistance, succeeded in ascending the plateau on its eastern front. Friant, at the same time, passing further on, made his way to the summit. The tower of Neusiedel, however, still held out, though a powerful French battery thundered against it from an adjoining height to the eastward ; and the Austrian cavalry, who were drawn up at the foot of the ascent, essayed several charges against the ponderous steel-clad cuirassiers of Arighi and Grouchy. The shock was terrible, but the French proved at first victorious, and routed Rosenberg's horse with great slaughter ; Hohenzollern's cuirassiers next came up to avenge the disaster, and Grouchy in his turn was broken and forced back ; Montbrun then charged the victorious Austrians, when blown by their rapid advance, with decisive effect ; and, after desperate acts of gallantry on both sides, they were compelled to follow the retrograde movement of their infantry, and abandon the eastern front of the plateau.¹

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LVI.

1809.

While this important advantage was gained on the extreme left, a furious combat on the right was raging around Neusiedel. Davoust in person there led on the divisions Gaudin and Pachtod to the attack with extraordinary vigour : the resistance by the Prince of Hesse Homberg was equally obstinate ; and some reinforcements dispatched by Hohenzollern, long enabled that gallant officer to maintain his ground against greatly superior forces. At length, however, the Austrians were driven by main force from the

¹ Kausler, 387. Jom. iii. 272, 273. Pel. iv. 225, 228. Vict. et Conq. xix. 209.
Neusiedel is taken, and the Austrian left driven back.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

houses, and pushed back to the foot of the plateau : there they again made a stand, and for long strove with desperate resolution to make good the tower, and prevent Davoust from debouching from the village. In this terrible strife Nordman and Veczay were killed ; Hesse Homberg, Muger, Warteachben, and almost all the Austrian generals wounded : while, on the French side, Gaudin received four wounds, and almost all his generals were struck down. At length the tower was carried by assault, and the enemy's infantry driven in disorder from the ground they had so long defended in its rear. Davoust upon this, ordered the cuirassiers of Arighi to charge the retreating lines, and soon the slope of the plateau glittered with the dazzling light of their helmets : but they got entangled in broken ground, among the huts of the Austrian bivouacs ; and the few who reached the summit were so grievously shattered by the pointblank fire of their guns, that the whole were driven headlong down, with severe loss, into the plain. Notwithstanding this success, however, Rosenberg was unable to keep his ground on the angle of the plateau, above Neusiedel, after the tower had fallen : his left was turned by Morand and Friant, who had established themselves on the crest of the plateau ; and on the other side, Oudinot, transported by the enthusiasm of the moment, had converted his feigned into a real attack, and though repeatedly repulsed, had at length made his way across the Russbach, near Baumersdorf, and, despite all the efforts of Hohenzollern, who was weakened by the succours sent to Neusiedel, reached the crest of the plateau.¹ Threatened thus on both flanks, Rosenberg drew back in excellent order, still facing to the eastward, and forming a junction with Hohen-

¹ Kausler, 387. Jom. iii. 272. Pel. iv. 229, 231. Vict. et Conq. xix. 209.

zollern, took up a new position towards the centre of the plateau, nearly at right angles to the line of the Russbach, and covering two-thirds of its surface : while Davoust, apprehensive of being taken in rear by the Archduke John, whose approach to the field was already announced by the scouts of both armies, showed no disposition to molest him in the new line which he had occupied.

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1809.

Napoleon was still riding with his suite in the perilous angle in front of Aderklaa, when these alternate disasters and successes were passing on either wing of his army. The accounts which he received from his left were every moment more alarming. Officers in breathless haste arrived every ten minutes, to announce the fearful progress of the enemy in that direction. "The cannon," said one, "which you hear in the rear, is that of the Austrians:" the Emperor made no answer. "The division Boudet is driven back into the island of Lobau," said another: still no answer; but his eyes were anxiously turned to the tower of Neusiedel, which was visible from all parts of the plain, and he frequently asked if the fire was on the east or west of that building. At length Davoust's cannon were distinctly seen to pass Neusiedel, and the slopes of the plateau were enveloped with smoke. "Hasten back to Massena," said he to the aide-de-camp, "and tell him to commence his attack; the battle is gained." At the same time he dispatched orders in all directions for offensive operations: Bessieres, with ten regiments of the reserve cavalry, was directed to charge the Austrian right wing, which had advanced so far into the French rear, in flank; while Massena, who had now got back to his original ground near Aspern, assailed it in front; Eugene,

Grand
attack by
Napoleon
from the
centre.

CHAP. Marmont, and Bernadotte were to assault Wagram;
 LVI. Oudinot and Davoust to renew their attacks, and, if
 1809. possible, drive the enemy from the plateau; while
 the Emperor in person prepared the decisive effort,
 by a grand charge of infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
 in the centre. For this purpose, Eugene's corps,
 which had marched across the field from Baumers-
 dorf, was arranged in close columns of three divi-
 sions; Macdonald in the central division, consisting of
 eight strong battalions; on either flank were six, drawn
 up in close array; behind them marched Serras's
 division, and Wrede's Bavarians; the light horse of
 the guard, and the cuirassiers of Nansouty covered
 their flanks; a hundred pieces of cannon, chiefly of
 the guard, under Drouet, which had now come up
 from Neusiedel, admirably served, preceded the
 whole, and spread death far and wide; while the
 Emperor himself, with the cavalry and infantry of
 the old guard, closed the array, on the success of
 which he had staked his crown and his life.¹

¹ Jom. iii.
 272, 273.
 Sav. iv.
 112, 113.
 Pel. iv.
 221, 223.
 Kausler,
 388.

Decisive
 advance of
 Macdonald
 in the
 centre.

Napoleon himself gave the signal to this terrible
 column to advance: its instructions were to move
 right upon the steeple of Sussenbrunn, leaving Ader-
 klaa to the right. The Archduke early perceived the
 effort which was preparing against his centre, and
 made every possible disposition to resist it. The lines
 were doubled; the reserves of cavalry, and the right
 of Bellegarde's corps brought up to the menaced
 point; artillery on either side planted in great abun-
 dance, so as to open a cross fire on the advancing co-
 lumn; while the Archduke in person hastened to the
 spot with his whole staff, to be in a situation to act
 with promptitude in the terrible crisis which was
 approaching. Hardly had they arrived, when Lau-
 riston and Drouet's artillery approached: the can-

noneers, regardless of the cross fire of the Austrian batteries, advanced at the trot to within half cannon-shot, and then opened a prodigious fire from their hundred pieces, which was sustained with such rapidity, that it forced back the Austrian line immediately in front, and dismounted several of their guns. Taking advantage of the confusion produced by this discharge, Macdonald advanced with his column, directly in at the opening, and pierced the Imperial centre: Aderklaa and Breitenlee are soon passed; Sussenbrunn is menaced: moving steadily forward through the wreck of guns, the dead, and the dying, this undaunted column, preceded by its terrific battery incessantly firing, pushed on half a league beyond the front, in other points, of the enemy's line. In proportion as it advanced, however, it became enveloped by fire: the guns were gradually dismounted or silenced, and the infantry emerged through their wreck to the front: the Austrians drew off their front line upon their second, and both falling back, formed a sort of wall on each side of the French column, from whence issued a dreadful fire of grape and musketry on either flank of the assailants. Still Macdonald presses on with unconquerable resolution: in the midst of a frightful storm of bullets, his ranks are unshaken; the destinies of Europe are in his hands, and he is worthy of the mission. The loss he experienced, however, was enormous; at every step, huge chasms are made in his ranks, whole files are struck down by cannon-shot; and, at length, his eight dense battalions are reduced to fifteen hundred men! Isolated in the midst of enemies, this band of heroes is compelled to halt: the empire rocked to its foundation: the rout of a similar body of the old guard at Waterloo, hurled Napoleon to the rock of St Helena.¹

CHAP.
LVI.

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¹ Kausler,
388. Pel.
iv. 221,
224. Sav.
iv. 113.
Jom. iv.
273. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 210.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

Measures of
Napoleon to
support that
attack.

¹ Kausler,
388, 389.
Sav. iv.
112, 113.
Pelet, iv.
225, 226.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
210, 211.

Retreat of
the Arch-
duke, and
bloody en-
counters in
the course
of it.

Following with intense anxiety the advance of this column, however, the Emperor was at hand to support it. The divisions on the flank, Durutte and Pachtod, which had insensibly fallen behind during the advance of Macdonald with the central column, were ordered to move forward; Serras and Wrede were hastened up to his support; and the young guard, under Reille, detached to support their attack. This last succour, however, almost exhausted the reserves of Napoleon. "Husband your men as much as possible," said he to Reille, as he gave him the command: "I have now no other reserve, but the two regiments of the old guard." At the same time, Nansouty, with the cuirassiers on the left, and Walther with the dragoons on the right of Macdonald's column, received orders to charge the masses in front of them, and Oudinot, Eugene, and Marmont, to press the enemy as much as possible, towards Aderklaa and Wagram.¹

The charges of the cavalry proved most unfortunate. Hardly had Bessieres set off to execute the orders of the Emperor, when he was struck down by a cannon-shot, which tore his thigh, killed his horse, and so disfigured his whole person, that he was taken up for dead. Nansouty succeeded to the command, and led on the charge; but such was the severity of the fire which they immediately encountered, that in a few minutes, twelve hundred horsemen were struck down by cannon balls, and the whole were compelled to halt, and retire before they even reached the enemy. The dragoons on the right, under Walther, met with the same fate; and, after sustaining a grievous loss, were driven back under cover of the foot soldiers. But the infantry were more successful. No sooner did Macdonald perceive that the di-

visions of Pachtod, Durutte, Serras and Wrede, had come up to his flanks, and that Reille was advancing to his support, than he resumed his forward movement; and the Archduke, despairing now of maintaining his position, gave orders for a general retreat. It was executed, however, in the most admirable order: the infantry retiring by echelon, and alternately marching and facing about to pour destructive volleys into the ranks of the pursuers. The field of battle, as seen from the steeples of Vienna, now presented a magnificent spectacle. Massena, upon the retreat of Kollowrath and Klenau, readily regained Essling and Aspern, and the Austrian army, in a line nearly perpendicular to the Danube, slowly and deliberately retired: while the French host formed a vast line of sabres and bayonets, from the banks of the river to the summit of the plateau of Wagram, on which the declining rays of the sun glanced with extraordinary splendour. Vast volumes of smoke at intervals indicated the position of the opposing batteries; a white line of curling smoke, marked the advance and line of the infantry; and gleams of almost intolerable brightness were reflected from the helmets and cuirasses of the cavalry. A bloody encounter took place at Gerarsdorf, which the rear-guard of Kollowrath long held with unconquerable bravery; but it was at length carried by the chasseurs of the guard: Wagram yielded to the impetuous assaults of Oudinot, and two battalions were made prisoners. But, with this exception, the retreat of the Austrians was conducted with hardly any loss: the Archduke, with consummate skill, availed himself of every advantage of ground to retard the enemy; and so exhausted were the French by their efforts, that they displayed very little vigour in the pursuit. Neither

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

CHAP.
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¹ Kausler,
389, 390.
Pelet, iv.
234, 238.
Archduke
Charles's
official ac-
count. Ann.
Reg. 1809.
App. to
Chron.
Sav. iv.
114. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 211,
212.

Tardy ap-
proach and
retreat of
the Arch-
duke John.
Vital im-
portance of
his co-
operation.

cannons nor prisoners were taken; the cavalry hardly charged: but for the retrograde movement of one army and the advance of the other, it would have been impossible to have decided which had gained the advantage in the fight. Napoleon was much chagrined at this indecisive result, and suffered his ill humour to exhale in open reproaches to the cavalry generals of the guard. "Was ever any thing seen like this? Neither prisoners nor guns! This day will be attended with no results." At nightfall, the Austrians occupied a line along the heights behind Stammersdorf, from which their right wing had descended in the morning, along the great road to Brunn, through Hebersdorf to Obersdorf; while the French bivouacked in the plain, three miles in their front, from the edge of the Danube near Florisdorf, perpendicularly up to Sauring, at the foot of the hills.¹

It was towards the close of this obstinately contested battle that the Archduke John approached the field. Between three and four o'clock his columns came up to Leobensdorf and Obersiebenbrunn, while his advanced posts reached Neusiedel, and even approached Wagram, which the French troops had passed through not an hour before in pursuit of the Austrian grand army! Finding, however, upon his arrival there, that his brother had abandoned the field, and was retiring at all points towards the Bisamberg, he justly conceived apprehensions concerning his own situation, left alone with forty thousand men in the rear of the grand army, and gave orders to retreat. He marched till after dark, and regained Marchegg before midnight. An incident occurred, however, soon after he retired, which demonstrated in the most striking manner the vital importance of his co-operation, and the decisive effect

which might have arisen from it, had he come up, as he had been ordered, at an earlier hour of the day. The Emperor, worn out with fatigue, had lain down to rest, surrounded by his guards, in the plain between Sussenbrunn and Aderklaa, when cries of alarm were heard from the rear. The drums immediately beat at all points; the infantry hastily formed in squares, the artillerymen stood to their guns, the cavalry saddled their horses. Napoleon himself mounted his horse, and asked what was the cause of the alarm. "It is nothing, sire," replied Charles Lebrun, one of his aides-de-camp, "merely a few marauders." "What do you call nothing?" replied the Emperor, warmly: "know, sir, there are no trifling events in war: nothing endangers an army like an imprudent security. Return to see what is the matter, and come back quickly to render me an account." Mean-while he prepared every thing for a nocturnal combat, and the aspect of affairs in the rear of the army was such as to call forth all his solicitude. The artillery, baggage-waggons, stragglers, and camp-followers, who crowded the rear, were flying in disorder to the Danube; the plain was covered with fugitives, the entrance of the bridges blocked up with carriages, and many who even had the river between them and the supposed danger, continued their flight, and never drew bridle till they were within the ramparts of Vienna. The alarm spread like wild-fire from rank to rank: the guard even was shaken: the victors for a moment doubted of the fate of the day. The ranks presented the appearance of a general rout; and yet the whole was occasioned by a single squadron of the Archduke John's cavalry, which had been far advanced towards Wagram, and, seeking to regain, as he retired, the road to Presburg,

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CHAP. had cut down some French marauders in one of the
LVI. villages on the east of the field! So vital was the

1809. line of communication on which that prince was
intended to act, and so important were the results
which must have ensued from his co-operation, if it
had taken place, as the generalissimo was entitled
to expect, at an earlier period of the day.¹

¹ Jom. iii.
276, 277.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
215. Sav.
iv. 115.

Results of
the battle.

Such was the memorable battle of Wagram, one
of the greatest and most obstinately contested of the
whole war, and perhaps the most glorious in the
whole Austrian annals. The loss on both sides was
immense: twenty-five thousand brave men on either
part were either killed or wounded without any deci-
sive result having been obtained. The other trophies
were equally balanced: the Austrian right wing had
made five thousand prisoners, and two thousand of
their own wounded,* had fallen into the hands of

¹ Scott's
Napoleon,
vi. 334.

² Savary,
iv. 114,
115, 116.

³ Jomini,
iii. 276.

* The 25th bulletin says the French took 20,000 prisoners, forty pieces of cannon, and ten standards; and Sir Walter Scott has heedlessly transcribed that statement.¹ It is, however, grossly inaccurate, and proved to be so even by the warmest partisans of Napoleon. "The enemy retired," says Savary, who was by the Emperor's side through the whole battle, "at four o'clock, and abandoned to us the field of battle, but *without prisoners or cannon*, and after having fought in such a manner as to render every prudent man cautious of engaging in a rash enterprise: we followed without pressing him, for the truth is he had not been at all cut up. He made head against us every where, and his troops were very numerous, and *he had, in reality, no reason for retiring*; though, fortunately for us, he did so, and thus gave to France all the moral advantages of a victory."² Jomini says, "The Archduke retreated during the night, *leaving us no other trophies* but some thousand wounded or prisoners, and a few dismounted cannon. Their loss was 25,000 men; ours was about the same."³ Sir Walter's *Life of Napoleon* is a surprising work, considering that it was written in little more than twelve months, by an author whose life had been spent in studies of a different description; but his narrative is often little more than a transcript of the bulletins or Annual Register, and it is not surprising that in less than two years he could not, under severe anxiety and affliction, master what would have required twenty years, in Gibbon's words, "of health, leisure, and perseverance."—See LOCKHART'S *Life of Scott*, vii. 42.

the enemy in the centre of the plain. They were nowhere defeated: no panics disgraced their lines; no columns laid down their arms: slowly, at the command of their chief alone, in regular order they retired from the field without the loss of either prisoners or cannon, and inspiring, even to the last, dread to the enemy who followed their steps.¹

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¹ Kausler,
389, 390.
Pelet, iv.
238.

To have maintained such a conflict with greatly inferior forces, against Napoleon at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, was itself no ordinary distinction. But this is not all: if their forces had all joined in the action, and they had thereby been restored to an equality with the enemy, there can be no doubt the result would have been different. But for the failure of the Archduke John to come up at the period assigned to him, the battle would have terminated in a glorious and decisive victory. Had that prince made his appearance on the field either at six in the morning, when Rosenberg, in anticipation of his co-operation, advanced to Glinzendorf; or later, when Kollowrath and Klenau had routed the French left wing, and their leading columns were approaching the bridges of Lobau; or even when the fate of Europe hung in suspense on the advance of Macdonald's column in the centre, there can be no doubt that Napoleon would have been totally defeated, and possibly a disaster as great as that of Waterloo would have effected, six years before that memorable event, the deliverance of Europe. Experience in every age has demonstrated, that, after the protracted excitement of a great battle, the bravest soldiers become unstrung,* and, at such a moment,

Loss of the
battle was
owing to
the Arch-
duke John's
neglect of
orders.

* "The long and fearful excitement of battle once relaxed, leaves the toil-worn frame nerveless and exhausted, and the mind itself destitute of the energy requisite for any renewal of vigorous exertion. A bold

CHAP. the attack of a few fresh troops often produces the
LVI. most extraordinary results. It is this which so often

1809. has chained success to the effort of a small reserve in the close of an obstinately disputed day ; which made Kellerman's charge at Marengo snatch victory from the grasp of the victorious Austrians ; and the onset of Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade on the flank of the old guard, at Waterloo, overthrow at once the military fabric of the French Empire. The general terror inspired in Napoleon's rear by the capture of Aspern and Essling in the morning ; the marvellous panic occasioned by the charge of a squadron of hussars in their extreme right at night, demonstrate* that the disaster of Aspern had inspired the French troops with a nervous disquietude about the bridges in their rear ; and that any alarm in that quarter was likely to produce even greater effect than on troops of less military foresight and experience. What then must have been the effect of thirty thousand fresh troops suddenly thrown into the rear of the French army, where there was no reserve to oppose them, at the moment when the victorious shouts of Kollowrath's troops, and the ominous sound of the cannon of

onset made by a few resolute men on troops who have maintained, even successfully, a hard day's combat, is almost sure to turn the scale in favour of the new assailants."—*Life of WALLENSTEIN, by* LIEUT.-COLONEL MITCHELL, p. 259 ; a work written with the spirit of a soldier the principles of a patriot, and the penetration of a statesman.

* "If we reflect," says General Pelet, the able historian of this campaign, himself an actor in the mighty events he commemorates, and withal an ardent partisan of Napoleon, "on the result of the battle of Fontenoy ; if the 1500 who remained of Macdonald's corps had been surrounded and charged by fresh troops assembled from the right and the left, and those who remained on the heights of Stammersdorf, the battle might still have been gained by the Austrians. The Emperor had no other reserve at his disposal but two regiments of the old guard ; the isle of Lobau was threatened, and all around it was in the utmost disorder. The Archduke had many more forces not engaged than were required to have made that attack."—PEL. iv. 248.

Lobau, announced that their retreat was all but cut off; or when the heroic column of Macdonald, wasted away to fifteen hundred men, had halted their advance in front of Sussenbrunn? The Archduke John is a most accomplished prince, and, as a private individual, no one has greater title to esteem; but either his jealousy of his brother, or his incapacity to perceive the object of combined operations, twice in that single campaign proved fatal to his country: once when he disobeyed the orders of the Archduke Charles to combine with Kollowrath an attack on the bridge of Lintz, on the French line of communication, immediately after the battle of Aspern; and again, by his tardiness in obeying the orders of the same generalissimo to hasten to the theatre of decisive events on the field of Wagram.^{1*}

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¹ Kausler,
389, 390.
Pelet, iv.
238, 239.
Jom. iii.
275, 276.

The day after the battle, Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the field of battle. Without the features of horror which had imprinted so awful a character on that of Eylau, it presented some circumstances of a still more distressing description. The plain was covered with the corpses of the slain; the march of Macdonald's column especially, might be traced by the train of dead bodies which lay along its course. Such was the multitude of the wounded, that they far exceeded all the efforts of the French surgeons, and of the humane citizens of Vienna, for their relief; and, four days after the battle, the mutilated remains of human beings, still alive, were found in great numbers among the rich fields of wheat with which the plain was covered. Some of these unhappy wretches endured for days together the rays of a vertical sun during the dog-days, without either food or water: mutilated, and unable

Napoleon
visits the
field of bat-
tle, and
makes Mac-
donald a
marshal.

* See note B.

CHAP. to remove the flies which fastened on their wounds,
 LVI. they literally became, while still alive, the prey of
 1809. the insects which hover round carcasses of animals in
 hot weather.¹ The Emperor frequently dismounted,
 and with his own hands administered relief to some
 of the wounded, and drew tears of gratitude from
 eyes about to be closed in death.* The knowledge
 that the victory was their own, had restored all
 their wonted enthusiasm to the French soldiers; the
 wounded exclaimed *Vive l'Empereur* as he passed,
 and hoisted little white flags, formed by putting their
 handkerchiefs or an arm of their shirt on their
 bayonets, as well to testify their joy as to implore
 relief. After having traversed the field of battle, Na-
 poleon inspected the soldiers who were about to march
 in pursuit of the enemy, and distributed rewards in
 great profusion among the most deserving. In pass-
 ing, he stopt and held out his hand to Macdonald:
 "Touch it, Macdonald, without any further grudge:†
 from this day we shall be friends; and I will send
 you, as a pledge of my sincerity, your marshal's staff,
 which you have won so gloriously yesterday." "Ah!
 sire," replied Macdonald, with tears in his eyes, "we
 are now together for life and death." And well did

¹ D'Abr.
 xii. 261,
 262.

* "The Emperor stopped his horse beside a young officer of carabineers, who had had his skull fractured by a cannon shot; he knelt beside him, felt his pulse, and wiped with his own handkerchief the dust from his lips and brow. A little spirits made him revive; he opened his eyes and fixed them on the Emperor; he recognised him, and his eyes filled with tears; but he was too weak to be able to sob, and soon after breathed his last."—SAVARY, iv. 119.

† A coldness had long subsisted between Napoleon and this distinguished general. He had not been employed in any considerable command since the battle of the Trebia, in 1799. Jealousy and malevolence had widened the breach occasioned by Macdonald's original disinclination to join the herd of obsequious flatterers at the Tuilleries. How often does difficulty and misfortune bring to the post they are really worthy to fill, those noble minds, who disdain the arts by which, in easier times, it is generally won!—SAVARY, iv. 119.

the hero of Scottish blood redeem his word ! Through every future change of his reign he adhered with unshaken fidelity to the fortunes of his master. He was to be found by his side, alike amidst the disasters of Fontainbleau as the triumph of Wagram ; and, when all the other objects of his bounty had deserted their benefactor and passed over to the enemy, he remained almost alone to support him ; the latest object of his prosperous favour, but the most faithful follower of his adverse fortunes.¹

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¹ Sav. iv.
119, 120.
Pelet. iv.
241, 242.

Oudinot, a general, as the bulletin said, “ tried in a hundred battles,” and Marmont, whose campaign in Illyria and Carniola had so powerfully contributed to the success of the grand army, were at the same time elevated to the rank of marshals. Very different was the destiny which awaited Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo, hitherto one of the most favoured of Napoleon’s lieutenants. This chief, who had been singularly unfortunate both in his attack on the heights of Wagram and village of Aderklaa, on the evening of the 5th, and his encounter with the Austrian centre, on the morning of the 6th, had, with the true spirit of Gascony, his native country, glossed over his defeat by a boasting proclamation to the Saxons on the 7th, in which he professed to convey to them the Emperor’s approbation for the gallantry which they had evinced on these occasions.* Napoleon, who was both irritated at Bernadotte and the Saxons for the abandonment of Aderklaa, which it required him so much time and bloodshed to regain on the following day, and jealous of any of his lieutenants assuming his own peculiar function in the distribution of praise or blame, immediately prepared and circulated, but among the marshals and mini-

Appoint-
ment of
Oudinot
marshal of
the empire.
Disgrace of
Bernadotte.

* See note C.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

July 9.

July 30.

sters alone, an order of the day, reflecting in very severe terms, both on the conduct of the Saxons and this step on the part of their chief;* and soon after a decree was published in the bulletin dissolving that corps, and incorporating its soldiers with other parts of the army. Bernadotte sought a private interview with the Emperor on this painful subject, but in vain; he constantly refused to see him; and the disgraced marshal immediately set out for Paris, where he was soon after employed by the minister at war, without the concurrence of Napoleon, in a very important duty, that of commanding at Antwerp during the English invasion of the Scheldt. No sooner, however, did the Emperor learn of this fresh appointment by the government at Paris, than it, too, was cancelled, and Bessieres put there in his stead; even although Bernadotte's efforts, during the short period he held the command, had been eminently serviceable to the empire. These repeated indignities made a deep impression on the mind of the French marshal; they revived that ancient jealousy at the First Consul† which all the subsequent glories of his reign had not entirely extinguished; induced a sullen discontent at the Imperial service, which experience had shown was liable to such inconstancy; made him grasp eagerly at the Swedish throne, which fortune soon after proffered to his grasp; and, by investing the disgraced soldier with the power and feelings of an independent sovereign, contributed, in the end, in no inconsiderable degree, to the downfall of the French empire.¹

¹ Bom.
viii. 280,
281. Pel.
iv. 241,
242. Sav.
iv. 123.

Two lines of retreat were open to the Archduke after he had determined to relinquish the field; that to Olmutz and Moravia, and that to Bohemia; and

* See note D.

† Ante, iii. 638.

so little did the French press their adversaries when the retrograde movement commenced, that the Emperor was for some time ignorant which of the two routes they had adopted. There were several reasons, however, which induced him to prefer the latter. Prague was, next to Vienna, the greatest military establishment, and contained the largest arsenal of the empire; and it stood in a country surrounded with a range of hills, which offered favourable positions for retarding the advance of an invading army. Hopes were not wanting, also, that the great naval and military armament which England had so long been preparing, would soon make its appearance, either in Flanders or the north of Germany, and that the indecision of Prussia, notwithstanding the retreat from Wagram, might be determined by such powerful support in the north of Germany. For these reasons, the line of Bohemia was selected for the retreat of the grand army, leaving to the Archduke John, with the forces under his command, and the Hungarian insurrection, the care of covering Hungary and the eastern provinces of the empire. The greater part of the army followed the high road to Znaym; Rosenberg alone, on the extreme left, took that to Brunn by Wolkersdorf. The retreat continued all the 7th without any serious molestation from the enemy; while Napoleon, who was disquieted by the presence of so large a body as the Archduke John's army, still untouched on his right flank, and by the menacing advance of Giulay with twenty-five thousand men from the side of Styria, towards Vienna, separated the immense army which had so lately been concentrated on the field of Wagram. Davoust, Marmont, Massena, with Oudinot, Bessieres, and the guards, being directed to follow on

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

The Aus-
trians retire
towards
Bohemia.

July 7.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pelet, iv.
253, 257.
Jom. iii.
279, 280.
Napoleon's
Orders, 9th
July, 1809.
Pelet, iv.
408.

Retreat of
the Arch-
duke to
Znaym, and
his position
there.

July 9.

the traces of the Archduke Charles; the Viceroy's corps, augmented to fifty thousand men by the addition of the Saxons and Wirtemburghers, being moved towards Presburg, to observe the Archduke John; while Macdonald's division remained in charge of the bridges of Vienna, and was prepared, with the garrison of the capital, to repel any insult that might be offered by the Ban of Croatia. No less circumspect than adventurous, Napoleon, at the same time, ordered a hundred pieces of heavy cannon to be mounted on the ramparts of Vienna, augmented its garrison to six thousand men, laid in provisions for six months, directed the formation of great new fortifications on the bridgeheads of the capital, especially at Florisdorf, where the road to Brunn and Znaym traversed the Danube, and ordered Passau, Lintz, Raab, Melk, and Gottweig, in different directions around the capital, to be put in a state of defence.¹

No considerable action took place during the retreat. Massena, however, pressed the Austrian rear-guard with all his wonted activity, and bloody encounters of inconsiderable bodies marked the track of the armies. The Archduke conducted the retreat with consummate skill, and in the most admirable order: always protecting the rear-guard, composed of formidable masses of cavalry and infantry, by a numerous artillery skilfully posted on the rising grounds, with which that undulating country abounded. To accelerate his movements, and if possible throw him in some degree into confusion, Napoleon moved Marmont's corps, which was following Rosenberg on the road to Brunn, by a cross road to Laa, by which means he threatened to arrive at Znaym before the main Austrian army.

The Archduke no sooner received intelligence of this movement, than he fell back with all his forces, and took post at that town, on the banks of the Taya. Nothing can exceed the military position which the environs of Znaym afford: the town itself, surrounded by walls, rests, towards the west, on the rugged precipices which border the river; towards the east on the slopes of the Lischen; the ground descends on all sides to the point of Schallersdorf, where the river turns sharp by a right angle, and flows towards Tipwitz, and the junction of the Lischen and Taya. These two streams thus enclose, as it were, a vast bastion, with a great natural wet ditch in front, about a mile long, and equally broad. The Archduke himself took post at Bren-¹ Pelet, iv. 264, 267. Jom. iv. 282. Vict. et Conq. xix. 216, 217. ditz, which rendered him master both of the roads to Budweiss, and Bohemia, and Brunn; but the slopes of Znaym were filled with troops, the bridge of the Taya barricaded, and four powerful batteries erected on the heights above to dispute the passage.¹

Strong as this position was, it was doubtful whether the Austrians would maintain themselves in it. The advanced guards of Massena, indeed, when they first approached the bridge, were arrested by the tremendous fire of grape and musketry which issued from the woods and heights on the opposite side: but the French cannon were soon placed in such a position as to rake the Austrian batteries; the bridge was disengaged by their flanking fire; fords were discovered both above and below; and soon the attacking columns were passed over, and began to ascend the slopes on the opposite side. The Archduke withdrew his troops into Znaym; and arranged his artillery in such numbers around its walls, that, when the French leading columns arrived

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

July 10.

Combat at
Znaym.
July 11.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pelet, iv.
269, 273,
Jom. iii.
282.

Advance of
Marmont
and conclu-
sion of the
armistice of
Znaym.

within reach of the fire, on the slope leading to the town, they were checked with so terrible a discharge as to be obliged to retire precipitately with severe loss. Upon this the Austrians issued forth, and took post around the town and in front of the bridge, in great strength, in a position admirable for defence, though cramped for manœuvring, and especially hazardous if a retreat was intended. A dreadful storm arose at noon, which darkened the air, and deluged both armies with such a torrent of rain, that for two hours the discharge of fire-arms was impossible, and the combat of necessity was suspended. When the atmosphere cleared, Massena renewed his attacks on the grenadiers in front of the bridge; but he was driven back, and the Austrians, pursuing the flying enemy, regained that important passage, and made prisoners a battalion with three generals, in the village at its opposite extremity. Massena, upon this, brought up the 10th regiment, which again won the village, forced the bridge, and being followed by a brigade of cuirassiers, who charged with uncommon resolution, drove back the enemy's column to their position in front of Znaym, with the loss of five hundred prisoners; while the French guns were brought up on the left, in great numbers, to Edlepiz, from whence they took in flank the most formidable batteries of the Austrians.¹

The progress of the Austrians in front of Znaym did not escape the observation of Napoleon, who had arrived during the storm at Theswitz, and established himself at the headquarters of Marmont's corps. To relieve the pressure on Massena, who was obviously engaged with superior forces, and whose defeat would endanger the whole army, he

immediately ordered the former marshal to debouch from Theswitz, to cross the Lischen, and to ascend on the north-eastern side the plateau of Znaym. These orders were immediately obeyed, and Marmont crossed the stream and ascended the hill, but sustained a very heavy fire when he approached the town of Znaym, and came within reach of the formidable Austrian batteries arranged round its walls. Matters were thus in a very critical state; for the two corps of Massena and Marmont were alone engaged with the whole Austrian army, except Rosenberg's corps; and Davoust and Oudinot, destined to support them, could not arrive at the theatre of action till the following morning. Nevertheless, Massena, with his usual impetuosity, was urging the attack on the town, and already the rattle of musketry was heard in the suburbs, when the cry was heard, "Peace, peace; cease firing." Such, however, was the exasperation of the contending parties, that it was with great difficulty the action could be stopped, and when the officers arrived from the headquarters of the two armies to announce the armistice, they were wounded before the troops could be prevailed upon to desist from mutual slaughter.¹

In effect, the Archduke Charles had, on the preceding night, sent Prince John of Lichtenstein to the Emperor's headquarters to propose an armistice; but Napoleon was unwilling to accept it, till he had enjoyed an opportunity of observing in person the situation of the armies. The motives which led the Austrian cabinet to take this step were sufficiently obvious. The policy of that government always has been to avoid coming to extremities: to come to an accommodation before the chances of war had become desperate; to consider the preservation of the army

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
272, 274.
Thib. vi.
350. Sav.
iv. 124,
125.Motives
which led
the Aus-
trians to
this step.

CHAP. the grand object, and trust, by preserving it entire,
 LVI. to regain at some future time the advantages which
 1809. might be lost at the moment by yielding to the
 storm. Considering another battle, therefore, fraught
 with the existence of the empire, and the result of
 the former not so decisive as to induce the enemy
 to refuse reasonable terms of accommodation, they
 deemed it the more prudent course to propose an
 armistice while yet the forces of the monarchy were
 entire, the more especially as the retreat from Wa-
 gram was not likely to induce Prussia to adopt a de-
 cisive course, and the long promised armament of
 Great Britain had not yet left the harbours of the
 Channel.¹

¹ Pel. iv.
 274, 278.
 Stut. 388,
 390. Jom.
 iii. 283.

Arguments
 for and
 against the
 armistice at
 the French
 headquar-
 ters.

It was not, however, till Napoleon had himself
 seen the positions of the contending armies, and
 was satisfied that the Austrians, at the moment, had
 the advantage, as well in the position as the con-
 centration of their troops, that he resolved to ac-
 cede to the suspension of arms.* A council of war
 was afterwards held, attended by all the marshals in
 the Emperor's tent, in which the important point
 was debated, whether the armistice should be agreed
 to. Opinions were much divided, and the discussion
 was prolonged till a very late hour. On the one side,
 it was contended by Berthier, and the advocates for
 a continuance of hostilities, that it was of the last
 importance to take advantage of the reinforcements
 which had already come up, or were likely to arrive
 during the night, to commence a general attack on
 the enemy, and finish the war on the following day
 at a blow; that his position around Znaym, though

* "Oudinot, and the reserve from Wolkersdorf, could not come up till the following morning: it was material not to allow the enemy to perceive his superiority at that moment."—THIBAUDEAU, vii. 350.

strong was not impregnable ; that Austria was the irreconcilable enemy of France under the new régime ; and that, unless deprived of the power of again injuring her, she would never cease to violate the most solemn treaties, when it suited her own convenience, or there was a prospect of advantage from any the most flagrant violation of the public faith. That if, by retiring in the night, as present appearances rendered probable, the Archduke should succeed in regaining Bohemia, and uniting to his standards the forces of that province, the Emperor could summon to his aid the corps of Lefebvre, Junot, and Jerome, and the advantage would still remain on his side. That it was indispensable to put an end to these coalitions perpetually springing up, by dividing Austria, which was the centre of them all ; that this was a point of much more importance than finishing the war in Spain ; and that no sooner would the Emperor, for that purpose, enter the Peninsula, than a new coalition would spring up in his rear, which would embrace all the northern powers. On the other hand, it was contended by the advocates of peace, that if Prince Charles retreated, as he unquestionably might do, during the night, and gained the Bohemian mountains, there was every reason to fear a general conflagration in Germany, an open declaration from Prussia, and probably the ultimate adhesion of Russia itself : that it was evident from present appearances, not less than past events, that the real danger of France lay in the north : that an entire new system of Russian policy had been brought to light, in the course of the contest ; and that, in anticipation of the grand and final conflict between the south and the north, which was evidently approaching, it was of the last

CHAP.
LVI.
1809.

CHAP.
LVI.

1809.

¹ Pel. iv.
275, 277.
Bign. viii.
310. Thib.
vii. 350.

Limits
assigned to
the two
armies by
the armis-
tice.
July 12.

importance not merely to spare but conciliate Austria, and, by terminating the war in the Peninsula, not only secure the rear of France, but liberate two hundred thousand of its best soldiers from an inglorious but murderous warfare. The Emperor, after hearing, according to his usual custom, both sides patiently, more fully aware than many of his generals of the precarious footing on which he stood with Russia, inclined to the latter side, and broke up the conference with the decisive words,—“Enough of blood has been shed : I accept the armistice.”¹

No great difficulty was experienced in fixing the line of demarcation between the districts to be occupied by the two armies; their relative position, and the principle *uti possidetis*, afforded too clear a rule for drawing the line between them. The French were permitted to retain possession of all Upper Austria, as far as the borders of Bohemia, including the circles of Znaym and Brunn; the whole district included by the course of the Morava as far as its confluence with the Taya; thence by the high-road to Presburg, including that town; the course of the Danube as far as Raab, the river of that name, and thence by the frontiers of Styria and Carniola to Fiume. On this principle, the citadels of Gratz and Brunn, the fort of Sassenburg, the whole districts of Tyrol and Vorarlberg were to be surrendered to their arms. It was a third in point of extent, and more than a half in point of military strength, of the whole empire. The armies in Poland were to retain their respective positions; in western and northern Germany, the limits between the two powers were to be those of the states composing the confederation of the Rhine.¹

¹ See armis-
tice.
Martin's
Sup. v.
209.
Monit.
July 20,
1809.

The armistice was concluded by the Archduke

Charles alone, in virtue of the powers reposed in him as generalissimo, but subject to the ratification of the Emperor. The cabinet of Vienna, which at that period was assembled at Komorn in Hungary, had considerable difficulty in giving their consent to it. It was proposed to take advantage of the distance of the French troops to act on the right bank of the Danube; to unite the forces of Giulay and the Archduke John with those of the Hungarian insurrection, and move towards Styria and Tyrol, so as to threaten the French communications, while the Archduke Charles, by retreating towards Bohemia, drew the bulk of their forces to a distance from their only base of operations. In pursuance of these views, which, for a few days, prevailed at the Imperial headquarters, directions were sent to the Archduke John to “dis-
 regard any orders regarding an armistice which were not bearing the sign manual of the Emperor, and take his instructions from him alone.” In the course of the two following days, however, Prince Lichtenstein arrived from the headquarters of the Archduke Charles, and inspired more moderate views. The court, yielding to necessity, and desirous of gaining time to recruit its armies, await the progress of events in Spain, and the effect of the long expected English armament in the north of Germany, gave a reluctant consent; the armistice was signed by the Emperor on the 18th, and the flames of war were quenched in Germany, till they broke out with awful violence three years afterwards on the banks of the Niemen.¹

The Austrian people were not long of receiving a bitter proof the reality of their subjugation. On the very day after the armistice was concluded, a decree of Napoleon's imposed a war contribution of 237,800,000 francs (L.9,500,000), on the provinces

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Hesitation
of the
Emperor of
Austria to
sign the
armistice,
which is
only done
on the 18th.

July 14.

¹ Pel. iv.
283, 284.
Sav. iv.
126. Jom.
iii. 285.

Heavy
contribution levied
on Austria.
July 13.

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¹ Decree,
July 13.
Montg. vii.
430.

Comparison
of the battle
of Wagram
with those
of Cannæ
and Water-
loo.

occupied by the French armies, which was not a half of the monarchy; a burden at least as great, considering the relative wealth and value of money in the two countries, as an imposition of fifty millions sterling would be on Great Britain.¹

The battle of Wagram bears a striking resemblance to two of the most memorable that have occurred in ancient or modern times,—those of Cannæ and Waterloo. In all the three, the one party made a grand effort at the centre of his antagonist, and the final issue of each battle was owing to the success or failure of the measures adopted to defeat this central attack, by an united movement against the wings of the enemy. At Cannæ, as already noticed, it was the advance of the Roman centre, in column, into the middle of the Carthaginian army, followed by the turning of both their flanks by the Carthaginian cavalry, which brought about their ruin. At Aspern the defeat of the French on the second day was owing to a similar hazardous advance of the French centre in close column into the middle of the Austrian line, which skilfully receded, and brought the French columns into the centre of a converging fire of a prodigious artillery.* At Waterloo, the final defeat of the French was owing to the steadiness of the English guards, which in line arrested the advance of the old Imperial guard in column, while the concentric fire of the British batteries, now advanced into a kind of semicircle, and the simultaneous charge of a brigade of cavalry on the one side, and a line of infantry on the other, of the attacking mass, completed the final destruction of that formidable body. At Wagram the Archduke had, on a still more extended scale, prepared the means of repel-

* Ante, vii. 355.

ling the anticipated central attack of the French in column, and converting it into the cause of total ruin. CHAP.
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The batteries and troops in the centre were so disposed, that their awful fire at length arrested Macdonald's intrepid column; Aspern and Essling were captured on one flank; the Archduke John, with thirty thousand fresh troops, was destined to turn the other. To all appearance the greatest defeat recorded in history awaited the French Emperor; when the tardiness of that prince proved as fatal to the Austrians as a similar delay on Grouchy's part was to Napoleon himself at Waterloo, and victory was snatched from the grasp of the Austrian eagles when they seemed on the very point of seizing it.

The campaign of Aspern and Wagram is the most glorious in the Austrian annals; the most memorable example of patriotic resistance recorded in the history of the world. If we recollect that in the short space of three months were comprised the desperate contest in Bavaria, the victory of Aspern, the war in Tyrol, the doubtful fight of Wagram, we shall be at a loss whether to admire most the vital strength of a monarchy, which, so soon after the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz, was capable of such gigantic efforts, the noble spirit which prompted its people so unanimously to make such unheard of exertions, or the firm resolution of the chiefs who, undismayed by reverses which would have crumbled any other government to dust, maintained an undaunted front to the very last. We admire the courage of Darius, who, after the loss of half his provinces, still fought with heroic resolution against the Macedonian conqueror on the field of Arbela; we exult in the firmness of the Roman senate, which, yet bleeding with the slaughter of Cannæ, sent forth legions to Spain,

Reflections
on the
campaign,
and its
glorious
character to
Austria.

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and sold the ground on which Hannibal was encamped, when his standards crowded round the walls of the city; and we anticipate already the voice of ages in awarding the praise of unconquerable resolution to the Russian Emperor, who, undeterred by the carnage of Borodino, resolved to burn the ancient capital of his empire rather than permit it to become the resting place of his enemies, and, when pierced to the heart, still stretched forth his mighty arms from Finland to the Danube to envelope and crush the invader. But, without underrating these glorious examples of patriotic resistance, it may safely be affirmed that none of them will bear a comparison with that exhibited by Austria in this memorable campaign.

Other empires have almost invariably sunk upon the capture of the capital. Carthage was crushed by the storm of its metropolis under Scipio Africanus; Rome sunk at once with the fall of the eternal city before the Gothic trumpet; with the conquest of Constantinople the lower empire perished; the seizure of Berlin by the allies under the great Frederic was but a transient incursion, its lasting occupation by Napoleon proved fatal to the strength of the monarchy; France, during its Republican fervour, was nearly overthrown by the charge of fifteen hundred Prussian hussars on the plains of Champagne,* and twice saw its strength totally paralysed by the fall of its capital in 1814 and 1815; Russia survived the capture of Moscow only by the aid of a rigorous climate and the overwhelming force of its Scythian cavalry. Austria is the only state recorded in history which, without any such advantages, fought TWO desperate battles in defence of its independence AFTER

* Ante, i. 620.

its capital had fallen ! To this glorious and unique distinction the Imperial annals may justly lay claim ; and those who affect to condemn its institutions, and despise its national character, would do well to examine the annals of the world for a similar instance of patriotic resolution, and search their own hearts for the feelings and the devotion requisite for its repetition.

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In truth, the invincible tenacity with which both the Austrian nobility and people maintained the conflict, under circumstances of adversity which, in every other instance recorded in history, had subdued the minds of men, affords at once a decisive refutation of the opinion so industriously propagated and heedlessly received in this country, as to the despotic and oppressive nature of the Imperial rule, and the most memorable example of the capability of an aristocratic form of government to impart to the community under its direction a degree of consistency and resolution of which mankind under no other circumstances are capable. It was not general misery which caused the Tyrolese to start unanimously to arms at the call of the Austrian trumpet, and combat the invader with stone balls discharged from larch trees bored into the form of cannon : it was no oppressive rule which called forth the sublime devotion of Aspern and Wagram. No nation ever was so often defeated as the Austrians were during the course of the Revolutionary war ; but none rose with such vigour from the ground, or exhibited, in such vivid colours, the power of moral principle to withstand the shocks of fortune, to compensate, by firmness of purpose, the superior intellectual acquisitions of other states, and communicate to men that unconquerable resolution which brings them in the end victorious through the severest earthly

Proof
thereby
afforded of
the practical
blessings of
the Aus-
trian
govern-
ment.

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¹ Personal
Observa-
tion.

trials. The aspect of Austria Proper, especially in its mountainous regions, confirms and explains this extraordinary phenomenon. In no other country, perhaps, is so uncommon a degree of well-being to be seen among the peasantry; nowhere are the fruits of the earth divided in apparently such equitable proportions between the landlord and the cultivator; nowhere does ease and contentment prevail so universally in the dwellings of the poor.¹ When it is recollected that this general prosperity takes place in a country where the taxation is so light as to be almost imperceptible by the great body of the people, and where the proportion of persons instructed, is, on an average of the whole empire, equal to any state of similar dimensions in Europe, and as high as the best educated nations in some provinces;* it must be admitted, that the philanthropist has much cause to linger with satisfaction on its contemplation. It is on a different class, on the middle ranks, and the aspiring children of the burghers, that the restrictions of the Imperial sway are hereafter destined to hang heavy: but at this period, no heart-burnings arose from the exclusions to which they are subject, and one only passion, that of ardent devotion to their country, animated all classes of the people.

But the example of Austria in 1809, has afforded another, and a still more interesting lesson to mankind. That country had, at that period, no pretensions to intellectual superiority; commerce, manufactures, and the mechanical arts, had made little

* One in fifteen of the population over the whole empire attend the elementary schools; in some provinces, as Upper Austria, Tyrol, and Bohemia, the proportion is as high as 1 to 11. In Switzerland, it is now 1 to 10; in Ireland, 1 to 9; in Scotland, 1 to 11; in France, 1 to 17; in Prussia, 1 to 10; in Spain, 1 to 350; in Poland, 1 to 100; in Russia, 1 to 794.—See MOREAU, *Stat. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 333, 334.

progress over its surface ; literature was in its infancy ; science flourished only in a few favoured spots, under the fostering care of Imperial patronage ; poetry, history, philosophy, were to the great mass of the inhabitants almost unknown. It had long and painfully felt the consequences of this inferiority, in the bloody contests it had been compelled to maintain with the democratic energy and scientific ability of the French Revolution. How, then, did it happen that a state, so little qualified by intellectual superiority to contend with the gigantic powers of wickedness, should have stood forth with such unparalleled lustre in the contest ; should have resisted alone, with such heroic bravery, the military force of half of Europe, guided by consummate ability and trained by unparalleled conquests ; and, for the first time since the commencement of the struggle, made the scales hang even between the conservative and revolutionary principles ? Simply because she possessed a pure, virtuous, and single-minded people ; because, whatever the corruptions of the capital may have been, the heart of the nation was untainted ; because an indulgent rule had attached the nobility to their sovereign, and experienced benefits the peasantry to their landlords ; because patriotism was there established upon its only durable basis, a sense of moral obligation and the force of religious duty.

And, in this respect, France, in the days of her adversity, exhibited a memorable contrast to Austria in the hour of her national trial. When the evil days fell upon her, when the barrier of the Rhine was forced, and hostile standards approached the gates of Paris, the boasted virtues of Republicanism had disappeared, the brilliant energy of military courage was found unequal to the shock. Province

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Causes of
the extraor-
dinary
public vir-
tue thus
exhibited
in Austria.Remark-
able con-
trast after-
wards
exhibited
by France.

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after province sunk without performing one deed worthy of tradition: city after city surrendered without leaving one trace in the page of history: no French Saragossa proved that patriotism can supply the want of ramparts; no Revolutionary La Vendée that the civic virtues can dispense with Christian enthusiasm; no second Tyrol that even Imperial strength may sink before the "might that slumbers in a peasant's arm." The strength of the empire was in the army alone: with the fall of its capital the power of the Revolution was at an end: the marshals and generals, true to the real idol of worldly adoration ranged themselves on the side of success.* The conqueror of a hundred fights was left almost alone by the creatures of his bounty; and, like the sorcerers who crowded round the statue of Eblis when the idol was pierced to the

* "The galleries and saloons," says Caulaincourt, "which adjoined the apartment of the Emperor at Fontainebleau (in April, 1814) were deserted. The marshals had carried with them their brilliant staffs: the wind of adversity had blown, the glittering crowd had vanished. That solitude thrilled the heart. The redoubted chief, who so lately had never moved but surrounded by a magnificent cortège, the great monarch, who had seen kings at his feet, is now only a simple individual, disinherited even of the interest and care of his friends! All was desolate, all was solitary in that splendid palace. I felt the necessity of withdrawing the Emperor from so fearful a torture. 'Have you got every thing ready for my departure?'—'Yes, Sire!'—'My poor Caulaincourt, you discharge here the functions of grand marshal: could you have conceived it? Berthier has gone off without even bidding me adieu!'—'What, Sire!' exclaimed I, 'Berthier also, the creature of your bounty!'—'Berthier,' replied the Emperor, 'was born a courtier: you will see soon my vice-constable mendicate employment from the Bourbons. I feel humiliated, that the men whom I have raised so high in the eyes of Europe, should have sunk so low! What have they made of that atmosphere of glory in which they appeared enveloped in the eyes of the stranger! What must the Sovereigns think of all these men illustrated by my reign!' " Such was the fidelity and gratitude of the Revolution; its genius, its intellect, its glory! Contrast this with Austria after Aspern—with the devotion of Wagram, and the shepherds of Tyrol.—See CAULAINCOURT'S *Memoirs*, ii. 109, 111.

heart by the son of Hodeirah, "the ocean vault fell in, and all were crushed."

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These considerations, in a certain degree, lift up the veil which conceals from mortal eyes the ultimate designs of Providence in the wars which often desolate the world. If we compare Austria as she was in 1793 with Austria in 1809, we seem not merely to be dealing with a different people, but a different age of the world. In the first era is to be seen nothing but selfishness and vacillation in the national councils, lukewarmness and indifference in the public feeling, irresolution and disgrace in military events. But it is well for nations not less than individuals to be in affliction. Turn to the same nation in 1809, and behold her undaunted in the cabinet, unconquered in the field; glowing in every quarter with patriotism, teeming in every direction with energy; firm in her faith, generous in her resolutions; maintaining unshaken constancy to her principles amidst unheard of disasters, fidelity to her sovereign amidst unbounded temptations. This is indeed regeneration, this is true national glory, purchased in the only school of real improvement, the paths of suffering. How many centuries of national existence did Austria go through before this mighty change was effected; how many national sins did she expiate; what a spot of glory, not merely in imperial but in human annals has she left! She is to reappear in the contest for European freedom; but she is to reappear as a conqueror, invested with irresistible strength, arrayed in impenetrable panoply: but she shared the glories of Leipsic with Russia and Prussia; the heroism of Aspern, the constancy of Wagram, are her own. Mankind have little concern with the mere conquest of one nation

Elevation of
the Aus-
trian
character
from past
calamities.

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by another: it is the triumph of virtue over misfortune, of duty over selfishness, of religion over infidelity, which is the real patrimony of the human race. The heroic constancy, the generous fidelity of all classes in Austria at the close of the contest was placed by Providence in bright contrast to the treachery and selfishness of the French Revolutionists, as if to demonstrate the inability of the greatest intellectual acquisitions to communicate that elevation to the character which springs from the prevalence of moral feeling, and to show that even the conquerors of the world were unequal to a crisis, which religion had rendered of easy endurance to the shepherds of the Alps.

CHAPTER LVII.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION—PEACE OF VIENNA—SECOND
WAR IN TYROL—DETHRONEMENT OF THE POPE.

ARGUMENT.

Vast Capabilities of the Scheldt for Commerce—Former Grandeur and present Importance of Antwerp—Napoleon's Designs for its amplification—Efforts always made by England to keep this great stronghold from France—Extraordinary insatiation which has led to its abandonment to France in later times—Proposals of Austria for a British Diversion—Reasons for not sending the grand British Expedition to the North of Germany or Spain—Reasons for selecting the Scheldt as the point of attack—Unhappy Delay in sending out the Expedition—It is finally resolved on in the end of May, and on a very great scale—Sailing and immense Magnitude of the Expedition—It lands in Holland, and gains great early Success—Certainty of entire victory if Antwerp had been first attacked—Siege and Capture of Flushing—The time lost in reducing it saves Antwerp—Retention of Walcheren, at first attempted, is finally abandoned as impracticable—Blind injustice which frequently characterises the proceedings of the British Parliament—Pernicious waste of time in the Debates in Parliament at this period—Charges against the Duke of York, and his Resignation—Debates on the Walcheren Expedition—Quarrel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning—Changes in the Administration—Youth and first introduction to Public Life of Mr Canning—His Character as an Orator and Statesman—Character of Lord Castlereagh—Elevated features of his Character—Career of Mr Percival—His Character—Position of France relative to Russia at this period—Negotiations between France and Austria—Napoleon's reasons for secret disquietude—Attempt to Assassinate him by Stabs—Which leads to the conclusion of the Negotiation—Peace of Vienna—Its Secret Articles—Jealousy of Russia at the increase of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw by this Treaty—The Ramparts of Vienna blown up—Affairs of the Tyrol after the Armistice of Znaym—Fresh Invasion of that province by Marshal Lefebvre—Renewed resolution of the Tyrolese to continue the contest—Desperate Action at the Bridge of Laditch—Defeat of Marshal Lefebvre on the Brenner—Successes in other quarters—Total Defeat of Lefebvre at Innsbruck—Hofer's Deliverance and Government of Tyrol—Preparations of Napoleon for the subjugation of the Tyrol—Successful Invasion of the country on all sides—Hofer resolves to submit, and publishes a Proclamation to that effect—And which is soon recalled by him—Last Invasion of the Tyrol, and desperate Resistance—Final Conquest of the country—Betrayal and Seizure of Hofer—His Trial and Condemnation—And Execution—Reflections on this event—Adventures of Haspinger and Spechbacher—Extraordinary Adventures and Escape

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of the latter—Affairs of the Holy See—Original Causes of Discontent on the part of the Pope at Napoleon—Dazzling reception of the Pope at Paris in 1805—His Request for the restoration of the Three Marches is refused—Farther Encroachments of France on the Holy See—Farther Demands of France, and Resistance of the Pope—Increased mutual Irritation after the Peace of Tilsit—Entire assumption of the Government by the French—Fresh Outrages, and Confinement of the Pope to his palace—Annexation of the Papal States to the French Empire, and Excommunication of Napoleon—Views of Napoleon in regard to the Pope, and his transference to Paris—Arrest of the Pope by General Radet—Particulars of his Seizure—The Pope is conducted to Grenoble, and Cardinal Pacca to Fenestrelles—Complete Fusion of the Roman States with the French Empire—Prejudicial Effect of these Measures on the Independence of the Church—Vast and admirable Works undertaken by the French at Rome—Reflections on the Spoliation of the Pope, as connected with Napoleon's subsequent downfall.

Vast capabilities of the Scheldt for commerce.

NATURE has formed the Scheldt to be the rival of the Thames. Of equal magnitude and depth with its renowned competitor, flowing through a country excelling even the midland counties of England in wealth and resources, adjoining cities long superior to any in Europe in arts and commerce; the artery at once of Flanders and Holland, of Brabant and Luxemburg, it is fitted to be the great organ of communication between the fertile fields and rich manufacturing towns of the low countries and the other maritime states of the world. If it is not equally celebrated as the Thames in history or romance; if all the vessels of the ocean do not crowd its quays, and its merchants are not sought by the princes of the earth; if it does not give law to all the quarters of the globe, and boast a colonial empire on which the sun never sets, it is not because nature has denied it the physical advantages conducive to such exalted destinies, but because the jealousies and perverseness of man have in great part marred her choicest gifts. Flanders was a great and highly civilized manufacturing state, when England was still struggling between the coarse plenty of Anglo-Saxon rudeness and the

insulting oppression of Norman chivalry; even in the days of Edward III. and the Black Prince, the Brewer of Ghent was the esteemed ally of princes, and the political passions of our times had been warmed into being by the long-established prosperity of a commercial community; their territory was the richest, the most peopled, the most adorned by cities in Christendom; and the fine arts, arising in the wane of ancient opulence, had already produced the immortal works of Teniers, Rubens, and Vandyke, when the school of England was as yet hardly emerged from the obscurity of infant years.

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ANTWERP, the key of this great estuary, gradually rose with the increasing commerce of the Low Countries, until, at the period of the Reformation, it numbered two hundred thousand inhabitants within its walls, and engrossed the whole trade of those beautiful provinces. Its noble harbour, capable of containing a thousand vessels; its extensive ramparts and citadel, among the strongest in Europe; its splendid cathedral, exceeding even St Paul's in elevation;* its magnificent quays, bordering a river five hundred yards in breadth, which a seventy-four gun ship might navigate with safety,—all conspired to render this city one of the most renowned in Europe. If the seventeen provinces had remained united under government, and the Scheldt had continued to be the

Former
grandeur
and present
importance
of Ant-
werp.

* It is 451 feet high; the roof of the cathedral is 360 feet from the pavement; but more even than for these gigantic proportions is it fitted to arrest the traveller's admiration by the masterpieces of Rubens, the *Taking Down and Elevating on the Cross*, which it contains. Sir Joshua Reynolds justly observed, that whoever had not seen the masterpieces of Rubens at Antwerp, could form no adequate idea either of the genius of that great artist or the power of art. The paintings in the Museum, especially, by Rubens and Vandyke, are inimitable.—MALTE BRUN, viii. 618; REYNOLDS' *Tour in Flanders, Works*, ii. 264, 300; and *Personal Observation*.

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artery of communication between their admirable territory, their noble cities, and the rest of the world, it must, by this time, have been one of the greatest emporiums in existence, and possibly would have borne away the palm from London itself in wealth and grandeur. But religious persecution first rent asunder that beautiful dominion, and political jealousy next completed the bars which Catholic oppression had erected against its advancement. The revolt of Holland was the natural consequence of the atrocities of the Duke of Alva, and the massacre of fifty thousand Protestants, on the scaffold and at the stake, by the Spanish government; the closing of the mouth of the Scheldt, by the political and commercial jealousy of the Dutch, was the inevitable result and deserved punishment of the abominable cruelty which converted their most industrious and valuable subjects into successful rivals and inveterate enemies.¹

¹ Malte
Brun, viii.
618, 619.

Napoleon's
designs for
its amplifi-
cation.

Amidst all its degradation, however, and when its population had sunk to sixty thousand inhabitants, the eagle glance of Napoleon at once discerned the vast natural advantages and incalculable political importance of this city. No sooner had it attracted his attention, than he resolved to make it one of the greatest bulwarks of his dominions; the grand naval and military arsenal of northern Europe; the advanced post from which he might launch the thunders of his arms against the independence and existence of England. Under his vigorous administration, every thing soon assumed a new aspect: the subjection of Holland to the Imperial sway, had already extinguished, if not the commercial jealousy of the Dutch, at least their power of interfering with the prosperity of their Flemish rival; the vessels which they had sunk at the mouth of the Scheldt, to

impede its navigation, were raised; the sand-banks which had accumulated for centuries cleared away; new bulwarks annexed to the works, already formidable, of the citadel; vast wet docks added to the harbour, capable of containing forty ships of the line; and an arsenal adequate to the equipment of half the navy of France constructed. Vast as are these works, however, and durably as they will for ever remain, monuments of the grandeur of conception and prophetic spirit of the French Emperor, they were but a small part of what he had intended for this favoured bulwark of the empire. "The works hitherto erected," said Napoleon, at St Helena, "were nothing to what I intended at Antwerp. The whole sandy plain, which now stretches for miles behind the *Tête de Flandre*, on the left bank of the river, was to have been enclosed by fortifications, and formed into a vast city; the Imperial dock-yards and basins, the arsenal and magazines, were to have been constructed there; those on the right bank were to have been abandoned to private merchants. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St Helena; for the required cession of that fortress was my principal reason for refusing peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France without the frontiers of the Rhine and Antwerp is nothing."¹

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¹ Las Cases,
vii. 43, 44,
56, 57.

Antwerp is the point from which, in every age, the independence of these kingdoms has been seriously menaced. When the Duke of Parma prepared a land force in the time of Queen Elizabeth to overthrow the liberties of England and the Protestant faith, it was in the Scheldt and at Ostend that all his preparations were made. It was neither from

Efforts always made by England to keep this great stronghold from France.

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1809.

Boulogne nor Cherbourg, from Brest nor Toulon, that Napoleon, after his profound naval combinations of 1805 had been defeated, intended to invade the British isles. The Scheldt was the point of attack: Antwerp and Flushing were the strongholds in which sixty sail of the line were to be prepared for the centre of that mighty squadron, which, by a second battle of Actium, was to strike down the mistress of the seas. A vast and skilful system of internal communication had been brought to bear upon this artery, and enabled the French to collect their naval stores and seamen without incurring the hazard of a coastwise navigation. Sensible of her danger, it had been the fixed policy of Great Britain for centuries to prevent this formidable outwork against her independence from falling into the hands of her enemies; and the best days of her history are chiefly occupied with the struggle to ward off such a disaster. It was for this that William fought and that Marlborough conquered; that Nelson died and Wellington triumphed; that Chatham lighted a conflagration in every quarter of the globe, and Pitt braved all the dangers of the Revolutionary war.

Extraordi-
nary infatu-
ation which
has led to its
abandon-
ment in
later times.

It is one of the most singular facts in the history of mankind, that the English government, after having for a hundred and fifty years contended for the attainment of this object, and at length secured it, by the restoration, under the guarantee of the European powers, of the seventeen provinces into one united dominion, should have voluntarily, within twenty years afterwards, undone the work of its own hands; aided in the partition of the Netherlands into two separate states, alike incapable of maintaining their independence, one of which necessarily fell under the dominion of her enemies;

and at length actually joined her fleets to the Gallic revolutionary armies to restore Antwerp, the great stronghold prepared by Napoleon for our subjugation, to the son-in-law of France, and the sway of the tricolor flag ! Such a proceeding would be unparalleled in history, if it were not equalled, perhaps exceeded, by the refusal at the same time to lend any assistance to the Grand Seignior, then reduced to the last straits by the defeat of Koniah, and consequent abandonment of him to the arms of Russia, who failed not, as the price of protection, to exact the humiliating treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and the exclusion of the British flag from the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. Thus, in our anxiety to restore Antwerp, the fulcrum from which our independence is to be assailed in Western Europe, to France, we have surrendered Constantinople, the bulwark of the East, the key of our Eastern dominions, to Russia ! The simultaneous occurrence of two such acts on the part of government, without any mark of disapprobation, save from the reflecting few in the country, proves that there are occasions in which, under the influence of faction and in the heat of political contest, a nation may not only lose its reason, but become insensible to the strongest even of all animal instincts, that of self-preservation.

At the commencement of the contest in Germany, the cabinet of Vienna made the most urgent representations to the British government on the subject of a powerful diversion by an English land force in the north of Germany, whither the Imperial grand army was originally destined, and where so many ardent spirits, smarting under humiliation and oppression, were awaiting only the appearance of an external armed force to raise the standard of general

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Proposals of
Austria for
a British
diversion.

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insurrection. She proposed that a diversion should be made by an expedition of Anglo-Sicilian troops on the coasts of Italy ; that the military operations in the Peninsula should be continued ; and that a strong effort should be made towards the mouth of the Elbe. There can be no question that the disposable forces of England, at this juncture, were equal to these operations, how extensive soever ; for she had a hundred thousand regular troops, which could be ordered on foreign service, in the British islands ; forty thousand of whom, in Spain, under Wellington, forty thousand in the north of Germany, and twenty thousand in the Mediterranean, might have occasioned no small embarrassment to the French Emperor, especially after he was obliged to concentrate all his forces from the extremities of his dominions, for the decisive struggle on the banks of the Danube. Domestic danger could not be alleged as a reason for declining to make such an effort, for the British islands, encircled by their invincible fleet, garrisoned by eighty thousand admirable regular, and three hundred thousand local militia, and animated with an enthusiastic military spirit, were beyond the reach of attack. Nor was time wanting, for the British government was, in November 1808, in full possession of the resolution of the cabinet of Vienna to declare war ; it was communicated to the world in the King's speech on the 15th December of that year ; and hostilities were not commenced on the Inn till the 9th April following, before which time the grand expedition for the north of the vast theatre of operations might have been ready to sail from the British harbours.¹

¹ Mr Canning's Speech, Parl. Deb. xvi. 352 ; and ante, vi. 635.

In this momentous crisis, the cabinet of St James's was not wanting to itself, or to the noble post assigned to it in the contest of nations. Undiscouraged

by the disastrous issue of Sir John Moore's expedition, they resolved not only to resume the contest with increased vigour in the Spanish Peninsula, but to aid the common cause by a powerful demonstration in the north of Europe. Many reasons concurred, however, in dissuading them from adopting the proposed plan of landing in the north of Germany. Matters were entirely changed since the year 1807, when such a direction of our force was attempted, and if brought to the scene of action some months earlier, might have been attended with important, perhaps decisive effects. Prussia was then in arms against France; Denmark was neutral; Russia engrossed the attention of their principal army on the Vistula or the Alle; and Austria, collecting her strength in Bohemia, was prepared, on the first serious reverse, to fall with overwhelming force on Napoleon's line of communications. Now every thing was changed. The north of Germany, strewn with the wrecks of independent states, with its principal strongholds in the hands of the enemy, could no longer be relied on for efficient co-operation with a regular army; Russia, instead of being the enemy of France, was now her obsequious ally; Denmark was animated by a more than ordinary spirit of hostility to Great Britain; and though the inclination of Prussia to extricate herself from her fetters could not be doubted, yet her military resources were severely crippled, her strongest fortresses were in the possession of the Conqueror, and her government had suffered so severely from their recent ill-advised effort, that there was every reason to fear that they would now adhere to their old system of selfish indecision. A powerful army, if landed at St Sebastian, might, indeed, paralyse all the Impe-

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Reasons for
not sending
the expedi-
tion to the
north of
Germany or
Spain.

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¹ Mr Can-
ning's
Speech,
Parl. Deb.
xvi. 333,
336. Lord
Castlereagh's,
ibid. 99,
103.

rial forces in Spain, and occasion the evacuation of the whole Peninsula by the troops of Napoleon ; but the effect of such remote success would be inconsiderable on the vital line of operations in the valley of the Danube ; and, if the French Emperor were there successful, he would soon regain his lost footing beyond the Pyrenees, and securely complete, with undiminished strength, from Gibraltar to Hamburg, his vast naval preparations for our subjugation.¹

Reasons for
selecting
the Scheldt
as the point
of attack.

On the other hand, a variety of considerations equally powerful, concurred to recommend Antwerp as the grand point of attack. Its formidable strength and increasing importance as a great naval station and arsenal ; its close proximity to the British shores ; the anxiety which Napoleon had evinced for its extension, pointed it out as the quarter from which, more than any other, serious danger was to be apprehended. Its fortifications, though extensive and formidable, if in good condition, were in a state hardly susceptible of defence ; there was scarce any water in the ditches ; the rampart unarmed with cannon, was in many places dilapidated and tottering ; and the garrison, of little more than two thousand invalids and coast-guards, altogether unequal to the defence of its extensive works. The regular army of France was so completely absorbed by the war on the Danube and in the Peninsula, that no considerable force could be assembled for its relief ; and although, if operations in form were to be attempted, an immense body of national guards would doubtless converge to the threatened point, yet there was a fair prospect of carrying the town at once by escalade, almost before the intelligence of its danger could reach the government at Paris. Immense would be the effect, moral as well as material, of such a victory.

It would demonstrate that even the territory of the great nation, and its strongest fortresses, were not beyond the reach of attack; roll back on France the terrors of invasion; destroy at once the principal naval resources and fleets of the enemy; animate all the north of Germany by the prospect of a powerful army having gained a firm footing on their own shores, and intercept, by pressing dangers at home, a large portion of the reinforcements destined for the grand army. Even if Austria were finally to succumb, still the object gained would be immense: the darling naval establishment of the enemy would be destroyed; the centre of his maritime operations ruined; and his projected naval crusade against Great Britain thrown back for several years, if not altogether rendered abortive. Sound policy, therefore, recommended such a direction of our hostility as, while it powerfully aided our allies, was conducive also to our own safety; and which, increasing the chance of a successful combination against France on the Danube, provided at the same time for the case of the Imperial eagles returning as heretofore, loaded with the spoils of Germany, to their menacing position on the heights of Boulogne.¹

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1809.

Mr Canning's
Speech,
Parl. Deb.
xvi. 338,
347.

But, though the cabinet of St James's thus judged rightly in selecting Antwerp as the point of attack, and magnanimously in resolving to put forth the whole strength of the British empire, without sharing in the general panic produced by the calamitous termination of Sir John Moore's expedition, yet, in one vital point, they still proved themselves novices in combination, uninstructed by the military experience even of sixteen years. Although the Austrians crossed the Inn on the 9th March, and the battle of Ecmuhl was fought on the 21st April, and that of As-

Unhappy
delay in the
expedition.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

pern on the 22d May, it was not till the end of the latter month that any serious preparations began to be made by ministers for an expedition to lighten the load which had for two months fallen on the Imperial forces. They were deterred by a communication received from the commander-in-chief, Sir D. Dundas, on the 22d of March preceding, shortly after the broken bands of Sir John Moore's army had returned from Spain, stating, that fifteen thousand men could not be spared from the home service for any foreign expedition. That veteran officer, in making, and government in acting on such a statement, proved themselves alike unequal to the station which they occupied in the grand struggle. To accomplish the vital object of beginning the campaign *simultaneously* with the Austrians, and distracting the enemy with a descent on the Scheldt, at the same time that the Archduke Charles entered Bavaria,^{no} ~~on~~ sacrifices could have been too great. Even if not a man could be got from the regular army, every man of the guards should have been sent, half of the militia invited to volunteer; and in this way, fifty thousand admirable soldiers might with ease have been collected. It was not by never diminishing the usual domestic garrisons, and reckoning none disposable but those who had no home service to perform, that Napoleon carried the French standards to Vienna and the Kremlin.¹

¹ See Sir D. Dundas's Evidence, Parl. Deb. xv. 85, 86. App.

The expedition is resolved on in the end of May, and on a very great scale.

No serious steps were taken, after this abortive enquiry as to the disposable British force, to resume the expedition till the 8th of June, when the muster-rolls of all the regiments in the British islands having been obtained, and shewn a disposable force of forty thousand men, preparations in good earnest were commenced. It was still possible to bring them to bear with great effect on the vital operations on the

Danube; for the news of the battle of Aspern had just reached this country, and at the same time it was ascertained, by authentic evidence, that Antwerp was in the most defenceless state; that the garrison consisted only of two thousand four hundred men, of whom only fifteen hundred were soldiers, the remainder being invalids or artificers; that there were two small breaches on the ramparts, and the bastions in general not armed; the wet ditch fordable in some places, and only ten thousand soldiers in Holland, and hardly any in Flanders. But the inherent vice of procrastination still paralysed the British councils. Though every day and hour was precious, when the Scheldt was defenceless and Napoleon defeated on the Danube, no orders were given to the ordnance department to prepare battering trains, till the 19th June; and though their preparations were complete, and the navy in readiness by the end of that month, the expedition did not sail till the 28th July, upwards of a week after the result of the battle of Wagram had been known in the British islands. When it is considered that the sea voyage from the Downs to the Scheldt is not above thirty hours; that the British had thirty-five sail of the line, and transports innumerable at hand for the embarkation; that Marshal Ney¹ embarked twenty-five thousand men, with all their artillery, in ten minutes and a-half; that Napoleon, who gave his orders to the grand army to break up from Boulogne on the 1st September, 1805, beheld them on the Rhine on the 23d of the same month, and Mack defile before him as a prisoner, with all his army on the 20th October;¹ it must be admitted that, notwithstanding all they had suffered from this defect,² the British government were still rather influ-

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Vide ante, v. 314, 388, 412.² Sir T. Triggis' Evid. Parl. Deb. xv.

138, and xvi. 111, 119. Lord

Castle-reagh's Speech, and

Gen. Crawford's, *ibid.*

222.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Sailing and
immense
magnitude
of the
expedition.

¹ See the
Details in
Parl. Pap.
Deb. xv. 5
and 6.

Landing in
Holland,
and great
early success
of the expe-
dition.
July 30.

enced by the slowness of the Anglo-Saxon, than the fire of the Norman character.

When the expedition, however, even at the eleventh hour, did sail from the British islands, it was on a scale worthy both of the mistress of the seas, and of one of the greatest military powers in Europe. The armament, consisting of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops, eighty-two gun-boats, besides transports innumerable; and having on board thirty-nine thousand sabres and bayonets, equivalent to above forty-one thousand of all arms, with two battering trains, and all their stores complete, contained above a hundred thousand combatants, and was the largest and best equipped that ever put to sea in modern times. What might it not have accomplished, if conducted with vigour and directed by skill! With a British force of no greater amount, Wellington struck down the empire of France, on the field of Waterloo.*

This stupendous armament, which whitened the ocean with its sails, arrived on the coasts of Holland on the 29th of July. On the following day, twenty thousand men were disembarked in the isle of Walcheren, and speedily took possession of Middleburg, its chief town, besides driving the French troops into the walls of Flushing. At the same time, another

* The exact British force, with the King's German Legion, at Waterloo was,—

Infantry,	29,715
Cavalry,	8219
Artillery,	5434

Total, 43,368 sabres and bayonets, or about 45,000, including officers and non-commissioned officers.—*See Adjutant-General's Returns, 6th Nov., 1816, quoted in Jones' Waterloo, 138; Near Observer, vol. ii.*

division landed in Cadsand, and expelling the enemy from that island, opened the way for the passage of the fleet, up the western or principal branch of the Scheldt. Some days afterwards, Sir Richard Strachan, who commanded the naval force, disregarding the distant and ineffectual fire of the Flushing batteries, passed the straits with eighteen ships of the line, and soon both branches of the Scheldt were crowded with the British pendants. Nor was the progress of the land forces less rapid. Ter Vere, a fortress commanding the Veergat, a narrow entrance leading into the channel which separated South Beveland, was taken, with its garrison of a thousand men : Goes, the capital of the latter island, opened its gates ; and Sir JOHN HOPE, an officer destined to future celebrity in the Peninsular wars, with seven thousand men, pushing rapidly on, appeared before the gates of Bahtz, on the evening of the 2d. Such was the consternation produced by the sudden advance and formidable forces, both naval and military, of the invaders, that this important fort, situated at the point of separation of the East and West Scheldt, and the key to both channels, was evacuated in the night by the garrison, and next morning occupied by the British troops. The success of the expedition appeared certain : more than two-thirds of the distance to Antwerp had been got over in three days ; both divisions of the Scheldt were full of British vessels ; the British standards were only five leagues from that fortress, and in four days more thirty thousand men might be assembled around its walls.¹

CHAP.
LVII.
1809.

Goes, July 30.

Aug. 1.

Aug. 2.

¹ Lord Chatham's Desp. Aug. 2, 1809. Ann. Reg. 474, 479. Appendix to Chron. Vict. et Conq. xix. 247, 254.

It is agreed by all the French military writers, that such was the weakness of Antwerp at that moment, that if the English general had taken ad-

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Certainty
of success if
Antwerp
had been
first at-
tacked.

vantage of the first moment of consternation consequent on the rapid advance of his leading column, and pushed across the narrow channel which separates South Beveland from the main land, and marched up the right bank of the river, he would, in a few hours, have arrived at the gates of the fortress, and by a *coup-de-main*, carried it without the possibility of resistance.* By crossing over to the left bank of the Scheldt, and occupying the fort of Tête de Flandre, opposite Antwerp, which could hardly have made any resistance, success was certain ; for the city has no defences whatever on the left bank of the river, and the fleet could neither have got up above the Tête de Flandre, nor escaped destruction even in the dockyards themselves, from a bombardment from the opposite side, not half a mile distant. The instructions of the commander-in-chief, Lord Chatham, were precise ; and they bore, that the main object of the expe-

* “ Had the English advanced rapidly, either by South Beveland to Lillo and Antwerp, or with their squadron vigorously pursued ours as it withdrew up the Scheldt, they would have taken by surprise all the forts and defences of the Scheldt. Every thing induces the belief that they would have succeeded in burning our arsenals and destroying our fleet. Antwerp, like other places on the frontier, was garrisoned only by the weak depots of regiments who were combating on the Danube. Not one of them was armed. Monnet had six battalions in Flushing. Rousseau, who commanded on the left bank of the Scheldt, had only three or four thousand recruits under his orders, whom he kept at Ghent on account of the insalubrity of the country. Battalions of grenadiers and chasseurs of the national guards alone were entrusted with the defence of the coasts.”—PELET, iv. 319.

“ The fortress of Antwerp, ill defended and paralysed in the first moment of terror, would have easily yielded to a brisk attack.”—*Vict. et Conq.* xix. 254.

“ The coast was denuded to such a degree that nothing could have hindered the English to disembark 30,000 men on the left bank of the Scheldt, and in three days arrive with their numerous artillery before Antwerp. Mean-while, the remainder might have entered the Scheldt to fix our attention on Flushing and the Isle of Cadsand. Antwerp had hardly a garrison ; our fleet would have been taken by surprise, and its

dition was the destruction of the ships building or afloat in the Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards in Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing; and an ulterior or subordinate object only, the reduction of the island of Walcheren.* But England had not at that period two Wellingtons in her service. Lord Chatham, to whom the expedition was intrusted, neither inherited the energy of his father, the great Earl of Chatham, nor shared the capacity of his immortal brother, William Pitt. A respectable veteran, not without merit in the routine of official duty at home, he was totally destitute of the activity and decision requisite in an enterprise in which success was to be won rather by rapidity of movement than deliberation of conduct; destitute of experience, unknown to fame, of indolent habits, he owed his appointment to court favour, which ministers were chiefly culpable for not resisting to the uttermost of their power.

retreat rendered impossible; insomuch that, by merely occupying the fort of Tête de Flandre, opposite Antwerp, on the left bank of the Scheldt, the success of the enterprise would have been certain."—JOMINI, *Vie de NAPOLEON*, iii. 299, 300.

Napoleon has left a highly important observation on this subject. "The fleet," says he, "when the expedition arrived on the coast of Holland, was *moored off Flushing*. The great object of Chatham should have been to cut off the fleet from Antwerp, which would necessarily have drawn after it the destruction of both, for Antwerp had only a garrison of 3000 men. This might have been done by pushing on a corps of 6000 men through South Beveland to Bahtz *the day the expedition landed*; the fleet would thus have been cut off from Antwerp, and both it and that fortress must have surrendered. But, from the moment that the fleet got up to Antwerp, which it did soon after the siege of Flushing began, the failure of the expedition was certain."—NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON, ii. 261; and i. 219.—"I am of opinion," said he to O'Meara, "that if you had landed a few thousand men at first at Williamstadt, and marched direct to Antwerp, you might, between consternation, want of preparation, and the uncertainty of the number of assailants, have taken it by a *coup-de-main*. But, after the fleet got up, it was impossible."—O'MEARA, i. 255.

* See note A.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

' Lord
Chatham's
Instruc-
tions, Parl.
Deb. xv.
App. No. 1.
Jom. Vie de
Nap. iii.
300.

Siege and
capture of
Flushing.

Aug. 13.

Reversing, in consequence, alike the tenor of his instructions and the dictates of common sense on the subject, he directed his force, in the first instance, to the last object with which he was entrusted ; and, instead of pushing on in the outset by forced marches to seize Antwerp and the forts of the river, before the enemy could collect a force for their defence, lost the precious hours, big with the fate of the campaign, in reducing Flushing, valueless as a post in advance after the fleet had entered the Scheldt, incapable of defence after Antwerp had fallen, if required as a support in case of retreat.¹

Having adopted this unhappy resolution, Lord Chatham prosecuted the subordinate object of reducing Flushing with great vigour and success. The garrison were hotly driven into the works, with considerable loss, on the first approach of the besiegers ; several sallies, afterwards undertaken, repulsed, and the artillery having been quickly landed, the trenches were armed, approaches commenced and pushed on with great rapidity. On the 13th, the breaching batteries opened their fire on the land side, from fifty-two heavy guns, while seven ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, kept up a cannonade with uncommon vigour from the sea. It was then found, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that there are no land batteries, how strong soever, which can withstand, along an equal space in front, the well-supported fire of several ships of the line. The sea defences were speedily ruined, and every gun bearing on the water silenced ; the town took fire in several places, and the inhabitants, beset with a flaming tempest both from the north and south, besought the governor, as the only means of avoiding total ruin, to surrender. Such

was the consternation produced by the bombardment, that after it had continued three days, and the English troops had effected a lodgment within musket-shot of the rampart, the French general proposed a suspension of arms, and the town was surrendered on the 16th, with five thousand eight hundred prisoners and two hundred pieces of cannon. The total prisoners taken since the landing of the expedition, exceeded seven thousand.¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Lord Chat.
Desp. Ann.
Reg. 1809,
490, 493.
App. to
Chron.
Pel. iv.
327.

Hitherto Fortune seemed to have smiled on all the efforts of the expedition; but she soon showed that, like others of her sex, she reserved her favours only for the daring and the enterprising. The time lost in besieging Flushing proved fatal to all the other objects of the expedition. Indefatigable were the efforts of the French and Dutch governments, during that precious breathing time, to direct troops to the menaced point; and in a fortnight it was beyond the reach of attack. On the 12th, the King of Holland arrived at the head of his guards and five thousand troops of the line; the generals commanding in Flanders and Picardy, dispatched an equal number, who arrived from the 14th to the 20th. Mean-while the fleet was removed above the town; the batteries armed, the ditches cleared out and filled with water, and the national guards of all the surrounding departments poured into the fortress. While these active preparations were going on, twenty thousand admirable troops were kept inactive in South Beveland, almost within sight of the steeples of Antwerp; and so dilatory were the proceedings of the English general, that though Flushing surrendered on the 16th, it was not till the 26th that he advanced the headquarters to Bahtz, a distance not exceeding thirty miles. By that time thirty thou-

The time
lost in
reducing
Flushing
saves Ant-
werp.

Aug. 12.

Aug. 26.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xvi. App.
321. Lord
Chatham's
Desp. Sept.
2, 1809.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 502.
App. to
Chron.
Jom. iii.
302, 303.
Pel. iv.
328, 336.

sand of the enemy were assembled on the Scheldt; Bernadotte, who had been dispatched by the government at Paris to take the command, had put Antwerp in a respectable state of defence; the squadron was in safety; ulterior success impossible; while three thousand of the British troops were already in the hospital, and the pestilential marshes in that unhealthy district were fast exercising their malignant influence on the health of the soldiers. In these circumstances it was rightly judged by Lord Chatham and a council of war, whose opinion was unanimous on the subject, that further advance was impossible, and orders were given in the beginning of September to withdraw the whole troops into the island of Walcheren.¹

Retention of
Walcheren,
at first
attempted,
is at last
abandoned
as hopeless.

It was at first thought that it would have been practicable to have retained possession of this important conquest, and, doubtless, if it had been so, the acquisition would have been of the last consequence, as hermetically closing the Scheldt, and rendering useless all the vast naval preparations of the enemy in that quarter. At that particular moment, it was of the more consequence to retain possession of that island, as the negotiations with Austria were not only not yet brought to a conclusion, but it was sometimes more than doubtful, during their continuance, whether war would not again break out. In that event it would, of course, have been of the greatest importance to keep thirty thousand of the enemy grouped under the walls of Antwerp. Fifteen thousand men accordingly were left as a garrison in the island, and the remainder of the troops returned to England. But the malaria distemper of the country, since so well known under the name of the Walcheren fever, proved so fatal in its ravages, that it

was deemed impolitic to retain it permanently, especially after the conclusion of peace between the Austrians and French had removed the principal motive for keeping the troops in that unhealthy station. Towards the middle of September, the average number of deaths was from two to three hundred a-week, and nearly half the garrison was in hospital. Orders were therefore given to abandon the island; in the middle of November the works and naval basins of Flushing were destroyed, and before Christmas the whole was evacuated by the British troops; but it appeared from a parliamentary return, that seven thousand men were lost in the enterprise, and that nearly half the troops engaged in it brought home with them the seeds of a distemper which few were able entirely to shake off during the remainder of their lives.¹*

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Nov. 23.

Ann. Reg.
1809, 225.
Jom. iii.
303, 304.

It is observed by Mr Hallam, that the state trials of England exhibit the most appalling accumulation of judicial iniquity which is to be found in any age or country of the world, and far exceeding in atrocity any thing recorded of legal injustice in the annals even of Eastern despotism. The reason, he justly adds, is, that the monarch could not wreak his vengeance, or the contending nobles or parties destroy each other, as in other states, by open outrage or undisguised violence; and that the courts of law were the theatre, and state prosecutions the engines, by which this oppression was perpetrated, and these contests of faction conducted. If the purification of the legal tribunals, which took place at the Revolution, has freed, as it undoubtedly has, the judicial ermine of England from this hideous imputation, it has only,

Blind injustice which frequently characterises the proceedings of the British Parliament.

* The sick, returned at various times to England from Walcheren, amounted to 12,863.—*Parl. Pap. No. 24*; *Parl. Deb. xv. 23, App.*

CHAP. in many cases, transferred it to another quarter, and
 LVII. Parliament is the arena in which, from henceforth,
 1809. as the contests of party were conducted, the historian
 is to find the traces of the indelible corruption and
 weakness of humanity. On no other principle,
 indeed, can the occasional gross injustice, and fre-
 quent political insanity of the English legislature and
 people, during the last hundred and fifty years, be
 explained; and those who hope, by rendering our
 institutions more democratical, to remedy these evils,
 would do well to become still more radical in their
 cure, and apply their reform to the human heart.
 It is a common remark in Parliament, that, in party
 questions, the real motive of the speaker is never
 divulged in debate; and that the considerations and
 objects which both sides have most at heart, are
 those which are with the greatest care withdrawn
 from the view. All parties have, in this way, come
 to reduce to perfection, in a practical form, the cele-
 brated saying of Talleyrand, that the "great object
 of speech is to conceal the thought." The truth of
 these principles was signally illustrated, in the two
 great objects of party contention, during the session
 of 1809, the accusations against the Duke of York
 and the Walcheren expedition.

Pernicious
 consump-
 tion of time
 in debates
 in Parlia-
 ment at this
 time.

That the spring of 1809 was the grand crisis of
 the war; that Austria and Spain were then, for the
 first time, brought to act together in real earnest, and
 hurl their strength, animated by the highest degree
 of patriotic enthusiasm, against the enemy; that the
 military power of Britain had then risen to an unpa-
 ralleled degree of efficiency, and was prepared, under
 renowned leaders, to follow up the career of victory
 recently opened to their arms, was universally known
 and acknowledged. Every man in the empire felt

that the moment had arrived when Europe was to be disenthralled by one convulsive effort, or their fetters rivetted for a time to which no end could be seen, on the enchained nations. What, then, at such a moment, was the grand object of consideration in the House of Commons? Was it to cement the alliance, to pour forth the treasures of England with a profusion worthy of the greatness of the occasion, and increase, by every means in their power, the efficiency of the army upon which such mighty destinies depended? Quite the reverse. The popular party in the House of Commons appeared to value the crisis only in proportion to the means which it afforded them of directing, with additional effect, their attacks upon the government, and augmenting the difficulties experienced in the discharge of its vital duties by the executive. And at the moment when Austria was straining every nerve for the conflict, and Napoleon was preparing the forces which dealt out the thunderbolts of Echmuhl and Wagram, the British House of Commons was, for months together, occupied with no other subject but the secret springs of a few promotions in the army, and the details of the commander-in-chief's intrigue with his artful mistress, Mrs Clarke!

The attack on the Duke of York's administration of the army was founded upon the allegation of his having disposed of part of the patronage with which he was intrusted, as commander-in-chief, for corrupt or unworthy considerations. The debates and examinations on the subject, began in the end of January, and continued almost without the intermission of a day till the 17th March; absorbing thus nearly the whole time both of government and of the country, at the very moment when a concentration of all the national thought

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Charges
against the
Duke of
York. His
resignation.

Jan. 27.

March 17.

- CHAP. and energies were required for the prosecution of the
LVII. gigantic campaign in progress on the Continent.
1809. But this was not all : the time thus spent was not
only wasted, but it led to the most pernicious results.
Nothing whatever came out against the commander-
in-chief but that he had occasionally admitted a de-
signing and artful mistress to a certain share in the
disposal of commissions ; and that she made use of,
and exaggerated this influence to obtain bribes, un-
known to him, from the applicants for promotion.
If the moralist must ever see much to condemn in
the indulgence of habits which never fail in any
rank to degrade the character of such as become
slaves to them, the statesman must admit that a more
deplorable waste of time and national interest never
occurred than when such details were for months
together at such a crisis made the subject of legisla-
tive investigation. Mr Wardle, the mover of the
enquiry, rose for a short time into a blaze of popu-
larity, and then sunk at once to rise no more. After
a fatiguing investigation and debate, which occupies
above fifteen hundred pages of the parliamentary
March 17. debates, the charges were negatived by a majority of
241, the numbers being 364 to 123. No man of
sense, who reads the proceedings, can now doubt that
this decision was well founded in the evidence, and
that the Duke of York at that period was the victim
of factious injustice : but, mean-while, the public mind
became violently excited ; the fury of popular obloquy
was irresistible ; and government, deeming it neces-
sary to yield to the torrent, the Duke sent in his
March 18. resignation. This took place just four days before
March 22. the commander-in-chief was officially called upon to
report upon the vital point of the force which could
be spared for the projected expedition to the Scheldt ;

and thus, at the very time when the most important military operations ever engaged in by England were under consideration, the ambition of selfish faction, and the fury of misguided zeal, combined to introduce new and wholly inexperienced persons to the direction of the army, and chase from its command the public-spirited prince whose judicious reforms and practical improvements had brought it from an unworthy state of depression to its present state of efficiency and glory. The deplorable postponement of the Walcheren expedition till it was too late to serve as a relief to the heroism of Austria; its calamitous issue when it was undertaken; and the abortive result of the triumphs in Spain, are thus indissolubly connected with this act of national absurdity and injustice.¹*

CHAP.
LVII.
1809.

Parl. Deb.
xii. 263,
1057; xiii.
1, 710.

Much in the same spirit were the debates which took place on the Walcheren expedition. No fault, indeed, could here be found with the theme of discussion: the failure of so vast an armament, fitted out at such a cost, adequate to such achievements, formed a subject worthy of the anxious investigation of the Parliament of England; and if it had elicited either generous feelings or elevated views from those who conducted the accusation, no more useful subject of contemplation to the historian could have been presented. But this was very far indeed from being the case. Though the investigation was conducted with great industry and ability, the views taken on

Debates on
the Wal-
cheren
expedition.

* Mrs Clarke, the leading character in this maze of scandal and intrigue, was a woman possessed of considerable personal attractions, and no small share of ready wit and repartee. When asked, in a subsequent trial, by a cross-examining council, "pray, Madam, under whose *protection* are you just now?" She immediately answered, bowing to the court, "under that of my Lord Chief-Justice." The court was convulsed with laughter, in which his Lordship heartily joined, and the barrister was silent.

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the side of the Opposition were so overstrained and exaggerated, as to lead to no useful or practical result. Their great object was to show that the whole blame of the failure of the expedition rested with Ministers, and Ministers alone; that success was at no period, and by no efforts, attainable; that the point of attack was ill chosen, the force ill directed, and the whole cost and blood of the armament misapplied. Nothing can be clearer than that these charges were in great part wholly groundless, as the expedition was clearly directed against the most important point of the enemy's resources; the effects of success immense and vital to the national independence of England; the forces employed fully adequate to the object in view; and the general instructions given, such as would, if energetically acted upon, have unquestionably led to decisive success.* The real points in which government were blameable, and for which it is impossible to find any adequate excuse, were the long delay which occurred in determining upon the expedition, and not straining every nerve to send it out in April or May, instead of the end of July, and the sanctioning the appointment of an officer as commander-in-chief, unknown to fame, and obviously inadequate to the direction of such an enterprise. Yet these points were hardly ever touched on in the course of the debate, so great was the anxiety to throw the whole blame upon Ministers, rather than upon a commander known to have owed his appointment to royal favour. After a lengthened investigation and debate, Ministers were declared not blameable upon the general policy of the expedition, by a majority, however, of only forty-eight, the numbers being 275 to 227 :¹ a majority which, on the

¹ Parl. Deb.
xv. App. 1,
and xvi. 194,
422.

* See note B.

subordinate question of whether the protracted retention of Walcheren was blameable, fell to twenty-three; a division which clearly demonstrated, how strongly the calamitous issue of the expedition had come to influence the public mind.

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The untoward issue of this expedition, the obloquy which it brought upon government, and the narrow escape which they made from total shipwreck on its result, blew into a flame the ill-smothered embers of a conflagration in the cabinet, and led, at this critical moment, to a change in the most important offices of the state. Mr Canning, who, since the formation of Mr Percival's administration, had held the seals of the foreign office, had long conceived that Lord Castlereagh, who was secretary at war, was unfit to be entrusted with the important and hourly increasing duties of that department. This opinion, which subsequent events have triumphantly disproved, and which was doubtless chiefly based at that time, in the able but aspiring mind of the foreign secretary, on the illusions of ambition and the whisperings of jealousy, was strongly confirmed by the disastrous issue of the Scheldt expedition; which he ascribed, with how much justice the preceding observations will show, to the ignorance and incapacity of the secretary at war, to whom the direction of its details had been in a great measure entrusted. Early in April he had intimated to the Duke of Portland, the nominal head of the administration, that he conceived the public service required that either he or Lord Castlereagh should resign; and offered to remove all difficulties by his own retirement. Anxious to prevent any schism in the cabinet at such a crisis, the Duke consulted Lord Camden, and prevailed on Mr Canning mean-while to suspend his

Quarrel
between
Lord Castle-
reagh and
Mr Can-
ning.

April 4.

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Sept. 8.

Sept. 22.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1809, 239.
Mr. Can-
ning's
Statement,
Nov. 14,
1809. App.
to Chron.
517, 530.
Canning's
Life, i. 56,
83. Life and
Speeches.

resignation : the King was afterwards spoken to on the subject, but he also postponed any definite opinion. A long negotiation subsequently ensued, which, against Mr Canning's strongest remonstrances, was protracted till the issue of the Scheldt expedition became known ; and although some of Lord Castlereagh's friends were made acquainted with what was going on, yet they did not deem it advisable to make him privy to it. At length, in the first week of September, his lordship was informed of the whole by his friends, further concealment having become impossible by Mr Canning's resignation. Lord Castlereagh, under the impression that he had been ill used by Mr Canning in this transaction, by not having been made acquainted from the first with the steps calculated to prejudice him which he had adopted, immediately sent Mr Canning a challenge. The parties met ; and at the second fire Mr Canning fell, having received a severe wound in the thigh. Both gentlemen had previously sent in their resignations ; and though a reconciliation was subsequently effected, and their joint services regained for their country, the quarrel had the effect, at the time, of excluding both from administration. After an unsuccessful attempt to effect a coalition with Lords Grey and Grenville, Lord Wellesley was recalled from the embassy of Spain to fill the situation of foreign secretary ; Lord Castlereagh was, two years afterwards, reinstated in office, and contributed in an essential manner to the triumphs and glories of the grand alliance ; but Mr Canning, who aimed at the highest destinies, for long declined offers of employment at home, and did not appear again in official situation till after the peace.¹

A general change now took place in the administra-

tion. The Duke of Portland, whose health had for some time been declining, resigned his place as head of the government, and as the negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville had failed in procuring their accession to the cabinet, the ministry was reconstructed entirely from the Tory party. Mr Percival filled the place of first lord of the treasury, and chancellor of the exchequer; the Earl of Liverpool was transferred from the home to the war office; Mr Ryder became home, and Marquis Wellesley foreign secretary. There can be no doubt that all these offices were filled by men of business and talent; and the cabinet, as so constructed, possessed the inestimable advantage of unity of opinion on all vital questions, and especially on the great one of the prosecution of the war: an advantage so great, that for its want, no acquirements however great, no talents however splendid, can in the long run compensate. But still the abilities of none of these statesmen, with the exception of Marquis Wellesley, were either of the highest order or the most brilliant character: and it is a remarkable circumstance, indicating the power of unity of purpose and resolution of mind, in a nation and its government, to compensate for the want of the showy qualities of the orator or the practised skill of the parliamentary debater, that the most glorious triumphs recorded in the history of England were achieved, not only when the persons possessing in the highest degree these qualities were not in the administration, but when they were actively engaged on the side of opposition.

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Changes in
the Admi-
nistration.1 Ann. Reg.
1809, 239.
Canning's
Life, 84.
Works,
vol. i.

GEORGE CANNING, whom this abortive intrigue excluded from office for several years, was the most finished orator who had appeared in Parliament since the days of Pitt and Fox. Born of respectable, though not opulent parents, descended from an

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Youth and first introduction to public life of Mr Canning.

honourable line of ancestors, he was yet destitute of the advantages of rank and fortune, and owed his elevation entirely to the early display of brilliant talents at Oxford ; that noble establishment, which reflects, as it were, in a mirror, the empire, shaded only with a more aristocratic hue than the original, and where genius so often meets with the friends or acquires the distinction which determines its direction in future life. Originally destined for the bar, he was reluctantly pursuing the thorny study of the law, when the fame of his oratorical talents attracted the notice of Mr Pitt, then fully alive to the importance of drawing to his standard all that he could collect of debating powers, and counteracting by the influence of government the natural disposition of youth to range itself under the colours of opposition. Mr Canning had originally been imbued with Whig principles, and his nearest relations were of that party ; but the horrors of the French Revolution had produced that change in his mind which they induced at that period in so many of the best of mankind ; the leaders of opposition had nothing to offer him ; and, upon a conference with Mr Pitt in 1793, he found himself fully prepared to concur in all his views on the leading objects of policy. Thus he entered Parliament for Newport in 1793, an avowed supporter of the Tory administration ; his first speech, delivered on 31st January, 1794, already bespoke the practised orator, formed on the models of ancient eloquence ; and, to the end of his life, he continued the steady opponent of *French* Revolutionary principles. But it would have been well for his fame, as well as for the fortunes of his country, if he had been equally proof against the seductions as the terrors of democratic ambition ; if he had seen the syren in the same colours when placed by his

side as when arrayed with his enemies ; and remained steady, in exalted stations in maturer years, to those principles for which he had bravely combated in early youth under the ancient banners of England.¹

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¹ Canning's
Life, i. 1,
23.

Endowed by nature with the soul of genius, the fire of poetry, and the glow of eloquence ; an accomplished classical scholar, and deeply versed in native literature, Mr Canning acquired, before the end of his career, a greater command over the House of Commons than any statesman, from the mere force of oratorical power, ever possessed. Without the debating energy of Fox, the prophetic elevation of Pitt, or the philosophic wisdom of Burke, he possessed, in a higher degree than any of the three, the power of captivating his hearers by the charm of diction and the graces of an accomplished oratory. Nor was it only in the ornate branches of composition that he excelled ; in severer studies he was also a perfect master, and none treated the abstruse and difficult subjects of the monetary changes, and the corn laws, with more lucid effect. His state papers are a model, not only of terse and finished composition, but of cogent and accurate reasoning ; his conversational powers were of the highest order ; and much of his public influence was, in his later days, owing to those private friends whom the charm of his society had rendered insensible to the ultimate dangers of his career. He was early impressed with the strongest sense of the consequences of Jacobin ascendancy, even when veiled under the splendid mantle of the empire ; and Great Britain owes to his strenuous and persevering support much of the glories of the Peninsular war, and not a little of the final triumphs of the grand alliance. But the strength of his intellect was not equal to the brilliancy of his imagination, the sagacity of his

His character as an
orator and
statesman.

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foresight was less powerful than the glow of his ambition. Bent from the very outset upon being the first, conscious of talents second in the end to none, he was at times little scrupulous about the means of his elevation, and sometimes did not disdain to owe to private fascination or political intrigue what in a free monarchy should be thereward only of public greatness.

Prompted by this infirmity, passionately fond of popularity, he received with favour, after the war was over, the advances of the democratic leaders; gradually veered round more and more, with the increasing delusion of the age, to liberal principles; and at length, when the constitution was beset on all sides with dangers, rent asunder the monarchical party by his ambition, and elevated himself to the lead by a dubious alliance with his former opponents, its present enemies. This change is more to be ascribed to the age in which he lived, than himself as an individual; but it is the characteristic mark of the highest class of intellect and principle to be above the age. Such superiority may be often fatal to present power, but it is the only sure basis for future and enduring fame; it was not by yielding to the tide that Cato gained immortal renown at Utica. The effects of this change were felt throughout the world: his name was hailed with transport by the discontented and turbulent in every clime; his judgment yielded to the fascinating influence; he flattered himself he was promoting the national interests, when, in fact, he was listening to the syren voice of individual ambition; he encouraged the insurrection of the South American Colonies, but, in so doing, he established a precedent capable of fatal application in future times to his own country; he boasted that he had called a new world into existence, but the deluge which he raised in its ele-

vation has well-nigh submerged all the land-marks of the old ; he first exhibited the perilous example of the union of ministerial power with popular fascination ; and, after spending the best years of his life in successfully combating democratic principles, terminated his career by turning the prow of the state, perhaps unconsciously, right into the gulf of revolution.*

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In almost every feature of his character and career, LORD CASTLEREAGH was the reverse of this accom-

* Mr Canning's great oratorical powers will never be adequately appreciated but by those who study his speeches, on various occasions, *out of Parliament*, especially those to his Liverpool constituents, collected in the edition of his *Memoirs and Speeches*, vi. 319, *et seq.* In them there is much more of the real soul of eloquence, more energy and brevity, more undisguised announcement of principle, and fearless assertion of truth, than in any of his parliamentary orations. It is the same with Sir Robert Peel : none of his speeches in the House of Commons will, as read by posterity, or even by the public without the pale of parliamentary influence, be deemed so fine as some delivered to popular assemblies, particularly that at Merchant Tailor's Hall, in June, 1835, and at the Glasgow banquet in January, 1837. The reason is obvious, and is the same in both cases. What the world in general, and posterity without exception, look for in oratory, is not so much skilful combating with an adversary, dexterity in eluding difficulties, pointed reference to prior inconsistencies, or home thrusts at present tergiversations, as vigour of thought, energy of expression, heartfelt vehemence, fearless enunciation of eternal truth. Both these great masters in oratory possess these elevated qualities in a high degree ; but the habits of senatorial debate, and the impression produced in Parliament at the moment by such personal or temporary appeals, is such that it necessarily withdraws them in some degree, at least on ordinary occasions, from the loftiest flights of eloquence. The most "*effective*" present debater is by no means, in all cases, the man who will stand highest in the estimation of future ages, if his reputation is rested on his parliamentary efforts alone. The origin and frequent use of that expression in these times, and the high value attached to it in existing contests, is itself an indication of the assumption of a standard for parliamentary force in speaking, different from that commonly recognised, and not understood by the generality of men. But all such fictitious or conventional standards of excellence will be swept away by the floods of time ; and our great statesmen and orators on all sides would do well, while they cultivate this talent, as cultivate it they must for present impression, to anchor their reputation for future ages on the assertion of principles, and the use of expressions of permanent application and universal sway over the human heart.

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 Character of Lord Castlereagh.

plished statesman ; and the mortal hostility which for a time prevailed between them, was typical of the struggle between those antagonist principles in the British Constitution, so soon destined to come into collision, and whose conflict ere long shook the empire to its foundation. Born of a noble and powerful family, he did not, like his brilliant rival, owe his elevation to his own unaided exertions, but was wafted into office and public life with all the advantages of birth and connexions. He was early entrusted with high situations in the Irish government ; and in the important and arduous matter of the union with England, gave immediate proof of that prompt determination, and undaunted courage, which ultimately shone forth with such lustre on the great theatre of Europe. An indefatigable man of business, thoroughly acquainted with all the details of office in the situations which he successively held, he was gifted with none of the qualities which are calculated to win the favour of a popular assembly or captivate the imagination of the great body of mankind. His speeches, always distinguished by strong sense, unflinching energy, and lofty feeling, were generally full of matter, and often abounded with vigorous and conclusive arguments, but they wanted the charm of a poetic fancy, they were destitute of the force of condensed expression, and seldom rose to the height of impassioned oratory. Hence his influence in the house as a debater was inconsiderable ; and though he long held important situations, and commanded, from his qualities as a statesman, the respect even of his enemies, he owed less than any minister of the day to the power of eloquence.

But if the great and ennobling characteristics of a statesman are considered, none in English history will occupy a loftier pedestal, or be deemed worthy

of more unqualified admiration. Fixed in his principles, disinterested in his patriotism, unbending in his resolutions, he possessed in the highest degree that great quality, without which, in the hour of trial, all others are but as tinkling brass—moral courage and unflinching determination; and they know little of human affairs who are not aware, that this is at once the rarest, the most valuable, and the most commanding gift of nature. His courage was not simply that of a soldier who mounts the breach, though none possessed personal bravery in a higher degree; it was that of the general who greatly dares, of the statesman who nobly endures; and this invaluable quality seemed to rise with the circumstances which called for its exertion. Conspicuous in the conduct of the Irish government at the time of the Union, it was doubly so during the perils and anxieties of the Peninsular campaigns, and shone forth with the brightest lustre in the crisis of Europe during the invasion of France. By his firmness of character and yet suavity of manner, he mainly contributed to hold together the sometimes discordant elements of the grand alliance; by his energy he brought forth the mighty resources of England, at the decisive moment, with irresistible force; and when the resolution of the bravest hearts in Europe was failing under the responsibility of the last throw of the conflict, he nobly stood forth, and by his single efforts mainly brought about the bold determination which hurled Napoleon from his throne. The supporter of rational freedom, he was the resolute opponent of unbridled democracy; the real friend of the people, he was the unceasing enemy of their excesses; and while he disdained to purchase popularity by flattering their passions, he risked in their cause the objects

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Elevated
features of
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to which his life had been devoted, and alone of all the statesmen of Europe, procured for Poland, amidst the maledictions of the liberals and the delirium of Alexander's victories, a national existence, institutions, and laws; blessings, too soon, alas! torn from them amidst the democratic transports and selfish ambition of later times.

Career of
Mr Percival.

Cut short in his career, before these glorious days arrived, MR PERCIVAL has yet engraven his name deep on the brightest tablets in the annals of England. Born of a noble family, and not merely educated for, but eminent in the practice of the bar, he brought to public affairs the acuteness and precision of legal argument: and first rose to eminence in Parliament by his spirit and perseverance in opposition, during the brief period of Mr Fox's administration, when his party seldom mustered more than twenty or thirty members. But mere intellectual acumen seldom has weight with a mixed assembly; and in the House of Commons, unless their legal talents are merged in the force of public principle or moral feeling, lawyers have seldom risen to any lasting eminence. It was the great objects of philanthropy, for which he contended, which gave Sir Samuel Romilly his well-deserved weight in that assembly and the country; and it was to a principle of a still dearer interest to humanity that Mr Percival owed his elevation. He stood forth as the champion of the PROTESTANT FAITH; and, at a crisis when the national heart was violently agitated by the dangers to which, it was thought, the Protestant establishments of the empire were exposed by the concessions then sought to be forced upon the King, he won the public confidence by the intrepidity, and energy, with which he appealed

to the principles which had placed the house of Brunswick on the throne. Called by the favour of his Sovereign to a high place in the cabinet, on the change of ministry, in 1807, he conducted the lead in the House of Commons with a skill and ability which surpassed the expectations even of his friends; and when the Duke of Portland resigned, and Mr Canning and Lord Castlereagh withdrew, public opinion ratified the royal choice, which placed him at the head of administration.

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Without any of the great or commanding qualities of the orator, or the profound views which distinguish the highest class of statesmen, Mr Percival maintained himself successfully in this exalted station, by the integrity of his character, the sincerity of his principles, the acuteness of his reasoning, and the spirit with which he combated the multifarious attacks of his enemies. Reversing the situation of the Roman Emperor,* he would by common consent have been deemed unworthy of the lead, if he had not obtained it. Contrary to what is generally the case, he steadily advanced in reputation to the close of life; and possibly his premature end alone prevented him from rising, during the eventful years which immediately followed, to the very highest place among British statesmen. His measures were decided, his spirit resolute, his heart upright. Of unimpeachable integrity in private life, a sincere Christian, a tried patriot, the nation saw without suspicion hundreds of millions pass through his hands, and he justified their confidence by dying poor. He was adverse to all the liberal doctrines of the age, and anchored his faith, perhaps with too unbending rigidity, on the existing constitution in

His character.

* "Omnium consensu, dignus imperio, si non regnasset."—TACITUS.

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church and state; but time has since proved that the views are not always narrow which are founded on experience, and that the most liberal doctrines are sometimes the most ephemeral. His favourite maxims were, that concession of political power to the Catholics would infallibly lead from one step to another to the overthrow of our Protestant institutions, and that no remedy could be found for the disorders and sufferings of Ireland, but in the establishment of a well-regulated system of poor laws; and great was the ridicule thrown upon such professions by many of the most learned and all the most liberal men of his time. Subsequent events, however, have in a great degree justified his penetration, and added another to the numerous instances which history affords, of the eternal truth, that the only safe foundation for anticipation of the future, is experience of the past, and that those, who, from adhering to this principle, are thought to be behind one age, are generally in advance of the next.

Position of
France in
relation to
Russia at
this period.

While the vast resources of England, poured forth with a profusion worthy of the occasion, were thus lost to the cause of European freedom by the tardiness with which they were brought into action, and the want of vigour with which they were directed in the field, Austria was anxiously protracting a painful negotiation, and watching every gleam in the political horizon, before she finally put the seal to her degradation. The Emperor retired to Vienna, where he was soon immersed in the cares of his immense empire; while the immediate conduct of the negotiation was committed, at Altenburg in Hungary, to Metternich on the part of Austria, and Talleyrand on that of France. The situation of Napoleon was delicate, particularly in relation to

Russia, with which he had repeatedly, during the campaign, short as it was, been on terms bordering on hostility: but the battle of Wagram had, as if by magic, restored all the temporizing policy of the cabinet of St Petersburg, and the relations of amity between the two cabinets. When the Emperor Francis, after the conclusion of the armistice, addressed a letter to Alexander, and another to Napoleon, these two sovereigns instantly mutually communicated their despatches and answers to each other. On this side, therefore, no obstacles were to be anticipated; and although there were at first some difficulties, and no small alarm awakened by the proposal, on the part of the French minister, to unite a portion of Gallicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which gave instant umbrage to the cabinet and nobles of St Petersburg, yet, in the end, this difficulty, great as it was, yielded to the thirst for territorial aggrandisement. It was agreed to give Russia a share of the spoil of Gallicia; the name of Poland was never again to be revived; and the Emperor Alexander suffered himself to be persuaded, or affected to believe, that even with a considerable addition of territory, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania could never become an object of jealousy to the czars of Muscovy.^{1*}

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Bign. viii.
349, 357.
Hard. x.
469, 472.

* "My interests," said Alexander to Napoleon, "are entirely in the hands of your Majesty. You may give me a certain pledge of your friendship, in repeating what you said at Tilsit and Erfurth, on the interests of Russia in connexion with the *late kingdom of Poland*, and which I have since charged my ambassador to confirm."—"Poland," said Napoleon to M. Gorgoli, the officer who bore the despatches to St Petersburg, "may give rise to some embarrassment betwixt us; but the world is large enough to afford us room to arrange ourselves."—"If the re-establishment of Poland is to be brought on the tapis," replied Alexander, "*the world is not large enough*; for I desire nothing further in it." The ferment was prodigious at St Petersburg; and it was openly

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Negotiation
between
France and
Austria.

July 22.

Aug. 17.

Aug. 19.

The cabinet of Vienna, which was stationed at Komorn in Hungary, prolonged the negotiation, from a latent hope that successes in Spain, on the Scheldt, or in the Tyrol, might enable it to resume hostilities with some prospect of success, or obtain some abatement from the rigorous terms which were demanded by the conqueror. These were the immediate suppression of the landwehr, the reduction of the regular army to one-half, the expulsion of all French royalists from the Austrian monarchy, and the cession of all the provinces actually occupied by the French armies. To these extravagant demands, which amounted to a total destruction of the monarchy, Count Metternich opposed the equally extravagant proposition that every thing should be restored to the *statu quo ante bellum*. As the negotiation advanced, Napoleon employed menaces of the severest kind against the Imperial government, in the event of his being again driven to hostilities, boasted much of his perfect intelligence with the Emperor Alexander, and even dropped some significant hints of his intention, if driven to extremities, to separate the three crowns which now centered on the Imperial brows, and bestow two of them on the Archdukes Charles and John. Mean-while, the utmost care was taken to improve the military position of the army, and make every thing ready for a resumption of hostilities :

said in some circles that it would be better to die sword in hand, or assassinate the Emperor, if he was disposed to yield, than to permit the re-union of Poland to the Grand Duchy. Napoleon was not ignorant of these alarming symptoms : and it was at length agreed that France should guarantee to Russia its new possessions,—that the name of Poland and the Poles should be avoided, and three-fourths of the spoils of Gallicia given to Lithuania, and one-fourth to Russia. Under a new name, and the sway of the King of Saxony, this was thought not likely to awaken any dangerous ideas as to the re-establishment of Poland.—*See BIGNON, viii. 351, 354.*

magnificent reviews daily took place at Vienna ; troops were incessantly forwarded from the rear to the corps in front ; a grand distribution of honours and benefactions to the soldiers was made on the anniversary of the Emperor's birth-day on the 15th of August, accompanied by a decree for the erection of a column of granite of Cherburg, on the Pont Neuf at Paris, a hundred and eighty feet high, with the inscription, "Napoleon to the French people ;" a vast fortress was commenced at Spitz, opposite to Vienna, and another at Raab, to serve as impregnable têtes-du-pont for the passage of the Danube ; while, by a decree equally agreeable to the French as grievous to the German people, it was declared that, till the 11th April following, the whole expenses of the grand army should be laid upon the conquered territories.¹

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Aug. 11.

Pel. iv.

344, 357.

Sav. iv.

140, 148.

Bign, viii.

355, 361.

But, in the midst of all his magnificent preparations and dazzling announcements, the Emperor had several causes for disquietude, and was far from feeling that confidence in his position which he declared to the world, and held forth in his conferences with Metternich. The Walcheren expedition held all the Flemish provinces for some weeks in a state of suspense ; and there was good reason to believe, that, if Antwerp had fallen, the fermentation in the north of Germany would have drawn Prussia into an open declaration of war, which would at once have revived a desperate and doubtful contest on the Danube. The Tyrol was still in arms, and had a third time totally defeated the French invaders, and made the greater part of their number prisoners. Nor were the accounts from Spain of a more encouraging description. The disaster of Soult at Oporto, to be immediately noticed, had been followed by the inva-

Napoleon's
reasons for
secret dis-
quietude.

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¹ Pel. iv.
345, 346.
Hard. x.
470, 471.

Attempt to
assassinate
him by
Stabs.

Sept. 15.

sion of Estremadura and the defeat of Talavera; while, at the same time, accounts were daily received of the discord among the generals employed in the Peninsula, and the details of an alarming conspiracy in Soult's army, revealed the alarming truth that the Republican generals, like the Roman consuls, dazzled by the thrones which had been won by so many of their number, were not altogether beyond the reach of intrigues which might elevate them from a marshal's baton to a king's sceptre. "It is necessary," said Napoleon, "to hasten at any price to make peace, in order that the enemy may not gain time to profit by his machinations."!

The Emperor's desire to bring the long protracted negotiations to a conclusion, was increased by a singular attempt at assassination, which was at this period made upon his person. At the daily parades at Schoenbrunn, the attention of the guards and officers of his household had been more than once attracted by a young man, who threw himself in the way, and importunately demanded to be allowed to speak to the Emperor. On the third occasion, one of the gendarmes seized him rudely by the neck to move him back, and in doing so, perceived that he had something concealed in his bosom. He was searched; and it proved to be a large knife, sheathed in a number of sheets of paper. Being immediately apprehended and brought before Savary, the chief of the gendarmerie, for examination, he at once avowed that his intention was to have taken the Emperor's life; alleging as a reason, that he had been assured that the sovereigns would never make peace with him, and that, as he was the stronger, the grand object of universal pacification could never be attained till he were removed. It turned out that he was the son of

a Protestant minister at Erfurth, and only eighteen years old. He had seen the Emperor when he was at that town the year before; and he admitted that he had borrowed his father's horse, without his knowledge, and come to Vienna to execute his purpose. "I had chiefly studied history," said he, "and often envied Joan of Arc, because she had delivered France from the yoke of its enemies, and I wished to follow her example." "The guards who surrounded me," said the Emperor, "would have cut you in pieces before you could have struck me!" "I was well aware of that," replied he, "but I was not afraid to die." "If I set you at liberty," said Napoleon, "would you return to your parents, and abandon your purpose?" "Yes," replied he, "if we had peace; but if war continued, I would still put it in execution." Struck with these answers, the Emperor, with a magnanimity which formed at times a remarkable feature in his character, was desirous to save his life; and directed Dr Corvesart, who was in attendance, to feel his pulse, to see if he was in his sound senses. The physician reported that his pulse was slightly agitated, but that he was in perfect health. The young fanatic was sent to prison at Vienna; and though the Emperor for some time entertained thoughts of pardoning him, he was forgotten in the pressure of more important events; and after his departure for Paris, he was brought before a military council, condemned, and executed.¹ He evinced, in his last moments, the same intrepidity which had distinguished his conduct when examined before Napoleon, and his last words were, "For God and the fatherland!"¹ *

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¹ Sav. iv.
141, 145.Pel. iv.
371. Bign.
viii. 371,
373.

* An adventure of a different character befell Napoleon at Schœnbrunn during this period. A young Austrian lady of attractive person

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Which
leads to the
conclusion
of the ne-
gotiation.

¹ Bign. viii.
360, 365.
Pel. iv.
370, 373.
Bour. vii.
247, 256.
Oct. 14.

This singular event contributed as much, on the French side, to the conclusion of the negotiations, as the failure of the Walcheren expedition did, on that of the Austrian cabinet. There might be more characters in Germany like Stabs : in a country so profoundly agitated, and containing, especially in its northern provinces, so many enthusiastic spirits, it was impossible to measure the personal danger which the Emperor might run, if hostilities were resumed. These considerations weighed powerfully with the cabinet of Schoenbrunn. Napoleon gradually fell in his demands ; and though the orders given were abundantly warlike, and the marshals were all at their posts, yet it was evident to those in the secret of the negotiations, that matters were approaching to an accommodation. The demand, on the part of France, of the line from the Danube to the lake Aller, as the frontier towards Bavaria, gave rise to fresh difficulties, at the very moment when all seemed concluded ; for it deprived Austria, on that side, of the mountain ridge which formed its true frontier, and gave the court of Munich the crest of the Hansruck, and part of the slope towards the eastward. But matters had gone too far to recede : the cabinet of Vienna was true to its principle of yielding when it could no longer resist ;¹ and Prince Lichtenstein, with tears in his eyes, signed the treaty, on the part

and noble family, fell so desperately in love with the *renown* of the Emperor, that she became willing to sacrifice to him her person, and was, by her own desire, introduced at night into his apartment. Though abundantly warm in his temperament, so far as physical enjoyments were concerned, and noways disquieted, in the general case, by any lingering qualms of conscience about Josephine, Napoleon was so much struck with the artless simplicity of this poor girl's mind, and the devoted character of her passion, that, after some conversation, he had her re-conducted untouched to her own house.

of the Austrian government, at Vienna, on the 14th October. CHAP.
LVII.

By the peace of Vienna, Austria lost territories containing three millions and a-half of inhabitants. She ceded to Bavaria the Inn-Viertel, and the Hansruck-Viertel, as well as Salzburg, with its adjacent territory, and the valley of Berchtolsgaden; districts, the importance of which was not to be measured by their extent and inhabitants, but by the importance of their situation, lying on the ridge of mountains which separated the two monarchies, and taking a strong frontier from the one to bestow it upon the other. Portions of Gallicia, to the extent of fifteen hundred thousand souls, were ceded to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and of four hundred thousand to Russia: and besides this, the Grand Duchy acquired the fortress and whole circle of Zamosc, in the eastern part of the same province. To the kingdom of Italy, Austria ceded Carniola, the circle of Villach, in Carinthia, six districts of Croatia, Fiume, and its territory on the sea-shore, Trieste, the county of Gorici, Montefalcone, Austrian Istria, Cartua, and its dependent isles, the Thalweg of the Save, and the lordship of Radzuns in the Grisons. In addition to these immense sacrifices, the Emperor of Austria renounced, on the part of his brother, the Archduke Antony, the office of grand master of the Teutonic Order, with all the rights and territories. Tyrol remained to its Bavarian masters: but the Emperor Francis stipulated for his brave and devoted children in that province, an absolute and unconditional amnesty, as well in their persons as effects.¹

1809.

Peace of
Vienna.

¹ See Treaty
in Martens.
Pel. iv.
468. Ann.
Reg. 1809.
App. to
Chron. 733.
State
Papers.

In addition to these public articles, various secret ones were annexed to the treaty, of a still more humiliating kind to the House of Hapsburg. The

Its secret
articles.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

treaty was, in the first place, declared common to Russia; next, the Emperor of Austria engaged to reduce his army, so that it should not exceed a hundred and fifty thousand men, during the continuance of the maritime war; all persons born in France, Belgium, Piedmont, or the Venetian states, were to be dismissed from the Austrian service; and a contribution of 85,000,000 francs (L.3,400,000) was imposed on the provinces occupied by the French troops. By a letter of Napoleon to M. Daru, the intendant-general of the army and conquered provinces, it was specially enjoined that "from the 1st April to the 1st October, every farthing expended on the army should be drawn from the conquered provinces, and all the advances between these periods made from France, restored to the public treasury."¹*

¹ Bign. viii.
379, 380.

Jealousy of
Russia at
the increase
of the
Grand
Duchy from
this treaty.

The treaty of Vienna was received with marked disapprobation by the cabinet of St Petersburg; and it was attended with a most important effect, in widening the breach which was already formed between the two mighty rulers of continental Europe. In vain Napoleon assured Alexander that he had watched over his interests as he would have done over his own; the Russian Autocrat could perceive no traces of that consideration in the dangerous augmentation of the territory and population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and he openly testified to Caulaincourt his displeasure, referring to the date of his dismissal of General Gortschakoff for decisive evidence of the sincerity of his alliance.† In the midst of all his indignation, however, he made no scruples in accepting the moderate portion of the spoils of Austria allotted to his share; and M. De St Julian, who was despatched from Vienna to persuade him to renounce

* See note C.

† Vide ante, vii. 433.

that acquisition, found it impossible to induce the cabinet of St Petersburg to accept the sterile honours of disinterestedness. Napoleon, however, spared no efforts to appease the Czar; and being well aware that it was the secret dread of the restoration of Poland which was the spring of all their uneasiness, he engaged not only to concur with Alexander in every thing which should tend to efface ancient recollections, but even declared that he “was desirous that the name of Poland and of the Poles *should disappear, not merely from every political transaction but even from history.*” How fortunate that the eternal records of history are beyond the reach of the potentates who for a time oppress mankind! ¹

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1809.

¹ Cham-
pagny to
Alexander
20th Oct.
1809.
Bign. viii.
390.

Napoleon afterwards reproached himself at St Helena, with not having, at the treaty of Vienna, divided the three crowns of the Austrian empire, and thereby for ever prostrated its power and independence; and it is certain that, at one period of the negotiation, he not only threatened to adopt this extreme measure, but entertained serious thoughts of carrying it into execution. His secret thoughts seem to have been divulged in a despatch to his minister for foreign affairs, of 15th September, in which he openly avows that his desire is either to separate the three crowns, or to form a sincere and durable alliance with the Austrian empire. Provided he could obtain a sufficient guarantee for that alliance, he was willing to leave the monarchy entire, but he thought there could be no security for it, unless the throne were ceded to the Grand Duke of Wurtzburg.*

Napoleon's
secret views
in this
treaty.

* “I desire nothing from Austria,” said Napoleon. “Gallicia is beyond my limits: Trieste is good for nothing but to be destroyed, since I have Venice. It is a matter of indifference to me whether Bavaria has a million, more or less: my true interest is *either to separate the three crowns, or to contract an intimate alliance with the reigning family.* The

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1809.

¹ O'Meara,
ii. 199.Las Cases,
iii. 139.Bign. viii.
364, 368.The ram-
parts of
Vienna
blown up.

Oct. 17.

The Emperor Francis magnanimously agreed to the sacrifice, if it could have the effect of preserving the integrity of the monarchy ; but it was not afterwards insisted on by Napoleon, who began, in the course of this negotiation, to conceive the idea of connecting himself with the Cæsars in a way still more personally flattering and likely to be more politically enduring. In truth, he foresaw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable at some future period ; it was with the Czar that the real battle for supreme dominion was to be fought ; and he clearly perceived the policy of not weakening too far the power which would be his right wing in the conflict.¹

No sooner was the treaty of Vienna ratified than Napoleon set out for Paris, and arrived at Fontainebleau on the 26th of October. Before leaving the Austrian capital, however, in the interval between the signature and ratification of the treaty, he gave orders for the barbarous and unnecessary act of

separation of the three crowns is only to be obtained by resuming hostilities : an intimate alliance with the existing Emperor is difficult, because I have not an entire confidence in his resolution." I said to Prince Lichtenstein the other day : " Let the Emperor cede the crown to the grand Duke of Wurtzburg, I will restore every thing to Austria without exacting any thing. M. de Bubna took me at my word, and said the Emperor was far from having any repugnance to such a sacrifice : I said I would accept it : that the base put forward at Altenberg was far from being unsusceptible of modifications. Insinuate to Count Metternich, that if the Emperor is, on any account, inclined to cede the throne (report says he is weary of royalty), I will leave the monarchy entire. With the Grand Duke I will contract such an alliance as will speedily enable me to settle the affairs of the Continent : I have confidence in the character and good disposition of the Grand Duke : I would consider the repose of the world as secured by that event. You may say I can rely on the moral probity of the Emperor, but then he is always of the opinion of the last person who speaks ; such men as Stadion and Baldacci will continue to exercise influence over him. That way of arranging matters would suit me well."—NAPOLEON to CHAMPAGNY, 15th Sept. 1809 ; BIGNON, viii. 365–368.

blowing up its fortifications. Mines had previously been constructed under the principal bastions ; and the successive explosion of one after another, presented one of the most sublime and moving spectacles of the whole revolutionary war. The ramparts, slowly raised in the air, suddenly swelled, and bursting like so many volcanoes, scattered volumes of flame and smoke into the air ; showers of stones and fragments of masonry fell on all sides ; the subterraneous fire ran along the mines with a smothered roar, which froze every heart with terror ; one after another, the bastions were heaved up and exploded, till the city was enveloped on all sides by ruins, and the rattle of the falling masses broke the awful stillness of the capital. This cruel devastation produced the most profound impression at Vienna ; it exasperated the people more than could have been done by the loss of half the monarchy. These ramparts were the glory of the citizens ; shaded by trees, they formed delightful public walks ; they were associated with the most heart-stirring æras of their history ; they had withstood all the assaults of the Turks, and been witness to the heroism of Maria Theresa. To destroy these venerable monuments of former glory, not in the fury of assault, not under the pressure of necessity, but in cold blood, after peace had been signed, and when the invaders were preparing to withdraw, was justly felt as a wanton and unjustifiable act of military oppression. It brought the bitterness of conquest home to every man's breast : the iron had pierced into the soul of the nation. As a measure of military precaution it seemed unnecessary, when these walls had twice proved unable to arrest the invader : as a preliminary to the cordial alliance which Napoleon desired, it was in the highest degree

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1809.

Oct. 19.

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¹ Jom. iii.
314, 315.
Bign. viii.
375, 376.

Affairs of
Tyrol after
the armis-
tice of
Znaym.

July 12.

impolitic ; and its effects were felt by Napoleon, in the hour of his adversity, with terrible bitterness. The important lesson which it has left to the world, is the clear proof which it affords of that great general's opinion of the vital importance of central fortifications : he has told us himself, that, if Vienna could have held out three days longer, the fate of the campaign would have been changed : but, while this truth is perhaps the lesson of all others most strongly illustrated by the events of the war, it is the last which the vanity of kings, and the thoughtlessness of the people, will permit to be read to any useful effect.¹

While the cabinet of Vienna was thus yielding in the strife, and the last flames of this terrible conflagration were expiring on the banks of the Danube, the Tyrol continued the theatre of a desperate conflict, and the shepherds of the Alps, with mournful heroism, maintained their independence against a power which the Austrian monarchy had been unable to withstand. Having completely delivered their country, after the battle of Aspern, from the invaders, and spread themselves over the adjoining provinces of Bavaria, Vorarlberg, and Italy,* the brave mountaineers flattered themselves that their perils were over, and that a second victory on the Danube would speedily reunite them, by indissoluble bonds, to their beloved Emperor. Kufstein was besieged and on the point of surrendering, when the news of the battle of Wagram and the armistice of Znaym fell like a thunder-bolt on their minds. Many of the insurgents, as was natural in such circumstances, gave up the cause as lost, and retired in

* Ante, vii. 419.

deep dejection to their homes, while others, more resolute or desperate, redoubled in ardour, and seemed determined to spill the last drop of their blood rather than submit to the hated yoke of Bavaria. The chiefs of the insurrection, and the Austrian generals, who had again entered the country, were at first in a state of great perplexity, from uncertainty whether to yield to the summons of the French generals, who required them to evacuate the country, or the prayers of the inhabitants, who besought them to stand by them and defend it. The uncertainty of the soldiers, however, was removed by an order which arrived after the armistice of Znaym, July 21. for them to evacuate both the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, which they immediately prepared to obey: but the insurgents refused to acknowledge the convention, and declared they would submit to nothing but direct orders from the Emperor of Austria, who, they were confident, would never issue such commands, as he had promised to conclude no peace which did not secure to him the possession of the Tyrol. Such was the fury of the people, that some of the most violent proposed to seize and disarm all the Austrian troops, and put all the prisoners to death; and although Hormayer, Martin, and the real chiefs, did their utmost to calm the general effervescence and direct it to some useful object, yet they could not prevent many of the prisoners from falling victims to the ungovernable rage of the peasantry. In the midst of this heroic yet savage bewilderment, the general voice turned to Hofer; and his announcement, at a crowded assembly, that he would stand by them to the last drop of his blood, though it were only as chief of the peasants of Passeyr valley, was answered by a general shout,¹ which proclaimed him "com-

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Gesch. A.
Hofer, 521,
530. Barth.
276, 280.

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Fresh in-
vasion of
Tyrol by
Marshal
Lefebvre.

July 20.

July 21.

July 29.

July 30.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 334,
342. Barth.
280, 290.

mander-in-chief of the province so long as it pleased God.”

Dangers, however, of the most formidable kind were fast accumulating round the devoted province. The armistice of Znaym enabled the Emperor to detach overwhelming forces against the Tyrol; and he immediately set about the final reduction of the country. Marshal Lefebvre, at the head of twenty thousand men, renewed his invasion of the Innthal by the route of Salzburg, while Beaumont, with ten thousand, crossed the ridge of Scharnitz, and threatened Innsbruck from the northern side. Both irruptions proved successful. In the confusion produced by the withdrawing of the Austrian authorities, and uncertainty whether or not the war was to be continued, the frontier defiles were left unguarded, and both columns of the enemy appeared without opposition before the steeples of Innsbruck. The Archduke John and General Buol, who commanded the Austrian troops, successively issued proclamations to the people, announcing to them the conclusion of the armistice and stipulated evacuation of the Tyrol, and recommending to them to lay down their arms, and trust to the clemency of the Duke of Dantzic. Finding the people little inclined to follow their directions, Hormayer and Buol evacuated Innsbruck with all the regular troops and cannon, taking the route over the Brenner, leaving the Tyrol to its fate. Innsbruck, destitute of defenders, immediately submitted, and the spectacle of thirty thousand French and Bavarians in possession of its capital, naturally spread the belief that the war in the Tyrol was terminated.¹

This, however, was very far from being the case; and Europe, amidst the consternation produced by

the battle of Wagram, was speedily roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the unconquerable resolution and astonishing victories of its gallant mountaineers. General Hormayer, who was well aware of the influence of Hofer over his countrymen, and despaired with reason of any further success in the contest, had used the utmost efforts to induce that renowned chief to follow him in his retreat; but all his efforts were ineffectual. Many of the chiefs, including even the renowned Spechbacher, had resolved to withdraw with the Austrian generals; but, when he went to take leave of Hofer, the power of patriotic eloquence proved victorious, and he was prevailed on to remain and stand by his country to the last. Even after this acquisition, however, Hofer was still the victim of contending feelings: patriotic ardour impelling him one way, and the obvious hopelessness of the attempt another; and, in the agony of indecision, he retired to a hermitage in the valley of Passeyr, where, amidst pines and rocks, he spent several days in solitude and prayer. Haspinger was equally undecided; and meanwhile the peasants, who were full of ardour and ready on all sides to take up arms, remained inactive for want of a leader to direct them. At length, however, the latter courageous chief had a meeting at Brixen with Martin Schenk, Peter Kemmater, and Peter Mayer, at which Schenk, who was the friend and confidant of Hofer, produced a letter from him, in which he implored them to make "one more effort in behalf of their beloved country." These rural heroes mutually pledged themselves to sacrifice their lives rather than abandon the holy cause; and, having concerted measures, Haspinger took the command of the peasants,¹ while Hofer, who was summoned by

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1809.

Renewed
resolution
of the
Tyrolese to
continue the
contest.

July 29.

Aug. 2.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 345,
359. Barth.
294, 302.

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1809.

Desperate
action at
the bridge
of Laditch.
Aug. 4.

the Duke of Dantzic to appear at Innspruck on the 11th of August, returned for answer, "He would come, but it should be attended by ten thousand sharpshooters."

Hostilities commenced on the 4th of August by an attack on the advanced guard of the French and Bavarians, who were descending the southern declivity of the Brenner, on the banks of the Eisach, between Sterzing and Brixen. The Tyrolese, under Haspinger, occupied the overhanging woods and cliffs which surrounded the bridge of Laditch, a little below Mittenwald, where the high road from Bolsano to Innspruck crosses the Eisach. The French and Bavarians, little suspecting their danger, advanced incautiously down the defile. The woods were silent—no muskets or armed men appeared on the cliffs: but no sooner was a considerable body of the enemy, under General Rouyer, engaged in the defile, than a heavy fire burst forth on all sides; and, from amidst the leafy screen, the deadly bullets of the sharpshooters brought death with every discharge into the allied ranks. The column halted, fearful to advance, yet unwilling to recede; upon which the Tyrolese, with deafening shouts, burst forth from their concealment, and, mingling with the enemy, a frightful slaughter took place. Fresh troops, however, came up from the rear; courageous discipline prevailed over unskilled valour; and the Bavarian column pushed on towards the bridge. Suddenly, a crackling sound was heard; a rattle of falling stones startled the horsemen in advance, and immediately after several gigantic firs, which had been cut, and supported huge masses of rock and heaps of rubbish on the heights above, came thundering down, and crushed whole squadrons and com-

panies at a single blow. So awful was the crash, so complete the devastation, that both parties for a time suspended the conflict, and, amidst the death-like silence which ensued, the roar of the Eisach was distinctly heard. Undeterred, however, by this frightful catastrophe, the French again advanced, through a murderous fire, and, surmounting the ruins which obstructed the road and covered the bodies of their comrades, forced their way on to the bridge. Already, however, it was on fire: a Bavarian horseman attempted, with dauntless intrepidity, to cross the arch amidst the flames, but the burning rafters gave way, and he was precipitated into the torrent. Separated by the yawning gulf, over which there was no other passage, both parties desisted from the combat. Haspinger returned to Brixen to collect his scattered forces, and Rouyer, weakened by the loss of twelve hundred men, remeasured his steps to Mittenwald and Sterzing, at the foot of the Brenner.^{1*}

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¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 560,
561. Barth.
304, 312.

The successful issue of this extraordinary conflict produced, as might have been expected, a general outbreak in Tyrol. Hofer descended the valley of Passeyr, at the head of several thousand men, and joined Spechbacher on the Gaufen, the mountain ridge which overhangs, on the west and north, the

Defeat of
Marshal
Lefebvre on
the Bren-
ner.
Aug. 4.

* The scene of this memorable conflict is on the high road from Brixen to Sterzing, about a mile below Mittenwald, shortly before it crosses the bridge of Laditch. Every traveller from Italy to Germany, by Tyrol, passes through it; but how few are aware of the heart-stirring deeds of which the wood-clad precipices, beneath which they roll in their carriages, have been the theatre! Sir Walter Scott places the action in the Upper Innthal, but this is a mistake.—See GESCHICHTE ANDREAS HOFER, 560.—The author visited the scene in 1816, and he yet recollects, in all its vividness, the thrilling interest which it excited; the long black furrow, produced by the falling masses, like the track of an avalanche, was, even then, after the lapse of seven years, imperfectly obliterated by the bursting vegetation which the warmth of the Italian sun had awakened on these beautiful steep.

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 1809.
 Aug. 5, 6.

northern slope of the Brenner, and ten thousand men soon flocked to their standard. The Bavarians, under General Steingel, made several attempts to dislodge them from this threatening position, which menaced the great road by Brixen to Italy, but they were constantly repulsed. COUNT WITTGENSTEIN, an officer destined to immortal celebrity in a more glorious war, succeeded, however, in again clearing the road up the northern slope of the Brenner of the enemy; and Marshal Lefebvre, encouraged by this success, put himself at the head of his whole corps, with the intention of forcing his way over that elevated ridge to the Italian Tyrol. He had not advanced far, however, before his column, while winding in straggling files up the steep ascent, twenty miles in length, which leads to the summit of the pass, and when the vanguard had reached Steinach,—

Aug. 10.

peasantry; and, after an obstinate conflict, the whole, twenty thousand strong, were routed and driven back with immense loss to the bottom of the mountain. Such was the disorder, that the marshal himself arrived there disguised as a common trooper, on

Aug. 11.

the evening of the 11th, and his followers, horse, foot, and cannon, mingled together, were rolled down in utter confusion into Innspruck. Twenty-five pieces of cannon, and the whole ammunition of the army, fell into the hands of the victors, who, gathering strength, like a mountain torrent, with every tributary stream which crossed their course, soon appeared in great force on Mount Isel and the heights which overhang the capital.¹

¹ Gesch. A. Hofer, 361, 367. Barth. 324, 330. Pel. iv. 358.

Similar successes in other quarters attended the efforts of the Tyrolese patriots. A body of seventeen hundred men, who advanced from Landeck through

the Vintchgau, with the intention of falling on the rear of Hofer's people at Sterzing, was met at Prutz by a body of Tyrolese sharpshooters, and after a protracted contest of two days, were totally defeated, with the loss of three hundred killed and nine hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Rusca advanced in the Pusterthal from Carinthia to Lienz, with six thousand men, where he gave way to the most revolting atrocities, massacring every human being, of whatever age or sex, that fell in his way: until at length a stop was put to his career by a body of armed peasants, who met him at the Lienzer-clause, and after a bloody conflict, drove him back, with the loss of twelve hundred men, to Sachsenburg; from which, hotly pursued by the increasing fury of the peasantry, he retreated across the frontier into Carinthia, so that the whole of the Pusterthal was delivered from the enemy. At the same time, a body of Italian troops, which had advanced from the neighbourhood of Verona, with the design of co-operating with the corps of Lefebvre in its descent from the Brenner, alarmed at the general insurrection of the valley of the Adige, fell back, harassed by a cloud of peasants, to the Italian frontier, and the whole of the southern Tyrol was restored to the arms of the Tyrolese.¹

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1809.

Successes
in other
quarters.
Aug. 8.

Aug. 9.

Aug. 10.

Gesch. A.
Hofer, 566,
567. Barth.
330, 334.

Animated by these unlooked-for successes, the patriots no longer stood on the defensive, but, flocking from all quarters to the standard of Hofer, assembled in great multitudes on Mount Isel, the scene of their former triumphs, and destined to be immortalised by a still more extraordinary victory. Lefebvre had collected his whole force, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, of whom two thousand were horse, with forty pieces of cannon, on the little plain

Total defeat
of Lefebvre
at Inns-
bruck.
Aug. 12.

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1809.

Aug. 12.

which lies between Innspruck and the foot of the mountains on the southern side of the Inn. They were far from being animated, however, by their wonted spirit; the repeated defeats they had experienced had inspired them with that mysterious dread of the mountaineers, with which regular troops are so often seized, when, contrary to expectation, they have been worsted by undisciplined bodies of men; and a secret feeling of the injustice of their cause, and the heroism with which they had been resisted, paralysed many an arm which had never trembled before a regular enemy. The Tyrolese consisted of eighteen thousand men, three hundred of whom were Austrian soldiers, who had refused to follow their officers, and remained to share the fate of the inhabitants: they were tolerably supplied with ammunition, but had little provisions, in consequence of which several hundred peasants had already gone back to their homes. Spechbacher commanded the right wing, whose line extended from the heights of Passberg to the bridges of Halle and Volders; Hofer was with the centre, and had his headquarters at the inn of Spade, on the Schonberg; Haspinger directed the left, and advanced by Mutters. At four in the morning, this brave Capuchin roused Hofer from sleep, and, having first united with him in fervent prayer, hurried out to communicate his orders to the outposts. The battle commenced at six, and continued without intermission till midnight; the Bavarians constantly endeavouring to drive the Tyrolese from their position on Mount Isel, and they, in their turn, to force the enemy back into the town of Innspruck. For long, the contest was undecided,—the superior discipline and admirable artillery of the enemy, prevailing over the impetuous but disorderly

assaults and deadly aim of the mountaineers ; but, towards nightfall, the bridge of the Sill was carried after a desperate struggle, and their left flank being thus turned, the French and Bavarians gave way on all sides, and were pursued with great slaughter into the town. The Bavarians lost six thousand men, of whom seventeen hundred wounded fell into the hands of the Tyrolese ; while on the side of the latter, not more than nine hundred had fallen.¹

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¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 372,
376. Barth.
336, 342.
Pel. iv.
358.

This great victory was immediately followed by the liberation of the whole Tyrol. Lefebvre fell back across the Inn on the day after the battle, and, evacuating Innspruck, retreated rapidly to Kufstein, and from thence to Salzburg, where his whole army was collected on the 20th. Spechbacher followed them with a large body of peasants, and destroyed a considerable part of the rear-guard at Schwatz, while Hofer made his triumphant entry into Innspruck, and took up his residence in the Imperial castle, where his presence was very necessary to check the disorders consequent on the irruption of so large a body of tumultuous patriots into an opulent city. The entire command of the country was now assumed by this chief : proclamations were issued and coins struck in his name, as commander-in-chief of the Tyrol ; and the whole civil and military preparations submitted to his directions. While exercising these exalted functions, however, he still retained the simplicity of his rustic dress and manners : he wore nothing but his country jerkin and clouted shoes ; his long beard was retained, but his broad-brimmed hat was exchanged for one with a plume and inscription to him as the commander-in-chief of Tyrol, the gift of the holy sisterhood of Innspruck. It soon appeared, however, that their renowned

Hofer's de-
liverance
and govern-
ment of
Tyrol.
Aug. 15.

- CHAP. chief was not qualified for the duties of government:
 LVII. he interfered in an irregular and capricious way,
 1809. though from pure motives, with the administration
 of justice, and was more occupied with terminating
 the private quarrels of his countrymen than ward-
 ing off their public dangers. Among other attempts,
 he spent much time in endeavouring to reconcile the
 disputes of married persons; an undertaking which
 gave him ample employment. Mean-while, Ersens-
 tecken and Sieberer, who had both distinguished
 Sept. 28. themselves in the commencement of the war, but
 subsequently retired with the Austrian troops, re-
 turned to their countrymen to share at all hazards
 their fate: the former bore a gold medal and chain,
 which were presented to Hofer by the Emperor of
 Oct. 4. Austria, with which he was formally invested in
 the great church of Innspruck, at the foot of the
 tomb of Maximilian, by the abbot of Wilten, amidst
 the tears and acclamations of a vast concourse of
 spectators; while two deputies, Muller and Schone-
 cher, who contrived to elude the vigilance of the
 French sentinels who surrounded the country, and
 made their way to England to implore the aid of
 the British government, were received with heart-
 felt kindness by all classes, and filled the nation, and
 through it the world, with unbounded admiration
 for their heroic exploits.¹

¹ Gesch. A.
 Hofer, 376,
 405. Barth.
 346, 360.

But darker days were approaching, and the Tyro-
 lese war was destined to add another to the numer-
 ous proofs which history affords, that no amount,
 how great soever, of patriotism, and no prodigies,
 how marvellous soever, of valour, not even when
 aided by the enthusiasm of religion and the strength
 of mountains, can successfully maintain a protracted
 resistance against a numerous and well-conducted

Prepara-
 tions of Na-
 poleon for
 the subjugation of the
 Tyrol.

enemy, if destitute of the organisation and support of a regular government. Popular enthusiasm, often irresistible in the outset, and while the general effervescence lasts, is incapable of the steady and enduring efforts necessary in combating the forces of an established monarchy. Like the French Vendéans, or the Scotch Highlanders in 1745, the Tyrolese for the most part returned home, after the victory of Innspruck; in their simplicity they thought the contest was over, now that the invaders were again chased from the valley of the Inn; and thus the frontier passes were left guarded only by a few hundred men wholly inadequate to protect them from the incursions of the enemy. Meanwhile Napoleon, now thoroughly roused, and justly apprehensive of the fatal blow which the continued independence of this mountainous district, in the midst of his dominions, would inflict on his power, was preparing such immense forces for a renewed attack on the country, as rendered its subjugation a matter of certainty. In the south General Peyri, at the head of ten thousand men, received orders to advance from Verona, and make himself master of Trent at all hazards; Rusca was intrusted with the command of three divisions, eighteen thousand strong, who were to enter the Pusterthal from Villach and Carinthia; while three Bavarian divisions, under Drouet, mustering twenty thousand veterans, were to break in by the pass of Strubs and the Salzburg frontier. These immense forces were the more to be dreaded from their arriving simultaneously in the country, at the very moment when all hearts were frozen by the intelligence of the conclusion of a treaty of peace by Austria, in which the Tyrol was abandoned;¹ and when the first appearance of the winter snows was

CHAP.
LVII.
1809.

Oct. 10.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 405,
408. Thib.
vii. 410.
Pel. iv.
480.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Successful
invasion of
the country
on all sides.

Oct. 17.

Oct. 18.

driving the peasants, and their herds, from the elevated pastures in the mountains to the lower valleys, in which they might be easily reached by the invading columns.

Under such difficult and disheartening circumstances, it was hardly to be expected, and certainly not wished, that the resistance of the Tyrolese should be further protracted ; but such was the unconquerable spirit of the people, that for three months longer they continued obstinately to contend for their independence. Their frontiers were, in the first instance, forced on all sides : Peyri defeated a body of Tyrolese and Austrians at Ampezzo on the Adige, and, after making himself master of Trent and Roveredo, advanced to the celebrated positions of Lavis, from whence the peasants were driven with great loss. On the northern and eastern frontiers affairs were equally discouraging. Spechbacher, who occupied the important pass of Strubs, the only entrance from the Salzburg territory, with a few hundred peasants, was unexpectedly attacked at daybreak, on the 18th October, and defeated with considerable loss ; and, what to him was a heart-rending misfortune, his little son, Andrew, a boy of eleven years of age, who had escaped from his place of seclusion in the mountains, to join his father in the field, was made prisoner, fighting by his side.* Spechbacher himself was struck down, desperately wounded, and only made his escape by the

* Spechbacher was struck down by repeated blows with the butt-end of a musket, and, when he regained his feet, he found his little son had been carried off from his side. Wounded and bleeding as he was, he no sooner discovered his loss than he called on his followers to return to the rescue ; but, for the first time in the war, they refused to follow him. Little Andrew was told his father was dead, and, to convince him that he was so, the Bavarian soldiers produced his sabre and some part of his dress, all bloody, which had been lost in the struggle. On seeing them, he wept bitterly, but soon regained his composure, and

assistance of his brave friends, who, fighting the whole way, carried him up the almost inaccessible cliffs on the side of the pass, where the Bavarian soldiers could not follow them. The invaders now inundated the valley of the Inn: Hofer, almost deserted by his followers, was unable to maintain himself at Innsbruck, but, retiring to Mount Isel, the scene of his former victories, still maintained, with mournful resolution, the standard of independence.¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Oct. 24.

¹ Gesch. A.

Hofer, 409,

416. Barth.

374, 380.

Eugene Beauharnois, who was intrusted with the direction of all the invading columns, now issued a proclamation from Villach, in which, after announcing the conclusion of peace between France and Austria, he called on the people to submit, and offered them, on that condition, an unconditional amnesty for the past. At the same time, the Archduke John, in a proclamation, strongly counselled them to relinquish the contest, and with a heavy heart announced that no further aid or countenance could be given by the Austrian government. In these circumstances, Hofer had no course left but that of submission; he withdrew to Steinach, from whence he wrote to General Drouet, offering to make peace; and a few days after, issued a proclamation, in which he counselled the people, as peace had been concluded, to lay down their arms, and trust "to the greatness of soul of Napoleon for pardon and oblivion of the past, whose footsteps were guided by a power of a superior order, which it was no longer permitted them to resist." But, in a few days, after, finding that the inhabitants

Hofer

resolves to

submit, and

publishes a

proclama-

tion to that

effect.

Oct. 25.

Oct. 21.

Oct. 29.

Nov. 8.

Nov. 15.

marched in sullen silence with his fellow prisoners. At Munich, he was presented to the king, who treated him with much kindness, and placed him in the royal seminary. In after times, and under happier auspices, this heroic family were re-united, under their much-loved Emperor's sway.—See BARTHOLDY *der Krieg der Tyroler Landleute in Jahre* 1809, *Berlin*, 1814, p. 378, 379.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 424,
436. Barth.
382, 384.
Thib. vii.
411.

Last inva-
sion of
Tyrol, and
desperate
resistance.

Nov. 3.

Nov. 6.

Nov. 14.

of his beloved valley were still in arms, and that further resistance was resolved on, he issued another proclamation, in which he ascribed his former intention to the advice of evil counsellors, and called on the people "Still to fight in defence of your native country: I shall fight with you, and for you, as a father for his children." War was then resumed at

all points: but the forces brought from all sides against the Tyrol were so immense, that no hope remained to the inhabitants, but to throw, by deeds of glory, a last radiance around their fall.¹

Rusca and Baraguay d'Hilliers entered the Pusterthal from Carinthia with twenty thousand men in the beginning of November. Unable to resist so overwhelming a force, the Tyrolese fell back, fighting all the way, to the Mulbach-clause, which they made good for two days with the most determined bravery, and were only compelled to evacuate on the third, from their position being turned by a circuitous path through the mountains. All the principal valleys were now inundated by French troops; Brixen was occupied; and the Bavarians from Innspruck having surmounted the Brenner with little opposition, the victorious columns united at Sterzing, and, with fifteen thousand men, threatened the Passeyrthal from the eastward; while an equal force, under Peyri, followed the banks of the Adige and approached the only remaining district in arms by the southern side. Thus the insurrection was at last cooped up within very narrow limits, and, in fact, confined to Hofer's native valley. But, though assailed by forces so immense, and driven by the snow in the higher grounds down to the banks of the Adige, the peasants still showed an undaunted front; and Rusca, having incautiously advanced to

the old castle of Tyrol, and dispersed part of his forces to obtain the delivery of arms from the inhabitants, he was attacked by Haspinger, aided by Thalguter and Torggler, two rustic leaders, and totally defeated, with the loss of six hundred killed and wounded, and seventeen hundred prisoners. Thalguter fell in this action, in the very moment he was taking an eagle from the enemy.¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 436,
444. Barth.
384, 386.

This unexpected success again set the whole neighbouring valleys in a flame; but the storms of winter having set in, and the mountains become covered with their snowy mantle, want of provisions compelled the inhabitants to submit. The natives of those elevated regions, who maintain themselves by the produce of the dairy or the sale of their manufactures, were ruined by the exactions of the contending armies, and beheld with despair their families threatened with famine by the burning of their houses by the French soldiers, and stoppage of the wonted supplies of grain from the Italian plains. Before the middle of December, almost all the chiefs had taken advantage of an amnesty, pressed with generous earnestness upon the people by Eugene Beauharnois and Baraguay d'Hilliers, and joined a large party of Tyrolese emigrants at Waradein, while the peasants, in sullen grief, returned to their homes.¹

Final conquest of
the country.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 436,
452. Barth.
385, 390.
Thib. vii.
412.

Moved with the respect of true soldiers for a gallant adversary, both these brave generals were unwearied in their efforts to induce Hofer to submit; and they would have done any thing to extricate him from his perilous situation. But, though grievously depressed and perplexed, he refused to accompany his friends in their flight, or humble himself by submission to the conquerors. Retiring to his native valley, he

Betrayal and
seizure of
Hofer.
Jan. 5,
1810.

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

Jan. 5.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 446,
450. Barth,
396, 400.

His trial
and con-
demnation.

long eluded the search of the victors. His place of concealment was a solitary alpine hut, four leagues distant from his home, in general inaccessible from the snow which surrounded it. In that deep solitude he was furnished, by stealth, with provisions by a few faithful followers, and more than once visited by secret messengers from the Emperor of Austria, who in vain used every entreaty to induce him to abandon the Tyrol, and accept an asylum in the Imperial dominions. But Hofer steadily refused all their offers, declaring his resolution to be fixed never to abandon his country or family. He even resisted all their entreaties to shave his beard, or use any disguise which might prevent his person from being known to the enemy. At length, he was seized by a French force of sixteen hundred men, led by Donay, once his intimate friend, whom the magnitude of the reward induced to betray his benefactor. Two thousand more were in readiness to support them; the column set out at midnight, and, after marching four leagues over ice and snow, surrounded the hut at five in the morning on the 5th January. No sooner did Hofer hear the voice of the officer enquiring for him, than he quietly came to the door and delivered himself up. He was immediately bound, and marched down his beloved valley, amidst the tears of the inhabitants and the shouts of the French soldiers, to Bolsano, and thence by Trent to Mantua.¹

On his journey, he was treated by the French officers, and particularly General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the kindness which true valour ever pays to misfortune, and which, in his case, was well deserved by the efforts he had uniformly made to protect the French prisoners who fell into his hands. On his arrival at Mantua, a court-martial was im-

mediately summoned, with General Bison, the governor of the fortress, whom he had formerly vanquished, at its head, to try him for combating against the French after the last proclamation of Eugene Beauharnois offering a general amnesty. The proceedings were very short, as the facts charged were at once admitted by the accused; but, notwithstanding this, a very great difference of opinion prevailed as to the punishment to be inflicted. A majority were for confinement: two had the courage to vote for his entire deliverance; but a telegraphic despatch from Milan decided the question, by ordering his death within twenty-four hours; thus putting it out of the power of Austria to interfere. He received his sentence with unshaken firmness, though he had no idea previously that his life was endangered; and only requested that he might be attended by a confessor, which was immediately complied with. By this priest, Manifesti, who never quitted him till his death, he transmitted his last adieus to his family, and every thing he possessed to be delivered to his countrymen, consisting of five hundred florins in Austrian bank-notes, his silver snuff-box, and beautiful rosary, which he had constantly carried about with him. In the intervals of religious duty, he conversed eagerly about the Tyrolese war, expressing always his firm conviction that sooner or later his countrymen would be reunited to the Austrian government.¹

On the following morning he was led out to execution. As he passed by the barracks on the Porta Molina, where the Tyrolese prisoners were confined, they fell on their knees and wept aloud; those who were near enough to approach his escort, threw themselves on the ground and implored his blessing.

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 446,
451. Barth.
396.His execu-
tion.

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

This he freely gave them, requesting their forgiveness for the misfortunes in which he had involved their country, and assuring them, that he felt confident they would ere long return under the dominion of their beloved Emperor, to whom he cried out the last "Vivat!" with a clear and steady voice. On the broad bastion, a little distance from the Porta Ceresa, the grenadiers formed a square, open in the rear, while twelve men and a corporal stood forth with loaded pieces. A drummer offered Hofer a white handkerchief to bandage his eyes, and requested him to kneel; but this he refused, saying, "that he was used to stand upright before his Creator, and in that posture he would deliver up his spirit to him." Having then presented the corporal who commanded the detachment with his whole remaining property, consisting of twenty kreutzers, and uttered a few words expressive of attachment to his sovereign and country, he faced the guard, and with a loud voice pronounced the word "Fire!" On the first discharge he sunk only on one knee: a merciful shot, however, at length dispatched him.¹

¹ Gesch. A.
Hofer, 453,
456. Inglis'
Tyrol, ii.
223, 224.

Reflections
on this
event.

No event in the history of Napoleon has cast a darker stain on his memory, than this ungenerous slaughter of a brave and heroic antagonist. Admitting that the unutterable miseries of civil war sometimes render it indispensable for the laws of all countries to punish even the most elevated virtue, when enlisted on the side which ultimately is vanquished, with death, it can hardly be said that the resistance of the Tyrolese to the Bavarian yoke partook of that character. It was truly a national contest; the object in view was not to rise up in rebellion against a constituted government, but to restore a lost province to the Austrian monarchy.

The people had been forcibly transferred, only a few years before, against their will, from the paternal sway of their beloved Emperor to the rude oppression of a foreign throne : the dominion of four years could not obliterate the recollections of four centuries. In that very war, Napoleon had himself issued a proclamation, calling upon the Hungarians to throw off their allegiance to Austria, and re-assert, after its extinction for centuries, their national independence.* Hofer had never sworn allegiance to the French Emperor ; he had never held office under his government, nor tasted of his bounty ; yet what invectives have Napoleon and his panegyrists heaped upon the Bourbons in 1815, for visiting with severity the defection of the leaders of the French army, during the hundred days, who had done both ! If Ney was murdered, because, after swearing to bring back Napoleon in an iron cage, vanquished by old recollections, he gave the example, himself a marshal at the head of an army, of deserting the sovereign who had elevated him to its command ; what are we to say of Hofer, a simple mountaineer, who, without employment or command under Bavaria, merely strove to restore his country to the recollections and the ties of four centuries ? Even if his life had been clearly forfeited by the laws of war, a generous foe,

CHAP.
LVII.
1810.

* " Hungarians ! the moment has arrived to claim your independence. I offer you peace, the integrity of your territory, of your liberty, and constitutions. Your alliance with Austria has been the cause of all your misfortunes : you form the largest portion of its empire, and yet your dearest interests have always been sacrificed to the interests of the hereditary states. Resume, then, your rank as an independent nation ; choose a king who may permanently reside amongst you, who may be surrounded only by your citizens and soldiers. Hungarians ! this is what Europe demands, what I offer you."—*NAPOLEON'S Proclamation to the Hungarians, Vienna, 13th May, 1809 ; SCHÖELL. Hist. des Trait. ix. 245.*

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

won by his bravery, penetrated with his devotion, would only have seen in that circumstance an additional reason for sealing the glories of Wagram by an act of mercy, which would have won every noble bosom to his cause. But, though not destitute of humane emotions, Napoleon was steeled against every sentiment which had the semblance even of militating against reasons of state policy; and such was the force of his selfish feelings, that he was actuated by an indelible rancour towards all who in any degree thwarted his ambition. The execution of Hofer was the work of the same spirit, which, carrying its hostility beyond the grave, bequeathed a legacy to the assassin who had attempted the life of Wellington.

Adventures
of Haspinger
and Spech-
bacher.

Peter Mayer, having been tried at Botzen, was also shot, and behaved with equal heroism in his last moments. Haspinger, who put no faith either in the promises of pardon held out by Eugene or the visions of celestial succour declared by Kolb, a fanatic, who was mainly instrumental in exciting the last unhappy insurrection, succeeded, after a very long time, in escaping into Switzerland, by the way of St Gall and Einsiedlen, in the dress of a monk, from whence he succeeded, by cross paths through Friuli and Carinthia, in reaching Vienna, where he received protection from the Emperor. Spechbacher, after the unfortunate action at the pass of Strubs, where his son Andrew was made prisoner, was actively pursued by the Bavarians, who set a large price upon his head; and he was frequently obliged to shift his place of concealment to avoid discovery. He was at one time surrounded in a house by a party of Bavarian soldiers, who had been led to his retreat by a faithless wretch; but he escaped upon the roof, and, leaping thence, made his way into an adjoining forest, where

he was secreted nearly a month, and endured the utmost pangs of hunger. Wandering in this manner, he, by accident, met his wife and infant children, like him flying from persecution and death, and perishing of want and cold. They at length obtained a refuge in the house of a generous peasant, in the village of Volderberg, where they were concealed together several weeks ; but his retreat having been discovered, Spechbacher was obliged to fly to the higher mountains, where, on one of the summits of the Eisgletscherr, in a cavern discovered by him in former times when pursuing the chamois, he lay for several weeks in the depth of winter, supported by salt provisions, eaten raw, lest the smoke of a fire should betray his place of concealment to his pursuers.¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

¹ Barth.
438, 450.
Inglis' Ty-
rol, ii. 227,
230.

Happening one day, in the beginning of March, to walk to the entrance for a few minutes to enjoy the ascending sun, an avalanche, descending from the summit of the mountain above, swept him along with it down to the distance of half a mile on the slope beneath, and dislocated his hip-bone in the fall. Unable now to stand, surrounded only by ice and snow, tracked on every side by ruthless pursuers, his situation was, to all appearance, desperate ; but even then, the unconquerable energy of his mind and incorruptible fidelity of his friends saved him from destruction. Summoning up all his courage, he contrived to drag himself along the snow for several leagues during the night, to the village of Volderberg, where, to avoid discovery, he crept into the stable. His faithful friend gave him a kind reception, and carried him on his back to Rinn, where his wife and children were, and where his devoted domestic, George Zoppel, concealed him in a hole in the cow-house beneath where the cattle stood, though beyond the reach of their feet

Extraordi-
nary adven-
ture and
escape of
the latter.

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

where he was covered up with cow-dung and fodder, and remained for two months, till his leg was set and he was able to walk. The town was full of Bavarian troops; but this extraordinary place of concealment was never discovered, even when the Bavarian dragoons, as was frequently the case, were in the stable looking after their horses. Zoppel did not even inform Spechbacher's wife of her husband's return, lest her emotion or visits to the place might betray his place of concealment. At length, in the beginning of May, the Bavarian soldiers having left the house, Spechbacher was lifted from his living grave and restored to his wife and children. As soon as he was able to walk, he set out; and, journeying chiefly in the night, through the wildest and most secluded Alps, by Dux and the sources of the Salza, he passed the Styrian Alps, where he crossed the frontier and reached Vienna in safety. There he was soon after joined by his wife and children; and the Emperor's bounty provided both for them and Hofer's orphan family, with not undeserved munificence, till, on the restoration of the Tyrol to the House of Hapsburg, they returned to their native valleys, and Spechbacher died at Hall, in 1830, of a weakness in the chest, brought on by these unparalleled hardships. Little Andrew, then a man, who had been kindly treated at the court of Munich, was promoted to an official situation in Tyrol, under the Austrian government; but the widow and children of Hofer remained under their father's roof in the valley of Passeyr.¹

¹ Barth.
438, 474.
Inglis' Ty-
rol, ii. 227,
236.

Touching as is this record of simple virtue in the mountaineers of Tyrol, another event of still more surpassing interest, of yet more momentous conse-

quences, occurred in this eventful year. This was the dethronement and imprisonment of the Pope, and the annexation of the patrimony of St Peter and of the eternal city to the French empire. CHAP.
LVII.
1810.

When Pius VII, contrary to the usage of his predecessors, agreed to leave the Quirinal Hill and cross the Alps in the depth of winter to place the crown on the brows of the French Emperor, he naturally expected that some great and durable benefit would accrue to himself and his successors from the unwonted act of condescension. The flattering reception which he met with at Paris, the delicate attentions of all the functionaries of the Imperial palace, and the marked regard of the Emperor himself, confirmed these flattering illusions; and the papal suite returned into Italy charmed with their visit, and never doubting that, at the very least, the restoration of the three legations in Romagna, torn from the Holy See by the treaty of Tolentino in 1797, might with confidence be relied on.* M. Fontanes, the orator of government, had enlarged, in eloquent and touching terms, on the magnificent spectacle afforded by the reconversion of the first of European states to the Christian and Catholic faith. "When the conqueror of Marengo," said he, "conceived on the field of battle the design of re-establishing the unity of religion, and restoring to the French their ancient worship, he rescued civilisation from impending ruin. Day for ever memorable! dear alike to the wisdom of the statesman and the faith of the Christian. It was then that France, abjuring the greatest errors, gave the most useful lesson to the world. She recognised the eternal truth, that irreligious ideas are impolitic, and that every attempt against

Original
causes of
discontent
on the part
of the Pope
at Napo-
leon.

* Ante iii. 113.

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

Christianity is a stroke levelled at the best interests of humanity. Universal homage is due to the august Pontiff, who, renewing the virtues of the apostolic age, has consecrated the new destinies of the French empire, and clothed it with the lustre of the days of Clovis and Pepin. Every thing has changed around the Catholic faith, but it remains the same ! It beholds the rise and fall of empires ; but amidst their ruins, equally as their grandeur, it sees the working out of the divine administration. Never did the universe witness such a spectacle as is now exhibited : the days are past when the empire and the papacy were rival powers : cordially united, they now go hand in hand to arrest the fatal doctrines which have menaced Europe with a total subversion : may they yield to the combined influence of religion and wisdom !”¹

¹Artaud.
Hist. de Pio
VII. 1, 509,
and 504.

Dazzling
reception of
the Pope at
Paris in
1805.

It is not suprising that such a reception from the conqueror who had filled the world with his renown, and such a prospect of reconverting to its pristine faith the first of the European monarchies, should have dazzled the eyes not only of the Pope but of the whole conclave : but amidst the universal illusion, it did not escape, even at that time, the observation of some of the able statesmen who directed the cabinet of Rome, that, flattering as these attentions and expressions were, they were all general, and bore reference only to the *spiritual* extension of the Papal sway. Ardently as some temporal advantages were desired, both the Emperor and his diplomatists had carefully avoided holding out any distinct pledge, even the most indirect, of such concessions. Of this a painful proof was soon afforded.²

²Artaud,
ii. 252,
253.

Shortly after his return, however, Pius VII. transmitted a memorial to Napoleon, in which he enu-

merated the losses which the Holy See had sustained from the French government during the progress of the war, and strongly urged him to imitate the example of Charlemagne, and restore all their possessions. It was no part of the system of Napoleon to permit the Imperial eagles to recede from any territory which they had once occupied, and in a careful answer drawn by the Emperor himself, while he expressed boundless anxiety for the spiritual exaltation of the Holy See, and even admitted a desire, if "the occasion should offer," to augment his temporal advantages; yet he distinctly announced that this must not be expected from any interference with existing arrangements, or diminution of the territory of the kingdom of Italy, to which these acquisitions had been annexed." Repeated attempts were afterwards made by the Papal government to obtain some relaxation or concession in this particular; but they were always either eluded or met by a direct refusal.¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1810.

The Pope's request for the restitution of the three Marches is refused. Feb. 21, 1805. March 11.

¹ Pope Pius vii. to Nap. Feb. 21, and Nap. to Pius vii. March 11, 1805. Artaud, ii. 25, 33.

Still more decisive events speedily demonstrated that, amidst all Napoleon's professions of regard, which he really felt, for the spiritual authority of the successors of St Peter, he had no intention of adding to their territorial influence, or of treating them in any other way than as his own vassals, who in every part of their temporal administration were to take the law from the cabinet of the Tuilleries. In October, 1805, during the course of the Austrian war, the French troops seized upon Ancona, the most important fortress in the ecclesiastical dominions; and the remonstrances of the Pope against this violent invasion were not only entirely disregarded, but Napoleon, in reply, openly asserted the principle that he was Emperor of Rome, and the Pope was only his

Further encroachments of France on the Holy See

Nov. 13, 1805.

CHAP.
LVII.

1806.

Feb. 13,
1806.

March 12,
1806.

¹ Artaud, ii.
141. Bign.
vii. 137.

Unshaken
firmness of
the Pope.
June 11,
1806.

viceroy.* The haughty and disdainful terms of this letter, and the open announcement of an undisguised sovereignty over the Roman states, first opened the eyes of the benevolent Pontiff to the real intentions of the French Emperor: he returned an intrepid answer to the conqueror of Austerlitz, that he recognised no earthly potentate as his superior, and from that hour may be dated the hostility which grew up betwixt them.† Napoleon, so far from relaxing in any of his demands, was only the more aroused, by this unexpected opposition, to increased exactions from the Holy See: his troops spread over the whole Papal territory; Rome itself was surrounded by his battalions; and, within half-a-mile of the Quirinal palace, preparations were openly made for the siege of Gaeta.¹

Pius VII., however, was unshaken in his determination. "If they choose," said he, to M. Alquier, the French envoy, "to seize upon Rome, we shall make no resistance; but we shall refuse them the entry to the castle of St Angelo. All the important points of our territory have been successively occupied by their troops, and the collectors of our taxes can

* "All Italy must be subjected to my law: your situation requires that you should pay me the same respect in temporal which I do you in spiritual matters. Your holiness must cease to have any delicacy towards my enemies and those of the church. *You are Sovereign of Rome, but I am its Emperor*: all my enemies must be its enemies: no Sardinian, English, Russian, or Swedish envoy can be permitted to reside at your capital."—NAPOLÉON to PIUS VII., 13th Feb. 1806; ARTAUD, ii. 113–118; BIGNON, vii. 137.

† "Your Majesty," said Pius VII., "lays it down as a fundamental principle, that you are sovereign of Rome: the Supreme Pontiff recognises no such authority, nor any power superior in temporal matters to his own. There is no Emperor of Rome: it was not thus that Charlemagne treated our predecessors. The demand to dismiss the envoys of Russia, England, and Sweden, is positively refused: the Father of the Faithful is bound to remain at peace with all, without distinction of Catholics or heretics."—PIUS VII. to NAPOLÉON, 12th March, 1806; ARTAUD, ii. 121, 128.

no longer levy any imposts in the greater part of our territory, to provide for the contributions which have been imposed. We will make no resistance, but your soldiers will require to break open the gates with cannon-shot. Europe shall see how we are treated ; and we shall at least prove that we have acted in conformity to our honour and our conscience. If they take away our life, the tomb will do us honour, and we shall be justified in the eyes of God and man."¹

CHAP.
LVII.

1806.

¹ M. Al-

quier's

Letter,

June 13,

1806.

Artaud, ii.

141, 142,

and Bign.

vii. 137,

148.

The French minister soon after intimated, that, if the Pope continued on any terms with the enemies of France, the Emperor would be under the necessity of detaching the Duchy of Urbino, the March of Ancona, and the seacoast of Civita Vecchia, from the ecclesiastical territories ; but that he would greatly prefer remaining on amicable terms with his Holiness ; and with that view, he proposed, as the basis of a definitive arrangement between the two governments ;

1. " That the ports of his Holiness should be closed to the British flag, on all occasions when England was at war with France : 2. That the Papal fortresses should be occupied by the French troops, on all occasions when a foreign land force is debarked on or *menaces* the coasts of Italy." To these proposals, which amounted to a complete surrender of the shadow even of independence, the Pope returned a respectful but firm refusal, which concluded with these words : " His Majesty may, whenever he pleases, execute his menaces, and take from us whatever we possess. We are resigned to every thing, and shall never be so rash as to attempt resistance. Should he desire it, we shall instantly retire to a convent, or the catacombs of Rome, like the first successors of St Peter : but think not,¹ as long as we are intrusted with the

Further

demands of

France, and

refusal of

the Pope.

July 8,

1806.

Artaud, ii.

147, 151.

Bign. vii.

151.

CHAP. responsibility of power, to make us by menaces vio-
LVII. late its duties."

1806.

Renewed
mutual
irritations
after the
peace of
Tilsit.

Oct. 11.

Feb. 2,
1808.

¹ Letter of
M. Alquier,
Jan. 29,
1808. Bign.
vii. 176.
Artaud, ii.
178, 180.

The overwhelming interest of the campaign of Jena and Eylau, for a time suspended the attention of Napoleon from the affairs of Italy; but no sooner was he relieved by the peace of Tilsit from the weight of the Russian war, than he renewed his attempts to break down the resistance of the ecclesiastical government, and was peculiarly indignant at some hints which he had heard, that the Pope, if driven to extremities, might possibly launch against his head the thunders of the Vatican. A fresh negotiation was nevertheless opened; Napoleon insisting that the court of Rome should rigidly enforce the Berlin and Milan decrees in its dominions, shut the ports against the English flag, permit and maintain a permanent French garrison at Ancona, and allow the march of French columns through their territories. The Pope expressed his readiness to accede to these propositions, and submit to their immediate execution, except the actual declaration of war against England. But the Emperor had other designs; and mere adherence to the continental system was far from being now sufficient. On the 2d February, a large body of French troops entered Rome; which, ever after, continued to be occupied by their battalions. The formidable military force with which he was surrounded, had no effect in subduing the courage of the intrepid Pontiff. Calling in M. Alquier on the day of their arrival, he thus addressed him. "The Emperor insists on every thing, or nothing: you know to what articles proposed I will consent: I cannot subscribe the others. There shall be no military resistance: I will retire into the castle of St Angelo: ¹ not a shot shall be fired; but the Emperor will find it necessary

to break its gates. I will place myself at the entry ; the troops will require to pass over my body ; and the universe will know that he has trampled under foot him whom the Almighty has anointed. God will do the rest."*

CHAP.
LVII.
1808.

Insults and injuries continued to be heaped upon the head of the devoted Pontiff. The French troops did not, indeed, blow open the gates of the Quirinal palace ; but the entire government of his dominions was taken from him. Soon after, the Papal governor of Rome, an intrepid man, Signor Cavalchini, was seized and carried off by the French troops, and the military government of the capital was confided to the Imperial General Miollis ; the Papal troops were informed, in a letter from Eugene Beauharnois, that he "congratulated them upon their emancipation from the rule of priests ; that the Italian soldiers are now commanded by men who can lead them into fire ; and that they are no longer obliged to receive the commands of women or monks." Champagne officially intimated to the Papal government "that the French troops would remain at Rome until the Holy Father had consented to join the general

Entire
assumption
of the go-
vernment
by the
French.
April 2.
March 16.

Feb. 13,
1808.

"What," said Napoleon, in a confidential letter to Eugene Beauharnois at that period, "does Pius VII. mean by his threats of denouncing me to Christendom? Does he mean to excommunicate me? Does he *suppose the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers?* Would he put a poignard in the hands of my people to murder me? The Pope has taken the trouble to come to Paris to crown me; in that step I recognise the spirit of a true prelate ; but he expected in return to get the three legations from the kingdom of Italy ; but that I would not consent to. The Pope at present is too powerful : priests are not made to govern. The rights of the tiara consist only in humiliation and prayer. I hold my crown from God and my people ; I will always be Charlemagne to the court of Rome, and never Louis the Debonnaire. Jesus Christ has not instituted a pilgrimage to Rome, as Mahomet has to Mecca."—*Confidential Letter, NAPOLEON to EUGENE, 22d July, 1807.* ARTAUD, ii. 166, 167 ; and BIGNON, vii. 159, 160.

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1808.

April 2.

¹ Bign. vii.

172, 179.

Artaud, ii.

179, 182.

league, offensive and defensive, with Napoleon and the King of Naples ;” while, by an Imperial decree shortly after, the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino, about a third of the ecclesiastical territories, were declared to be irrevocably united to the kingdom of Italy.¹

Violent as these aggressions were, they were but the prelude to others still more serious. The Pope was confined a prisoner to his own palace. French guards occupied all parts of the capital ; the administration of posts, the control of the press, were assumed by their authorities ; the taxes were levied for their behoof, and those imposed by the Papal government of its own authority annulled ; the Papal troops were incorporated with the French, and the Roman officers dismissed. The Pontiff continued, under these multiplied injuries, to evince the same patience and resignation ; firmly protesting, both to Napoleon and the other European powers, against these usurpations, but making no attempt to resist them, and sedulously enjoining both his clergy and people to obey the intruded authority without opposition. CARDINAL PACCA, who was appointed secretary of state on the 18th June, was a prelate of powerful abilities, and that intrepid but discerning character which, disdaining all minor methods of resistance, aimed at bringing the great contest between the throne and the tiara at once to an issue on the most advantageous ground. He became, on this account, in an especial manner, obnoxious to the Emperor ; and, an attempt having been made by the French officers to carry him off and banish him from Rome, to detach the Pope from his energetic and manly councils, his holiness, with great expressions of indignation, took him into his own apartments. They were more

French out-
rages, and
confinement
of the Pope
to his
palace.

June 18.

Sept. 6.

successful, however, in their attempt on Cardinal Antonelli, who was on the same day arrested by a sergeant and eight grenadiers, and instantly sent out of the ecclesiastical territories ; while a cordon of sentinels was stationed round the Quirinal, and no one allowed to pass out or in without being strictly examined. The head of the faithful was no longer anything but a prisoner in his own palace ; but all Napoleon's efforts to overcome his constancy were unavailing. More courageous and better advised than the Bourbon princes of Spain, the venerable Pontiff remained proof alike against the menaces and the wiles of the Imperial authorities ; no resignation could be extorted from him ; and, without ever crossing the threshold of his apartments, he calmly awaited the decree which was to consign him to destruction.¹

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LVII.
1809.

¹ Cardinal
Pacca, i.
347, 351.
Artaud, ii.
196, 202.
Bign. vii.
183, 189.

The last act of violence at length arrived. On the 17th May, a decree was issued from the French camp at Schoenbrunn, which declared "that the states of the Pope are united to the French empire ; the city of Rome, so interesting from its recollections, and the first seat of Christianity, is declared an Imperial and free city ;" and that these changes should take effect on the 1st June following. On the 10th June, these decrees were announced by the discharge of artillery from the castle of St Angelo, and the hoisting of the tricolor flag on its walls, instead of the venerable Pontifical standard. "Consummatum est !" exclaimed Cardinal Pacca and the Pope at the same instant ; and immediately, having obtained a copy of the decree, which the dethroned Pontiff read with calmness, he authorized the publication of a BULL OF EXCOMMUNICATION against Napoleon and all concerned in that spoliation, which, in anti-

Annexation
of the Ro-
man States
to the
French
Empire.
Excommu-
nication of
Napoleon.
June 10,
1809.

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LVII.

1809.

cipation of such an event, had been some time before prepared by the secret council of the Vatican. Early on the following morning, this bull was affixed on all the usual places, particularly on the churches of St Peter's, Santa Maria Maggiore, and St John, with such secrecy as to be without the knowledge or suspicion of the police. It was torn down as soon as discovered, and taken to General Miollis, who forthwith forwarded it to the Emperor at his camp at Vienna. The Pope expressed great anxiety, that care should be taken, to conceal the persons engaged in printing and affixing on the churches this bull, as certain death awaited them if they were discovered by the French authorities; but he had no fears whatever for himself. On the contrary, he not only signed it with his name, but had transcribed the whole document, which was of great length, with his own hand, lest any other person should be involved, by the hand-writing, in the vengeance of the French Emperor.¹

¹Artaud, ii.
202, 209.
See Bull. in
Pacca, i.
355, 372.
Bign. viii.
279.

Views of
Napoleon in
regard to
the Pope,
and his
transference
to Paris.

²Artaud, ii.
170.

Napoleon was not prepared for so vigorous an act on the part of the council of the Vatican. He received accounts of it at Vienna, shortly before the battle of Wagram, and immediately resolved on the most decisive measures. For long he had meditated the transference of the seat of the Popedom to Paris, and the acquisition, to his authority, of the immense influence to be derived from a personal control over the head of the Church. He had been much struck by an expression of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth: "I experience no difficulty in affairs of religion: I am the head of my own church."² Deeming it impossible, however, in modern Europe, to accomplish such a union directly, or place the Pontifical tiara openly on the same brows as the Em-

peror's crown, he conceived the design of accomplishing the object indirectly, by procuring the transference of the residence of the Pope to Paris, and the incorporation of all his possessions with the Imperial dominions; so that, both by reason of local position and entire dependence for income, he should be under the influence of the French Emperor. By this policy, which, in his view, was truly a master-stroke, he hoped to do more than could have been accomplished by the entire extinction of the Papal authority. He did not intend the destruction of a rival power, but the addition of its influence to himself;* while the annexation of the ecclesiastical states to the French empire in effect rendered its sway irresistible over all parts of the Italian peninsula.¹

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LVII.

1809.

¹ Cardinal
Pacca, ii.
14, 15.
Nap. in Las
Cases, v.
262. Bot.
iv. 347,
348.

Accidental circumstances, however, precipitated matters more quickly than Napoleon intended, and gave him possession of the person of the Pope within a few days after the publication of the bull of excommunication. Measures of the last severity had been taken in vain; the palace of the Quirinal

Arrest of
the Pope by
Radet.
July 5.

* "By keeping the Pope at Paris," said Napoleon, "and annexing the Roman states to my dominions, I had obtained the important object of separating his temporal from his spiritual authority; and, having done so, I would have elevated him beyond measure: I would have surrounded him with pomp and homages; I would have caused him no longer to regret his temporal authority; I would have rendered him an idol: *he should have had his residence near my person.* Paris would have become the capital of the Christian world: *I would have directed the religious world as well as the political.* It was an additional means of uniting all the parts of the empire, and keeping in peace whatever was beyond it. I would have had *my religious sessions* as well as legislative: *my council* would have been the assembly of the representatives of Christianity; *the Popes would have been nothing but its presidents*: I would have opened and closed these assemblies, approved and published their decisions, as Constantine and Charlemagne did. That emancipation of the Church from the court of Rome, that union of the spiritual and temporal powers in the hands of one sovereign, had been long the object of my meditations and wishes."—LAS CASES, v. 262, 264.

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LVII.

1809.

July 4.

July 5.

1 Radet.
Narrative
de l'Enlev.
de Pie VII.
7, 9.

Artaud, ii.
214, 217.
Pacca, i.
122, 123.

was surrounded with soldiers, a battery of forty pieces of cannon was established directly opposite its gates; but still the spirit of the illustrious captives was unsubdued, and no indication of a disposition to recall the fulminating decree had appeared. Miollis deemed the state of matters so alarming in the beginning of July, that he entered into communication with Murat at Naples, and their united opinion was, that it was indispensable to get immediate possession of the Pope's person, and remove him into France. In pursuance of this determination, which, though not expressly known to or authorized by the Emperor, was doubtless in conformity with his prior instructions, and known to be agreeable to his wishes, Miollis sent for General Radet on the 4th July, and communicated to him his design of carrying off the Pope, and intrusting the execution of the delicate task to him. Radet, albeit, horror-struck with the task thus imposed upon him, knew his duty too well to hesitate in obeying his instructions; a strong battalion of troops arrived on the following day from Naples, and the military dispositions were quickly completed. At ten at night on the 5th, the Quirinal was surrounded by three regiments; thirty men escaladed the walls of the garden in profound silence, and took post under the windows of the palace; fifty more succeeded in effecting an entrance by the window of an uninhabited room, and, having dispersed some groups of domestics, who, on the first alarm, hastily assembled together, the gates were thrown open, and Radet entered at the head of his troops, who were ordered "to arrest the Pope and Cardinal Pacca, and conduct them immediately out of Rome."¹

Though the assembly of the troops took place on

the preceding night, it was not till six o'clock on the following morning that the entry of the palace itself took place. The Pope and Cardinal Pacca were awakened by the strokes of the hatchets which broke down the interior doors, and both instantly rising, perceived from the tumult in the court, glitter of arms, and troops in all quarters, that the French had effected an entrance into the palace. The holy father expected immediate death ; he called for the ring which his predecessor Pius VI. had worn when dying, the gift of Queen Clotilda ; and, putting it on his finger, looked at it with calm satisfaction. To prevent further violence, the doors were thrown open, and Radet with his officers and gendarmes entered the apartment, where the Pope stood between Cardinal Pacca, Cardinal Despuig, and a few other faithful prelates. Radet then, in a respectful manner, pale and trembling with emotion, announced to his Holiness that he was charged with a painful duty ; but that he was obliged to declare to him, that he must renounce the temporal sovereignty of Rome and the ecclesiastical states, and that, if he refused, he must conduct him to General Miollis, who would assign him his ulterior place of destination. The Pope, without agitation, replied that if the obligations of a soldier required of him such a duty, those of a pontiff imposed on him others still more sacred ; that the Emperor might “ cut him in pieces, but would never extract from him such a resignation, which he neither could, nor ought, nor would subscribe.” Radet then ordered him to prepare for immediate departure, intimating that Cardinal Pacca might accompany him on the journey. The Pontiff immediately complied ; and the French general having assured him that nothing in his palace should be violated, he said, with a smile, “ He who

CHAP.
LVII.
1809.

Particulars
of his
seizure.

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LVII.

1809.

¹ Pacca, i.
123, 129.
Radet, 12,
42. Artaud,
ii. 218,
229.

The Pope
is conducted
to Grenoble,
and Cardi-
nal Pacca
to the
castle of
Fenestrelles.

makes light of his own life, is not likely to be disquieted for the loss of his effects." Their preparations having been quickly made, the Pontiff took his place in the carriage with Cardinal Pacca by his side, and, escorted by a powerful body of French cavalry, soon passed the Porta del Popolo, and emerged into the open and desert Campagna. "Cardinal," said the Pope, "we did well to publish the bull of excommunication on the 10th, or how could it have been done now?" At the first post-house he wished to give some charity to a poor person; but, upon enquiry of Cardinal Pacca, he found that between them they had only a papetto, or tenpence. He showed it, smilingly, to Radet, saying, "Behold, general, all that we possess of our principality!"¹

The Pope was conducted with all possible expedition by Radicofani and Sienna to Florence. During the journey, as nothing was prepared, the illustrious prisoners underwent great privations; and, after nineteen hours of uninterrupted travelling, in the hottest weather, they reached the first of those towns, where a frugal repast and miserable bed awaited them; and at midnight following they arrived at the Chartreuse of Florence. From thence their journey was continued more leisurely to Alexandria, which they reached on the 15th. More than once in the course of the journey, the Pope and Cardinal Doria were obliged to exert their influence with the peasants to prevent a forcible attempt at rescue, which the rural crowds, indignant at this scandalous treatment of the head of the Church, were preparing to make. Before leaving Rome, a well-conceived project had been secretly communicated to Pius VII. for delivering him from his oppressors, and securing his escape on board an English frigate, which was

cruising for that purpose off Civita Vecchia ; but he refused on any account to leave his post. At Florence he was separated from Cardinal Pacca, who was conducted by a separate route to Grenoble, and soon after, by a special order from Napoleon, transferred to the state prison of Fenestrelles in Savoy, where, amidst Alpine snows, he was confined to a dungeon a close prisoner till the beginning of 1813, when the Emperor, after the disasters of the Moscow campaign, finding it for his interest to conciliate the Pope, the cardinal was liberated, and joined his captive master at Fontainebleau. The Pope himself was hurried across the Alps by Mont Cenis ; but, as he approached France, the enthusiasm of the people redoubled ; insomuch that, when he reached Grenoble, his *cortége* had rather the appearance of a beloved sovereign who was returning to his dominions, than of a captive pontiff who was on his way to confinement in a foreign land. By a singular coincidence, the enfeebled remnant of the heroic garrison of Saragossa were at that period in Grenoble ; they hastened in crowds to meet their distressed father, and, when his carriage appeared in sight, fell on their knees as one man, and received his earnest benediction. A captive pope inspired to these captive heroes a respect, which they would never have felt for the mighty conqueror who had enthralled them both ! Such, in generous and uncorrupted minds, is the superiority which religion bestows to all the calamities of life.¹

Napoleon has protested at St Helena, and apparently with truth, that he was not privy to the actual seizure of the Pope ; and that, when he first received the intelligence, he was at a loss what to do with his august captive.¹ But it required no argu-

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Aug. 3.

Jan. 30,
1813.

July 21.

¹ Pacca, i.
167, 183.
Artaud, ii.
241, 245.¹ Nap. in
Las Cases,
v. 261.
Month. i.
130.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Napoleon
approves of
the Pope's
seizure.

June 9,
1813.

¹ Sav. iv.
131. Ar-
taud, ii.
285, 368.
Nap. v.
261, 262.
Bign. viii.
286, 288.
Jan. 23,
1814.

ment to show, that neither Miollis nor Radet would have ventured on such a step unless they had been well assured that it would be conformable, if not to the formal instructions, at least to the secret wishes of the Emperor ; and he soon gave convincing proof of that, “ for as soon as he received advices of the event,” says Savary, “ he *approved of what had been done*, and stationed the Pope at Savona, revoking, at the same time, the gift of Charlemagne, and annexing the Papal states to the French Empire.” * His Holiness remained at Savona for above three years, always under restraint and guarded, though not in prison ; but Napoleon, after the Moscow campaign, having received intelligence that a squadron of English frigates was cruising in the Gulf of Lyons, with the design of facilitating his escape, had him removed to Fontainebleau, where he was detained a prisoner till the return of the Emperor from the disaster of Leipsic, when his necessities gave rise to important negotiations with the aged prisoner, which will form the subject of future consideration. Canova, who had been sent for to Paris by Napoleon to model the colossal statue which is now to be seen on the staircase of Apsley House, interceded energetically in his behalf ; but he could obtain no remission of the severe sentence ; the Emperor alleging, as insurmountable charges against him, that “ he was a German at heart, and had refused to banish the Russians and English.”¹ So tenaciously did he hold by his prey, that not even

* “ It is of little moment,” says Thibaudeau, “ whether Napoleon ordered the seizure of the Pope ; he did not disapprove of it, he profited by it, and took upon himself its whole responsibility. His alleged discontent at Schoenbrunn, when he received intelligence of the event, proves nothing ; it might be part of his views, to make it be believed it was done without his authority, and that he only undertook the scandal of the transaction because it was irreparable.” — THIBAudeau, vii. 507,

the horrors of the Russian retreat could make him relax it; he kept it firm during the campaign of Leipzig; and nothing but the crossing of the Rhine by the allied armies in spring, 1814, procured the liberation of the captive Pontiff.

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LVII.
1809.

The situation of the city of Rome was unquestionably improved by its transference from the drowsy sway of the Church to the energetic administration of Napoleon. Shortly after the annexation of the Roman states to the French empire, it was declared the second city in the empire. To a deputation from Rome, shortly after its incorporation with the French empire, Napoleon replied, "My mind is full of the recollections of your ancestors. The first time that I pass the Alps I desire to remain some time among you. The French Emperors, my predecessors, had detached you from the territory of the empire; but the good of my people no longer permits such a partition: France and Italy must be governed by the same system. You have need of a powerful hand to direct you. I shall have a singular pleasure in being your benefactor. Your Bishop is the spiritual head of the Church, as I am its Emperor: I 'render unto God the things that are God's, and unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's.'" The official exposition of the state of the empire at the close of the year, portrayed in vivid colours the advantages which would arise from the government of all Italy under one system, and proclaimed the fixed determination of the Emperor never to infringe upon the spiritual authority, nor ever to permit again the temporal sovereignty of the Church. In pursuance of these views, the Roman territory incorporated with the empire was speedily subjected to the whole regulations of the Imperial regime;

Thorough
fusion of the
Roman
states with
the French
empire.

Dec. 12.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Thib. vii.
512, 520.

the code Napoleon, the conscription, the continental system, were introduced in their full vigour ; préfets and sous préfets were established, and the taxes, levied according to French principles, carried to the credit of the Imperial budget.¹

Prejudicial
effect of this
measure on
the inde-
pendence of
the Church.

Bossuet has assigned the reason, with his usual elevation of thought, why this spoliation of all the possessions of the Supreme Pontiff, by a secular power, ever must be prejudicial to the best interests of religion. "God had chosen," says he, "that the Church, the common mother of all nations, should be independent of all in its temporal affairs, and that the common centre to which all the faithful should look for the unity of their faith, should be placed in a situation above the partialities which the different interests and jealousies of states might occasion. The Church, independent in its head of all temporal powers, finds itself in a situation to exercise more freely, for the common good and protection of Christian Kings, its celestial power of ruling the mind, when it holds in the right hand the balance, even amidst so many empires, often in a state of hostility ; it maintains unity in all its parts, sometimes by inflexible decrees, sometimes by sage concessions." The principle which calls for the independence of the head of the Church from all temporal sovereignties, is the same which requires the emancipation of its subordinate ministers from the contributions of their flocks. Human nature in every rank is the same ; the thraldom of vice and passion is felt alike in the cottage as on the throne ; the subjection of the Supreme Pontiff to the direct control of France or Austria, is as fatal to his character and respectability, as the control of the rural congregations is to the utility of the village pastor. Admitting that the court of Rome has not

always shown itself free from tramontane influence, it has at least been less swayed than if it had had its residence at Vienna or Paris; supposing that the conclave of the cardinals has often been swayed by selfish or ambitious views, it has been much less exposed to their effects than if it had been wholly dependent on external potentates for support. Equity in judgment, whether in temporal or spiritual matters, can never be attained but by those who are independent of those to whom the judgment is to be applied; coercion of vice, whether in exalted or humble stations, can never be effected by those who depend upon that vice for their support; the due direction of thought can never be given but by those who are not constrained to bend to the thoughts of others. It will ever be the great object of tyranny, whether regal or democratic, to beat down this central independent authority; to render the censors of morals subservient to the dominant power; and, under the specious pretence of emancipating mankind from spiritual shackles, in effect to subject them to a far more grievous temporal oppression.

But, whatever effects the dethronement and captivity of the Pope were likely to have produced, if they had continued long, on the independence and usefulness of the Church, the immediate effects of the change were in the highest degree beneficial on the city of Rome. Vast was the difference between the slumber of the cardinals and the energetic measures of Napoleon. Improvements, interesting alike to the antiquary and the citizen, were undertaken in every direction. The majestic monuments of ancient Rome, half concealed by the ruins and accumulations of fourteen hundred years, stood forth in renovated splendour; the stately columns of the temple of

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Vast and
admirable
works un-
dertaken by
the French
at Rome.

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

Jupiter Tonans, relieved of the load of their displaced architrave, were restored to the perpendicular from which they had swerved during their long decay; the beautiful pillars of that of Jupiter Stator, half covered up with fragments of marbles, revealed their exquisite and now fully discovered proportions; the huge interior of the Colyseum, cleared of the rubbish which obstructed its base, again exhibited its wonders to the light; the channels which conducted the water for the aquatic exhibitions, the iron gates which were opened to admit the hundreds of lions to the amphitheatre, the dens where their natural ferocity was augmented by artificial stimulants, the bronze rings to which the Christian martyrs were chained, again appeared to the wondering populace;* the houses which deformed the centre of the Forum were cleared away; and, piercing through a covering of eighteen feet in thickness, the labours of the workmen at length revealed the pavement of the ancient Forum, the venerable blocks of the Via Sacra, still furrowed by the chariot-wheel marks of a hundred triumphs. Similar excavations at the foot of the pillar of Trajan, disclosed the graceful peristyle of columns with which it had been surrounded, and again exhibited fresh, after an interment of a thousand years, the delicate tints of its giallo antico pillars and pavement. Nor were more distant quarters or modern interests neglected. The temple of Vesta, near

* The interior of the Colyseum has been again filled up by the Papal government, in order to facilitate access to the numerous chapels with which it is encircled; but the highly curious and interesting structures which were brought to light by the French excavations, may be seen faithfully portrayed in several views of Rome, particularly one very interesting plate in Rossini's "Antichite Romane;" a work which, without the inimitable force and grandeur of Piranisi's, is incomparably more accurate, and gives the best idea of the Roman ruins which is any where to be met with.—*Personal Observation.*

the Tiber, was cleared out; a hundred workmen under the direction of Canova, prosecuted their searches in the baths of Titus, where the Laocoon had been discovered; large sums were expended on the Quirinal palace, destined for the residence of the Imperial family when at Rome. Severe laws, and an impartial execution of them, speedily repressed the hideous practice of private assassination, so long the disgrace of the Papal states: a double row of shady trees led from the Arch of Constantine to the Appian Way, and thence to the Forum; surveys were made with a view to the completion of the long neglected drainage of the Pontine Marshes; and preparations commenced for turning aside, for a season, the course of the Tiber, and discovering in its bed the inestimable treasures of art, which were thrown into it during the terrors of the Gothic invasion.¹

CHAP.
LVII.
1809.

¹ Thib. viii.
429, 431.
Bign. ix.
382, 383.
Bot. iv. 25.

“What does the Pope mean,” said Napoleon to Eugene, in July, 1807, “by the threat of excommunicating me? Does he think the world has gone back a thousand years? *Does he suppose the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers?*”^{*} Within two years after these remarkable words were written, the Pope did excommunicate him, in return for the confiscation of his whole dominions; and in less than four years more, the arms *did fall from the hands of his soldiers*;† and the hosts, apparently invincible, which he had collected, were dispersed and ruined by the blasts of winter: he extorted

Reflections
on the spo-
liation of
the Pope, as
connected
with Napo-
leon's subse-
quent re-
verses

^{*} Ante, vii. 605, note.

† “The weapons of the soldiers,” says Segur, in describing the Russian retreat, “appeared of an insupportable weight to their stiffened arms. During their frequent falls, they *fell from their hands*; and destitute of the power of raising them from the ground, they were left in the snow. They did not throw them away; *famine and cold tore them from their grasp*. The fingers of many were frozen on the muskets which

CHAP.
LVII.

1809.

¹ Pacca, i.
283.

from the Supreme Pontiff at Fontainebleau, in 1813, by the terrors and exhaustion of a long captivity, a renunciation of the rights of the Church over the Roman states; and within a year after, he himself was compelled, *at Fontainebleau*, to sign the abdication of all his dominions: he consigned Cardinal Pacca and several other prelates, the courageous counsellors of the bull of excommunication, to a dreary imprisonment of four years amidst the snows of the Alps; and he himself was shortly after doomed to a painful exile of six on the rock of St Helena!¹ There is something in these marvellous coincidences beyond the operations of chance, and which even a Protestant historian feels himself bound to mark for the observation of future ages. The world had not gone back a thousand years, but that Being existed, with whom a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. And, without ascribing any deviation from ordinary laws to these events, or supposing that the common Father, “who sees with equal eye, as Lord of all,” the varied modes of worship of his different creatures, had interposed in a peculiar manner in favour of any particular church, we may, without presumption, rest in the humble belief, that the laws of the moral world are of universal application; that there are limits to the oppression of virtue even in this scene of trial; and that, when a power, elevated on the ascendancy of passion and crime, has gone such a

they yet carried, and their hands deprived of the circulation necessary to sustain the weight.”—SEGUR, ii. 182.

“The soldiers could no longer hold their weapons; they fell from the hands even of the bravest and most robust.—The muskets dropped from the frozen arms of those who bore them.”—SALGUES. *Memoires pour Generale Histoire de France sous NAPOLEON*, vol. xx., c. 5.

length as to outrage alike the principles of justice and the religious feelings of a whole quarter of the globe, the period is not far distant when the aroused indignation of mankind will bring about its punishment.

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CHAPTER LVIII.

MARITIME WAR, AND CAMPAIGN OF 1809 IN PORTUGAL
AND SPAIN.

ARGUMENT.

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Comparative Military Power of France and England at this period—Noble Spirit which prevailed at this time in the British Diplomatic Engagements—Rejection of the Proposals from Erfurth—Treaty, Offensive and Defensive, between England and Spain—And with Sweden—Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey—Desponding Views on the Peninsular Contest which generally prevailed at this time in Great Britain—Argument of the Opposition against the Spanish War—Argument in support of the War by Ministers—Result of the Debate—Lights which these Discussions threw on the real Errors of the Campaign—The Government resolve to Support the Spanish War, and Sir A. Wellesley is sent out to Lisbon—Measures adopted to increase the Land Forces—Budget, and Naval and Military Forces of Great Britain—French Expedition sails from Brest for Basque Roads—Position of the French in Basque Roads—An Attack with Fire-ships is resolved on by the English—Preparations on both sides for the Attack and Defence—Dreadful Nocturnal Attack, and Destruction of the French Fleet—Attack of the Ships ashore, and Destruction of part of them—Proceedings which followed in England—Character of Lord Cochrane—Capture of Martinique and St Domingo, in the West Indies—And of the Isle of Bourbon in the East—Reduction of the Seven Ionian Islands by Lord Collingwood and a Land Force—Fruitless Expedition of Sir John Stuart against the Coast of Naples—Brilliant Naval Success of Lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean—State of Affairs in Portugal at this period, and forces of the Allies there—And in Spain—Forces and Distribution of the French in Spain—Effect in the Peninsula of the English resolution to defend Portugal and stand by Spain—Arrangements for the Siege of Saragossa—Preparations which had been made for the Defence of the place—Preparatory Dispositions of Palafox—Forces of the Besiegers, and Forces at their disposal, before the trenches were opened—Assault and Fall of all the external Fortified Posts—Storming of the Convents of Santa Eufracia and the Capuchins on the Ramparts—Obstinate Defence of the Town, after the Walls were taken—Slow Progress of the assailants—Miseries to which the besieged were exposed from Pestilence—Able Efforts and Successes of Marshal Lannes on the Left of the Ebro—Capitulation of the place—Cruel use which the French generals made of their Victory—Submission of the whole of Arragon—Winter Operations in Catalonia, under St Cyr—Siege of Rosas—Battle of Cardadeu, and Relief of Barcelona—Defeat of the Spaniards at Molinos del Rey—Reding's Plan for a general Attack on St Cyr, with the whole Forces of the Province, to open the way to Saragossa—Defeat of the Spaniards at Igualada—Languid Operations in Catalonia, after this success, and Retreat of St Cyr to the

north of the Province—Unsuccessful Attempt on Barcelona—Renewal of the Contest by Blake in Arragon—Suchet takes the Command in that province—His Character—His Defeat at Alcanitz—Approach of Blake to Saragossa—His Repulse at Maria near that town—And disgraceful Rout at Belchité—Preparations of St Cyr for the Siege of Gerona—Unfortunate Supply of Barcelona with Stores by Sea, and its Effect on the Campaign in Catalonia—Preparations of the Besieged—Progress of the Siege—Heroic Constancy of the garrison—Obstinate Conflicts of which it was the theatre—Efforts of the Spaniards for its Relief—Fall of Monjuic—Extreme Distress of the Besieged from want of Provisions—Their honourable Capitulation—Termination of the Campaign in Catalonia, and Aspect of the Contest in that quarter at that period—State of Galicia and Asturias, after the Embarkation of the English from Corunna—Advance of Sir R. Wilson to Ciudad Rodrigo—Ney's Expedition into Asturias, and Successes there—Sault's Preparations for an Invasion of Portugal—His Progress through Trasl-os-Montes—Bloody Action before Oporto—Fall of that place—First Measures of Sir Arthur Wellesley on Landing in Portugal—Marches against Soult—Passage of the Douro, and Defeat of the French—Soult's hazardous Situation, and disastrous Retreat—Escape into Galicia—Sir Arthur Returns to the Frontier of Estremadura—Plan of a Combined Movement on Madrid—Forces of Cuesta, and the Army of La Mancha at this Period—Advance of the British into Spain—Preparations and Forces of the French generals—Description of the Position of Talavera—Bloody Action on the 27th July—Desperate Battle on the 28th—Imminent Danger of the British—And their heroic Valour—Final Victory—Reflections on this Event—March of Soult, Ney, and Mortier into Sir Arthur's Rear—His Plan to resist the Attack—Cuesta abandons Talavera and the English Wounded—Imminent Hazard and skilful Retreat of the English—Losses sustained by them in this Campaign—They Retire into Portugal—Advance of Vanegas in La Mancha—His total Defeat at Ocana—Cuesta's Measures in Estremadura—His Overthrow at Medellin—Disastrous State of the Spanish Affairs at this period—Reflections on the Campaign—Immense Forces developed by England in different parts of the World during its Continuance—Comparison with what it was at the Commencement of the War, and what it has since become—Causes of the remarkable Diminution of the National Force in later times—Its probable Effect on the future Fate of England.

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ALTHOUGH the military power of France and England had never been fairly brought into collision since the commencement of the contest, and both the government and the nation were, to a degree which is now almost inconceivable, ignorant alike of the principles of war with land troops, and the magnitude of the resources for such a conflict which were at their disposal; yet the forces of the contending parties, when a battle-field was at last found, were, in reality, much more equally balanced than was

Comparative military power of France and England at this period.

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commonly imagined. France, indeed, had conquered all the states of continental Europe, and her armies were surrounded with a halo of success, which rendered them invincible to the hostility of present power; but England and she were ancient rivals, and the lustre of former renown shone, dimly indeed, but perceptibly, through the blaze of present victory. It was in vain that the conquest of all the armies, and the capture of almost all the capitals of Europe was referred to by their old antagonists; the English rested on the battles of Cressy and Azincourt, and calmly pointed to the imperishable inheritance of historic glory. Their soldiers, their citizens, were alike penetrated with these recollections; the belief of the natural superiority of the English to the French, in a fair field, was impressed on the humblest sentinel of the army; the exploits of the Edwards and the Henrys of ancient times, burned in the hearts of the officers and animated the spirit of the people. The universal arming of all classes, under the danger of Napoleon's invasion, had spread, to an extent of which the continental nations were wholly unaware, the military spirit throughout the realm; while the recent campaigns of the army in India had trained a number of officers to daring exploits, habituated them to the difficulties of actual service, and roused again, in the ranks of the privates, that confidence in themselves which is the surest forerunner of victory. The French journals spoke contemptuously of the British conquests in the East, and anxiously invoked the time when "this general of Sepoys" should measure his strength with the marshals of the empire; but this feeling of security, as is generally the case, when not derived from experience, was founded on ignorance; the chief who had fronted the dangers of Assaye, was not likely to quail

before the terrors of more equal encounter, and the men who had mounted the breach of Seringapatam or faced the cannonade of Laswaree, had no reason to distrust themselves in the most perilous fields of European warfare.

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If the occasional faulty direction of the national resources when the land contest began, and above all, the total ignorance of the value of time in war which universally prevailed, frequently led the British forces into disaster, and rendered abortive their greatest enterprises; the firmness with which the contest was still persevered in by the government and people, the noble spirit which dictated their national engagements, are worthy of the very highest admiration. Shortly after the Peninsular contest broke out, and when it was still rather a tumultuary insurrection than a regular warfare, proposals of peace were addressed by Alexander and Napoleon, from the place of conference at Erfurth. The basis of this proposition was the principle of *uti possidetis*, and it received additional lustre from being signed by both these illustrious potentates, and acknowledging the very principles for which Great Britain herself had formerly contended. In answer to this communication, Mr Canning, the British minister for foreign affairs, stated, " he would hasten to communicate to his allies, the King of Sweden and *the existing government of Spain*, the proposals which have been made to him. Your Excellency will perceive that it is absolutely necessary that his Majesty should receive an immediate assurance that France acknowledges the government of Spain as party to any negotiation. With Portugal and Sweden, Great Britain has long had the closest ties; the interests of Sicily are confided to his care; and though he is not

Noble spirit
which pre-
vailed at
this time
in the Bri-
tish diplo-
matic en-
gagements.
Rejection of
the propo-
sals from
Erfurth.
Oct. 12,
1808.

Oct. 22.

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Dec. 15,
1808.

¹ Parl.
Deb. xii.
93, 105.

Treaty
offensive
and defen-
sive between
England
and Spain.
Jan. 14,
1809.

as yet bound to Spain by any formal instrument, he has, in the face of the world, contracted engagements not less binding and sacred than the most solemn treaties." To this it was replied by Russia and France, that "they had no difficulty in at once admitting the sovereigns in alliance with England to a congress, but that they could not admit the Spanish insurgents. The Russian empire has always acted on this principle; and its Emperor is now, in an especial manner, called to adhere to it, as he has already acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain."* This answer broke off the negotiation, and the King of England soon after issued a declaration in which he announced the rupture of the correspondence, and lamented the adherence of the allied sovereigns to the determination not to treat with the Spanish nation, as the cause of its failure.¹

The gallant determination thus expressed by the British government, to admit of no conferences to which the Spanish nation was not admitted as a party, was soon after put to a still more serious trial. Negotiations had for some time been pending for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between England and the Spanish government, which had been commenced as soon as the formation of the Central Junta offered any responsible party with whom such an engagement could be formed; and they were persisted in with unshaken constancy by the British cabinet, notwithstanding all the disasters which, in the close of the campaign, had befallen the Spanish armies, and the capture of their capital by the forces of Napoleon. At length, on the 14th January, Mr Canning had the satisfaction of signing a treaty of peace and alliance between the two states, by which it was

* See note A.

stipulated that the "King of England shall assist to the utmost of his power the Spanish nation in their struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France, and promises not to acknowledge any other King of Spain and the Indies than Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successors as the Spanish nation shall acknowledge; and the Spanish government engages never, in any case, to cede to France any part of the territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the world; and both the high contracting parties agree to make common cause against France, and not to make peace but by common consent." When it is recollected, that this treaty was concluded after the Spanish armies had been utterly routed and dispersed by the overwhelming forces of Napoleon, when their capital was taken, more than half their provinces overrun, and on the very day when the British forces embarked at Corunna, after their disastrous retreat from Leon, it must be admitted that the annals of the world do not afford a more sublime example of constancy in adversity and heroic fidelity to engagements on the part of both the contracting parties.¹

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¹ See the treaty in Parl. Deb. xiii. 810, 811; and Martin's Sup. v. 163.

Faithful alike to its least as its most considerable allies, the British government, at this period, concluded a new treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Swedish nation, now exposed to the most serious peril from the invasion of their formidable neighbour; and threatened alike in Finland and on the Baltic by an overwhelming force. Shortly after the treaty of Tilsit, and when this danger from Russia was foreseen, a convention was concluded with the court of Stockholm, by which Great Britain and Sweden mutually engaged to conclude no separate peace, and the former power was to pay

And with Sweden.

Feb. 8,
1808.

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March 1,
1809.

¹ Martin's
Sup. v. 2,
9.

an annual subsidy of L.1,200,000 to the latter : and this agreement was confirmed by an additional convention concluded at Stockholm a year after, by which it was agreed that the subsidy should be paid quarterly, and in advance.¹ But the pressure of external events prevented the latter treaty from being long carried into execution, and produced a change of dynasty in the Scandinavian Peninsula, fraught with important consequences upon the general interests of Europe, which will be the subject of interesting narrative in a future chapter.*

Treaty
between
Great Bri-
tain and
Turkey.
Jan. 5,
1809.

Another treaty, attended with important consequences, both present and future, was about the same time contracted between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte. Since the conclusion of the peace of Tilsit, which delivered over Napoleon's ally Turkey, to the tender mercies of Russia, only stipulating the lion's share for the French empire, and the consequent commencement of a bloody war on the Danube, between the two powers, which will hereafter be considered,† there was, in reality, no cause of hostility between England and the court of Constantinople. They were both at war with Russia, and both the objects of spoliation to France ; they were naturally, therefore, friends to each other. Impressed with these ideas, the British cabinet made advances to the Divan, representing the mutual advantage of an immediate cessation of hostilities ; and so completely had the desertion of France at Tilsit obliterated the irritation produced by Sir John Duckworth's expedition, and undermined the influence of Sebastiani at Constantinople, that they met with the most favourable reception. A treaty of peace was, in consequence, concluded between

Jan. 5.

* Infra, ch. lix.

† Infra, lx.

England and Turkey, in the beginning of January, at Constantinople, which, relieving the Grand Seignior from all apprehension in his rear, or of the maritime power of Russia, enabled the Turks to direct their whole force to the desperate contest on the Danube. Nor was this treaty of less importance eventually to Great Britain. By re-establishing the relations of amity and commerce with a vast empire, adjoining, along so extensive a frontier, the eastern states of Christendom, it opened a huge inlet for British manufactures and colonial produce, which was immediately and largely taken advantage of. Bales of goods, infinitely beyond the wants or consumption of the Ottoman empire, were shipped for Turkey, transported up the Danube, across the barrier of Hungary and the Albanian Hills, and finding their way, carried on mules and men's heads, over the mountain frontier of Transylvania, penetrated through all Hungary and the Austrian empire. Thus, while Napoleon, intent on the continental system, which absolutely required for its success the formation of all Europe into one league for the exclusion of British merchandise, flattered himself that by his victory at Tilsit he had effectually attained that object, he had already, in the consequences of that very triumph, awakened a resistance which in a great degree defeated it; and in the aroused hostility of the Spanish Peninsula and Turkey, severally delivered up to his own and Alexander's ambition by that pacification, amply compensated Great Britain for the commercial intercourse she had lost in northern Europe.¹

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¹ See the treaty in Martin's Sup. v. 160. Ann. Reg. 1809, 134. State Papers.

But, although the constancy and resolution of the British government at this crisis was worthy of the noble cause which they were called upon to support,

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Desponding
views on the
Peninsular
contest
which gene-
rally pre-
vailed in
Great
Britain.¹ Ann. Reg.
1809, 26,
29. South.
Pen. War.
ii. 328,
331.

it was not without great difficulty that they succeeded in prevailing upon Parliament and the people to second their efforts. The dispersion of the Spanish armies, the fall of Madrid, and the calamitous issue of Sir John Moore's retreat, had conspired in an extraordinary degree to agitate and distract the public mind. To the unanimous burst of enthusiasm which had followed the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection, and the extraordinary successes with which it was at first attended, had succeeded a depression proportionably unreasonable; and the populace, incapable of steady perseverance, and ever ready to rush from one extreme to another, now condemned government, in no measured strains, for pursuing that very line of conduct, which, a few months before, had been the object of their warmest eulogy and most strenuous support. The insanity of attempting to resist the French power at land; the madness of expecting any thing like durable support from popular insurrection; the impossibility of opposing any effectual barrier to Napoleon's continental dominion; his vast abilities, daring energy, and unbounded resources, were loudly proclaimed by the Opposition party: a large portion of the press adopted the same views, and augmented the general consternation by the most gloomy predictions. To such a height did the ferment arise, that it required all the firmness of ministers, supported by the constancy of the aristocratic party, to stem the torrent, and prevent the British troops from being entirely withdrawn from the Peninsula, and the Spanish war entirely extinguished by its first serious reverses.¹

The debates in Parliament on this, as on every other occasion, exhibited a faithful picture of the

sentiments entertained by the people ; and are interesting not merely as indicating the views adopted by the leaders of the opposite parties, but affording a true image of the opinions by which the nation itself was divided. On the side of the Opposition, it was strongly argued by Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, Mr Ponsonby, and Mr Whitbread, "That experience had now proved, what might from the first have been anticipated, that the Peninsula was not a theatre on which the British forces could ever be employed with advantage ; with the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as between Paris and Antwerp, nothing could justify our sending thirty or forty thousand men into the interior of Spain to combat two hundred thousand. Such a measure can only be compared to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and absurdity.* It is clear it must rest with the Spaniards themselves to work out their own independence, and that without that spirit no army that we can send can be of any avail. The cautious defensive system of warfare which the Spanish juntas

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Arguments
of the Op-
position
against the
Spanish
war.

* Lord Grenville here alluded to an expression of Lord Liverpool, then Mr Jenkinson, in 1793, that the allied army, after the fall of Valenciennes, should march direct to Paris. This saying was, for twenty years afterwards, the subject of constant ridicule by the Opposition party, and it was set down by general consent as one of the most absurd ebullitions that ever came from the mouth of man. Yet it is now admitted by Napoleon, and all the French military historians, that the observation was perfectly just, and that, if the allies had held together and pressed on after that event, they would have taken the French capital and terminated the war in the same campaign. A parallel case, in domestic transactions, is to be found in Lord Castlereagh's celebrated saying regarding "the ignorant impatience of taxation," which nevertheless it is now plain was entirely well founded, as but for it the national debt would now have been entirely paid off, or reduced to a mere trifle. So fallacious a guide is public opinion, when not formed at a distance from the event, and with the benefit of the light which subsequent experience, calm discussion, and superior intellects have thrown on the question.—*See ante*, ii. 172, 173 ; and v. 554–573.

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originally recommended has been abandoned, from the delusive hopes inspired by the regular armies we chose to send them, and defeat and ruin has been the consequence. As if to make a mockery of our assistance, we have sent our succours to the farthest possible point from the scene of action, and made our depôt at Lisbon, where the French must have been cut off and surrendered, if we had not kindly furnished them with the means of transport to France, from whence they might be moved by the enemy to the quarter most serviceable for his projects.

“When the Spanish insurrection broke out, and the world looked on in anxious suspense on that great event, ministers took none of the steps necessary to enable Parliament to judge of the measures which should be pursued. In the generous enthusiasm, the confidence and prodigality of the nation outstripped even their most sanguine hopes; men, money, transports, stores, all were put with boundless profusion at their disposal. How have they justified that confidence? Is it not clear that it has been misplaced? It was evident to every one that our whole disposable military force could not hope to cope single-handed against the immense armies of Napoleon; and, therefore, it was their bounden duty, before they hazarded any portion of our troops in the cause, to be well assured that the materials of an efficient and lasting hostility existed in the country. It was not sufficient to know, that monks could excite some of the poorer classes to insurrection, and that, when so excited, they evinced, for a time, great enthusiasm. The real question was, were they animated with that general resolution, from which alone national efforts could flow, and was it guided and directed by those influential classes, from whose exertion alone any thing like steadiness and perseverance could be anticipated?

No proper enquiry was made into these subjects. From the agents whom ministers sent out they got nothing but false or exaggerated information, more likely to mislead than to enlighten; and the consequence has been, that immense stores were thrown away or fell into the enemy's hands, vast subsidies were squandered or embezzled, and the entire fabric of delusion and misrepresentation fell before the first shock of the Imperial forces.

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“ In the direction of our own troops, mismanagement was, if possible, still more flagrant. Mr Frere was obviously not a proper person to be sent to Madrid to report as to the prudence or chances of success of Sir John Moore's advance into Spain; a military man should have been there, qualified to judge of the real state of the Spanish armies, and not expose the flower of the British troops to destruction, from crediting the rodomontade of proclamations, and the representations of interested supporters. When Sir John did arrive in Spain, in the middle of December, he came in time only to be the last devoured; all the Spanish armies had been dissipated before the British fired a shot. After Napoleon had arrived at Madrid, the retreat previously and wisely ordered by the English general was suspended, and a forward movement, fraught with the most calamitous results, commenced. By what influence or representations was that most disastrous change of measures brought about? That was the point into which it behoved Parliament to enquire, for there was the root of all the subsequent misfortunes. Mr Frere's despatches at that time urged him to advance, representing the great strength of the insurrection in the south of Spain; and that, if he would attack the enemy in the north, the Spanish cause, then almost desperate, would

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¹ Parl.
Deb. xii.
12, 21, and
1058,
1073.

Answer of
the Minis-
ters in
support of
the Span-
iards.

have time to revive. Incalculable were the calamities consequent on that most absurd advice; for such were the dangers into which it led the British army, that within a few days afterwards, Sir John Moore was obliged to resume its retreat, and if he had not done so, in twenty-four hours more it would have been surrounded and destroyed. What has been the result of all this imbecility? A shameful and disastrous retreat, which will influence the character of England long after all of us shall have ceased to live. We never can expect to be able to meet the four or five hundred thousand men whom Buonaparte can pour into Spain: when the opportunity was lost of seizing the passes of the Pyrenees, and the Peninsula was inundated with his troops, success had become hopeless, and the struggle should never have been attempted.”¹

On the other hand, it was contended by Lord Liverpool, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr Canning, “The question now is, whether we are to record a public avowal of a determination not to desert the cause and the government which we have espoused, and profess ourselves undismayed by the reverses we have sustained, which those very reverses had rendered it a more sacred duty to support. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate on account of these reverses, were little acquainted with history, and least of all with Spanish history. There it would be found, that nations, overrun just as completely as the Spaniards had been, had continued the contest for ten or twenty years; and, though constantly worsted in regular battles, had still, by perseverance and resolution, in the end proved triumphant. The cause in which they were engaged was the most interesting to humanity; it was a struggle for their

liberty, their independence, and their religion; for the homes of their fathers and the cradles of their descendants. Is nothing to be risked in support of so generous an ally? Is England, so renowned in history for her valour and perseverance, to be disheartened by the first reverse, and yield the palm to her ancient rivals, whom she has so often conquered even in their own territory, merely because she was unable to withstand forces quadruple of her own arms?

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“ It is a mistake, however, to assert that we have sustained nothing but disasters in the campaign. Was the conquest of Portugal; the capture of all its fortresses, arsenals and resources; the defeat and capitulation of one of the best armies and ablest marshals of France, nothing for our first essay in continental warfare? When we advanced into Spain, it was to act only as an auxiliary force; such was the express and earnest request of the Spaniards themselves, and it was the part which befitted the allies of so considerable and renowned a nation to take. Spain had made an energetic effort: she had combated with a spirit and constancy which had not distinguished greater empires and more extensive resources; she had gained triumphs which might put northern Europe to the blush; and, if she had been unable to stand the first brunt of a power before which all the military monarchies of the Continent had sunk, it was ungenerous to reproach her with her reverses in the hour of her misfortune, unmanly to be discouraged because important victories have been followed by what may yet prove only passing clouds. It is in vain to attempt to disparage the efforts of the Spanish army and nation; those are not despicable victories which, for the first time

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since the French Revolution broke out, had arrested the course of its champion's triumphs, and made the conquerors of Northern Europe pass under the Caudine forks: those were not contemptible national exertions which drove a French army of a hundred thousand men behind the Ebro, and brought Napoleon with two hundred thousand more from the other side of the Rhine.

“Nothing can be more erroneous than the opinion which has become general since the late reverses, that the Spaniards cannot, under any circumstances, require our assistance; that if they are in earnest in the great object of their deliverance, they must work it out for themselves, and have the means of doing so without the aid of British soldiers; and that, if they are indifferent to their salvation, no succour of ours can achieve it for them. Such a proposition sounds well, and might perhaps be founded in truth, if the Spaniards had a regular army to support and form a nucleus for the efforts of their enthusiastic peasantry; but all history demonstrates, that the resistance of no people, how resolute soever, is to be relied on for success in a protracted warfare, if entirely deprived of the support and example of regular armies. It is the combination of the two which makes a nation invincible. Spain has the one, but not the other; it is for England, so far as her resources will go, to supply the deficiency, and ingraft on the energetic efforts of newly raised forces the coolness and intrepidity of her incomparable soldiers. Unless such a nucleus of resistance remains in the Peninsula, to occupy the French armies in one quarter, while organization is going on in another, no efficient resistance can be expected, because the patriot armies will be reached and dispersed, in every province, before

they have acquired any degree of efficiency. How has every English patriot mourned the neglect of the fairest opportunity that ever occurred of combating the forces of the Revolution, by leaving the heroic Vendéans to perish under the merciless sword of the Republic ! Taught by past error, let us not repeat it, now that resistance of the same description has arisen on a much greater scale, and under circumstances promising a much fairer prospect of success.

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“ The advance of Sir John Moore to Sahagun was neither undertaken solely on his own responsibility, nor solely on the advice of Mr Frere : he had previously, from intercepted despatches from Berthier to Soult, ascertained that he would be on the Carrion on a certain day, and knew from thence that an opportunity was afforded of striking an important blow against that general when unsupported by the other French corps. About the same time advices arrived from Mr Frere, painting in the warmest colours the resolution of the people of Madrid to emulate the example of Saragossa, and bury themselves under the ruins of the capital rather than surrender it to the French arms. Such were the concurring reasons which prompted the forward movement of the British general ; and would not that general be unworthy of commanding British soldiers who would hesitate, under such circumstances, to advance to the support of his allies ? On this occasion, the inestimable importance of our regular troops in the war was distinctly shown ; this well-conceived invasion, though effected only by twenty-five thousand men, by menacing the enemy’s line of communication, paralysed the whole hostile armies of Spain ; stopped at once the progress of the French corps both towards Andalusia and Portugal ; gave the troops and inhabitants

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of these countries time to prepare for their defence, and drew Napoleon himself, with seventy thousand of his best men, into a remote corner of Spain. But for this seasonable advance, but for our assistance, the war would have been terminated in the first consternation consequent on the fall of Madrid. The sending out transports and bringing the troops home was not the work of government : it was the consequence of a distinct requisition from Sir David Baird that he required them ; thirteen thousand men were relanded after being shipped, in consequence of that demand, and the transports, to the infinite grief of government, sent out empty. But the cause of Spain was not yet desperate, and it was neither just to that country nor our own army, which, it was to be hoped, would yet prove the stay of Europe, to assert that its honour was gone for ever. All the energy of liberty, all the sacredness of loyalty still survived ; and the Spanish Revolution might yet be destined by Providence to stand between posterity and French despotism, and to show to the world that amidst the paroxysms of freedom a monarch might still be loved. If we had been obliged to leave Spain, we had left it with fresh laurels blooming upon our brows ; more honourable in the sight of God and man, because more purely won, than if gained in the richest field of self aggrandisement, or amidst the securest triumphs of selfish ambition.”¹

¹ Parl.
Deb. xii.
22, 23, and
1075,
1104.

Result of
the debate.

These generous sentiments, addressed to an assembly in a large proportion of whom the chivalrous feelings yet glowed, and who had recently caught the flame of patriotic ardour from the early glories of the Spanish war, proved triumphant with a great majority of the house ; and Mr Ponsonby's motion for a committee to enquire into the conduct

of the campaign in Spain, was negatived by a majority of 93; the numbers being 127 to 220.

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These debates, though they by no means assuaged the public mind after the calamitous issue of the campaign, had at least one good effect, that of demonstrating where it was that the real fault lay, and what should now be done to repair it. Nothing could be clearer, when the question was sifted to the bottom, than that the advance of Sir John Moore had been an able and well-judged step; that his subsequent retreat was alike necessary and expedient; that the withdrawing Napoleon's guards from Madrid, and leading Ney and Soult to Corunna, had saved the southern provinces and the cause of Spanish independence; and that, if there was any fault in its direction, it was in the unnecessary haste with which it had been conducted—a venial error, the result of inexperienced troops and a long established despondency, on military affairs, of the public mind. The real error lay in abandoning the Peninsula, if Corunna was no longer tenable, and steering with the transports for England, instead of making for Lisbon or Cadiz. Disorganized as the army was by the sufferings of the retreat, it would soon have recovered its efficiency in the quiet of the Portuguese capital; the immense stores sent out by England would have speedily replaced its equipment and restored its *materiel*; a sense of security, the arrival of reinforcements from home, would, ere long, have reanimated its spirit; and the French marshals would have had little to boast of, if, after the whole Peninsular war had been paralysed for its destruction, and two of their corps been drawn to the extremity of Galicia in its pursuit, the English army had reap-

Light which
these de-
bates threw
on the real
errors of the
campaign.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

The go-
vernment
resolve to
support the
Spanish
war, and
Sir A. Wel-
lesley is
sent out to
Lisbon.

peared, a few days after, at the rock of Lisbon ; and, from a still more formidable central position, threatened in flank their wearied and harrassed troops, scattered from the Asturian mountains to the Sierra Morena.

Impressed with these ideas, the English government, after a temporary hesitation till the decision of parliament on the subject was known, took the magnanimous and fortunate resolution, still to persevere in a land contest in the Peninsula, and to send out considerable reinforcements to Portugal. The troops which had been prepared to reinforce Sir John Moore, accordingly were retained in the seaports to which they had been directed, and in the beginning of April sailed for Lisbon. The command of the expedition was given to Sir Arthur Wellesley, whom his great achievements in India, as well as recent unclouded triumph in Portugal, clearly pointed out for that arduous duty. So shaken were the minds of all, however, by the recent Peninsular disasters, and so uncertain was even government of the state of Portugal, that his instructions directed him, if, on his arrival at Lisbon, he found that capital evacuated by the British troops, to make for Cadiz. This calamitous event, fortunately, did not take place : the standard of independence still waved on the Tagus : courageous efforts had been made during the winter in Portugal, and on the 22d April Sir Arthur landed, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, at Lisbon, and commenced that career which has rendered his own name and that of his country immortal. He never re-embarked there again to steer for Britain : the days were past when the English looked for safety to their ships :¹ when

¹ Gurw. iv.
246. Soult.
ii. 388.

next he set sail for England, it was from Calais with his cavalry, which had marched thither in triumph from Bayonne.

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LVIII.

1809.

To provide for the war on the gigantic scale on which, during this year, it was to be conducted, at once in Flanders, Austria, and Portugal, large supplies of men and money were requisite; and the attention of government was early and anxiously directed to these vital objects. It had long been perceived that the true nursery for the British army was the militia, which being raised by ballot for home service only, did not excite the jealousy of a people too much attached to their liberties, to submit, save in the last necessity, to conscription for the regular army. A bill, accordingly, was brought in by Lord Castlereagh, which soon received the assent of the legislature, which provided for raising twenty-four thousand men for the militia, by bounties of ten guineas each, paid by the public; and, if it proved insufficient, by ballot; in order to replace an equal number who had volunteered from that service into the line. This measure proved entirely successful: the bounty for enlisting into the regular army was at the same time raised to twelve guineas; and from that time till the close of the war no difficulty was experienced in raising the requisite number of men, without any forced levy, for both services—even to supply the vast consumption of the Peninsular war—so strongly was the spirit of the nation now roused against the usurpations of France, and so widely had the military spirit spread with the general arming of the people which followed the threats of Napoleon's invasion.¹

Measures
to increase
the land
forces.

March 6,
1809.

Parl. Deb.
xii. 538,
539, and
314, 323.

The raising of supplies for a year, when operations were contemplated on a scale of such magni-

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Budget, and
naval and
military
forces of
Britain.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1809, 81.
James'
Naval
Hist. iv.
404, Table
17. Parl.
Deb. xiv.
531. Por-
ter's Parl.
Tables, i.
p. 1.

tude, presented difficulties of no ordinary kind; but they were surmounted without any extraordinary addition to the burdens of the people. The war expenditure amounted to L.53,000,000; the ways and means, including a loan of L.11,000,000, being somewhat more. The total expenditure of this year, including the interest of the debt and sinking fund, was L.89,522,000, while the total income was L.90,525,000. The regular army amounted to 210,000 men, besides 80,000 militia, of whom 100,000 were disposable in the British islands; and the navy, manned by 130,000 seamen, numbered no less than 1061 ships of war, of which 698 were in commission, 242 were of the line, besides 42 building, and 113 of that class actually at sea.¹ These numbers deserve to be noted, as marking the highest point to which the British navy had yet reached in that or any other war; and indicate an amount of naval force far superior to that of all other nations put together, and to which the world never had, and perhaps never will, see a parallel.*

French ex-
pedition
sails from
Brest for
Basque
Roads.

The first great success which occurred to elevate the hopes of the British after the disasters of the Peninsular campaign, occurred at sea. A squadron of eight sail of the line and two frigates, under Admiral Villaumez, had for some time been watching for an opportunity to elude the vigilance of the British cruisers, and escape from Brest, in order to gain a general rendezvous assigned them by the French government in BASQUE ROADS. The object of this movement was to chase the British blockading squadron from before L'Orient; liberate the ships there, which consisted of three ships of the line and five frigates; and, with the united force of eleven line-

* See note B.

of-battle ships and seven frigates, make for Marti-
 nique, now threatened by a British expedition, and
 for the relief of which it had several thousand land
 troops on board. On the 21st February they effected
 their object of sailing from Brest, and immediately
 steered for the south, and after some difficulty, owing
 to the narrow channels and shoal waters round the
 Isle d'Aix, the desired junction was effected, and
 Villaumez found himself at the head of eleven ships
 of the line and seven frigates in Basque Roads.
 Thither he was immediately followed by the British
 squadron, under Lord Gambier, which, being joined
 to the blockading squadron off L'Orient, amounted to
 eleven sail of the line. Alarmed by the approach of
 so formidable a force, the French squadron weighed
 anchor, and stood for the inner and more protected
 roads of Isle d'Aix. In performing this operation,
 one of their line-of-battle ships, the Jean Bart, went
 ashore and was lost. The British admiral immediate-
 ly followed, and anchored in Basque Roads, directly
 opposite to the enemy, with his frigates and smaller
 vessels in advance; and as the close proximity of
 the hostile fleets, and their confined anchorage, ren-
 dered them in a peculiar manner exposed to the
 danger of fireships, extraordinary precautions were
 adopted on both sides against that much dreaded
 mode of attack.¹

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LVIII.

1809.

Feb. 21.

March 26.

¹ James'
Naval Hist.
iv. 94, 110.
Brenton, ii.
277, 279.
Thib. vii.
260.

The French fleet was now anchored in a very strong
 position. On one side they were covered by the Isle
 d'Aix, garrisoned by two thousand men, and batteries
 mounting thirty long thirty-six pounders and several
 mortars; while, on the other side, the isle of Oleron,
 at the distance of three miles and a-half, was forti-
 fied by several works, the guns of which nearly
 reached the range of those of the citadel of Aix.

Position of
the French
in Basque
Roads.
An attack
with fire-
ships is re-
solved on.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ James, iv.
102, 103.
Brenton, ii.
278, 279.

Prepara-
tions for
the attack
on the
enemy in
Basque
Roads.
April 14:

Shoals also abounded in all directions, and the French fleet, drawn up in two close lines, between the protecting forts near the shore, in a situation not unlike that of Brueys at the Nile, with this difference, that the vessels in the second line were placed opposite the openings in the first, as at Trafalgar. As any regular action with the fleet seemed hazardous in such a situation, Lord Gambier suggested an attack by means of fireships, in which the Admiralty readily concurred. Twelve fireships were immediately prepared, with extraordinary expedition, in the English harbours ; and, as most of the officers consulted gave it as their opinion that the undertaking would be attended with great hazard, the execution of it was entrusted to LORD COCHRANE, who considered it as attended with little difficulty, and whose cool intrepidity and inexhaustible resources, long demonstrated in a partisan warfare on the coast of France and Spain, pointed him out as peculiarly qualified for the important enterprise. He at first declined, from delicacy to the officers already in the fleet ; but, being pressed by government, accepted the command, and in the beginning of April joined the fleet in Basque Roads, where he was immediately afterwards joined by the Mediator frigate, and twelve other vessels armed as fireships.¹

The preparations being at length completed, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the stations assigned to them ; and, on the evening of the 11th April, advanced to their perilous service. The enemy, being aware, from the arrival of the fireships, what was intended, had made every preparation for repelling the attack ; a strong boom had been drawn across the line of their fleet, at the distance of 110 yards, composed of cables and chains twisted to-

gether, and secured by anchors at either end, of the enormous weight of five tons each ; while the whole boats of the fleet, seventy-three in number, were assembled near the boom, in five divisions, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fireships ; and the line-of-battle ships lay behind, with their top-masts on deck, and every imaginable precaution taken to avert the dreadful fate which menaced them. Nothing, however, could resist the daring of the British sailors, and the admirable skill of the officers in direction of the fireships. The wind, which was strong and blew right in upon shore, was as favourable as possible ; and under its blasts the fireships got under weigh, and bore down swiftly on the enemy's line, while the sailors in both fleets strained their anxious eyes to discern the dark masses as they silently glided through the gloom. Lord Cochrane directed the leading vessel, which had fifteen hundred barrels of powder and four hundred shells on board ; while the Mediator, under the able direction of Captain Woolridge, filled with as many combustibles, immediately followed. The admirable directions given the latter vessel, by its heroic commander, brought it down direct against the boom, and the whole fireships, which rapidly followed, made direct towards the enemy's fleet, amidst a heavy fire from the batteries on both sides and the line in front. Dauntless, indeed, was the intrepidity of the crews, who, during the darkness of a tempestuous night, steered vessels charged to the brim with gunpowder, and the most combustible materials, right into the middle of a concentric fire of bombs and projectiles, any one of which might, in an instant, have blown them into the air !¹

During the darkness of a tempestuous night, however, it was impossible even for the greatest skill

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ James, iv.
106, 107
Lord
Gambier's
Desp., 14th
April,
1809.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 443.
App. to
Chron.
Brenton,
ii. 280.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Dreadful
nocturnal
attack, and
destruction
of the
French
fleet.

and coolness to steer the fireships precisely to the points assigned to them ; the wind was lulled by the effect of the first explosions ; and the consequence was, that many of them blew up at such a distance from the enemy's line as to do little or no damage. So resolute, however, were the captain and crew of the Mediator to discharge the duty assigned to them, that, after breaking the boom and setting fire to their vessel, they still held by her till she was almost in the enemy's fleet, and were blown out of the ship when she exploded, severely, though happily not mortally scorched. Lord Cochrane's vessel, which led the way, though directed by that gallant officer with the most consummate skill and courage, was unable to break the boom, till the Mediator came up, when it gave way ; and a minute thus lost caused her to explode a hundred yards too soon, and without any damage to the enemy. No sooner, however, was the boom burst, than the other fireships came in, wrapped in flames, in quick succession, and this awful spectacle, joined to the tremendous explosions of the Mediator and Lord Cochrane's vessel, produced such consternation in the French fleet, that they all slipped their cables and ran ashore in wild confusion. The glare of so many prodigious fires illuminating half the heavens, the flashes of the guns from the forts and retreating ships, the frequent flight of shells and rockets from the fire-vessels, and the bright reflection of the rays of light from the sides of the French ships in the background, formed a scene at once animating and sublime. One fireship fell on board the Ocean, which carried the French admiral's flag, as she lay grounded on the shore ; in an instant the flames spread over her. At this moment the Tonnerre

and Patriote also got entangled in the fearful group : inevitable destruction seemed to await them all, when a sudden roll of the sea threw the *Tonnerre* aside, and the fireship drifted past. When the day dawned at five o'clock, half the enemy's fleet were discerned ashore ; at half-past seven only two were afloat ; and Lord Cochrane, who had regained his own ship, the *Imperieuse*, repeatedly made signal to Lord Gambier, who lay twelve miles off, to advance. The last bore, " Half the fleet can destroy the enemy : eleven on shore." ¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ James,
iv. 109,
^{111.}
Brenton,
ii. 280,
281.
French offi-
cial account.
James, iv.
109.

Success as splendid as that gained at the Nile or Copenhagen now awaited the British admiral, and it had been won by daring and skill not inferior to that of Nelson himself. But Nelson was not at the head of the fleet. Inferior to none of the captains who followed that immortal flag in personal gallantry, Lord Gambier wanted the moral courage, the confidence in himself, which, in hazardous circumstances, is requisite for decisive success in a commander. At ten minutes before six Lord Cochrane had first made signal that half the fleet was ashore ; and, if the admiral had instantly weighed anchor and stood in to the roads, he would, at eight o'clock, have been within reach of fire, when only two of them were afloat. Instead of this, he did nothing till half-past nine, and then, instead of making the signal to move, merely called a council of war of flag-captains to come on board his ship ; and it was, in consequence, not till a quarter before eleven that the fleet weighed ; and having advanced half-way, anchored again six miles from the enemy, in the belief that their ships could not be got off, and that it was hazardous, till the tide had risen higher, to venture further in amidst the intricate shoals of Basque Roads. The *Ætna*

Attack on
the ships
ashore, and
destruction
of part of
them.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

bomb and some frigates and lighter vessels were, however, moved on under the orders of Captain Bligh. Mean-while the French fleet evinced extraordinary activity in getting their vessels off the shore, and as the tide rose several were floated and warped up the Charente. Stung to the quick by seeing his noble prizes thus eluding his grasp, Lord Cochrane, with heroic gallantry, advanced himself to the attack in his frigate the *Imperieuse*. He was quickly followed by Captain Bligh with the bomb and light vessels, and a heavy cannonade was commenced on the most exposed of the enemy's ships. The *Calcutta* of fifty guns quickly struck her colours to the *Imperieuse*, the *Ville de Varsovie* and *Aquilon* soon after yielded to the concentric fire of the other frigates, and were burned as soon as the prisoners were removed; and the *Tonnerre* was set on fire by her own crew, and blew up. So general was the consternation on the part of the enemy, that another French seventy-four, the *Tourville*, was abandoned by its crew, and might have been taken possession of by an English boat's crew, which, unaware of its condition, accidentally came very near. The *Indienne* frigate was also burnt by the enemy. The other ships, however, though seriously injured, and two of them rendered unserviceable, by being thrown ashore in the tempestuous gale, were, by great efforts, got afloat during the high tides which followed the strong westerly wind that prevailed during the action, and warped into safe anchorage in the upper part of the Charente.¹

¹ James, iv.
110, 122.
Brenton, ii.
281, 282.
Thib. vii.
261.
Lord
Gambier's
Account.
Ann. Reg.
435. App.
to Chron.

Proceedings
which fol-
lowed in
England.

Lord Cochrane was deservedly made a knight of the Bath for the admirable skill and coolness exhibited by him on this trying occasion; and there cannot be a doubt, when the French accounts are com-

pared with the English, that, if he had had the command of the fleet, the whole enemy's ships would have been destroyed. Such as it was, the success was almost equal to that of Lord Howe in those seas fifteen years before, and it would have thrown the nation into transports of joy at the commencement of the war. But Lord Nelson had spoiled the English for any thing less than complete success ; and murmurs soon began to spread against Lord Gambier for not having, in a more energetic manner, supported Lord Cochrane on that occasion. These were soon materially increased by the strong charges openly advanced against the commander-in-chief by Admiral Harvey, the second in command, one of the bravest captains of Trafalgar, who burned with desire to signalize himself against the enemy, and had expressed his opinion on the occasion, perhaps, with more frankness than discretion : and by Lord Cochrane intimating, that if the thanks of the House of Commons were moved to Lord Gambier, he would oppose it in Parliament. The result was, that Admiral Harvey was brought to a court-martial for the words he had uttered, cashiered, and dismissed the service, though he was shortly after restored for his gallantry at that memorable battle, with the general approbation of the navy ; and Lord Gambier, after a protracted trial, was acquitted by his court-martial, and afterwards received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, as well as Lord Cochrane and the other officers and men employed on the occasion.¹

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Brenton,
ii. 285,
286.
James, iv.
118, 121.

Napoleon's opinion on this matter was very decided. "Cochrane," said he, "not only could have destroyed the whole French ships, but he might and would have taken them out, had the English admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by the French admiral

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ O'Meara,
ii. 292.

Thib. vii.
261.

Character
of Lord
Cochrane.

for every one to shift for himself, they became panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the fire-ships was so great, that they actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance. Fear deprived the French captains of their senses. Had Cochrane been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships."¹ Impressed with these ideas, the French Emperor brought the officers of his lost vessels to trial; and Lafond, the captain of the *Calcutta*, was condemned and executed, and two others were sentenced to imprisonment.²

Lord Cochrane was, after the death of Nelson, the greatest naval commander of that age of glory. Equal to his great predecessor in personal gallantry, enthusiastic ardour, and devotion to his country, he was perhaps his superior in original genius, inventive power, and inexhaustible resources. The skill and indefatigable perseverance with which, during the Spanish war, when in command only of his own frigate, he alarmed and distracted the whole coast from Toulon to Barcelona, has never been surpassed: with the crew of a frigate, which did not exceed three hundred and fifty men, he kept ten thousand of the enemy constantly occupied. It was his misfortune to arrive at manhood and high command only towards the close of the war, when the enemy's fleets had disappeared from the ocean, and the glorious opportunities of its earlier years had passed away: more truly than Alexander the Great he might have wept that there no longer remained a world to conquer. His coolness in danger was almost unparalleled even in the English navy, and in the days of Nelson and Collingwood:* his men, nevertheless, had

* In Basque Roads, a seaman sitting by his side in the boat, was killed by a cannon-shot from one of the French vessels, when in the act of

such confidence in his judgment and resources, that they would have followed wherever he led, even to the cannon's mouth. Unhappily for himself and his country, he engaged with little discretion when ashore in party politics; he stood forth as a prominent opponent of government on various occasions, on which he unnecessarily put himself forward in contests with which he had no concern; while his strong inventive turn led him, when unemployed, to connect himself with some transactions with which his heroic qualities had no affinity. In consequence of these unhappy indiscretions and connexions, he was, towards the close of the war, brought to trial before the court of King's Bench, for a hoax practised for jobbing purposes on the Stock Exchange, and, under the direction of Lord Ellenborough, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and an ignominious punishment, the worst part of which the better feeling of government led them to remit. The result was, that the hero of Basque Roads was dismissed the navy, bereft of his honours, and driven into the service of the South American republics, where his exploits, of the most extraordinary and romantic character, powerfully contributed to destroy the last relics of the Spanish empire in that quarter, and establish the doubtful ascendancy of democratic fervour. But in a free country no deed of injustice, whether popular or ministerial, can permanently blast a noble character. With the changes of time, the power which had oppressed England's greatest existing naval hero passed away: another generation succeeded, to which his exploits were an object of admiration, his weak-

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LVIII.
1809.

looking through a telescope at the enemy's fleet: without saying a word, or averting his eye, he took the instrument out of the dead man's hand and completed the observation.

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1809.

nesses of forgiveness, his wrongs of commiseration ; one of the most deservedly popular acts of the new ministry, which succeeded to the helm after the overthrow of the Tory administration, was to restore him to the rank and the honours of which he had been deprived ; and there remains now, to the historian, only the grateful duty of lending his humble efforts to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the victim of aristocratic, as he has frequently done those of popular injustice.*

Capture of
Martinique,
and St
Domingo,
in the
West Indies.

Feb. 2.

Feb. 18.

July 2.

The defeat and blockade of the French squadron in Basque Roads, was shortly felt in the capture of the French West India islands, to relieve which, was the object of its ill-fated sortie from Brest harbour. A British expedition sailed from Jamaica, and appeared off Martinique in the end of January. The landing was effected without any resistance, and the enemy, having been defeated in a general action some days after, they were shut up in Fort Bourbon, the principal stronghold in the island, which shortly after surrendered, with three thousand men, at discretion. This was followed, some months afterwards,

* Lord Cochrane was tried for alleged accession to the Stock Exchange hoax, before a most able and powerful judge, Lord Ellenborough, and being convicted, sentenced to imprisonment and the pillory. There can be no doubt that the evidence tending to connect him with the facts charged was of a very strong kind, and the judge was constrained to exhibit the case in an unfavourable light against the accused to the jury. Yet the author, after hearing Lord Cochrane deliver his defence in the House of Commons, on July 7, 1814, has never entertained a doubt of his innocence ; and, even if the facts charged had been distinctly brought home to him, it was surely a most unwarrantable stretch to sentence to the degrading punishment of the pillory so heroic a character, especially for a proceeding involving no moral turpitude, and rarely, if ever, before or since made the object of punishment. This part of the sentence was immediately and most properly remitted by government ; but the result of the trial hung heavily on the hero of Basque Roads, in this country, for twenty years afterwards.

by a successful descent on the colony and fortress of St. Domingo, which, with two battalions of infantry, were taken by General Carmichael. Cayenne was also reduced ; so that, as Cuba and the other Spanish settlements in those latitudes were now allied colonies, the French flag was entirely excluded from the West Indies.¹

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Ann. Reg.
228 and
461. App.
to Chron.

The Isle of France in the Indian ocean, was, at the same time, strictly blockaded, and, it was foreseen, must ere long capitulate ; the Isle of Bourbon surrendered on the 21st September ; the French settlement on the Senegal River, on the western coast of Africa, had fallen into the hands of the English ; and preparations were making on a great scale for an attack on Batavia, and the important island of Java in the Indian Archipelago. Thus, in every direction, the last distant settlements of Napoleon were falling into the hands of the British ; and, at the time when the triumphant conclusion of the Austrian war seemed to give him the undisputed command of continental Europe, the maritime superiority of England was producing its natural results, in the successive acquisition of the whole colonies of the globe.²

And of the
Isle of
Bourbon in
the East.
Sept. 21.

² Ann. Reg.
1809, 228,
and 429,
461.
App. to
Chron.
Jom. ii.
296.

Important success also attended the British arms, both by sea and land, in the Mediterranean. A powerful naval expedition was dispatched in autumn, by Lord Collingwood, with sixteen hundred land troops on board, who, after a slight resistance, made themselves masters of the seven islands of Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, &c., which were permanently placed under the protection and sway of Great Britain. The importance of this acquisition was not at that period perceived ; but, by giving Great Britain a permanent footing in the neighbourhood of Greece, and the command of Corfu, the finest harbour and

Reduction of
the seven
Ionian
Islands.
Oct. 3.

CHAP.
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1809.

1 Ann. Reg.
1809.
Lord
Colling-
wood's
Despatch,
Oct. 30,
1809. App.
to Chron.
530, 531.

Fruitless
expedition
of Sir J.
Stuart
against the
coast of
Naples.

strongest fortress in the Adriatic, it powerfully contributed in the end to counterbalance the influence of the cabinet of St Petersburg in that quarter, and may be regarded as the first step, in a series of events, linked together by a chain of necessary though unperceived connexion,—the Greek Revolution—the battle of Navarino—the prostration of Turkey—the establishment of a Christian government in Greece—the subjugation of Persia—and rapid extension of Russian influence in Khorassan, which are destined, to all human appearance, in their ultimate consequences, to roll back to the East the tide of civilised contest,—array the powers of the West in fearful collision in central Asia, and prepare, in the hostile efforts of European ambition, that general restoration of the regions of the sun, which, for mysterious purposes, Providence has hitherto prevented from taking place by the desolating sway of Mahometan power.¹

In conformity with the earnest desire expressed by the Austrian government, that a diversion of considerable magnitude should be attempted on the coast of Italy, an expedition was prepared in the Sicilian harbours in the course of this summer to menace the coast of Naples. As usual, however, the British government were so tardy in their operations, that not only was ample time given to the enemy to prepare for his defence at the menaced points, but it was utterly impossible that the armament could have any beneficial effect on the vital line of operations in the valley of the Danube. The fleet, having no less than fifteen thousand troops, half British and half Sicilian, on board, did not set sail from Palermo till the beginning of June; that is to say, more than a month after the Archduke John had retired from

Italy, and the theatre of contest between him and Eugene Beauharnois had been transferred to the Hungarian plains. It at first met with considerable success. The island of Ischia, which forms so conspicuous an object in the bay of Naples, was assaulted and carried by the British troops : Procida was next taken, close to the shore, with a flotilla of forty gun-boats, fifteen hundred prisoners, and a hundred pieces of cannon ; while a detachment of the English forces, landing on the straits of Messina, took possession of the castle of Scylla and the chain of fortified posts opposite to Sicily. These advantages had at first the effect of spreading a great alarm along the Neapolitan coast, and occasioning the recall of a considerable body of men whom Murat had detached to the support of the viceroy ; but they led to no other or more durable result. This powerful British force, nearly as large as that which gained the battle of Vimiero, and which, if landed and skillfully brought into action, would probably have overthrown the whole army of Naples, was shortly after withdrawn by the instructions of government, who intended this only as a diversion, without attempting any thing further ; and the fortified posts at Scylla, after being several times taken and retaken, were at length abandoned to the enemy. This expedition, from its tardy appearance and inconsiderable exploits, could hardly be said to have contributed much to aid the common cause ; but, from the alarm which it diffused through the Italian peninsula, it had a powerful effect in accelerating the ecclesiastical revolution, which has already been noticed, and may be regarded as the immediate cause of the arrest of the Pope, which in its ultimate effects produced such important results.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

June 6.

¹ Sir J.
Stuart's
Desp., June
5, 1809.
App. to
Chron. 457.
Ann. Reg.
Pel. iv. 41,
44.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Brilliant
success of
Lord Col-
lingwood in
the Medi-
terranean.
Oct. 30.

A maritime operation, attended with more decisive consequences, took place in autumn, in the bay of Genoa. A detachment of the Toulon fleet, having put to sea, with a view to carry succours to the French troops in the bay of Rosas, which were cut off by the Spaniards from the direct communication with their own country, they were immediately chased by Lord Collingwood, who blockaded that port, and after a hard pursuit, the ships of war were forced to separate from the convoy, and three ships of the line and one frigate driven ashore, where they were burned by the enemy, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the British. Mean-while, the transports, under convoy of a frigate and some smaller armed ships, in all eleven vessels, having taken refuge in the bay of Rosas, under protection of the powerful castle and batteries there, deemed themselves beyond the reach of attack. In that situation, however, they were assailed by a detachment of the British fleet, under the orders of Captain Hallowell, who at once formed the daring resolution of cutting out the whole, with the boats of the ships under his command. The arrangements for this purpose, made with the judgment and foresight which might have been expected from that distinguished hero of the Nile, were carried into effect by Lieutenant Tailour with a spirit and resolution above all praise. In sight of the fleet, the boats stretched out, the crews being at the highest point of animation, filling the air with their cheers; and rapidly advancing under a very heavy fire from the armed ships and batteries, carried the whole vessels in the most gallant style, and either burnt or brought away them all.¹

¹ Lord Col-
lingwood's
Desp. Nov.
1, 1809.
Captain
Hallowell,
Nov. 1.
Ann. Reg.
1809, 511,
515. App.
to Chron.

Brilliant as these naval operations were, they had no decisive effect on the issue of the war. The ma-

ritime contest was decided : at Trafalgar the domin-
 ion of the seas had finally passed to the British
 flag. It was at land that the real struggle now lay :
 it was for the deliverance of other nations that Eng-
 land now fought ; it was on the soldiers of Welling-
 ton that the eyes of the world were turned.

CHAP.
 LVIII.
 1809.

After the retreat of the English to Corunna, and
 the fall of Madrid, affairs in the Peninsula appeared
 well nigh desperate. In Portugal there was merely
 a corps of eight thousand British soldiers, chiefly in
 and around Lisbon, upon whom any reliance could
 be placed ; for though about six thousand men, under
 Silveira, lay in the northern provinces, and the Lusi-
 tanian legion, of half that amount, on the north-
 eastern frontier, yet the composition of the forces of
 which these detachments consisted was not such as
 to inspire any confidence as to their ability to con-
 tend with regular soldiers, or defend the country
 in the event of a fresh invasion. Their small numer-
 ical amount compelled Cradock, in the first instance,
 to concentrate his forces, which he did at Passa d'Ar-
 cos, close to the mouth of the Tagus, where he might
 be in a situation to embark with safety, if a serious
 invasion should be attempted. These dispositions,
 however, naturally spread the belief that the Eng-
 lish were going to abandon the country, as they had
 done Galicia, and tumults broke out in various
 quarters, arising from the dread of this anticipated
 desertion. Towards the end of February, however,
 the arrival of six thousand men from England,
 under Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, having augmented
 Cradock's force to fourteen thousand, he was enabled
 to take a position in advance, covering the capital, at
 Saccavino, which soon, by reviving confidence, had
 the effect of removing the public discontents.¹

State of
 affairs in
 Portugal,
 and forces
 of the pa-
 triots at
 this period.

Nap. ii.
 142, 159.
 Lond. i.
 294, 295.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

And in
Spain.

Affairs in Spain were still more unpromising. The army of Blake, which had suffered so severely at Espinosa and Reynosa, had dwindled into eight or nine thousand ragged and half-starved troops, without either stores or artillery, who with difficulty maintained themselves in the Galician mountains: the remains of the soldiers of Arragon, about twenty thousand strong, had thrown themselves into Saragossa, where they were preparing to undergo a fresh siege; Castanos' men who had come up from Andalusia, joined to some which had escaped from Somosierra and Madrid, in all, twenty-five thousand strong, were in La Mancha, and had their headquarters at Toledo; while ten or twelve thousand disorganized levies at Badajoz, formed a sort of guard for the Central Junta, who had established themselves in that city after the fall of Madrid. As to the new levies in Andalusia, Granada, and Valencia, they were, as yet, too ill disciplined and remote from the scene of action to be capable of affording any efficient support to regular troops in the earlier periods of the campaign; and though, in Catalonia, there were at least fifty thousand brave men in possession of Gerona, Rosas, Tarragona, Tortosa, Lerida, and a strong central range of mountains, yet they were fully occupied with the invaders in their own bounds, and without either seeking from, or being able to afford succour to the neighbouring provinces, resolutely maintained, on their own hills an independent hostility. In all, scarcely a hundred and twenty thousand men, scattered round the whole circumference of the Peninsula, without either any means of uniting with each other, any central authority to which they all yielded obedience, or common object to which they could simultaneously be applied. At Madrid, Joseph

reigned with the apparent consent of the nation : registers having been opened for the inscription of the names of those who were favourable to his government, no less than twenty-eight thousand heads of families in a few days enrolled themselves ; and deputations from the municipal council, the council of the Indies, and all the incorporations, waited upon him at Valladolid to entreat that he would return to the capital and re-assume the royal functions, with which he at length complied.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Jan. 22,
1809.¹ Lond. i.
294, 295.Nap. ii. 4,
5. Vict. etConq. xviii.
255, 257.Tor. ii.
204, 205.

On the other hand, the forces of Napoleon were much more formidable, both from the position which they occupied, and the number and quality of the troops of which they were composed. Instead of being spread out, like the English and Spanish hosts, round an immense circumference, without any means of communicating with or supporting each other, they were massed together in the central parts of the kingdom, and possessed the inestimable advantage of an interior and comparatively short line of communication. The total French force in the Peninsula, amounted, even after the Imperial guards had departed for Germany, to two hundred and eighty thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry, of whom two hundred and forty thousand were present in the field with the eagles. Fifty thousand of this immense force protected the great line of communication with France, which was strengthened by three fortresses, and sixty-four fortified posts of correspondence ; and the corps were so distributed that they could all support each other in case of need, or combine in any common operation. The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded with each other by means of moveable columns, repressed any attempt

Forces and
distribution
of the
French in
Spain.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Belmas, i.
37, 38.
Imp. Must.
Rolls, Nap.
ii. App.
Nos. 1, 2.

Effect in
the Penin-
sula of the
English
treaty, and
resolution to
defend Por-
tugal, and
stand by
Spain.

March 2.

at insurrection, and levied military contributions on the inhabitants, to the amount not only of all the wants of their respective corps, but in some cases of immense fortunes to themselves. Nearly the whole charges of this enormous force were at the expense of the conquered provinces. Soult, with twenty-three thousand effective men, lay at Corunna, while Ney, with fourteen thousand, occupied Asturias and the northern coast; Lannes and Moncey, with two corps, about forty-eight thousand strong, were charged with the siege of Saragossa; Victor was in Estremadura with twenty-five thousand; Mortier, with as many, in the valley of the Tagus; and Sebastiani, who had succeeded to the command of Lefebvre's corps, observed the enemy's forces in La Mancha; St Cyr, with forty thousand, lay in Catalonia; and Joseph, with twelve thousand guards, was at Madrid.¹

The spirits of the Spaniards, which had been sunk to an extraordinary degree by the disasters of the preceding campaign, the capture of their capital, and retreat of the English troops from Galicia, were first revived by the intelligence of the treaty so opportunely and generously concluded by Great Britain, at the moment of their greatest depression, by which she engaged never to conclude a separate peace with Napoleon; and by the resolution expressed in Parliament by the ministers, notwithstanding the gloomy forebodings of the Opposition, never to abandon the cause of Spanish independence. These cheering announcements were speedily followed by deeds which clearly evinced an unabated resolution to maintain the contest. Measures were set on foot in Portugal, evidently calculated for a protracted struggle. General Beresford had been appointed by the Regency field-marshal in the Portuguese service, and intrusted with

the arduous duty of training and directing the new levies in that kingdom: twenty thousand of these troops were taken into British pay, placed under the direction of British officers, and admitted to all the benefits of British upright administration: the Regency revived and enforced the ancient law of the monarchy, by which, in periods of peril, the whole male population capable of bearing arms were called out in defence of their country: numerous transports, filled with stores and muniments of war, daily arrived at Lisbon, which became a vast depôt for the military operations of the kingdom; and, finally, the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley, with powerful reinforcements from England, was regarded at once as a pledge of sincerity in the cause, and the harbinger of yet higher glories than he had yet acquired. Reanimated by these vigorous steps on the part of their ally, not less than the breaking out of the Austrian war, and withdrawing of the Imperial guard from the Peninsula, the Central Junta, which was now established at Seville, issued an animated proclamation to their countrymen, in which, after recounting the propitious circumstances which were now appearing in their favour, they strongly recommended the general adoption of the guerrilla system of warfare, and renewed their protestation never to make peace while a single Frenchman polluted the Spanish territory! ¹

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LVIII.
1809.

¹ See proclamation in Belmas, i. App. No. 25. App. Lond. i. 294, 295. Nap. ii. 142, 159.

Saragossa was the first place of note which was threatened by the French arms. The vicinity of that place to the frontier of the empire, its commanding situation on the banks of the Ebro, the valour of its inhabitants, and the renown which they had acquired by the successful issue of the last siege, all conspired to render its early reduction a matter

Preparations for the siege of Saragossa.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Jom. iii.
125. Cav.
68, 69.
Tor. ii.
236, 237.

Prepara-
tions which
had been
made for
the defence
of the
place.

of the highest interest to the Emperor. After the disastrous issue of the battle of Tudela, Palafox, with about fifteen thousand regular troops, had thrown himself into that city; but their number was soon augmented to thirty thousand, by the stragglers who had taken refuge there after that rout, to whom were soon joined fifteen thousand armed but undisciplined peasants, monks, and mechanics. The enthusiasm of this motley crowd was inconceivable; it recalled, in the nineteenth century, the days of Numantia and Saguntum. The citizens of the town were animated by the spirit of democratic freedom; the peasants of the country by that of devout enthusiasm; the monks by religious devotion; the soldiers by former glory—all by patriotic fervour. By a singular combination of circumstances, but which frequently occurred during the Spanish war, the three great principles which agitate mankind,—the spirit of religion, the fervour of equality, the glow of patriotism,—were all called into action at the same time, and brought to conspire to stimulate one common resistance; and thence the obstinate defence of Saragossa and its deathless fame.

The defences of the place had been considerably strengthened since the former siege. The weak or ruined parts of the wall had been repaired, additional parapets erected in the most exposed situations, the suburbs included in new fortifications, barriers and trenches drawn across the principal streets, and the houses loopholed; so that, even if the rampart were surmounted, a formidable resistance might be anticipated in the interior of the town. General Doyle, of the English service, had, ever since the termination of the first siege, been indefatigable in his efforts to strengthen the place; a large quantity of English

muskets were distributed among the inhabitants; ammunition, stores, and provisions, were provided in abundance; the solid construction of the storehouses diminished to a considerable degree the chances of a successful bombardment; and one hundred and eighty guns distributed on the ramparts gave token of a much more serious resistance than on the last memorable occasion. Such was the confidence of the Arragonese in the strength of the ramparts of Saragossa, the unconquerable spirit of its garrison, and the all-powerful protection of our Lady of the Pillar, that, on the approach of the French troops to invest the town, the peasants from all quarters flocked into it, burning with ardour, and undaunted in resolution, so as to swell its defenders to fifty thousand men, but bringing with them, as into Athens when besieged by the Lacedemonians, the seeds of a contagious malady, which among its now crowded dwellings spread with alarming rapidity, and in the end proved more fatal even than the sword of the enemy.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Cav. 74,
87. Tor.
ii. 239,
240. Jom.
iii. 126,
127. Belm.
ii. 139,
140; and
Piec. Just.

Palafox exercised an absolute authority over the city, and such was the patriotic ardour of the inhabitants, that all his orders for the public defence were obeyed without a moment's hesitation, even though involving the sacrifice of the most valuable property, or dearest attachments of the people. If a house in the neighbourhood was required to be demolished to make way for the fire of the ramparts, hardly was the order given than the proprietor himself levelled it with the ground. The shady groves, the delicious gardens in which the citizens so much delighted, fell before the axe: in a few days the accumulated wealth of centuries disappeared in the environs of the town before the breath of patriotism.

Preparatory
dispositions
of Palafox.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Belm. ii.
143, 144.
Tor. ii.
238. Cav.
77, 81.
Jones, i.
170.

Forces of
the besiegers,
and
progress of
the siege
before the
trenches
were
opened.

Dec. 20.

Palafox's provident care extended to every department; his spirit animated every rank: but such was the ardour of the people, that their voluntary supplies anticipated every requisition, and amply provided for the multitude now accumulated within the walls; terror was summoned to the aid of loyalty, and the fearful engines of popular power, the scaffold and the gallows, were erected on the public square, where some unhappy wretches, suspected of a leaning to the enemy, were indignantly executed.¹

To attack a town defended by fifty thousand armed men, animated with such a spirit, was truly a formidable undertaking; but the forces which Napoleon put at the disposal of his generals were adequate to the enterprise. Two strong corps, numbering together nearly fifty thousand combatants, present with the eagles, were placed under the command of the Marshals Moncey and Mortier; and the operations of the siege began in good earnest in the middle of December.* The fortified outpost of Torrero was

* Colonel Napier (*Peninsular War*, ii. 25) says that the besieging force was only 35,000; but this is a mistake, as the numbers proved by the Imperial Muster-Rolls, published by order of the French government, were as follows:—

Third corps—Junot's —	Infantry and	}	.	22,473
	Cavalry,			
	Artillery,			
Fifth corps—Mortier's—	Infantry and	}	.	22,607
	Cavalry,			
	Artillery,			
Artillery, heavy, Officers and men,		.	.	542
Engineers' establishment,		.	.	1017
Total,				49,087

Sixteen thousand five hundred of the infantry and cavalry of the Third corps alone were employed in the siege, the remainder being devoted to keeping up the communications, making the force actually employed in the siege 43,000 men. See BELMAS, *Journaux des Sieges dans la Peninsule*, vol. ii. 333, 339; an official work of great accuracy and splendour.

carried after a slight resistance, the garrison having withdrawn into the town ; but an assault, two days afterwards, upon the suburb in the same quarter, though at first successful, was finally repulsed with great slaughter by Palafox, who hastened to the menaced point, and, by his example, powerfully contributed to restore the day. An honourable capitulation was then proposed by Mortier, accompanied with the intimation that Madrid had fallen, and the English were retiring before Napoleon to their ships ; but even this disheartening intelligence had no effect upon the resolution of the brave governor, who replied, that if Madrid had fallen, it was because it had been sold, but that the ramparts of Saragossa were still untouched, and he would bury himself and his soldiers under its ruins rather than capitulate. Despairing now of effecting an accommodation, the French marshals completed the investment of the town on both sides of the river, and the parallels being now considerably advanced, a powerful fire was opened on the walls, especially on the convents of the Augustines, the Capuchins, and Santa EUGRACIA, the only structures resembling bastions in their whole circumference.¹

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1809.

Dec. 22.

Dec. 30.

¹ Jones, i.
171, 173.Tor. ii.
241, 242.Cav. 91,
93. Belm.
ii. 153,
163.

Marshal Junot arrived and took the command of the besieging force on the 2d January, and every day and night thereafter was signalized by bloody combats. Sorties were daily attempted by the Spanish troops, and sometimes with success ; but, in spite of all their efforts, the progress of the besiegers was sensible, and, by the middle of January, almost all the fortified posts outside the rampart had fallen into their hands. The feeble parapet of the wall was soon levelled by the French cannon ; and the heroic Spanish gunners had no defence but bags of earth, which the citizens

Assault, and
fall of all
the external
fortified
posts.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Jan. 15.

replaced as fast as they were shattered by the enemy's shot, and their own unconquerable courage. The tête-du-pont of the Huerba was carried with very little loss, and though the bridge itself was blown up by the besieged, the enemy made their way across the stream, and, from fifty-five pieces of heavy cannon, thundered on the feeble rampart which, in that place, was so dilapidated as to give way after a few hours' battering. But, mean-while, the Spaniards were not idle. Not only was every inch of ground resolutely contested, and the most extraordinary means taken to keep up the spirits of the besieged; the report was spread by the generals, and gained implicit credence, that the Emperor had been defeated, several of the marshals killed, and that Don Francisco Palafox, brother to the commander-in-chief, was approaching with a powerful army to raise the siege. In truth, Don Philippe Perena, a guerrilla leader, had succeeded in drawing together six thousand peasants, with whom he kept the field in Arragon, and disquieted the rear of the French army; and, although neither the numbers nor composition of this force was such as to give them any serious alarm, the knowledge of its existence had a surprising effect in supporting the efforts of the besieged, who now stood much in need of such encouragement, from the crowded condition of the population shut up within the narrow circle of the old walls, and the fearful ravages which contagious maladies were making among an indigent and suffering multitude, driven into crowded cellars to avoid the terrible and incessant fire of the enemy's bombs and cannon-shot.

¹ Belm. ii.
163, 204.
Nap. ii. 31.
Tor. ii.
243, 244,
Cav. 93,
101.
Rogn. 22,
24.

Matters were in this state when Marshal Lannes arrived, entrusted by Napoleon, who was dissatisfied

with the progress made, with the general direction of the siege, and the command of both the corps employed in its prosecution. The influence of his master-mind speedily appeared in the increased energy of the attacks, and more thorough co-operation of the troops engaged in the undertaking. Several nocturnal sorties attempted by the Spaniards to retard their progress towards the convent of Santa Eugracia, which itself formed a prominent part of the wall towards the river, having failed to stop the besiegers, an assault on that quarter was ordered by Marshal Lannes on the 27th at noon. Two practicable breaches had been made in that quarter; and a third nearer the centre of the town, in the convent of Santa Eugracia. The tolling of the great bell of the new tower warned the Saragossans of the approach of the enemy, and all instantly hastened to the post of danger. Hardly had they arrived when the assaulting columns appeared at the breaches, vast crowds of daring men issued from the trenches, and with loud shouts rushed on to the attack. Such was the vigour of the assault, that, after a hard struggle, the French, though twice repulsed, at length succeeded in making themselves masters of the convent of St Joseph; while, in the centre, the attacking column on Santa Eugracia, after reaching the summit of the breach, was hurled headlong to its foot by a gallant effort of the Spanish soldiers. Returning again, however, with redoubled vigour to the charge, they not only penetrated in, but made themselves masters of the adjoining convent, where, in spite of the efforts of the besieged to dispossess them, they maintained themselves till evening. All night the tocsin rang incessantly to call the citizens to the scene of danger,¹ and devoted crowds rushed with

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Storming of
the convents
of Santa
Eugracia,
and the
Capuchins
in the ram-
parts.

Jan. 27.

¹ Belm. ii.
218, 227.
Cav. 103,
105. Tor.
ii., 246,
247. Nap.
ii. 34, 37.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Obstinate
defence of
the town
after the
walls were
taken.

Jan. 28.

¹ Cav. 107,
111. Tor.
ii. 247,
248. Nap.
ii. 37, 38.
Belm. ii.
226, 277.
Rogn. 26,
30.

indomitable courage to the very mouth of the enemy's guns; but though they fought from every house and window, with the most desperate resolution they could not drive the assailants from the posts they had won.

The walls of Saragossa had now gone to the ground, and an ordinary garrison, having lost its military defences, would never have thought of prolonging the contest. But the valour of the inhabitants remained; and from the ruins of all regulated or acknowledged modes of defence, emerged the redoubtable warfare of the people. On the very next day, the commander of their engineers, San Genis, a man of equal professional skill and resolution, fell on the battery of Palafox. Though his manners were gentle, yet he had the true spirit of a soldier, and often said, "It is needless ever to cite me to a council of war in which there is to be a question of capitulating: my opinion is, we can, under all circumstances, defend ourselves." The French chief of engineers, La Coste, a young man of similar acquirements and valour, perished at the same time; but the loss of their skilled talents was now of little moment; the dreadful war from house to house had commenced, in which individual courage more than directing talent was required. No sooner was it discovered that the enemy had effected a lodgment within the walls, than the people assembled in crowds in every house and building near the structures which they occupied, and kept up so incessant a fire on the assailants, that for some days Lannes deemed it not advisable to provoke an open combat, but to confine his efforts to strengthening the posts he had won, and preparing the way for further progress by the more certain methods of sap and mine.¹ Meantime the passions of the people were roused to the

very highest pitch by the dread of treason or any accommodation with the enemy; and popular vehemence, overwhelming all the restraints of law or order, sacrificed, almost every night, persons to the blind suspicions of the multitude, who were found hanging in the morning on gallows erected in the Cosso and market place.

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LVIII.
1809.

Feb. 2.

The enemy's efforts were directed chiefly against the convents of San Augustin and Santa Monaca, and a breach having been effected in their walls, they were carried by assault; but the assailants, having endeavoured, after this success, to penetrate into the principal street of the Cosso, were repulsed with great slaughter. Every house, every room, in the quarters where the attack was going on with most vehemence, became the theatre of mortal combat; as the original assailants and defenders were killed or wounded others were hurried forward to the spot; the dead and the dying lay heaped upon each other, to the height of several feet above the ground; but mounting on this ghastly pile, the undaunted foemen still maintained the fight for hours together, with such obstinacy, that no progress could be made on either side; and not unfrequently, while still fast locked in the deadly struggle, the whole, dead, dying, and combatants, were together blown into the air, by the explosion of the mines beneath. Yet even these awful catastrophes were turned by the besieged to their advantage; the ruined walls afforded no protection to the French soldiers; and, from the adjoining windows, the Arragonese marksmen brought down, with unerring aim, every hostile figure that appeared among the ruins. Taught by these dangers, the French engineers diminished the charge of powder in their mines, so as to blow up the inside of the houses

Slow progress of the
assailants.
Feb. 2.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

only, without throwing down the external walls ; and in these half-ruined edifices, they maintained themselves, and pushed on fresh mines and attacks. Still, however, the convents and churches remained in the hands of the Spaniards ; and, as long as these massy structures were garrisoned by their undaunted troops, the progress of the French was not only extremely slow, but liable to continual disaster from the sallies, often successful, of the besieged, and the countermines with which they thwarted the progress of their subterraneous attacks. Disheartened by this murderous, and apparently interminable warfare, which continued without intermission night and day, for three weeks, the French soldiers began to murmur at their lot ; they almost despaired of conquering a city where every house was defended like a citadel, where every street could be won only by torrents of blood, and victory was attained only by destruction ; the wounded, the sick, had fearfully thinned their ranks ; and that depression was rapidly spreading amongst them, which is so often the forerunner of the greatest calamities. “ Scarce a fourth of the town,” said they, “ is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements, or we shall all perish among these ruins, which will become our own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens.”¹

¹ Belm. ii. 227, 266.
Nap. ii. 39, 40.
Rogniat, 34, 39.
Cav. 113, 123.

Miseries to which the besieged were exposed from pestilence.

But, while depression was thus paralysing the arm of the besiegers, the miseries of the besieged were incomparably greater. The incessant shower of bombs and cannon-balls which fell upon the town, had for a month past obliged the whole inhabitants, not actually combating, to take refuge in the cellars ; and the close confinement of so vast a multitude in these narrow and gloomy abodes, joined to the failure

of provisions, and mental depression springing from the unbounded calamities with which they were surrounded, induced a terrible fever, which was now making the most dreadful ravages. What between the devastations of the epidemic, and the sword of the enemy, several thousands, in the middle of February, were dying every day; room could not be found in the charnel-houses for such a multitude of bodies; and the living and dead were shut up together in these subterraneous abodes, while the roar of artillery, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling houses, the flames of conflagration, and the alternate shouts and cries of the combatants, shook the city night and day without intermission above their head. Happy those who expired amidst this scene of unutterable woe! yet even they bequeathed with their last breath to the survivors the most solemn injunctions to continue to the last this unparalleled struggle; and from these dens of the living and the dead issued daily crowds of warriors, extenuated, indeed, and livid, but who maintained with unconquerable resolution a desperate resistance. But human nature, even in its most exalted mood, cannot go beyond a certain point: Saragossa was about to fall: but she was to leave a name immortal, like Numantia or Saguntum, in the annals of mankind.^{1*}

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Belm. ii.
267, 277.
Cav. 129,
131.
Rogniat,
38, 42.
Tor. 249,
250.

Marshal Lannes, unshaken by the murmurs of his troops, was indefatigable in his endeavours to prose-

* Such was the heroic spirit which animated the inhabitants, that it inspired even the softer sex to deeds of valour. Among these Augustina Zaragoza was peculiarly distinguished. She had served with unshaken courage a cannon near the gate of Portillo at the former siege, and she took her station there again when the enemy returned. "See, general," said she to Palafox when he visited that quarter, "I am again with my old friend." Her husband being struck by a cannon ball as he served the battery, she calmly stepped into his place, and pointed the gun as he lay bleeding at her side. Frequently she was to be

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LVIII.

1809.

Able efforts
and suc-
cesses of
Marshal
Lannes on
the left of
the Ebro.
Feb. 18.

cute the siege to a successful issue. He pointed out to them, with justice, that the losses of the besieged greatly exceeded their own, and that, even if the fierceness of their defence should continue unabated, their destruction must speedily ensue from the united ravages of famine and pestilence. Mean-while, intelligence arrived of the evacuation of Galicia by the English, and various successes in other parts of Spain ; and these advices having somewhat elevated their spirits, a general assault took place on the 18th on both banks of the Ebro. The division Gazan burst with irresistible violence into the suburb on the left bank, which the Spaniards had hitherto held ; and, pushing on to the convent of St Lazan, which stood on the water's edge, after a bloody repulse, made good their entrance through an enormous breach which their artillery had made in its walls. This important acquisition rendered the suburb no longer tenable ; and its brave defenders were forced to retreat across the bridge into the town. Part effected their object, amidst a terrific fire of grape, bombs, and musket-shot, which raked them on both sides in rushing through the perilous defile ; the remainder, to the number of fifteen hundred, after vainly endeavouring to cut their way through the dense masses of the enemy, were surrounded, and, having exhausted their ammunition, were made prisoners. This was a fatal blow to the Spaniards. Fifty pieces of heavy

seen at the head of an assaulting party, wrapped in her cloak, sword in hand, cheering on the soldiers to the discharge of their duty. She was at length taken prisoner, but being carried to the French hospital, and taken dangerously ill, she contrived to escape. A female corps was formed to carry provisions and water to the combatants and remove the wounded, at the head of which was Donna Benita, a lady of rank. Several hundred women and children perished during the siege, not by bombs or cannon-shot, but in actual combat.—See SOUTHEY, ii. 200 ; and RIC., 220, 221.

artillery, placed in the abandoned suburb, played across the Ebro on the defenceless houses on the quay, and soon laid them in ruins. Before the besieged could recover from their consternation, Lannes commenced a furious assault on the monastery of the Trinity, near the University; and, after a vain attempt to carry it by open force, the assailants succeeded in making good their entrance during the confusion occasioned by the explosion of a petard. At the same time, a mine, charged with sixteen hundred pounds of powder, exploded with a terrific shock near the Comic Theatre, and six mines had been run under the street of the Cosso, each of which were charged with three thousand pounds of powder, more than sufficient to lay all that part of the city in ruins, and expose naked and defenceless all those quarters which were still held by the patriots.¹

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¹ Vict. et
Conq. xviii.
291, 293.
Cav. 137,
139. Tor.
ii. 251,
252. Nap.
ii. 44, 45.
Belm. ii.
308, 317.
Rogniat,
42, 45.

Happily it was not necessary to have recourse to that extremity. Palafox who, from the commencement of the siege, had discharged with heroic resolution the duties of a commander-in-chief, and, though laid prostrate for nearly a month by the prevailing epidemic, still held the keys of the city in his grasp, now perceived that further resistance was fruitless. His brother, Don Francisco Palafox, had not only been unable to throw succours into the place, but had been driven off to a distance, and the troops dispatched against him had returned to reinforce the besieging host; the malignant fever daily made great ravages, both among the troops and inhabitants; hardly nine thousand of the former remained capable of bearing arms, and the latter were diminished in a still greater proportion; there were neither hospitals for the thousands of sick who crowded the city, nor medicines for their relief. In these

Capitula-
tion of
Saragossa.
Feb. 20.

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Feb. 19.

circumstances, this noble chief, who was so reduced by fever as to be unable any longer to bear the burden of the command, and yet knew that as soon as the ascendant of his character was no longer felt, the resistance could not be prolonged, took the resolution to send his aide-de-camp to Lannes to negotiate for a capitulation. The terms he contended for were, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and be allowed to retire to the nearest Spanish army; but these proposals were, of course, rejected, and Lannes at first would only consent to protect the women and children. Don Pedro Ric, who, in the name of the Junta of Saragossa, was intrusted with the negotiation, replied with great spirit, "That would be delivering us to the mercy of the enemy; if that be the case, Saragossa will continue to defend herself, for she has still weapons, ammunition, and, above all, arms." Fearful of driving to desperation a body of men of whose prowess he had recently had such ample proof, the French marshal, upon this, agreed to a capitulation, by which it was stipulated that the garrison should march out the following morning with the honours of war, and be marched as prisoners of war into France; the officers retaining their swords, horses, and baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks; that private property and public worship should be respected, and the armed peasants dismissed. Situated as the besieged were, these terms could not be regarded but as eminently favourable, and an enduring monument of their heroic constancy; but such was the spirit which still animated the people, that they murmured loudly at any capitulation, and it was with difficulty that the ruling junta prevented an insurrection during the night for the purpose of continuing the contest till the last extremity.¹

¹ Cav. 143,
147. Rog-
niat, 47,
52. Tor. ii.
252, 253.
Don Pedro
Ric, 230,
231.

On the following day at noon, twelve thousand men, for the most part pale, emaciated, and livid in hue, marched out, and having surrendered their arms, which they had hardly strength left to hold, to their courageous enemies, were sent into the besiegers' camp, where they received the rations of which they stood so much in need. The French troops then marched into the town; and never had such a spectacle before been exhibited in modern times. Six thousand dead bodies still lay unburied in the streets, among the fragments of buildings, or around the churches; half the houses were in ruins; infants were striving in vain to get nutriment from their dying mothers; from the vaults and subterraneous rooms a few squalid persons of both sexes, like ghosts, were issuing, drawing the corpses, hardly distinguishable save by their stillness from the persons who bore them; the pestilence spread almost visibly from those living charnel-houses, alike on friend and foe around. Fifty-four thousand human beings had perished during the siege, of whom only six thousand were killed by the sword or fire of the enemy; the awful plague had carried off the rest. Sixteen thousand sick, for the most part in a dying state, encumbered the town when hostilities ceased, and filled every quarter with wo. The French had three thousand killed and twelve thousand wounded during the struggle.* Fifty days of open trenches had been borne by a town defended by nothing but a single wall; half that time the contest had continued with more than

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Hideous
appearance
of the town
when sur-
rendered.
Losses on
both sides.

* Rogniat says the French loss was three thousand only, but without specifying whether it was killed, or killed and wounded; and it seems clear that it was the former only—an obscurity which has misled many later writers. It is incredible that forty-eight thousand French, headed by Lannes, should have been arrested for fifty days of open trenches, by a resistance which cost them only three thousand men. See

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¹ Belm. ii.
318, 327.
Cav. 148,
149. Don
Pedro Ric,
232.
Schepeler,
ii. 196.
South. ii.
198, 199.

Cruel use
which the
French
generals
make of
their vic-
tory.

forty thousand besiegers after that feeble defence had fallen, and the town, in a military sense, was taken. Thirty-three thousand cannon-shot, and sixteen thousand bombs, had been thrown into the place: yet at the close of the siege the assailants were only masters of a fourth of the town; thirteen convents and churches had been taken, but forty remained to be forced. It was domestic pestilence, not foreign arms, which subdued Saragossa. Modern Europe has not so memorable a siege to recount; and to the end of the world, even after Spain and France have sunk before the waves of time, and all the glories of modern Europe have passed away, it will stand forth, in undecaying lustre, a monument of heroic devotion, which will thrill the hearts of the brave and the generous throughout every succeeding age.¹

The lustre which the French arms justly acquired by the energy and perseverance which they had displayed during this memorable siege, was much tarnished by the cruel or rapacious conduct of the chiefs by whom it had been concluded. Don Basilio Boggiero, the former tutor and present friend of Palafox, who was watching beside that heroic chief's bedside to administer to him the last consolations of religion, was, by the express commands of Lannes, three days after the capitulation, dragged at midnight out of the sick chamber, and, along with Don Santiago Sas, another courageous chaplain, who had been distinguished alike by his bravery in the last and the present siege, bayoneted on the banks of the Ebro, and their dead bodies thrown into the river. The French

ROGNIAT, 49, 51; and SCHEPELER, *Hist. de la Guerra d'Espagne*, ii. 195, 196. In fact, we have the authority of Suchet for the assertion, that Junot's corps in May, which, at the commencement of the siege was twenty-three thousand strong, could only muster ten thousand men.—SUCHET, ii. 14, 15.

had the cruelty to exact from the wo-struck city of Saragossa, immediately after their entry, a contribution of fifty thousand pairs of shoes, and eight thousand pairs of boots, with medicines and every other requisite for an hospital; a service of china and fitting up for a tennis court were demanded for the particular use of Marshal Junot. The church of our Lady of the Pillar, one of the richest in Spain, was rifled by Marshal Lannes of jewels to the enormous amount of 4,687,000 francs, or L.184,000, the whole of which he carried with him into France,¹ to the infinite mortification of Madame Junot, who conceived her husband had an equal right to the precious spoil, and has, in her vexation, revealed the whole details of the disgraceful spoliation.^{2*} By way of striking terror into the monks, some of them were enclosed in sacks and thrown at night into the Ebro, whose waters threw them ashore in the morning, to the utter horror of the inhabitants; while Palafox himself, who was at the point of death when the city surrendered, was conducted a close prisoner into France the moment he was able to travel, in defiance of a promise by Lannes to Ric, that he should be permitted to retire wherever he chose.³ †

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Tor. ii.
371. D'Abr.
xii. 221.² D'Abr.
xii. 213,
221.³ Ric. 245,
249.
D'Abr, xii.
213, 214.
Tor. ii.
253, 254.
South., ii.
201, 204.

* The clergy at first offered a third of the treasure, but this was refused by Lannes, who insisted upon the whole. Marshal Mortier, with a true soldier's honour, refused any part of the plunder.—D'ABBANTES, xii. 221.

† Colonel Napier, after mentioning what is correct, that for a month before the siege terminated, Palafox had been constantly in a bomb-proof cellar, adds (ii. 82) that "there is too much reason to believe that he and others of both sexes lived in a *state of sensuality*, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness which surrounded them." No authority is quoted for this assertion, and the author can discover none in any other historian. On the contrary, Cavallero, the Spanish chief of engineers of the siege, says, "Le général-en-chef qui depuis un mois n'avait pas sorti de son caveau, avait été atteint de la terrible maladie; il pouvait à peine veiller aux soins de son gouvernement. Il sentit son affaiblisse-

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Submission
of the whole
of Arragon.

March 22.

¹ South., ii.
201. Vict.
et Conq.
xviii. 296.
Schepeler,
ii. 226,
227.

Winter
operations
in Catalonia
under St
Cyr.

The whole moral as well as physical strength of Arragon having been concentrated in Saragossa, its fall immediately drew after it the submission of the rest of the province. The important fortress of Jaca, commanding the chief pass from that province through the Pyrenees into France, surrendered with its garrison of two thousand men, a few days after the capital had fallen. Benasque, and some other places of lesser note, followed the example; and before Marshal Lannes was summoned by Napoleon, in the middle of March, to join the grand army in Bavaria, the conquest of the whole province, in a military sense, had been so far completed, that nothing remained for Junot, who continued in command in that quarter, and preparations were commenced for an expedition against Valencia.¹

While these important operations were destroying all the elements of resistance in Arragon, Catalonia was becoming the theatre of a sanguinary warfare. At the close of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, when Duhesme, as already noticed, had withdrawn to Barcelona after the failure before Gerona, there remained to the French in that province only that important fortress, garrisoned by eight thousand, and the citadel of Figueras, by four

ment, et sachant bien que la place ne résisterait pas long temps lorsque l'ascendant de son caractère ne soutiendrait plus l'énergie des Saragossans, il envoya son aide-de-camp proposer au Duc de Montebello une capitulation."—CAVALLERO, 140. And Toreno adds, "Le Général (Palafox) fût emporté mourant de Saragosse; on l'on ne tarda pas à le rapporter au cause de l'extreme faiblesse dans lequel il se trouvait."—TORENO, *Hist. de la Guerre en Espagne*, ii. 254. Colonel Jones of the British engineers observes, "Granting the palm of skill and science to the besiegers, as seems their due, it cannot be doubted, that while heroic self-devotion, unshaken loyalty, and exalted patriotism are held in estimation among mankind, the name of Palafox, blended with that of Saragossa, will be immortal."—JONES'S *Sieges of the Peninsula*, i. 183.

thousand men.* Napoleon, however, had no intention of allowing the eastern gate of Spain to slip from his grasp, and even while the first siege of Gerona was still going forward, he was collecting a fresh corps at Perpignan to relieve those who were shut up in Barcelona, and confided the direction of it to Marshal St Cyr. That accomplished officer took the command in the end of October: Napoleon's parting words to him were brief, but characteristic. "Preserve Barcelona for me; if it is lost, I cannot retake it with eighty thousand men." St Cyr crossed the frontier on the 5th November, and advanced towards ROSAS, the siege of which he immediately commenced. His forces consisted at first of thirty thousand, though they were some months afterwards augmented to forty-eight thousand men; but they were a motley group of Italians, Germans, and Swiss, upon some of whom little reliance could be placed, and the marshal felt great discouragement at entering with such a force a mountainous province, where eighty thousand men were said to be in arms. But his forebodings were in a great degree groundless: the patriot force in the province was by no means in the brilliant condition which the Spanish journals represented. To the first burst of patriotic exertion, had succeeded the usual depressing reaction when the effort is over, and the necessity for sustained sacrifices and organised armies is felt; great part of the peasants had returned to their homes; the local juntas were disunited, and had, in a considerable degree, fallen into incapable hands; a large part of the prodigal supplies of England had been embezzled or misapplied by the cupidity of the Spanish agents,¹ to whom they had been

CHAP.
LVIII.

1808.

Nov. 5,
1808.

¹ Nap. ii.
54, 61. St
Cyr Guerre
en Cata-
logne, 19,
30. Tor. ii.
223, 224.
Colling.
Mem. ii.
315.

* Ante, vi. 740.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1808.

Siege of
Rosas.

Nov. 27.

Nov. 30.

Dec. 3.

¹ St Cyr,
41, 51.
Nap. ii. 61,
65. Tor. ii.
227, 228.

consigned ; while the English co-operation from Sicily, which was anxiously looked for, had been intercepted, by demonstrations of Murat against Sicily, which had the effect of retaining Sir John Stuart and ten thousand British troops in that island.¹

Rosas, however, was too strong a place to fall without a vigorous resistance, and it was supported by means of defence which rarely fell to the lot of the Spanish besieged cities. The Excellent, of 74 guns, with two bomb vessels, lay in the bay within cannon-shot of the town. Lord Cochrane came up in his frigate the Imperieuse, in the middle of the siege ; and the fortifications, though old, were regular and respectable. The citadel and the fort of Trinidad, a mile and a quarter distant, were the strongest points, though they were both commanded by the mountains rising above the town, and the garrison consisted of nearly three thousand men. The town, which was hardly fortified, was soon taken ; but the citadel and Fort Trinidad made a stout resistance. Heavy guns were at length brought up close to the walls of the latter, and a large breach made in the ramparts, upon which the Spanish governor declared the post no longer tenable ; but Lord Cochrane, who had just arrived, and to whose ardent spirit such scenes of danger were an actual enjoyment, immediately threw himself into it, and, by his courage and resources, prolonged a defence which otherwise would have been altogether desperate. Two assaults were repulsed by this intrepid officer, and his undaunted seamen, with very great slaughter : but, mean-while, a practicable breach was effected in the citadel ; and a sally, attempted on the night of the 3d, having failed to arrest the progress of the besiegers,¹ the place surrendered with its gar-

rison, still 2400 strong, on the following day; but Lord Cochrane succeeded in getting the whole garrison of Fort Trinidad in safety on board his vessel.

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 LVIII.
 1808.

Having his retreat and communication in some degree secured by this success, St Cyr moved on to the relief of Barcelona, where General Duhesme, with eight thousand men, was shut up by the Spanish armies, and reduced to great straits for want of provisions and military stores. It has been already mentioned,* that two roads lead from Perpignan to Barcelona; one going through Hostalrich and Gerona, and the other by Rosas and the sea coast. To avoid the destructive fire of the English cruisers, St Cyr chose the mountain road; trusting to his resources and skill to discover some path through the hills, which might avoid the fire of the first of these fortresses. On arriving at the point of danger, a shepherd discovered an unguarded path by which Hostalrich might be turned, which was accordingly done, though not without a very harassing opposition from the Spanish light troops. Next day, however, after their circuitous route was over, and they had regained the great road, they encountered the main body of the Spanish army under Vivas and Reding, who had collected fourteen thousand men, half regulars and half armed peasants, in a strong position at Cardadeu, to bar his progress; while seven thousand men, under Lazan, who had issued from Gerona, hung upon their rear, and Milans, with four thousand men, supported by clouds of Somatenes, or armed peasants, infested the wooded hills on either flank. The French force on the spot was fifteen thousand infantry and thirteen hundred horse, while the whole Spanish force, if collected together, even after

Battle of
 Cardadeu,
 and relief of
 Barcelona.

Dec. 15.

Dec. 16.

* Ante, vi. 739.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

providing for the blockade of Barcelona, would have exceeded forty thousand, stationed in a rocky and wooded country, traversed only by narrow defiles ; a situation of all others the most favourable for irregular or half-disciplined troops. Napoleon, in such circumstances, would have raised the blockade of Barcelona, as he did that of Mantua, in 1796, and fallen with his whole force on the invader, who could scarcely have escaped destruction ; a result which would have changed the whole face of the campaign, and possibly of Europe. But Vivas was not Napoleon, and the Spanish generals deemed no such concentration of all their means necessary. Elated with their advantages, they anticipated an easy victory, and were already, in imagination, renewing the triumphs of Baylen. St Cyr, however, soon showed he was very different from Dupont. Uniting his troops into one solid mass, with orders to march headlong on, without firing a shot, he bore down with such vigour on the enemy's centre, that in half an hour they were totally defeated, with the loss of five hundred killed and two thousand wounded, besides all their artillery and ammunition. Lazan and Milans came up just when the action was over, and instantly retired to the shelter of Gerona and the mountains : arrived two hours sooner, they might have inspired hesitation in the enemy's column, given time for their whole forces to come up, and Cardadeu had been Baylen. Such is the value of time in war.¹

¹ Nap. ii.
71, 73.

Tor. ii.

232, 233.

St Cyr, 62,
72.

Cabanes, p.
3, c. 11.

Defeat of
the Span-
iards at
Molinos del
Rey.

Nothing now remained to prevent the relief of Barcelona by St Cyr, which was effected the day after, and the junction of Duhesme with his troops completed. The Spaniards had been so thoroughly dispersed by their defeat, that the general-in-chief, Vivas, had escaped by a cross mountain path on board

one of the English cruisers ; and Reding, the second in command, who was left in the direction of the fugitives, could with difficulty, two days afterwards, rally ten thousand foot and nine hundred horse to the south of Barcelona. In a few days, however, these troops swelled to twenty thousand men, and took post at Molinos del Rey, where, at daybreak on the 21st, they were attacked by St Cyr with such vigour, that in half an hour they were totally routed, and dispersed in every direction. Such was the swiftness of their flight, that few were killed or wounded, but twelve hundred were made prisoners, and all their magazines, stores, ammunition, and artillery, fell into the hands of the victors. Among these were fifty pieces of cannon, three millions of cartridges, sixty thousand pounds of powder, and a magazine containing thirty thousand stand of English arms. The whole open country was, after this great defeat, abandoned by the Spaniards : twelve thousand took refuge in the utmost disorder in Tarragona, while five thousand fled to the mountains in the interior, where they conferred the command on Reding, who, undismayed by so many disasters, immediately commenced, with unshaken constancy, the re-organization of his tumultuary forces. But the discouragement of the province was extreme ; and Lord Collingwood, who, from the British fleet in the neighbourhood, took a cool survey of the state of affairs, at once saw through the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish authorities, and declared that the elements of resistance in the province were all but dissolved.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Dec. 21.

¹ Lord Col-
lingwood to
R. Adair,
Feb. 2,
1809.
Mem. ii.
315. Nap.
ii. 75, 77.
Tor. ii. 235,
236.
St Cyr, 79,
89. Cab. p.
3, c. 12.

These disasters in Catalonia powerfully contributed to the fall of Saragossa, by extinguishing the only force from which any relief to its distressed garrison could have been obtained. Thus far, therefore, the

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LVIII.

1809.

Reding's
plan of a
general at-
tack on
the enemy
to clear the
way for
Saragossa.

successes of St Cyr had been most signal, and the immediate reduction of the province might reasonably have been expected. But that able commander experienced, in his turn, the exhausting effects of this interminable warfare. While he lay at Villa Franca refitting his troops, and forming a park of artillery out of the spoils captured from the enemy, the Spaniards recovered from their consternation, and in several guerilla combats regained in some degree their confidence in engaging the enemy. The junta at Tarragona, elected from the democratic party during the first tumult of alarm and revolt consequent on the defeat of Molinos del Rey, displayed the utmost vigour: preparations for defence were made on such a scale as precluded all hope of a successful siege; and the confluence of disbanded soldiers who had escaped from the rout, soon raised the force within the walls to twenty thousand men, while an equal force at Gerona and in the intervening mountains debarred the French all access into the hilly region to the westward. But a perception of their strength, notwithstanding all the disasters they had experienced, again proved fatal to the Spaniards; the cry for succour from Saragossa met with a responsive echo in the citizens of Tarragona and the breast of the brave Reding, who resolved at all hazards to make an attempt for its relief. The plan which he adopted was ably conceived, and failed only from the indifferent quality of the troops to whose execution it was entrusted. Fifteen thousand men under Castro, who lay outside of Tarragona, were to move forward so as to interpose between St Cyr and Barcelona; Reding, with ten thousand more, issuing from the town was to assail their front, while the Somatenes,¹ from all quarters, were summoned to descend from their hills to co-operate in the grand

¹ Tor. ii.
301, 302.
Nap. ii. 84,
85. St Cyr,
94, 102.
Cabanès. p.
3, c. 14.

attack, from which the total destruction of the enemy was confidently and universally anticipated. CHAP.
LVIII.

To withstand this formidable concentration of forces, St Cyr had nominally forty-eight thousand men at his disposal, but of these only twenty-three thousand were concentrated under his immediate command at Villa Franca in the Llobregat, the remainder being either detached to keep up the communications, or sick and wounded in the rear. But such a body, under such a chief, had little to apprehend from the ill-combined efforts of forty thousand Spaniards, in part irregular, over a line of fifteen leagues in circumference. The moment that St Cyr saw the enemy's forces accumulating around him, he took the judicious resolution to act vigorously on the offensive, and break the enemy's centre before their wings could come up to its relief. With this view, he broke up from Villa Franca with the division of Pino, and joining his generals of division, Chabran and Chabot, formed a force in all eleven thousand strong. Early on the morning of the 17th, he commenced a vigorous attack on Castro's troops at Igualada, who, being completely surprised, were speedily put to the rout; and having thus broken through the enemy's line, he left the two former divisions at that place, and advanced against Reding, who was issuing from Tarragona with ten thousand men. Though assailed by superior forces, the brave soul of Reding retreated with reluctance, but he felt the necessity of doing so, and with great difficulty he contrived to collect the greater part of his army, about twelve thousand men, with which he slowly moved, hardly shunning a combat, towards Tarragona. On the following morning, however, he encountered St Cyr with fifteen thousand men at Valls, and after a short combat, was totally routed. Two thousand men were killed

1809.

Defeat of
the Span-
iards at
Igualada.
Feb. 17.

Feb. 16.

Feb. 17.

Feb. 24.

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1809.

¹ Tor. ii.
302, 307.
Cabanes. c.
14, 15.
St Cyr,
112, 126.
Nap. ii. 83,
91.

Languid
operations
in Catalonia
after this
success, and
retreat of
St Cyr to
the north of
the pro-
vince.
Feb. 27.

or wounded, the whole artillery taken, and Reding, who fought heroically to the very last, so severely wounded, that he had great difficulty in regaining Tarragona, where he soon after died. The loss of the French did not exceed a thousand men. Such was the popular ferment against Reding, when he arrived at that fortress, that he with difficulty escaped destruction from the populace, though he had discharged his duty better than any man in his army.¹

After this decisive victory, the regular war in Catalonia was at an end; and such was the general consternation which it produced, joined to the fall of Saragossa, of which intelligence was received at the same time, that, if St Cyr had pushed on immediately to Tortosa, it too would have fallen into his hands, almost without resistance. As it was, he made himself master of Reuss, an important commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona, and containing ample resources of every kind. There were taken, also, several thousand sick and wounded, whom St Cyr, with generous, though perhaps not altogether disinterested humanity, as he hoped to transplant the seeds of pestilence into the place sent into Tarragona to Reding; a step which led to a convention, by which it was agreed, that the wounded on either side should not be regarded as prisoners, but allowed to remain where they were, and re-join their respective armies upon their recovery: an admirable arrangement, which it is devoutly to be wished, could be extended to all civilized warfare. Want of provisions, however, compelled the French general to leave the plains of Tarragona, of which he was not yet in a condition to undertake the siege, and, approaching the French frontier, he drew near to Vich, with a view to make preparations for the siege of Gerona, which he meditated.²

March 19.
² Tor. ii.
207, 209.
St Cyr,
127, 140.
Cabanes. c.
16.

Upon this retreat, the Somatenes, who had never ceased to maintain themselves in the mountains, even after the disaster of Valls, issued in all directions from their retreats, and increasing in audacity with a few partizan successes, not only regained possession of the whole open country to the south of Barcelona, but pushed parties up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this movement was, to lend a hand to a strong party within the town, who were conspiring to gain possession of some of the gates, and deliver them to the patriots ; and the English squadron, under Lord Collingwood, at the same time approached to co-operate in the enterprise, and cannonaded the works towards the sea. It failed, however, from the accidental defeat of a body of the Somatenes, who were advancing towards the walls : but such was the alarm inspired by this attempt, that Duhesme took the resolution of compelling all the principal Spanish functionaries to take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph, and upon their courageous refusal, twenty-nine of the principal citizens were forthwith sent prisoners to Montjuic ; from which they were soon after despatched by St Cyr into France. But this severity, so foreign to the usual character of that officer, failed in producing any effect : on the contrary, the fortitude of these intrepid magistrates, in enduring captivity rather than abandon their sovereign and oath, spread the flame afresh over the country ; Tarragona, Lerida, and Tortosa, recovered from their consternation, and took separate measures for their defence, and the guerrillas multiplied to such a degree in the mountains, that the French army was soon master of no ground, but what itself occupied within the walls of Barcelona, or at Vich, deserted of its inhabitants on their approach, where St Cyr was making preparations for the siege of Gerona.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Unsuccessful attempt
on Barcelona.
March 10.

April 10.

¹ Tor. ii.
307, 312.
St Cyr,
127, 159.
Nap. ii. 93,
98.
Cabanes. p.
3, c. 16.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Renewal of
the contest
by Blake in
Arragon.
May 16.

To such a degree were the spirits of the rural population, especially in the mountainous districts, elevated by the retreat of St Cyr, from the neighbourhood of Tarragona to the foot of the Pyrenees, that Blake, who, on the death of Reding, was appointed captain-general of the three provinces of Arragon, Catalonia and Valencia, deemed the opportunity favourable for making a forward movement, to recover his lost ground in the first of these provinces. With this view, he advanced from the mountain region around Lerida, towards the plain of Arragon; and having arrived on the banks of the Cinca, a mountain torrent which descends from the mountains on the Catalonian frontier to the Ebro, he found eight companies of chosen infantry, separated from the remainder of the brigade to which they belonged, and succeeded in making the whole prisoners. This success elevated the hopes of the peasantry in the highest degree, and encouraged Blake to attempt the deliverance of Saragossa and the entire expulsion of the French from the province. He was confirmed in the hope that this was practicable by the great reduction of their troops on the Ebro: Bessieres' corps having been moved to Valladolid and Old Castile in the beginning of April, to keep up the communication on the great road from Bayonne; and Junot's alone left to make head against the Arragonese around Saragossa. Such had been the ravages which the sword of the enemy and the pestilence consequent on the siege had made in the ranks of this corps, that at this time, instead of twenty-four thousand, who crowded round its standards at the commencement of the siege, it could not muster more than ten thousand combatants; and they were in such a state of depression from the privations and dangers to which they had been exposed,¹ that little

¹ Suchet's
Mem. i. 10,
12. Tor.
iii. 15, 16.
Nap. ii. 97,
98.

reliance could be placed on them in presence of an enterprising enemy. CHAP.
LVIII.

Junot, who was taken ill at this juncture, and had never recovered, in the Emperor's estimation, his defeat by the English in Portugal, was superseded by SUCHET, a young general of division, hitherto unknown in high command, but whose great exploits and almost unbroken success threw a radiance round the declining years of the empire. Though not of the school of those illustrious chiefs who, roused to greatness during the struggles of the Republic, afterwards sustained with such lustre the fortunes of the Empire, he was distinguished by a capacity which rendered him better qualified than any one of them to attain the summit of military glory. Unlike Murat, Ney, and many other leaders, whose brilliant actions were performed chiefly, if not entirely, when executing the orders of the Emperor, and when surrounded by the halo of his fame, he early showed remarkable ability in separate command, and evinced those resources in difficulty, and that resolution in adversity, which, more than the splendour of success, are the tests of real military greatness. He has been characterised by Napoleon as "the first of his generals; as having grown in capacity, in later times, in a manner which was altogether surprising;"¹ and after making every allowance for the feelings which must have been roused in the Emperor's mind, by the manner in which he was deserted by many of his other marshals in the period of his adversity, enough remains durably engraved on the tablets of history to prove, that Suchet was not undeserving of this magnificent eulogium. Nor were his civil qualities less remarkable than his military: the order and regularity which he introduced into the provinces which his arms had

1809.

Suchet
takes the
command
in Arragon.
His charac-
ter.

O'Meara,
i. 492.
Las Cases,
ii. 11.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Defeat of
the French
at Alcaniz.

May 23.

¹ Suchet, i.
16, 21.
Tor. iii. 17,
18. Nap. ii.
99, 100.

subdued, were justly regarded as in the highest degree admirable; and while they completely relieved the Imperial treasury of all the expense of his armaments, they secured for him the gratitude and affection of the inhabitants subject to his rule, even at the very time that he was inflicting the deepest wounds on the fortunes of their country.

The first essay in arms, however, of this celebrated chief was unfortunate; and so unpromising was the aspect of affairs, shortly after he entered on the command in Arragon, that nothing but the greatest courage and capacity could have saved the French cause in the province from total ruin. Collecting all the disposable forces which he could muster, to avenge the affront received on the banks of the Cinca, and stop the progress of the enemy in that quarter, Suchet issued from Saragossa, and soon came up with the enemy, who had made himself master of Alcaniz, which he occupied with twelve thousand men. The French general had eight thousand infantry, and seven hundred horse, but the superior discipline of his troops gave him hopes of an easy victory. The action began by an attack by the French on the Mount of Las Horcas, in the centre of the Spanish line, which was assailed by three thousand of their best men; but the assault was repulsed without much difficulty by Blake's infantry and artillery, and Suchet, apprehensive of still greater disasters with troops so seriously discouraged, drew off, after a short combat. Such, however, was the disorder which prevailed, that though they were not pursued, a panic, originating in a false report spread by a drummer, in the night, threw the whole army into confusion, and they fled pell-mell into Samper, as if utterly routed.¹ In this

disgraceful affair, the French lost nearly a thousand men, the Spaniards not three hundred; and such was the dejected state of the troops, that Suchet was compelled to fall back to Saragossa, where it required all his moral courage to withstand the general clamour for a total evacuation of Arragon.

CHAP.
LVIII.
1809.

Had the Spanish general been at the head of well-disciplined troops, who could be relied on for operations in the level country, he might, by Suchet's admission, have accomplished the entire expulsion of the French from Saragossa; but the event proved that Blake judged wisely in not compromising his army, which had still very little of the consistency of regular soldiers, and was almost destitute of cavalry, in the level plains of the Ebro. For a fortnight after the battle he did nothing but march his troops from one position to another, sedulously endeavouring, during that period, to instruct them in the rudiments of the military art: and at length he deemed them sufficiently improved to hazard a conflict in the flat country. Suchet, mean-while, expecting a siege, had been strengthening the Monte Torrero and suburbs of Saragossa, on the southern bank of the Ebro, and strenuously endeavouring to restore the spirit of his soldiers; but the event did not put the strength of his fortifications to the test. In the middle of June, Blake, at the head of seventeen thousand men, approached Saragossa, and the French general marched out with ten thousand men and twelve guns to meet him. The battle was fought under the walls of the capital: Arragon was the prize of the victor: but the enthusiasm of the Spaniards in such a situation was no match for the discipline, and now restored spirit of the French.¹ Blake had imprudently detached five thou-

Approach
of Blake to
Saragossa.

June 16.

¹ Suchet, i.
28, 30.
Tor. iii.
20, 21.
South. ii.
505, 506.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Indecisive
action at
Maria, close
to Sara-
gossa.

sand of his best troops under Arezaga, to Botorrita, with the design, at that time so common with the Spaniards, of surrounding the enemy, so that, for the shock of battle, he had only twelve thousand men to rely on, and they were decidedly inferior, not merely in the steadiness of the foot soldiers, but in the number and quality of their cavalry.

He began the action by extending his left, with the design of outflanking his opponent; but this movement was quickly checked by a rude charge of Polish lancers, on the flank of the advancing wing, which threw it back in disorder on the second line. Suchet took advantage of this success, to move forward his whole centre and right against the enemy, at the same time refusing his left. A precipitous ravine separated the two armies along this part of the line; the French infantry plunged into the hollow, and rapidly scaling the opposite heights, boldly advanced against the enemy: they were received, however, with so violent a fire of grape and musketry, as drove them back into the shelter of the ravine: Suchet immediately reinforced the attacking troops by two battalions of Polish infantry, who again led on the charge. A violent storm at this instant arose, and concealed the two armies from each other, though separated only by a very short distance; but, during this obscurity, Suchet was preparing his decisive movement, and no sooner had it cleared away, than he made a rapid charge with two regiments of horse on the Spanish right, overthrew their cavalry, which were there stationed, and got possession of a bridge in the rear, by which the retreat of the army could alone be effected. The victorious horse now turned fiercely, supported by the infantry of the left, which quickly came up, on the Spanish centre, which

nevertheless resisted bravely, and by the aid of its numerous artillery, for long made good its ground against the combined attacks of the French centre and right. At length, however, some regiments stationed there, pressed at once in front and flank, having given way, the general ordered the whole to retire, and the retreat by the bridge, the only one practicable for the guns, being cut off, they were all taken, to the number of twenty. Favoured by the broken ground, however, almost all the troops withdrew in safety, and were rallied at night by Blake, at Botorrita, and reunited to Arezaga, from whom in an evil hour they had been separated. The French lost about eight hundred, the Spaniards a thousand men in this battle; but it decided the fate of Arragon for the remainder of the campaign, and by its results restored the French superiority on both banks of the Ebro.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.
1809.

¹ Suchet, ii.
28, 32.
Tor. iii.
22, 23.
Soult, ii.
306, 307.

It quickly appeared how completely the spirit of the French army had been raised, and that of the Spanish depressed by this reverse. Next day, Blake, reinforced by Arezaga's troops, was much stronger than when he had first fought, while the French were nearly a thousand weaker; and the artillery of the fresh division almost compensated that which had been lost on the preceding day. Blake withdrew with these troops, still fourteen thousand strong, to Belchité; and Suchet, having, by great exertions, collected twelve thousand, followed and attacked them. The Spanish army was skilfully posted in a strong position among the sloping banks and olive groves which surround that town; Blake harangued his men before the enemy came up, and they promised a vigorous resistance. Nevertheless, hardly had the fire commenced, when a French shell having fallen on a Spanish ammunition waggon and blown

Disgraceful
route of the
Spaniards
at Belchité.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Tor. iii.
24, 25.
Suchet, i.
34, 36.
South. ii.
508, 510.

it up, the nearest battalion disbanded and fled ; the next immediately followed the example ; the contagion ran like wild-fire along the whole line, and soon Blake was left alone with his staff and a few officers. Such was the rapidity of their flight that few prisoners were taken, and fewer still were killed or wounded ; but the whole remaining guns, ten in number, with all the caissons, fell into the enemy's hands, and the Spanish army was entirely dispersed. A few broken bands reached Lerida and Mequinenza in Catalonia, but the greater part returned to their homes, and the elements of all regular resistance were extinguished in Arragon for the remainder of the war.¹

St Cyr's
preparations
for the siege
of Gerona.

St Cyr, mean-while, was actively preparing for the siege of Gerona. The design of the Emperor was, that Verdier should be entrusted with the direction of the siege, and St Cyr with that of the covering army ; but the former of these generals, who had failed at Saragossa, and was most anxious to retrieve his character by a signal victory in the present instance, was unwilling to begin till assured of success, and urgent that his attacking force, which did not at first exceed ten thousand men, should be reinforced by a division of the general-in-chief's army ; a proposal which St Cyr at first refused, from a just sense of the risk to which such a small body as would remain to him would be exposed, in the midst of so vast a host of enemies as was in arms in Catalonia. This produced an angry correspondence between the two generals, which terminated in Verdier appealing directly to Napoleon, who ordered St Cyr to place three thousand infantry, five hundred horse, and a corps of artillery and sappers at his disposal ; a dislocation of force which reduced the covering army to fifteen thousand men, and raised

the besieging to the same amount.* These reinforcements having left Verdier without excuse in any longer delay, he resolved forthwith to commence the siege; and the investment was completed by the Spanish outposts being all driven in on the 1st June. But this disagreement between the two generals produced a coldness, which essentially injured their mutual co-operation, and protracted, beyond what might otherwise have been required, the duration of the siege.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.
1809.

¹ St Cyr,
157, 162.
Belm. ii.
494, 498.
Nap. iii.
19.

An untoward event occurred at this time, even on the element on which Great Britain had hitherto been victorious, which had a most calamitous effect on the war in Catalonia. Notwithstanding the extreme vigilance and admirable arrangements of Lord Collingwood, Admiral Cosmao, with a valuable convoy, succeeded in eluding the English blockading squadron, and escaping from Toulon, from whence he made straight for Barcelona, into which he threw his supplies, and got back without sustaining any serious injury. The garrison of that important fortress, from being in a state of extreme want, especially of stores and ammunition, were, by this seasonable reinforcement, put in a state of such affluence that they were not merely in a condition to sustain a long siege, but

Unfortunate
supply of
Barcelona
with stores
by sea.

May 7.

* The exact force employed by the besiegers in this memorable siege, and the covering army, was as follows:—

Forces employed in the siege, viz.

Infantry and cavalry,	14,456
Artillery,	1362
Do. 7th corps,	961
Engineers,	314
Total in the siege,	17,093
Army of observation, cavalry and infantry,	15,732
Total,	32,825

—BELMAS, *Journaux des Sieges dans la Peninsule*, ii. 650–655.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ St Cyr,
159, 160.
Tor. iii. 78.

Prepara-
tions of the
besieged for
their de-
fence.

could spare ample supplies of stores of all kinds to the besiegers, which arrived safe before Gerona, under the protection of six of St Cyr's battalions, detached for that purpose from the covering force; and by relieving the general-in-chief of all anxiety in regard to Barcelona, enabled him to give his undivided attention to the important duty with which he was more immediately connected.¹

“Whoever speaks of a capitulation or surrender, shall be instantly put to death.” Such were the words of an order of the day, on the 5th May, with which Alvarez, governor of Gerona, announced his resolution to hold out to the last extremity. Nor did the spirit of the garrison and inhabitants fall short of these heroic sentiments. Animated by the recollection of their former glorious resistance, the citizens had taken the most energetic steps to second the efforts of the regular soldiers; and had formed a corps, composed of the whole male population, without distinction of rank or age, whose duty was to support, by every possible means, the defence of the garrison. There, too, as at Saragossa, the women, even of rank and station, were formed into companies to bear away and tend the wounded; and at every breath of air, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers. The patron saint of the town, Saint Narcissus, was declared generalissimo of the armies, and the utmost efforts were made to exalt the courage of the besieged, by the belief that his celestial aid would extend the same protection to the town which he had already shown in the former siege, and as had been displayed five hundred years before, when Philip the Bold, who besieged the place, had, according to the old chronicles, had his army destroyed by a miraculous cloud

of locusts. Nor were more worldly means of defence neglected: the garrison of three thousand men was animated with the best spirit; the ramparts were plentifully lined with artillery, and provisions for a siege of many months' duration already provided. The town stands on a steep declivity, rising up from the right bank of the Ter, which terminates in a bluff precipice, on which are situated several forts which constitute the real strength of the place. The upper town is only defended by a single wall, fifteen feet high; the lower, which is more exposed, has the protection of a rampart, wet ditch, and outworks. The crest of the hill is occupied by three forts, called of the Capucines; and on the north, the town is commanded by a fort called Monjuich, standing on a rocky eminence, and separated from it by the valley of Galligau. This fort, which had the advantage of bomb-proof casemates, and cisterns, and magazines, was tolerably fortified, and was garrisoned by nine hundred brave men, resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity; while the rocky nature of the ground, round both it and the forts of the Capucines, rendered the formation of approaches a matter of great labour and difficulty.¹

The first serious attack of the enemy was directed against Monjuich, and the towers which formed its outworks were carried by assault, on the 19th June. About the same time, a convoy of a thousand cattle, destined for the garrison, fell into the hands of the French; and the near approach of St Cyr with his covering force, raised the troops which might be employed in the siege to thirty thousand men. After this, the breaching batteries continued to thunder incessantly on the walls of the fort for a fortnight; and a large breach having been at length effected,

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Belm. ii.
497, 501.
Nap. ii. 23,
24. Tor.
iii. 77, 78.
St Cyr,
181, 182.

Progress of
the siege.
June 19.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809,

July 4.

July 8.

¹ Tor. iii.
82, 84.
Belmas, ii.
501, 536.
Jones, i.
257. Nap.
ii. 25, 26.
St Cyr,
190, 194.

Fall of
Monjuich,
and obsti-
nate con-
flicts of
which it
was the
theatre.
Aug. 12.

an assault was attempted early in July, which was repulsed with severe loss. Three days afterwards, and when the breach had been enlarged, and the adjoining defences ruined by the incessant fire of sixty pieces of cannon, the attack was again renewed with a very large force ; but, although the French, in close column, twice returned to the assault with great courage, they were on both occasions repulsed. The Spaniards had so barricaded the summit of the breach, that it was impossible to surmount the obstacles, and the flanking fire of a half-moon and ravelin on either side, tore the assailants in pieces, and finally drove them back with the loss of a thousand killed and wounded. Taught, by this bloody repulse, the quality of the enemy with whom he had to deal, St Cyr now confined himself to the surer operations of sap and mine, and a month was consumed in that subterraneous warfare, without any material progress being made in the reduction of the place.^{1*}

Mean-while, St Cyr carried by storm Palamos, a small town, built on a rocky promontory running into the sea, a day's march from Gerona, from which the besieged had occasionally derived supplies. This detachment, and the accumulation of force round Gerona, having reduced the covering army on the side of Hostalrich and Barcelona to eight thousand men, the Spanish generals, notwithstanding their numerous defeats, were tempted to try the relief of the place. While the preparations for this purpose

* "A drummer had been placed near the breach to beat the alarm when a shell was approaching. As he was doing so, a cannon-shot carried off part of his thigh, and lacerated his knee in a dreadful manner. When the attendants, however, approached to convey him to the hospital, he said, "No! though wounded in the leg, I have still arms left to beat the drum, and warn my friends of the approach of bombs."
—TORENO. iii. 84.

were going on under the direction of Blake, the mining operations and fire of the besiegers against Monjuich continued with such violence, that its buildings and defences were entirely ruined, and the fort being no longer tenable, it was evacuated in the middle of August, and the garrison withdrawn into the town. The defence of this external post was of sinister augury for the ultimate issue of their undertaking to the besiegers; for though garrisoned only by nine hundred men, it had withstood thirty-seven days of open trenches, two assaults, had sustained the fire of twenty-three thousand cannon-shot and two thousand bombs, and had cost the assailants three thousand men. Hardly one of the garrison was unhurt: five hundred had been killed or seriously wounded. Elated with this success, however, Verdier boasted in his public despatches that Gerona could not now hold out fifteen days: but in making this assertion, he underrated both the resolution of the besiegers and the resources of the Spaniards for the relief of the place.¹

Although the lower town was commanded in many parts by the fire from Monjuich and the forts of the Capucines, and its defences on that side consisted only of an old weak wall, yet, the governor and inhabitants continued to make the most resolute defence, and every inch of ground which the besiegers gained, was won only by hard fighting and profuse bloodshed. Mean-while, Blake, having made his arrangements for the relief of the town, the attempt was made, and with perfect success, on the first of September. Claros and Rovira, two Somatene chiefs, had previously excited great alarm on the French frontier, by their attack on a convoy coming up to the relief of Figueras, which was constantly block-

¹ Nap. ii. 33, 35.
Tor. iii. 85,
88. Belm.
ii. 541,
566.

Efforts of
the Span-
iards for its
relief, which
are success-
ful.
Sept. 1.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Tor. iii.
91, 92.
Nap. ii. 36,
38. Belm.
ii. 568,
588. St
Cyr, 210,
226.

Heroic con-
stancy of
the besie-
ged.

aded by the Miquilets; and Blake, having concerted measures with them, approached with nine thousand men from the side of Hostalrich, while four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, under General Conde, with a convoy of two thousand beasts of burden, each laden with flour, unknown to the enemy, approached from the same direction, and Claros and Rovira threatened the besiegers' posts on the north, from the side of Figueras. With such skill were these operations conducted, that the enemy found himself assailed in every quarter, except that by which the convoy was to enter; and St Cyr, conceiving that the raising of the siege, not the revictualing of the town, was intended, drew off his troops to the points menaced, to such a degree, that the convoy entered safe, amidst the transports of the inhabitants, with hardly any fighting; and Conde, having left three thousand of his men to reinforce the garrison, withdrew in safety with the remainder to Hostalrich, whither Blake soon after retired, with the bulk of his forces.¹

To have relieved the besieged in presence of fifteen thousand disposeable French troops, headed by such a general as St Cyr, with soldiers discouraged by repeated defeats, was no small subject of congratulation to the Spaniards, and reflected great honour on the perseverance and skill of Blake; but it speedily appeared, that the supplies thus received, without having given them the means of permanent deliverance, had only prolonged for an additional period the duration of their sufferings. The supply of provisions introduced, taking into view the number of extra mouths brought along with them, did not exceed a fortnight's consumption; and the spirits of the besieged, which had been elevated to an extraor-

dinary degree by the first appearance of succour, and anticipated from it a total deliverance, were proportionally depressed, when they beheld the friendly standards on all sides recede from the view, and the French, without being disturbed, resume their menacing positions round the city. The fire of the breaching batteries was recommenced on the 11th Sept. 11. September, with redoubled fury; a sortie to destroy the most advanced works of the besiegers, though attended at first with some success, was finally repulsed with loss; and three enormous breaches having been made in the walls, a general assault was made a few days after, and led to a struggle supported on both sides with unparalleled resolution.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Belm. ii.

596, 600.

Tor. ii. 93,

94. St Cyr,

226, 252.

Alvarez had skilfully prepared all the means, not only of defence but of succouring the wounded, bringing up supplies to the points of danger, and relieving with fresh troops the defenders of the breaches; but, able as were his previous dispositions, and heroically as he discharged, on that eventful crisis, all the duties of a commander and common soldier, the town must have sunk under the fury of the assault, if his efforts had not been seconded by the whole population. At the sound of the drums, which beat in all the streets, and the mournful clang of the tocsin, which rung in the churches, the whole inhabitants poured forth; men and women, monks and children, hastened with perfect regularity, without either trepidation or confusion, to the posts assigned them; and, amidst the fire of two hundred pieces of artillery, calmly awaited death in the service of their country. Never was a more sublime spectacle beheld in modern times: silently they took up their stations; neither shouts nor cries were heard, but the bright expression of every eye re-

Repulse of
the grand
assault.

Sept. 19.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ St Cyr,
252, 254.
Nap. ii. 45.
Tor. iii. 94,
96. Belm.
ii. 600,
610.

Extreme
distress of
the besieged
from want
of provi-
sions.

vealed the sacred ardour by which the whole were animated. At half-past four in the afternoon, three massy columns advanced to the breaches, while a terrific fire of artillery swept the ramparts by which they were flanked, now almost entirely denuded of their parapets. Three times did the assailants, animated with heroic courage, mount to the summit of the breaches, and three times were they repulsed by the invincible firmness of the garrison. Such was the fury with which their defenders were animated, that often finding the discharge of fire-arms too slow a method of defence, they threw down their muskets, and lifting up great stones with both hands, hurled them down upon the enemy. At length, after a hard struggle of three hours' duration, the assailants drew off, leaving the breaches covered with their slain, and weakened by the fall of sixteen hundred men.¹

The dreadful loss sustained in these bloody assaults, and the undaunted countenance of the garrison, induced St Cyr, after this, to convert the siege into a blockade, and trust for the final reduction of the place to the certain effect of famine, and the continued fire of artillery, which would ruin every habitation which it contained. With this view, the lines round the town were drawn still closer than before, and every effort was made to exclude the casual introduction of small bodies of troops, which had occasionally taken place, notwithstanding all the vigilance of the besiegers, since the commencement of the siege. Blake, on the other hand, being sensible that the garrison was reduced to great straits from want of provisions, assembled fourteen thousand men, and made a second attempt for its relief. Mean-while, the besiegers were suffering almost as

much from want of supplies as the besieged; the Somatenes on all the neighbouring hills rendering the supply of the army extremely hazardous, and the vigilance of Lord Collingwood having intercepted and destroyed the large squadron which sailed from Toulon for their relief. But the failure of Blake's attempt to throw any effectual supplies into the place, relieved the one party as much as it depressed the other: St Cyr, more on his guard on this occasion, interposed with the bulk of his covering force between the besiegers' lines and the quarter from which the convoy was approaching; and the whole, consisting of two thousand beasts of burden, with the exception of a hundred and seventy which penetrated, with O'Donnell, at the head of a thousand men, into the town, fell into the enemy's hands, while Blake was driven off with the loss of three thousand of his best troops. This was a fatal blow to Gerona: plenty, thereafter, reigned in the one camp as much as want in the beleaguered fortress. Secure within his impregnable lines, St Cyr, as he has himself told us, waited quietly till time, fever, and famine, should subdue the resistance of the enemy.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.
1809.

Sept. 26.

¹ Tor. iii.
97, 98. St
Cyr, 254,
263. Belm.
ii. 611.

He was not permitted, however, himself to reap the fruit of this prudent but inglorious policy. The slow progress of the siege, and the frequent repulses of the assaults, were little suited to the impatient mind of Napoleon, who recalled St Cyr, and sent Marshal Augereau to assume the command. On the same day on which he arrived, O'Donnell, with his brave band, fearful of augmenting the distress of the besieged by additional mouths, again made his way out of the place, and reached Blake's quarters in safety. But the failure of provisions and supplies of all sorts was now daily making it more

Recall of St
Cyr, and
distress of
the place,
and its hon-
ourable ca-
pitulation.
Oct. 5.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Oct. 18.

apparent that the fall of this heroic town could not much longer be averted. The hospitals were crowded with sick and wounded, and both beds, attendants, and medicines, were wanting: a malignant fever, as at Saragossa, had broken out, and was daily carrying off great numbers, both of the soldiers and citizens; the magazines of corn and flour were almost exhausted, and the inhabitants were seeking the miserable resource of inferior animals; the capture of a third great convoy collected at Hostalrich for the relief of the place, and the defeat of O'Donnell's force, which formed its escort, both deprived the besieged of present relief, and supplied the besiegers in plenty with all sorts of provisions; while the transference of a large portion of Junot's corps from Arragon to the beleaguering force, and the arrival of powerful reinforcements from France, cut off all hopes of ultimate deliverance. Still the heroic governor, and his worthy companions in arms, continued their resistance for two months longer, with hopeless but unsubdued resolution: all offers of capitulation were sternly rejected, and it was not till provisions of all sorts were entirely exhausted, and the inhabitants, almost dying of famine, and having consumed every vestige of food in the city, had been reduced to the deplorable and unparalleled necessity of feeding on their own hair, that the word capitulation was for the first time pronounced in the city. Even in that woful extremity, and when seven large breaches were guarded by detachments of soldiers hardly able to bear the weight of their own arms, and more resembling ghosts than living men, Augereau did not venture to attempt an assault; but Alvares, whom no necessity, how cruel soever, could induce to think of a surrender, was seized, like Palafox, with the pre-

vailing fever, and soon reduced to the last extremity ; and his successor, Bolivar, felt the necessity of entering into negotiations for the surrender of the place. Augereau, too happy to gain possession of it on any conditions, willingly granted honourable terms to the besieged, and on the 12th December, Gerona opened its gates to the conqueror. When the French marched in, they gazed with amazement on the proofs which were every where presented of the devoted courage of the garrison and inhabitants. The town was little better than a heap of ruins ; the streets, unpaved and intersected in all quarters by barricades, were lined by half-destroyed edifices ; unburied bodies lying about in all directions, putrid pools yet stained with blood, spread a pestilential air around ; the survivors of the inhabitants, pale and emaciated, resembled spectres haunting a city of the dead. Almost all the heads of families had fallen ; the women with child had, without exception, perished ; numbers of infants at the breast had starved from want of nourishment. Nine thousand persons had died during the siege, within its walls, in the service of their country, of whom four thousand were citizens, being nearly a third part of their whole number.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Dec. 12.

¹ Tor. iii.

99, 104.

St Cyr,

270, 274.

Belm. ii.

612, 642.

Nap. ii.

46, 49.

Carnot has observed that the siege even of the greatest fortresses in modern times has seldom been prolonged beyond six weeks ; and yet Gerona, with its feeble ramparts, held out seven months, of which six and a half were of open trenches. The besiegers directed against the place the fire of forty batteries, armed by above a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, from which were thrown into the town, during its continuance, eighty thousand cannon-balls and twenty thousand bombs. The greater part of the guns of the besiegers were rendered useless by

Extraordi-
nary nature
of their
defence.

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1809.

¹ Nap. ii.
50. Tor. iii.
103, 104.
Belm. ii.
645, 648.

Termina-
tion of the
campaign in
Catalonia,
and aspect
of affairs at
that period
in that
quarter.

constant discharges, or dismounted by the fire of the town: fifteen thousand men had perished by the sword or disease around its walls. Four thousand three hundred men were made prisoners in the town, including its heroic governor, Alvarez, then in the last stage of fever. With brutal harshness, Augereau, without regard to his noble defence or lamentable condition, had him shut up alone in a dungeon of Figueras, where he soon after died, under circumstances which made the Spaniards suspect assassination; although his state of debility probably rendered that last act of atrocity unnecessary. But, as Colonel Napier, with the true spirit of a soldier, observes, "As long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both."¹

The fall of Gerona terminated the campaign in Arragon and Catalonia. The Cortes, assembled at Seville, in just commemoration of the unparalleled constancy displayed by the besieged both in that town and Saragossa, passed decrees awarding extraordinary honours to the inhabitants and garrisons of both, and to the illustrious chiefs, Palafox and Alvarez, by whom their defence had been conducted; and after the peace, Castanos, then governor-general of Catalonia, repaired to Figueras, and constructed an appropriate monument to the last of these heroes in the dungeon where he had expired. But these successes gave the enemy a firm footing both in Arragon and Catalonia; and the elements of resistance in those provinces were now reduced to a desultory guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and the siege of the remaining strongholds in the latter

province, still in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole fortresses of Arragon had fallen into the hands of the enemy : and although Tarragona, Lerida, Tortosa, and the other fortified cities of Catalonia were still in the possession of the patriots, yet it soon became painfully apparent, that their means of regular resistance in the field were exhausted. Shortly after the fall of Gerona, Augereau having sent all the monks of the town off as prisoners of war into France, marched against the irregular mass, in front of Hostalrich, which had so long disquieted the operations of the besiegers. Two brigades sufficed to defeat six thousand of them, on the ridge of La Jonquieris : Dec. 18. Souham dispersed the bands of Rovera and Claros at Olot and Campredon, and got possession of Ripoll, Dec. 25. their principal manufactory of arms ; at the same time, Pino, with his Italian division, routed a corps Dec. 26. of four thousand mountaineers ; while Augereau himself, having, by these successes, re-established his communications with France, marched against the principal Spanish army, under Blake, whom he Dec. 28. worsted at the Col-di-Sespina, and drove towards Tarragona ; which enabled him to draw his forces around Hostalrich, and commence the blockade of that fortress. Suchet, at the same time, was making preparations for the sieges of Tarragona and Lerida ; so that every thing announced vigorous and decisive operations in that quarter of the Peninsula, early in the ensuing year.¹

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Bem i
643, 649.
South. iv.

While Arragon and Catalonia were the theatre of these memorable events, Soult and Ney, in Galicia, were slowly reaping the fruit of their successful operations, which had terminated in the expulsion of the English from the north of Spain. Both parties for

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1809.

State of
Galicia and
Asturias
after the
embarka-
tion of the
English at
Corunna.

Feb. 3,
1809.

¹ Tor. ii.
205. South.
ii. 224.

Advance of
Sir R. Wil-
son to Ro-
derigo, and
return of
Joseph to
Madrid.

a time appeared exhausted: the Spaniards, bent to the earth by the flight of their allies, and the loss of Corunna and Ferrol, the two strongest and most important places on the northern coast of the Peninsula, were sunk in the deepest affliction, and for a considerable time gave hardly any signs of life; while the French, almost equally exhausted, rested without any attempt at further exertion, in the important fortresses which they had conquered. Romana alone, with the remnant of Blake's army, which had been routed at Reynosa, still maintained, in the recesses of the mountains, the standard of independence: but his forces were reduced to six or eight thousand men, without either cannon, stores, or resources of any kind: the soldiers were without shoes, almost without clothes, and nothing but the devoted patriotism of their chief, and the extraordinary tenacity of the men, preserved the country from total subjugation. Fearful of permitting even such a wasted band to keep the field, Soult moved a division against him; but the brave Spaniard retreated by Orense, to the rugged mountains on the Portuguese frontier; and having thus got beyond the reach of his pursuers, resolved to maintain himself, like Pelayo in the days of the Moors, in the inaccessible ridges of his country, and await the issue of events, to re-appear again in the field in its support.¹

Mean-while, Sir Robert Wilson, with the Portuguese levies which he had trained and disciplined, advanced beyond the Spanish frontier, and took post near Ciudad Rodrigo, in Leon. When the news of Sir John Moore's embarkation arrived, he sent his guns, as a measure of precaution, to Abrantes in the rear, but remained himself in the neighbourhood of that fortress, where he was soon joined by Don

Carlos d'España, a Spanish chief, with a few followers; and though their united force was too weak to undertake any operation of importance, yet, by merely remaining where they were, and showing a bold front in a moment of such disaster, they did good service, and kept the spirits of the province from sinking under their misfortunes. And truly the aid of such chivalrous spirits as this gallant officer, to whom scenes of danger were a source of pleasure, was necessary to prevent the cause of Spanish independence from appearing altogether hopeless, amidst the defection of many who should have taken the lead in its support. Addresses, as already mentioned, had been forwarded to Joseph Bonaparte at Valladolid, from all the incorporations and influential bodies at Madrid, inviting him to return to the capital and resume the reins of government; registers had been opened in different parts of the city, for those citizens to inscribe their names who were favourable to his government; and, in a few days, thirty thousand signatures, chiefly of the more opulent classes, had been inscribed on the lists: and, in obedience to these flattering invitations, the intrusive King had entered the capital, with great pomp, amidst the discharge of a hundred pieces of cannon, and numerous, if not heartfelt demonstrations, of public satisfaction,—a memorable example of the effect of the acquisition of wealth, and the enjoyment of luxury, in enervating the minds of their possessors; and of the difference between the patriotic energy of those classes, who, having little to lose, yield to ardent sentiments without reflection, and those in whom the suggestions of interest, or the habits of indulgence, have stifled the generous emotions of our nature.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1808.

Jan. 22,
1809.¹ South. ii.
24, 33.Nilletto. ii.
287, 301.

Pièces Just.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1810.

Prepara-
tions for the
invasion of
Portugal by
Soult and
Victor.

Mean-while, Napoleon, whose ardent mind could as little endure repose in any of his lieutenants as in himself, sent orders to Soult, while he still lay with the bulk of his corps at Ferrol, to prepare immediately for the invasion of Portugal. The plan for this purpose was formed by the Emperor on a grand scale, and apparently promised certain success. Soult himself was to move, with four divisions of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, numbering in all twenty-five thousand combatants present with the eagles, direct upon Oporto; on the road he was to be joined by Loison, with five thousand more; Lapisse, with nine thousand, was to menace the country from the side of Leon; while Victor, with thirty thousand, who was stationed at Merida, on the eastern frontier of the kingdom, was to co-operate from the side of Estremadura, and take a part in the combined movement on Lisbon. Thus sixty thousand men, from different quarters, were to invade Portugal, in which, at that time, there were not more than fourteen thousand British and an equal number of native troops, all in a state of extreme discouragement at the reverses in Spain, and the embarkation of the army from the shores of Galicia. So little did Napoleon anticipate any serious resistance in this undertaking, and so deeply was the future career of the British in the Peninsula shrouded from his view, that he calculated that, on the 5th February, he would be at Oporto, and, on the 16th, before Lisbon; after reducing which, and driving the English into the sea, he was to co-operate in an expedition against Andalusia, and follow in the footsteps of Dupont to the shores of the Guadalquivir. After reading a despatch from Soult, giving an account of his operations in Galicia and the battle of Corunna, he said, "Every thing

proceeds well: Romana cannot exist a fortnight longer: the English will never make a second effort: in three months the war will be at an end. Spain may be a La Vendée; but I have tranquillized La Vendée. The Romans conquered its inhabitants, the Moors conquered them, and they are not nearly so fine a people now as they were then. I will settle the government firmly; conciliate the nobles, and cut down the people with grape-shot. They say the country is against me; but there is no longer a population there; Spain is, in most places, a solitude without five men to a square league. I will let them see what a first-rate power can effect."¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Tor. ii.
264, 265.
Jones, i.
166. Nap.
ii. 164,
165. Belm.
ii. No. 24.
Pièces Just.

Soult commenced his march from Vigo, on the coast of Galicia, in the beginning of February, and reached Tuy, on the shores of the Minho, on the 10th of the same month. The river being deep and rapid, and at that season of the year a raging flood, it was no easy matter to pass it in presence of several thousand Portuguese ordenanzas, who occupied the opposite bank, which in that quarter formed the frontier of their country. At length, a small flotilla, secretly appeared in the tributary stream of the Tamuga, was sent down during the night, and ferried three hundred soldiers over to the Portuguese shore; but they were instantly attacked at day-break by three thousand of the armed bands, the men already landed made prisoners, and the remainder driven back to the opposite bank. This check obliged Soult to ascend the banks of the river, through horrible roads, to Orense, in order to take advantage of the bridge there over the Minho; and his advanced guard reached that town in time to secure that important passage before it could be destroyed. Still this gallant resistance of the Portuguese on their frontier was attended with impor-

Soult's
march
through
Galicia
towards
Oporto.

Feb. 15.

Feb. 17.

Feb. 20.

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1809.

March 4.

March 6.

¹ Operations
de M. Soult,
50, 115.
Nap. ii.
180, 187.
Belm. i. 61,
62. South.
ii. 214,
231.

And
through
Tras-os-
Montes.
March 17.

tant effects ; for such was the fatigue of his troops, that the French general was unable to resume his march for Oporto till the 4th March, which rendered it impossible for him to reach Lisbon before the English reinforcements, under Mackenzie and Hill, had arrived there in the beginning of April. Hardly had he left Orense, taking the road for Chaves and Oporto, when his advanced guard overtook the rear-guard of Romana, which was withdrawing before him at Monterey, and defeated it, with the loss of nearly a thousand slain, and as many prisoners. Romana, upon this, separated himself from the Portuguese general Silviera, with whom he had been endeavouring to concert operations, and defiled by mountain paths towards Braganza, from whence he made for the valley of the Sil, and the direction of Asturias ; while the Portuguese militia, now left to their own resources, were driven back, fighting all the way, to Chaves, a fortified town, which was immediately invested, and capitulated on the 13th, with fifty pieces of cannon, and ramparts in tolerable repair : an acquisition of great importance, as it gave the invaders a solid footing within the Portuguese frontier.¹

Having established the depôt of his army, and left his heavy artillery, sick, and wounded, as well as stragglers, who were very numerous, in this stronghold, Soult set out on the 17th for Oporto, taking the route of Tras-os-Montes, in preference to that of Entre-Douro-Minho, in consequence of the number of deep and difficult streams which required to be crossed in the latter province. The road through the romantic and beautiful mountains of the upper province, however, passed through a series of defiles equal to any in Europe in strength and intricacy ; and the French troops were not long of experiencing

the resources which the ancient military institutions of the kingdom offered for resistance to an invading army. At every step they met with an incessant and harrassing opposition, which both retarded their march and fatigued the soldiers; and it was not till the 20th that they arrived in sight of Braga, which was occupied by General Freire, with two thousand regular troops and twenty thousand ordenanzas, of whom, however, only five thousand were armed with muskets, the remainder being a confused rabble with pikes, clubs, or pruning hooks. Justly distrustful of such a tumultuary body in presence of an equal number of French soldiers, Freire evacuated Braga, and was taking the road for Oporto, when the multitude, suspecting treachery, mutinied, put him to death, and forced the command on General Eben, a Hanoverian officer in the Portuguese service, who had gained their confidence by his activity in organizing the new levies. Eben, thus forced to fight, made the best dispositions which the circumstances would admit; but it speedily appeared how totally unfit such an undisciplined body was to make head against the Imperial veterans. A well-concerted attack from three French divisions soon proved successful: the Portuguese, utterly routed, fled on all sides, having lost all their artillery, and above three thousand men slain on the spot. So exasperated were the victors at some cruelties exercised by the peasants on their stragglers, that they took few prisoners; and such was the reciprocal feeling of hatred excited in the breasts of the natives, that when the French entered Braga after their victory, they found it totally deserted by its inhabitants.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

March 20.

¹ Operations
de M.
Sault, 115,
142. Belm.
i. 63, 64.
Tor. ii.
339, 340.
Nap. ii.
196, 198.

No force now existed in the northern provinces to arrest the progress of the invaders; for though Silvi-

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1809.
Bloody ac-
tion before
Oporto.
March 29.

era, at the head of ten thousand men, still kept his footing in the mountains on the Eastern frontier, yet he was rather in their rear, and it was not to be expected that his irregular force could interpose any serious obstacles in the way of their further advance towards the Douro. Thither, accordingly, Marshal Soult bent his steps, after resting his troops some days at Braga, and on the 28th he appeared on the north bank of that river, before OPORTO. The means of defence were there very considerable, and the inhabitants were animated with the most unbounded hatred of the French, both from the experience of former wrongs and recent injuries; but regular soldiers and arrangements were wanting to turn to proper account the ardent passions and fervent zeal of the people. The Bishop of Oporto was at the head of affairs; a warlike and courageous prelate, whose patriotic zeal, not less than political ambition, had shone forth conspicuous since the first French invasion of the Peninsula. A series of field-works, dignified with the name of an entrenched camp, had been thrown up, on the north of the city, which were armed by a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; and fifteen hundred regular troops had been collected as a reserve to support any part of the line which might require assistance. The people were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit; all night the tocsin sounded from the churches, and at day-break on the 29th, being Good Friday, a tumultuous body of twenty-five thousand men hurried forth and occupied the redoubts. But such a crowd of urban citizens, even though animated by an ardent spirit, is seldom capable of withstanding, except behind regular ramparts, the assault of disciplined soldiers. Having completed his arrangements, and

distracted the enemy's attention by demonstrations against his flanks, Soult bore down with the weight of his force against their centre ; two redoubts, which flanked the main road in that quarter, were carried after a stout resistance, and the fire from thence having raked great part of the remainder of the Portuguese line, a general panic took place, and the whole rushed in wild confusion into the town. The French cavalry instantly charged the flying mass, now incapable of opposing any resistance, through the city ; the horsemen galloped, cutting them down in vast numbers, to the edge of the Douro ; such was the multitude which thronged the bridge, that part of it sunk under the weight, and hundreds were precipitated into the river ; but even after this catastrophe, the crowd from behind pressed on to avoid the bloody sabres of the Imperial dragoons, and forced those in front headlong into the waves. Boats, hastily collected to receive the wretched throng, were as quickly sunk by the fire of the French artillery, which had now come down to the water's edge, and discharged grape incessantly on the living stream ; the river was covered with dead bodies, among which numbers of those of women and children were to be seen ; and, before the French made themselves masters of the town, four thousand corpses encumbered the banks of the Douro. Even in this extremity, however, some traces of the ancient Portuguese valour were to be discerned ; and a body of two hundred devoted patriots, who had taken refuge in one of the neighbouring churches of the city, resolutely refused all proposals of surrender, and were slain to the last man. When the French soldiers were fairly masters of the town, their passions were strongly excited, in addition to the usual fury of an assault, by the

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¹ Tor. ii.

340, 341.

Nap. 201,

207. Belm.

i. 63, 64.

South. iii.

245, 250.

Jones, i.

194, 195.

cruelties which had been exercised by the inhabitants on some of the prisoners who had fallen into their hands; and although Marshal Soult exerted himself to the utmost to arrest the disorders, tranquillity was not restored until about eight thousand Portuguese had fallen, and the city had undergone all the horrors which are usually the fate of towns taken by storm.¹

Operations
by Ney in
Galicia and
Asturias
after Soult's
departure.

Whilst Soult was thus, amidst blood and carnage, forcing a hateful domination upon the northern provinces of Portugal, Marshal Ney, who had been left in charge of Galicia and Asturias, was maintaining a harrassing and desultory warfare with the undaunted mountaineers of those rugged provinces. The Marquis Romana, after his check at Monterey already noticed, had defiled in the direction of Pont Ferrada, on the great road from Benevente to Corunna; and having accidentally discovered a French twelve-pounder, and some ammunition and balls, in a hermitage near Villa Franca, he took advantage of it to commence an attack upon the castle of that town, garrisoned by a French battalion, and after a siege of seven days forced it to capitulate. Eight hundred prisoners were taken on this occasion—a success which, loudly magnified by common rumour, so elevated the spirits of the Spaniards in these mountainous regions, that, in less than a fortnight, twenty thousand men hastened to Romana's standards. Upon this, Ney, who deemed it high time to put a stop to this alarming progress, marched out of Corunna at the head of ten thousand men, with the design of giving battle to the Spanish general wherever he could find him. He advanced to Lugo, the point where the chief roads of the country intersect each other; but Romana, who had no intention of hazard-

March 17.

ing his raw troops, who were totally destitute of ar-
 tillery or cavalry, in a general action with the French
 veterans, suddenly shifted his quarters, and leaving
 Galicia with part of his troops, entered Asturias
 with the bulk of his forces, with the design of rous-
 ing the population and animating the resistance of
 that province. Ney followed upon his footsteps, and
 marched across the mountains to Oviedo, the capital
 of the latter province. King Joseph, who deemed it
 of the highest importance to stifle in the outset the
 formidable insurrection which, on the appearance of
 Romana, broke out in that quarter, on account of
 its vicinity to the great line of communication with
 France, directed at the same time against it consider-
 able forces from other quarters. Kellerman, who
 came up from Leon with nine thousand men, crossed
 the lofty ridge of Pajares a few days after, and hav-
 ing put to flight a corps of two thousand Spaniards
 who attempted to dispute the passage, descended to
 Pola, in the neighbourhood of Oviedo; while, in three
 days afterwards, Bonnet, with a third column, eight
 thousand strong, made his appearance at the passage
 of the Deba, on the coast road, and threatened the
 Asturian capital, by the highway from France. Bal-
 lasteros, who, with ten thousand of Romana's troops,
 endeavoured to defend the passage of that river, was
 defeated with the loss of two thousand men. These
 strong divisions had been largely reinforced by the
 troops of Mortier's corps, which had been transferred
 to Old Castile after the fall of Saragossa, and had
 its head-quarters at Valladolid. The concentration
 of such formidable forces rendered it impossible for
 the Spaniards to defend Oviedo. Ney arrived on
 the 18th of May on the Nora, and forced the
 bridges of Pennaflor and Gallivos, and on the day

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

April 20.

May 13.

May 19.

May 22.

May 18.

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LVIII.

1809.

May 29.

¹ Belm. i.
77, 79.

Tor. ii.

327, 331.

Jones, i.

209, 210.

Total de-
feat of the
army of the
centre, at
Ciudad
Real.

following entered Oviedo. Mean-while, Romana, having left General Ballasteros in command of his troops, who retired from the valleys into the higher and inaccessible parts of the mountains, embarked at Gijon on the day following, and made sail for Ribadio, on the northern coast of Galicia, from whence he made his way across the hills to his brave followers, who still maintained themselves on the mountains in the interior of that province; and, joining his old soldiers near Mondonedo, reappeared in undiminished strength in the valley of the Sil. Astonished at his active adversary having thus escaped him, Ney lost no time in retracing his footsteps, and marched direct for Lugo; and on the 29th met Marshal Soult at that place, whither he had arrived on his retreat from Portugal, after his defeat by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the manner to be immediately noticed.¹

To complete the picture of the state of affairs in the adjoining provinces of Spain, when Sir Arthur's memorable career began, it remains to notice the situation of Estremadura and New Castile after the departure of Napoleon from the Peninsula.

After the fall of Madrid, the Duke del Infantado, who commanded the army of the centre, which had fallen back towards La Mancha, with great difficulty collected twenty thousand men at Cuença in that province. So little, however, were the Spanish generals at this period aware of their inferiority to the French troops, notwithstanding all the disasters which they had undergone, that no sooner had he received accounts of the march of Napoleon with his guards and Ney's corps to attack Sir John Moore on the Carrion, in the end of December, than, deeming the capital now denuded of its principal defen-

ders, he advanced to co-operate in the movement upon it. Victor having received early intelligence of his approach, set out to meet him with fourteen thousand foot and three thousand horse; and having defeated the advance guard under Venegas, at Tarancon, the whole fell back to a strong position in front of Ucles, where they awaited the attack of the enemy. The battle took place on the 13th January, and proved one of the most disastrous of the whole war to the Spanish troops. Victor, perceiving that the left of the enemy was the weakest point of their line, threw the bulk of his forces against that wing; it was speedily routed, and the reinforcements which Venegas sent up to its support were successively driven back. The whole army now retreated; but this retrograde movement was speedily converted into a disorderly flight by the impetuous charges of the terrible French dragoons. Fifteen hundred men were slain on the spot; nine thousand prisoners taken, with the whole artillery, standards, and baggage of the army. This battle destroyed almost all the remains of the Spanish regular army; and the host which was thereafter collected by Cartaojal, who was appointed to succeed the Duke del Infantado in the command in the defiles of the Sierra Morena, were almost entirely raw and inexperienced levies, upon whom no reliance whatever could be placed. The French disgraced their victory by the most inhuman cruelties; and, after subjecting the clergy and principal inhabitants of Ucles to every indignity, bound sixty-nine, two and two together, and massacred them, as in the Reign of Terror, some even in the public slaughter-houses; while three hundred women, the wives or daughters of the victims, who made the air resound with their shrieks at this atrocious iniquity,

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LVIII.

1809.

Jan. 4.

Jan. 10.

Jan. 13.

Belm. i.

56. Tor. ii.

211, 219.

Rocca

Guerre d'

Espagne,

110, 113.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Rout of
the Span-
iards at
Ciudad
Real.

March 27

¹ Nap. i.
208, 213.
Tor. ii.
279, 289.
Belm. i.
68, 69.

were delivered over, immediately after, to the passions and brutality of the soldiers; and great numbers of the prisoners taken in battle, on the plea of reprisals, were murdered in cold blood.

After this disaster, the Spanish armies who had escaped from the rout of Ucles, and fled from the Somo-Sierra pass, fell back in two divisions; one towards the Sierra Morena, on the road to Seville; the other, in the direction of Merida and Almarez, with a view to the support of Badajoz. The first was under the command of Cartaojal; the latter of Cuesta. Cartaojal, when his whole detachments were called in, had still, in the end of February, sixteen thousand infantry and three thousand horse, with which he observed the French under Sebastiani, who lay with fifteen thousand men at Toledo; while Cuesta with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry was opposed to Victor on the Tagus, in Estremadura. The Duke d'Albuquerque commanded the advanced division of Cartaojal's army, consisting of nine thousand foot soldiers and two thousand horse, with which he advanced in the middle of February towards Toledo, from Carolina in the Sierra Morena, where the remainder of the corps lay. This ill-concerted attack with part only of the Spanish force, depressed by defeat, on a superior body of the enemy, flushed with victory, led to the result which might easily have been anticipated. Sebastiani hastily assembled twelve thousand men, with whom, as the enemy approached Toledo, he gave battle at Ciudad Real, and routed them in half-an-hour, with the loss of a thousand slain, all their guns, and three thousand prisoners. The remainder fled into the Sierra Morena, where they were quickly reinforced by new levies from Andalusia and Grenada,¹ and

Sebastiani, satisfied with his success, quickly resumed his position in the capital of La Mancha.

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LVIII.

A still greater disaster awaited the army collected in Estremadura, under the orders of Cuesta. This general, though a brave old veteran, was unhappily of a headstrong and obstinate disposition, and, being imbued with his full share of Castilian pride and ignorance, was equally incapable of taking counsel from the lessons of experience or yielding to the advice of abler persons than himself. These peculiarities, which appeared painfully conspicuous in the course of the campaign, on the first occasion when he acted in concert with Sir Arthur Wellesley, soon brought about a very serious disaster on the plains of Estremadura. Early in March, Victor received orders from Joseph at Madrid forthwith to pass the Tagus, in order to co-operate in Napoleon's design of the general attack upon Portugal, while, at the same time, Lapisse, who, with a division of eight thousand men was stationed near Salamanca, was ordered to move and advance to Abrantes. Cuesta, at this time, lay on the banks of the Tagus, and occupied the famous bridge of Almaraz,—a noble structure, five hundred and eighty feet long, and one hundred and thirty-four high, built by the town of Plasencia during the reign of Charles V., and which vied with the greatest works of the Romans in solidity and grandeur; but, as the enemy had possession of the bridges of Talavera and Arsobizbo, further up the river, it was impossible to prevent them from crossing, and the destruction of one of the arches by Cuesta's order, was to be lamented, as it destroyed a precious monument of former greatness, without contributing in any material degree to present security. Cuesta, finding himself assailed along the line of the Tagus by twenty thousand infantry

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Rout of the
army of
Cuesta at
Medellin by
Victor.

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and three thousand cavalry, with forty-two guns, fell back at all points, and, crossing the ridge of mountains which separates the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, took post at Medellin, on the latter river, where he contrived, by rallying all his detachments, to collect twenty thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and twenty pieces of cannon. The bridge of Medellin was not seriously contested by the Spaniards, who were drawn up in the form of a half moon, in a line about a league in breadth, a little to the south of the river. Notwithstanding his inferiority in numbers, having only fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse on the spot, Victor immediately advanced to the attack. The right wing of the Spaniards, where their best troops were placed, made a brave resistance, and for two hours not only held the enemy in check, but sensibly gained ground, and already the shouts of victory were heard in that quarter. Encouraged by these favourable appearances, Cuesta moved forward his centre, which also drove back the enemy; and deeming the victory now secure, the Spanish general sent forward his cavalry to charge. No sooner had they come into fire, however, than the whole horse, instead of charging the enemy, turned about and fled, trampling the victorious infantry under foot, and spreading disorder and alarm through the whole rear. The consequence of such a flight in an army, composed in great part of new levies, was immediately fatal. Great part of the Spanish army took to flight. Still, however, the victorious centre stood firm, and gallantly, by a point-blank discharge, repelled the first efforts of the victorious French dragoons; but Victor, upon this, instantly brought up cannon, and made such gaps in their ranks, by his volleys of grape, that the

French dragoons succeeded in breaking in, and then the whole army took to flight. The French horse pursued the fugitives for several miles, with great slaughter. The whole Spanish artillery fell into the hands of the victors, and their total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, did not fall short of ten thousand men, while that of the French did not exceed a tenth part of the number. So complete was their rout, that Cuesta, who fled with a few horsemen into the recesses of the Sierra Morena, could not, for some days after the battle, rally a single battalion of infantry; and nothing but the strength and intricacy of those mountains, and the vague apprehension excited by the disaster experienced in the last campaign by Dupont, beyond them, prevented Victor, in the first moments of dismay occasioned by this victory and that of Ciudad Real, from penetrating into that beautiful province, and planting the French Eagles in triumph on the minarets of Seville.¹

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¹ Nap. ii.
213, 226.
Tor. ii.
284, 289.
Belm. 67,
68.

While these disastrous events were prostrating the Spanish strength on the plains of La Mancha, and on the banks of the Guadiana, Marshal Soult lay inactive at Oporto, and was far from making that use of his important conquest which might have been expected from his vigour and ability. He had made himself master, indeed, of an opulent commercial city, abounding in resources of all kinds, and containing one hundred and ninety pieces of heavy cannon, besides immense warlike stores and magazines; and his advanced posts, pushing forward to the south of the Douro, subdued the whole country as far as the Vouga. But not only had the obstinate hostility of the population considerably weakened his army during its march from Galicia, but strongly impressed him with the risk of advancing further into a country animated by such feel-

Situation
and views of
Soult at
Oporto, at
this period.

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1809.

April 6.

March 27.

March 20.

¹ Belm. i.

64, 65.

Tor. ii. 342,

334, 336.

Lond. i.

317, 318.

Vict. et

Conq. xix.

19, 20.

ings, until he received more accurate accounts of the force and intentions of the English army, and advices of the co-operation of Lapisse and Victor on the eastern frontier of the kingdom. Nor was this all. While he himself overcame all hostility in front, the elements of a most serious resistance had again sprung up in the country he had passed, and blows of no inconsiderable magnitude had been struck, both by the Spaniards and Portuguese, on the fortified posts and detachments left in his rear. The Galician insurgents, taking advantage of the absence of Soult in Portugal, and Ney with the greater part of his corps in Asturias, had collected in great strength round the depôts and armed stations in the southern parts of their province: Tuy, containing the principal reserve of Soult's corps, and Vigo, garrisoned by thirteen hundred men, left in guard of the military chest, were soon surrounded each by several thousand armed peasants; and although the former, after a blockade of several weeks, was relieved by succours dispatched from Oporto, the latter, with its whole garrison and treasure, fell into the hands of the Spaniards. A still more serious blow was struck by Silviera with his Portuguese levies, who had taken refuge, on the French invasion, in the wildest recesses of Tras-os-Montes. That enterprising officer, issuing from his retreat as soon as the French had passed on, suddenly appeared before Chaves, now filled with the sick and magazines of their army, entered the town without opposition, and in four days afterwards made himself master of the castle, with thirteen prisoners. Encouraged by this success, he advanced on the traces of the French army; reached Braga, which he evacuated upon hearing of the fall of Oporto, and crossed over to the valley of the Tamega,¹ where he made himself master of the important town and

bridge of Amarante, a pass of great strength, the possession of which barred the principal line of communication from the Douro to Tras-os-Montes, and the northern provinces of the Peninsula.

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1809.
March 30.

But, in addition to these untoward circumstances, the situation of Soult, both from the intrigues with which he was surrounded, and those in which he himself was engaged, was one of a very peculiar and almost unprecedented kind. While the example of thrones having been won by soldiers' hands in the case of Napoleon, Murat, and more recently, Jerome and Joseph, had inspired the marshal with extravagant ideas of the destiny which might await him in his Lusitanian provinces, the dreadful privations which they had recently undergone, and the apparently interminable extent of the wars in which the Emperor was engaged, had laid the foundations of a wide-spread disaffection among his followers. Thus a double set of intrigues was going forward in the army at Oporto at the same time. While the French party in the northern provinces of Portugal were preparing an address, which, in a few days, was signed by thirty thousand persons, to Soult, praying him to assume the sovereignty of their country, and that officer, yielding to the flattering illusion, was preparing proclamations in the name of Nicholas I., King of Portugal,* and endeavouring, though without success, to gain the consent of his generals of division to the usurpation, a numerous body of superior officers

Extraordi-
nary in-
trigues in
Soult's army
at this
period.

¹ Thib. vii.
546. Sav.
iv. 128.
Well. Desp.
7th May,
1809.
Gurw. iv.
288.

* "It is certain that a proclamation was printed at Soult's headquarters addressed to the generals of division, to be published as an order of the day, in which he announced himself King of Portugal and Algarva, subject only to the approval of the Emperor, of which he entertained no doubts. Delaborde, one of his generals, who positively refused, as well as Loison, to go into the project, long after showed a copy of this proclamation at Paris."—THIBAudeau, vii. 546, 547.

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Tor. ii.
344, 345.
Wellington
to Lord
Castlereagh,
7th May,
1809. Gur.
iv. 288.

² Sav. iv.
128.

First mea-
sures of
Wellington,
in Portugal.
April 22.

in his army were organizing the ramifications of a vast conspiracy among the troops, the object of which was to revolt against the authority of Napoleon, restore a republican government in France, seize Soult and such officers as should adhere to his fortunes, and put a stop to the devastating wars which he was waging, to the detriment alike of his own country and the world. Secret advances, in relation to both these projects, were made to Sir Arthur Wellesley soon after he landed; but that cautious general, without implicating himself or his government in such dark designs, continued steadfast in his plan of terminating all these chimerical projects, by expelling Soult from Portugal by force of arms;¹ while Napoleon wisely and magnanimously overlooked the whole affair, and wrote to Soult that "he recollected nothing but Austerlitz," where he had particularly distinguished himself.²

It was in this situation of affairs in Spain and Portugal that Sir Arthur Wellesley, who shall hereafter be called WELLINGTON, LANDED AT LISBON; and from this time forward, the historian, in narrating the annals of the Peninsular campaigns, instead of a confused and involved narrative of separate actions and operations, which no art can render interesting to the reader, and which it requires no small effort in the writer himself to apprehend, finds himself embarked on a connected and consecutive stream of events, at first inconsiderable, and scarcely attended to in the shock of vast armies on the Danube, but which steadily increased in depth and magnitude, until it attracted the attention of all Europe, and finally overwhelmed the empire of Napoleon in its waves.

Two different plans of operation presented themselves to the choice of the English general, when he

took the command in Portugal. The first was to move to the eastward, and combine an attack on Victor, with Cuesta, in the valley of the Tagus. This plan, which was strongly recommended by the Spanish general, had the advantage of striking at once at the heart of the enemy's power, and by compelling the concentration of his principal forces to cover Madrid, would prove a seasonable relief to the patriot bands in all quarters, and prepare the means of renewed resistance in the remote provinces, especially of Andalusia. Wellington was not insensible to the importance of these considerations; and he declared, two days after his arrival in Portugal, that he was convinced "the French would be in serious danger in Spain, only when a great force shall be collected which shall oblige them to collect their troops; and a combined operation of the force in this country, with that under Cuesta, may be the ground-work of such extended operations." But, on a more mature consideration, it was justly deemed more expedient to commence operations by clearing the northern provinces of Portugal of the enemy. Much dissatisfaction would, with reason, be excited in that country, if, while one-third of its territory was still in the hands of the enemy, a portion of the native and all the allied forces should be employed in a foreign operation; the English army might be exposed to considerable hazard, if, while far advanced into the interior of Spain, its line of communication were to be menaced by the advance of Soult from Oporto; and it was of no small consequence, in a war in which so much depended on opinion and early success, to engage at first in an operation within the compass of the British army alone,¹ rather than one in which much would depend on the co-operation of the

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1809.

Reasons for
marching
against
Soult at
Oporto.¹ Well. to
Frere, 24th
April, 1809.
Gurw. iv.
247 and
249, to
Lord Castle-
reagh.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Marches
against
Soult.

May 2.

¹ Well. to
Mackenzie,
1st May,
1809. Gur.
iv. 265 and
273. Nap.
ii. 283-5.
Tor. ii.
345, 346.

Spanish forces, too clearly proved, by woful experience, to be incapable of bearing in the field the shock of the Imperial legions.

Operations against Soult being resolved on in the first instance, Wellington moved his force in two columns into the north of Portugal: the right, consisting of six thousand foot and one thousand horse, under Beresford, was to advance by Viseu and Lamego, towards the upper Douro, in order to co-operate with Silveira, who, it was hoped, still held the line of the Tamego, and the important bridge of Amarante; and thus turn Soult's left flank and cut him off from any retreat by Braga or across the Tras-os-Montes to Astorga and Leon: the left, under Wellington in person, after assembling at Coimbra, consisted of fifteen thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, was to move direct by the Vouga upon Oporto. Hopes were entertained that a considerable part of Soult's army might be cut off in its retreat from the Vouga to the Douro; and measures had been very skilfully taken to surprise the enemy and secure that object: but Soult got information of the approach of the English, and the conspiracy in his own army, just in time to prevent the catastrophe; the principal leaders were suddenly arrested, and the troops rapidly withdrawn behind the Douro, the bridge over which at Oporto was prepared for firing, and all the boats that could be discovered brought over to the northern bank of the river. At the same time, Loison was dispatched to the rear, with a strong division, to clear the banks of the Tamega, and secure the bridge of Amarante; and, after some days' sharp fighting, he succeeded in that object, and dislodged Silveira from that important post.¹ Mackenzie, mean-while, with three thousand British and four thousand Portuguese

troops, was moved forward to Alcantara and the eastern frontier of the kingdom, to observe Lapisse and Victor, and afford some protection to that exposed part of the Portuguese dominions.

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1809.

The British advanced posts fell in with the enemy on the 11th May; but, by a rapid retreat, they succeeded in extricating themselves from a situation of some peril, crossed the Douro, and burned the bridge of boats at Oporto. The English standards soon appeared in great strength on the southern bank, and the French battalions lined the northern shore; but the broad Douro rolled between the hostile forces, and it appeared next to impossible, without either bridge or boats, to cross the river in face of a nearly equal force. Early on the morning of the 12th, however, General Murray succeeded in collecting some boats four miles up at Avintas; and three boats having, by great daring, been obtained by Colonel Waters, by crossing in a small skiff opposite the seminary at Oporto, twenty-five of the Buffs were quickly ferried over in the first boat, and the two others rapidly following, about a hundred men got a footing under cover of that building, unperceived by the enemy. The anxiety of the people, however, soon drew the enemy's attention to the spot; and no sooner were the red coats perceived, than a tumultuous noise of drums and shouts was heard in the city, and confused masses of the enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of sharpshooters, who came furiously down upon the seminary. The building was soon surrounded; the fire of the enemy visibly augmented faster than that of the British; General Paget, who commanded the Buffs, was struck down severely wounded; the eager gesticulations of the citizens

Passage of
the Douro.
May 12.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

from the houses on the opposite bank, implored relief for their heroic allies, now apparently doomed to destruction. So violent was the struggle, so critical the moment, that Wellington himself was on the point of crossing to share the dangers of his advanced guard ; and it was only the entreaties of his friends, and his own just confidence in GENERAL HILL, the second in command, which prevented him from doing so. By degrees, however, the fire of the British artillery, consisting of twenty guns, placed on the heights of Villa Nova, on a projecting promontory of the southern bank, opposite the seminary, became so powerful, that it drove the enemy from all sides of the building, excepting the iron gate on the north, where the Buffs were a match for them : some daring citizens crossed over with large boats to Sherbrooke's division, further down the river, which was soon ferried over in large bodies ; and hesitation became visible in the French columns, which was increased to confusion, when Murray's columns, on the extreme right of the British, began to appear and threaten their communication with Amarante and the great line of retreat. Horse, foot, and cannon, now rushed tumultuously towards the rear ; the city was hastily evacuated, amidst the enthusiastic cheers of the people : Hill's central column, now strongly reinforced by the passage of the 48th and 66th regiments, debouched fiercely from the seminary, and, by repeated volleys on the flank of the flying columns, threw them into utter confusion ; and nothing but the inactivity of Murray on the right, who did not make the use he might of his advantageous position on the flank of the retreating host, preserved them from total ruin.¹ As it was, they lost five hundred killed and wounded, five guns,

¹ Wel. Des. 12th May, 1809. Gur. iv. 297, 301. Nap. ii. 287, 291. Belm. i. 72, 73. Tor. ii. 345, 347.

and a large quantity of ammunition, in the action :
 seven hundred sick were taken in the hospital, and
 fifty French guns in the arsenal ; and so complete
 and unexpected was the surprise, that Wellington,
 at four o'clock, quietly sat down to the dinner and
 table service which had been prepared for Marshal
 Soult.

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1809.

To have crossed such a river as the Douro, in presence of such a general as Soult, with a force little, if at all, superior to his own, was a most brilliant opening of the campaign, and was justly regarded as reflecting as much credit on the daring and skill of the young English general, as it cast a shade on the vigilance and circumspection of the veteran French marshal. But Napoleon's troops were, beyond all others, capable of remedying such a disaster ; and, notwithstanding the confusion into which they had been thrown by their precipitate retreat, before night-fall order was restored, and the army securely rested under the protection of a vigilant and powerful rear-guard. Next morning Soult was quietly resuming his march for Guimaraens, in the direction of Amarante, when he received the stunning intelligence that that important post, commanding the only bridge and defile over the Tamega, and the only line of retreat practicable for artillery, was already in the hands of the enemy. In effect, Beresford, having crossed the Douro further up, had attacked Loison's outposts at Amarante on the morning of the 12th, with such vigour that he fell back from that post in the direction of Oporto, and met the retreating columns evacuating that city late at night. Soult's situation now seemed all but desperate : the well-known strength of the bridge of Amarante precluded the hope that it could be forced with discouraged and

Soult's
 hazardous
 situation.

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LVIII.

1809.

retreating troops, now that it was held by regular British and Portuguese soldiers: the great road to Braga was already in the possession of the enemy, as they held Oporto, from which it issued; and it could be regained only by cross hill roads, totally impracticable for artillery, and almost unpassable for mules or horses. Yet not a moment was to be lost: already the British outposts began to appear, and the thunder of their horse artillery was heard at no great distance. The energy of the French general, however, now fully aroused, was equal to the crisis. He instantly resolved to abandon his artillery, ammunition, and baggage, and make his way, with all imaginable expedition, across the mountains to the Braga road. This resolution was immediately adopted, all the powder which the men could not carry was blown up near Penafiel on the morning of the 13th; and the French army, abandoning its whole carriages, rapidly ascended the valley of the Sousa by roads almost impracticable, even for the cavalry; rejoined Loison at Guimaraens; and continuing its passage over the mountains, and leaving Braga on its left, at length regained the great road at San-Joad del Rey, a short way beyond that town.¹

¹ Belm. i.
72, 74.
Well. Desp.
18th May,
1809. Gur.
iv. 315.
Tor. ii.
346, 347.

His disas-
trous retreat
and escape
into Galicia.

Notwithstanding the sacrifice of his whole *materiel*, however, Soult's retreat was extremely disastrous, even to the soldiers of his army. When he rejoined Loison at Guimaraens, it became necessary to sacrifice all the artillery and ammunition belonging to that division: heavy rains, ever since the 13th, impeded the progress of the troops through the mountains; the stragglers multiplied at every step; frightful defiles, beside raging torrents, formed their paths; the shoes of the soldiers were worn out; they could hardly bear their arms; and, with the whole remaining

mules and horses, all the sick and wounded fell into the hands of the British. The streams, every where swollen by the excessive floods, were unpassable, except by their bridges, and the arch of Ponte Nova, over the roaring torrent of the Cavado, was the only line of retreat which lay open, after the occupation of the road to Braga by Wellington, and Amarante by Beresford. This bridge was occupied, and had been partially destroyed by the peasants: unless it could be regained, the hour of surrender had arrived; for the army was struggling through a narrow defile between awful precipices, almost in single file. Wellington, in close pursuit, thundered in the rear, and would infallibly attack on the following morning. In this extremity, the heroic courage of Colonel Dulong, who, in the dark, with twelve grenadiers, crept along a narrow ledge of masonry which was left of the arch, surprised the Portuguese guards, and made himself master of the bridge, extricated the army from this apparently hopeless situation, and opened up the road to Montalagre, where the whole arrived perfectly exhausted, and in woful plight, late on the evening of the 17th. Soult continued his retreat across the Galician frontier, reached Orense on the 26th, and on the day following met Ney at Lugo, who had returned from his Asturian expedition, and dislodged an irregular body of twelve thousand peasants who were blockading three French battalions in that place. "His condition," says Jomini, "was much more disastrous than that in which General Moore had traversed the same town six months before."¹ The French disgraced this gallant retreat by savage cruelty: the peasants were massacred, and their houses burnt by them along their whole line of march, without remorse:² but their own

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

May 15.

May 17.

May 20.

May 21.

¹ Jom. iii.

335.

² Wel. Des.

18th and

22d May,

1809. Gur.

iv. 315;

326. Nap.

ii. 294,

300. Tor.

ii. 347,

349. Belm.

i. 74, 75.

Vict. et

Conq. xix.

39, 44.

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LVIII.

1809.

Wellington's preparations for operations in Estremadura.

losses were very severe, amounting to about a fourth part of the whole troops, which were attacked on the Douro, besides all their artillery, ammunition, and baggage, and even a considerable part of their muskets.

After this important success, Wellington returned to Oporto, from whence he moved his troops forward as rapidly as possible to Abrantes, and engaged in active preparations for co-operating with Cuesta, and advancing through Estremadura towards Madrid. Victor had not improved his important victory at Medellin so much as might have been expected, especially considering the great amount and excellent quality of his cavalry, which were of inestimable importance in the level plains which run up to the foot of the Sierra Morena. But the operations of the English general were impeded for above a month by the want of money, of which, at this period, he bitterly complained; and which led him to suspect at the time that government had engaged in an enterprise beyond their strength. In truth, however, the finances of Great Britain, as the event proved, were fully equal to the strain, and the difficulty arose entirely from the extraordinary scarcity of *specie*, at that crisis, in the British islands, arising partly from the profuse issue of paper to carry on the prodigious mercantile operations and national expenditure of the period, and partly from the vast consumption and requisitions of the French and Austrian armies during the campaign on the Danube. At the same time, the want of warlike experience was severely felt in the army, both on the part of the officers and soldiers. The commissariat, in all its branches, was very defective. Released, by a month's intermission from active operations, from the excitement and dangers of

actual warfare, the troops gave themselves up to disorders of every kind; plunder was universal along their line of march; the country, for miles on either side, was filled with stragglers; and the instant the common men got out of the sight of their officers, outrages were committed without end on the defenceless inhabitants, who had hailed their arrival as deliverers. To such a height did these evils arise, that Wellington, in several regiments, directed the roll to be called every hour; he largely augmented the powers and force at the disposal of the Provost Marshal, and in the bitterness of his heart, more than once wrote to government, that the British army, "excellent on parade, excellent to fight, was worse than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution alike by success or defeat."¹ Doubtless the large arrears of pay due at this time to the army, amounting to L.300,000, and in several regiments to two months' pay, contributed in a great degree to this disgraceful state of things; and it is interesting to trace the early difficulties of that commander in training his troops to the duties of real warfare, who afterwards declared, in the just pride of experienced achievement, "that with the army he led from Spain into France, he could have gone any where and done any thing." But these facts are highly valuable, as demonstrating how essentially the military is an art dependant upon practice for success: how little even a rigid discipline, gallant officers, and admirable equipment, can compensate for the want of actual experience; what difficulties the commander had to contend with, who was compelled thus to educate his officers and his soldiers in presence of the enemy; how much allowance must be made for the disasters of the Spanish troops,¹ who, without any of those ad-

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Gurw. iv.
407. Well.
to Castle-
reagh, 17th
June, 1809.¹ Well.
Desp. to
Lord Castle-
reagh, &c.
30th May,
7th June,
16th June,
17th June,
1809.Gurw. iv.
343, 352,
407, 346,
385, 363,
400.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Plan of a
combined
movement
on Madrid.
June 27.

vantages, were at once exposed to the shock of the veteran legions of Napoleon; and what must have been the sterling courage of those men, who, even when thus inexperienced, were never once brought in the Peninsula into fair combat with the enemy, that they did not successfully assert the inherent superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Remittances to an adequate amount, in gold bars and specie, having, in consequence of the pressing representations of the English general, been at length obtained, on the 25th June, for the army, and a more efficient system of control established by his unceasing vigilance among the troops, Wellington, in the end of that month, commenced his march from Abrantes, in the direction of Alcantara and the Spanish frontier. His plan at first was, that Cuesta should maintain himself in some strong position towards the foot of the Sierra Morena, and if possible amuse Victor so as to retain him in that quarter, to the south not only of the Tagus, but the Guadiana, while he himself moved on Placentia and Talavera, so as to cut off his retreat to Madrid, and prevent his junction with the forces of Sebastiani in La Mancha, or Joseph in the capital. This plan, however, which had every thing to recommend it, was found to be impracticable from the obstinacy of Cuesta, who refused to retire any further back than the banks of the Guadiana, and the impossibility of finding any position there, where there was the least chance of his making a successful stand if attacked by Victor. The English general, therefore, was compelled to alter his views, and adopt the more hazardous plan of a junction and combined operation of the two armies. With this view, the British army marched by Castelbranco, Coria, and Placentia; while the Spanish advanced to the same point by the bridges

July 1.

of Almarez and Arsobizbo. Victor fell back as Wellington advanced, and the two armies effected their junction at Oropesa on the 20th July; while Sir Robert Wilson, with his brave Lusitanian legion and three thousand Spaniards, advanced on their left, from the Alberche to the mountains of the Escorial, with whom he approached, and actually put himself in communication with Madrid. The forces which thus menaced the capital were very considerable: the English were twenty-two thousand strong, of whom three thousand were cavalry, with thirty guns: Cuesta had thirty-two thousand infantry and six thousand horse, with forty-six cannon; and Venegas, who was to advance on Toledo, and join the other two armies in the neighbourhood of the capital, was at the head of twenty-three thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry,—in all above eighty-five thousand men, but of different nations, independent of each other, and of whom the British alone could be relied on for movements in the field in presence of the enemy. Beresford, mean-while, with fifteen thousand Portuguese, established his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, near Ciudad Rodrigo; but his duty was merely to protect the frontier from insult, and observe the enemy at Salamanca, not take any active part in the important operations which were in contemplation.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

July 20.

¹ Wilson's
Desp. 17th
June, 1st
July, 24th
July, 1809.
Gurw. iv.
403, 499.
Belm. i. 89,
90. Nap. ii.
339. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 278,
279.

The approach of forces so considerable, all converging towards the capital, produced an alarming fermentation, the sure proof, as Jomini observes, of the judgment with which the enterprise had been conceived. Joseph no sooner received intelligence of the formidable forces with which he was menaced, than he dispatched the most pressing orders to Soult and Ney, who were at Astorga, on the frontiers of Leon, and Mortier, who lay at Valladolid, to unite

Prepara-
tions and
forces of
the French
General.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

July 25.

¹ Wellington's Desp. 24th July, 1809. Gurw. iv. 499. Nap. ii. 372, 373. Tor. iii. 36, 37. Belm. i. 91, 92. Jom. iii. 340, 344.

Joseph advances towards Talavera. Description of that position.

their forces and descend as rapidly as possible through the pass of the Puerto de Banos, which forms the only line of communication, through the great central chain of Spanish mountains from the valley of the Douro to that of the Tagus, to Placentia, so as to menace the communications of the English army with Lisbon; he himself, leaving only three weak battalions in the Retiro, marched with six thousand of his guards and five thousand other troops towards Toledo, which was assigned as the general rendezvous of all his forces; Sebastiani was hastily ordered to the same place, whither also Victor fell back from Talavera. Before doing so, however, Victor narrowly escaped destruction on the 23d, when the British troops were all in readiness for the attack, and Victor alone was exposed to their blows. The events which followed leave no room for doubt, that if Wellington had attacked, even unsupported by the Spaniards on that day, he would have gained a glorious victory; but it could have led to no beneficial result, menaced as the British army was by the descent of an overwhelming force in its rear. Cuesta refused to fight on that day, as his troops were not prepared; and next morning, when the columns of attack were formed at daylight, the enemy had disappeared, having retired in the night in the direction of Toledo.¹

Finding himself, on the 25th July, by the concentration of these forces, at the head of fifty-five thousand brave veterans, animated by repeated victories, and under the direction of experienced officers, Joseph deemed himself sufficiently strong to resume the offensive; and, contrary to the strenuous advice of Jourdan, and, indeed, the dictates of common sense on the subject, gave orders to advance, before the

co-operation of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, who could not arrive on the Tagus before the 1st of August, could be relied on. He quickly repulsed the advanced guards of Cuesta, which, elated by the continued retreat of the French before them, were advancing in a disorderly manner, dreaming of Madrid and the Pyrenees; and, on the 26th, the French troops, driving Cuesta's advanced posts before them, reappeared in great strength in front of TALAVERA. The English general had only sent two brigades in pursuit of the enemy beyond the Alberche, having already begun to experience that pressing want of provisions and the means of transport, which soon had such important effects on the issue of the campaign; and, in consequence, resolved not to advance with the main body of his force beyond that stream till some arrangement was made for the supply of these necessary articles. The whole allied army took post at Talavera, in a battle-field well calculated by the diversity of its character for the various qualities of the troops which were there to combat for the independence of the Peninsula. On the right, the dense but disorderly array of the Spaniards, with their flank resting on the Tagus, occupied the town and environs of Talavera, with the olive woods, intersected with inclosures, which lay along its front, filled with light troops, and their numerous artillery planted in an advantageous position along the front of their line, and commanding all the avenues by which it could be approached. Far beyond the inclosures, the British stood in the open field on the left, on the uneven ground which extended from the olive woods to the foot of the hills, forming the first range of the Sierra de Montalban. A deep ravine, in the bottom of which flowed the Portina rivulet, lay

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Wel. Desp.
29th July,
1809.
Gurw. iv.
504. Belm.
i. 91, 92.
Kausler,
536. Nap.
ii. 386,
387.

Bloody
action on
the 27th
July.

at the foot of these hills, and formed the extreme British left, the streamlet turning sharp round, and winding through its way to the Tagus at Talavera, ran across the front of the whole allied line. On the heights, on one side of it, the French were placed in a strong position, with their batteries on the right, placed on some lofty heights overlooking a great part of the field of battle: right opposite to them stood the British line, on a similar ridge of eminences, and their guns also sweeping the open slope by which they were to be ascended. In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding hillock or mount, on which the English had begun to construct a redoubt, and on which some Spanish guns were placed; it was evident, that on its possession the fate of the approaching battle, would in a great degree depend.¹*

About three o'clock on the afternoon of the 27th, Victor's advanced guards approached the British outposts, stationed beyond the Portina streamlet, and immediately commenced an attack. Some of the English regiments, which had then seen fire for

* The exact French and allied force at Talavera, as obtained by Kausler from the War-office at Paris, was as follows:—

FRENCH.			ALLIES.		
		guns.			guns.
Royal Guards, . . .	5,000		British Infantry } (28½ battalions), }	16,663	30
<i>Victor's corps.</i>			Artil., engineers, &c.,	1,287	
Infantry and artillery,	18,890	30	Cavalry, . . .	3,047	
Cavalry, . . .	3,781				
<i>Sebastiani's corps.</i>					
Infantry and artillery,	17,100	30		20,997	
Cavalry, . . .	3,670		Spanish infantry, and		
<i>Reserve divisions.</i>			artillery, . . .	33,000	70
Infantry and artillery,	7,681	20	Cavalry, . . .	6,000	
75 bat. 3 squad.]	56,122	80		59,997	100
—See KAUSLER, 535, and NAP. ii. 361.					

the first time, were thrown into confusion by the suddenness of the onset, and Wellington, who was with the advanced posts, narrowly escaped being made prisoner; while ten thousand Spaniards on the right, were so alarmed by the French light cavalry riding up to them and discharging their pistols, that they broke after a single discharge of their muskets, and flying tumultuously several miles to the rear, gave out that all was lost. Wellington, however, brought up some veteran troops to the scene of danger, and checked the disorder, while at the same time the British advanced posts, covered by the brave 45th regiment, and 5th battalion of the 60th, retired to the position of the main body on the other side of the stream. Encouraged by this success, Victor, as night approached, was induced to hazard an attack on the English left, stationed on their line of heights, and for this purpose Ruffin was ordered to charge with his division, supported by Villatte, while Lapisse fell on the German Legion on their right, so as to prevent assistance being rendered from the other parts of the line. The forces which thus were brought into action by the French, were above twenty thousand men, and the assault was so quick and vigorous, that though Colonel Donkin gallantly repulsed the corps which attacked his front, his left flank was at the same moment turned by several French battalions, who, having advanced unperceived through the valley, suddenly appeared with loud shouts on the heights in his rear. General Hill, however, with the 29th regiment, charged them without an instant's delay, and drove them down the hill, and immediately bringing up other battalions, formed a convex front, facing outwards, which effectually covered the British left. It was full time; for Lapisse, soon after, opened a heavy

CHAP.
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1809.

July 27.

CHAP.
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1809.

¹ Nap. ii.
392, 395.
Well. Desp.
iv. 505,
506. Jom.
iii. 344,
345.
Kausler,
537. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 282,
284.

Desperate
battle on
the 28th.

fire on the German Legion on the right, and fresh battalions of Ruffin's division, emerging from the hollow, resolutely advanced to storm the heights on the left. It was now dark: the opposing lines approached to within thirty yards of each other, and the frequent flashes of the musketry enabled the dauntless antagonists to discern each other's visages through the gloom. For a few minutes the event seemed doubtful: but soon the loud cheer of the British soldiers was heard above the receding roar of the musketry, and the French fell back in disorder into the hollow, while Lapisse drew off on the right; and the soldiers, on either side, worn out with fatigue, sunk into sleep around the fires of their bivouacs.¹

Not discouraged by this bloody repulse, which cost him above eight hundred of his best troops, Victor, contrary to the opinion of Jourdan, who contended strenuously that all offensive operations should be suspended till Soult was sufficiently near to threaten the enemy's communications, prevailed on Joseph to permit him to renew the battle on the following morning. The centre of the British being deemed too strong, by reason of the ravine which covered their front, it was determined to renew the attack on the heights on the left. At eight o'clock, Ruffin's division again advanced to the attack, supported by Villatte's, and the French troops with an intrepid step ascended to the summit of the hill, while the artillery on both sides kept up a vehement fire, and soon made frightful chasms in the opposing ranks. Having gallantly made their way to the summit, the French instantly closed with Hill's division, and for half an hour a desperate struggle took place, in the course of which Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast: but the

French loss was still greater; insensibly their line gave ground, and at length, being forced back to the edge of the slope, the whole broke, and were hurled in wild disorder to the foot of the hill. Fearful, from these repeated attacks, that the enemy would at length succeed in turning his left, Wellington placed his cavalry at the entrance of the valley, obtained from Cuesta the succour of Bassecourt's division, which was stationed on the hills beyond its outer side, and two guns to reinforce Hill's batteries, which were bravely served by the Spanish gunners and rendered good service during the remainder of the day.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Wel. Desp.
29th July.
Gurw. iv.
506. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 285,
286. Jom.
iii. 345,
346. Nap.
ii. 396,
400.

The extreme heat of the day now for a few hours suspended the combat, during which the lines were re-formed on both sides, the ammunition waggons replenished, and the wounded withdrawn to the rear. In this interval Joseph held a council of war, in which Jourdan again renewed his counsel that they should retire to the Alberche, and Victor urged that they should recommence the attack. The latter advice prevailed, chiefly in consequence of the arrival of a courier from Soult, announcing that he could not arrive at Plasencia till the 4th August, and the threatening advance of Venegas, who was already near Aranjuez. Mean-while, the troops on either part, overcome by thirst, straggled down in great numbers to the streamlet which ran in the bottom of the ravine which separated the two armies: not a shot was fired, not a drum was beat; peaceably the foemen drank from the opposite banks of the same rill; and not unfrequently the hands which had so recently before been dyed in mutual slaughter, were extended and shaken across the water in token of their mutual admiration of the valour and constancy displayed on both sides. Wellington, mean-while,

Temporary
suspension
of the battle
during the
heat of the
day.

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1809.

¹ Lord
Castle-
reagh's
Speech, 1st
Feb. 1809,
Parl. Deb.
xv. 293.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
285, 286.
Nap. 398,
401. Well.
Desp.
Gurw. iv.
506, 507.

Heroic
valour of
the British.

was seated on the grass on the top of the hill which had been so obstinately contested, eagerly surveying the enemy's movements, which indicated a renewal of the conflict with redoubled forces along the whole line. At this moment Colonel Donkin rode up to him, charged with a message from the Duke d'Albuquerque, that Cuesta was betraying him. Calmly continuing his survey, Wellington desired Donkin to return to his brigade! In a few minutes a rolling of drums was heard along the whole French line; the broad black masses of the enemy appeared full in view, and preceded by the fire of eighty pieces of artillery, fifty thousand men advanced to the attack.¹

The French columns came down their side of the ravine at a rapid pace, and though a little disordered by crossing the stream, mounted the opposite hill with the utmost intrepidity. On the extreme British right, Sebastiani's corps fell with the utmost fury on General Campbell's division, and by their loud cries indicated the confidence of immediate victory; but their attack was in column and the English were in line; and then the inherent vice of that arrangement became at once apparent. The British regiments which stood against the front of the mass, drawn up three deep, kept up an incessant rolling fire on the enemy; while those on either side, inclining forwards and directing their fire against both flanks of the column, soon occasioned so frightful a carnage that even the intrepidity of the Imperial veterans sunk under the trial, and the whole broke and fell back in confusion. On rushed Campbell's division, supported by two regiments of Spanish infantry and one of cavalry, who were inspired with unwonted steadiness by the example of their allies, and pushing the disorganized mass before them, com-

pleted their discomfiture, and took ten pieces of cannon. At the same time, Ruffin and Villatte's divisions were descried marching across the valley on the enemy's extreme right, in order to turn by the foot of the Sierra de Montalban, that blood-stained hill, which they had in vain sought to carry by assault. Wellington immediately ordered the 1st German hussars and 23d dragoons to charge the column in the bottom of the valley. On they went at a canter, but soon came to a hollow cleft which lay right across their path, and which seemed impossible to cross. The veteran German, Arenstcheld, with characteristic coolness, reined up his men on the edge of the hollow; but Seymour, at the head of the 23d, with true English hardihood, plunged headlong down, and though half of his men fell over each other in wild confusion in the bottom, where Seymour was wounded, the survivors, under Ponsonby, coming up by twos and threes, charged right on, and disregarding the fire of Villatte's columns, through which they passed, fell with inexpressible fury on Strolz's brigade of chasseurs in the rear, which, unable to resist the shock, opened its ranks to let them through. The heroic British dragoons, however, after this marvelous charge, were assailed, when blown and disordered by success, by a regiment of Polish lancers and a body of Westphalian light horse, and broken with great slaughter; the survivors, not half of those who went into action, found shelter on the broken ground behind Bassecourt's division of Spanish infantry on the mountains beyond.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xix.
287, 289.
Nap. ii.
401, 403.
Kausler,
538. Well.
Desp. 29th
July. Gurw.
iv. 506.

While these terrible conflicts were going on in the two wings of the army, the centre, where Sherbrooke commanded, and the German Legion and guards were placed, was exposed to a still severer trial.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Their immi-
nent danger
and final vic-
tory.

The great batteries, mounting fifty guns, which there stood right opposite to the British line, at the distance of only half cannon-shot, made fearful chasms in their ranks ; and the English guns, greatly inferior both in number and weight of metal, could make no adequate reply. Under cover of this fearful storm, Lapisse's division crossed the ravine in their front, and ascending the opposite hill concealed by the smoke, got close to the British line, and already set up the shouts of victory. They were received, however, by a close and well-directed volley, followed by a general rush with the bayonet, which instantly threw the assailants back in great confusion, and the guards, following fast on their heels, not only drove them down the hill, but crossed the rivulet at the bottom, and were soon seen in disorderly array streaming up the opposite bank. Here, however, they met the enemy's reserve, who advanced in close order through the throng ; powerful batteries, discharging grape, tore down whole ranks at every discharge on one flank, and some regiments of cavalry threatened the other. The guards, thus sorely pressed, gave way and fled in confusion ; the disorder quickly spread to the Germans on their flank, and the whole British centre appeared broken. The danger was imminent : but Wellington, who had foreseen the consequences of the gallant but inconsiderate advance of the guards, had provided the means of restoring the combat. Instantly pushing forward the 48th regiment, which was in reserve, he directed it against the right flank of the French, who, in their turn, were somewhat disordered by success. When this gallant regiment got into the throng, beyond the stream, it was so beset by the crowd of fugitives, that it became necessary to open

the ranks to let them through : but immediately closing again, it advanced in beautiful array against the flank of the pursuing French, and, by a destructive volley, compelled them to halt. The guards and Germans immediately rallied, faced about, and renewed their fire, and Cotton's brigade of light cavalry having come up on the other flank at the same time, the advance of the French was effectually checked in the centre. This was their last effort : their columns now drew off in good order, and retired across the Alberche, three miles in the rear, which was passed in the night. Shortly after the firing ceased, a frightful incident occurred : the grass, dried by the excessive heat, accidentally took fire, and, spreading rapidly over part of the field, scorched cruelly numbers of the wounded of both armies.¹

Such was the glorious battle of Talavera, the first for a century past in which the English had been brought to contend on a great scale with the French, and which in its lustre equalled, in its ultimate effects exceeded, the far-famed days of Cressy and Azincour. Two-and-twenty thousand British had engaged for two successive days, and finally defeated above forty-five thousand French ; for the aid which the Spaniards afforded in the battle was very trifling, and not more than ten thousand of the enemy, including the King's guard, remained to watch their lines in the olive woods of Talavera, who never fired a shot. Seventeen pieces of cannon, several tumbrils, and some hundred prisoners, taken in fair fight, were the proud trophies of this hard-fought action. The loss on both sides was enormous ; but greater on that of the French than the British, owing to their much superior numbers and their system of attack in close column. The latter lost 6268 in the two days : that of the French

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Wel. Des.
Gurw. iv.
508. Nap.
ii. 403,
406. Vict.
et Conq.
xix. 286,
288. Jom.
iii. 347,
348.

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Kausler,
539. Nap.
ii. 405,
406. Well.
Returns,
Ann. Reg.
1809. App.
to Chron.
Jom. iii.
348.

is now ascertained, from the returns in the war office, to have been 8794.¹ "This battle," says Jomini, "at once restored the reputation of the British army which during a century had declined. It was now ascertained that the English infantry could dispute the palm with the best in Europe." In vain the mercantile spirit, which looks for gain in every transaction, and the virulence of faction, which has ever accompanied the noblest events in history, fastened on this far-famed field, complained of the subsequent retreat, and asked for durable results from the laurels of Talavera. These cold or selfish calculations were answered by the exulting throb of every British heart; the results asked for were found in the subsequent glorious career and long-continued security of England. Far from every generous bosom be that frigid spirit which would measure the importance of events only by their immediate gains, and estimate at nothing the lasting effect of elevation of national feeling. Character is the true strength of nations: historic glory is their best inheritance. When the time shall come that the British heart no longer thrills at the name of Talavera, its fruit will indeed be lost, for the last hour of the British empire will have struck.

March of
Soult, Ney,
and Mortier
into Wel-
lington's
rear.

On the day following the battle, General Craufurd, with three thousand fresh troops, joined the English army and replaced nearly half of those who had been disabled in the battle. This gallant band had, at the distance nearly of sixty miles from the field of battle, met several Spanish runaways from the action of the 27th, who told them the English army was defeated and Lord Wellington killed. Pressing on only the more eagerly from this intelligence, Craufurd, after giving his men a few hours' rest and withdrawing

fifty of the weakest from the ranks, hurried on with the utmost expedition with the remainder, and reached Talavera at eleven in the morning of the 29th, having passed over, in regular order, *sixty-two English miles* in the preceding twenty-six hours; a march which deserves to be noted as the greatest made by any foot soldiers of any nation during the whole war, as that made by Lord Lake with the English cavalry, before the battle of Furruckabad, was the extreme stretch of horsemen.* But, notwithstanding this seasonable reinforcement, Wellington had soon sufficient cause for anxiety; for, on the 2d August, as he was preparing to march to Madrid, intelligence arrived that Soult, with a very large force, had penetrated, without opposition, through the Puerto de Banos, the Spaniards stationed in that important pass having abandoned it without firing a shot, and entered Plasencia, directly in the British rear and on the line of their communications with Lisbon, with thirty-four thousand men.¹

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LVIII.

1809.

¹ Wellington to Lord Beresford, August 4. Gurw. iv. 531, 533. Nap. ii. 412, 413.

This formidable and unlooked-for apparition, had been occasioned by the concentration of the whole forces of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, in consequence of the pressing orders of Joseph, who, after uniting near Salamanca, had descended by forced marches through Leon and the mountains forming the northern barrier of Estremadura, and appeared just in time to interfere with decisive effect on the theatre of the vital operations on the banks of the Tagus. Their concentration at this crisis was owing to a very singular and fortuitous chain of events. Soult, after he had brought the ghastly crowd which formed the only remains of his once splendid corps to Lugo, and delivering the garrison imprisoned there by the

Events in Galicia and Asturias which had led to this force assailing Wellington.

* Ante, vii. 192.

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June 27.

Galicians, deeming himself not strong enough to effect any thing among the rugged mountains of that province, and having no magazines or stores to recruit his troops, resolved to make the best of his way into Old Castile ; and having set out in the end of June for Benavente and Zamora, he put his troops into cantonments on the Esla in the beginning of July. Mean-while Ney, thus left in Galicia, had experienced a variety of disasters. After the conference at Lugo with Soult, he had moved towards Vigo, with a view to regain possession of that important fortress and seaport, and stifle the insurrection which, from the aid of several ships of war in the harbour, was there daily becoming more formidable. To reach it, however, he required to pass the bridge of St Payo, in the valley of Soto-Mayor, where the road crosses the river Octaven. The Spaniards, ten thousand strong, with several pieces of heavy cannon, were there entrenched in a strong position on the opposite side of the river ; the bridge was cut ; and several gun-boats, manned by English sailors, at its mouth, a short way further down, prevented the passage from being turned in that direction. Driven thus to carry the passage by main force, Ney led on his troops gallantly to the attack ; but the well-sustained fire of the Spaniards defeated all his efforts. He renewed the assault next day with no better success, and despairing of forcing the position, he retired with the loss of three hundred men. Discouraged by this reverse, and finding himself abandoned by Soult, in a country swarming with enemies, and extremely difficult for military operations, Ney resolved to abandon Galicia. He was the more confirmed in this resolution, from the opinion which he entertained, that he had been scandalously

June 7.

deserted and left to perish by Soult; and under the influence of these mingled feelings of disappointment and indignation, he abandoned Ferrol and Corunna, and, collecting all his detachments, evacuated the whole province, and reached Astorga in the end of July. Asturias had previously been evacuated by Kellerman and Bonnet, who had arrived at Valladolid on the 20th June, in order to co-operate in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which at that period was in contemplation, after Santander had been carried by assault by the Spaniards some days before, and retaken, with great slaughter, by the latter of these generals. Thus, by a singular combination of circumstances, at the time when Wellington made his grand advance towards Madrid, Soult, Kellerman, and Bonnet, with above thirty thousand men, were assembled in the north of Leon, ready to descend on his line of communication with Lisbon, and Ney was rapidly following in their footsteps from the extremity of Galicia.¹

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1809.

July 22.

July 30.

June 20.

June 10.

June 15.

¹ Belm. i.

80, 83.

Tor. ii.

349, 353.

Nap. ii.

324, 328.

Wellington, thus menaced by a superior force in rear, at the same time that an army defeated, but still superior in number, lay in his front, had still the advantage of a central position between the two; and, if the quality of the whole allied forces had been alike, and he had commanded the whole, he had the means of striking the same redoubtable blows on the right and left, with a force inferior upon the whole, but superior to either taken singly, which Napoleon dealt out in 1796 to the converging Austrian columns which descended from the Alps for the relief of Mantua. This was the more feasible, as Joseph's army, which fought at Talavera, had been divided after the action; the King, with Sebastiani's corps, the reserve and royal guards, having marched towards Madrid, now

Wellington's plan to resist the attack.

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1809.

threatened on the one side by Venegas, who had occupied Aranjuez and passed Toledo, and on the other by Sir Robert Wilson, who was within seven leagues of the capital, and in communication with it. Doubtless, if Wellington had been at the head of fifty thousand British troops, he would have attempted, and probably with success, that resolute game. But, though the allied force at Talavera was of that numerical strength, dear-bought experience had demonstrated, that no reliance could be placed on any part of it in the field, except the twenty thousand English soldiers. The British general and his whole troops had now seen the Spanish army, and the illusion which had formerly prevailed on the subject had been dispelled. Their artillery, it was ascertained, was for the most part well trained, and had rendered good service on some important occasions ; but their cavalry was wretched, and their infantry, though courageous when resisting an attack, totally unfit to perform movements under fire or in presence of the enemy, without falling into confusion. In these circumstances, it was apparent that a prudent defensive policy was the only one which promised a chance of success with an army in great part composed of such troops ; but this was precisely the system which the ignorance and presumption of the Spanish generals rendered them incapable of adopting. Wellington, therefore, to avoid being attacked both in front and rear at the same time, deemed it necessary to divide the allied army ; and he offered to General Cuesta either to stay with the wounded at Talavera, or march to the attack of Soult, as he chose. The Spanish general preferred remaining where he was, and Wellington, in consequence, set out from Talavera, on the 3d August,¹ taking with him the whole

¹ Well. Des. Gurw. iv. 524, 534. Jom. iii. 349, 350. Nap. ii. 415, 417. Tor. iii. 48, 49.

British army, and leaving about two thousand of their wounded in the hospital at Talavera, under charge of the Spanish army.

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1809.

Hardly, however, had the last of the troops left the blood-stained banks of the Alberche, when intelligence arrived that Cuesta was making preparations to abandon Talavera and the English wounded; and at five o'clock, Wellington received official intimation that the Spanish general had actually put his intentions in execution, and was moving after the British army, leaving nearly half the wounded to their fate. Apprehension of being attacked, at the same time, both by Victor and Soult, was assigned as the motive of this proceeding; but the real fact was, that the Spanish general entertained well-grounded apprehension of the stability of his own force, when left to defend an important position against such an enemy as he had seen fight at Talavera, and he felt no chance of safety but in close proximity to the British force. Advices were received at the same time of the arrival of Soult at Naval Moral, on the high road leading to the bridge of Almaraz, and that his force, which was hourly increasing, was already thirty thousand strong. In these circumstances, Wellington wisely resolved to alter his line of march, and, quitting the road by Almaraz and Alcantara, to move across to the bridge of Arsobizbo, and take up a defensive position on the line of the Tagus. This resolution was instantly acted upon; the troops defiled to the left, and passed the bridge in safety; the Spaniards rapidly followed after them; and the bulk of the allied army reassembled at Deleitosa, on the south of the Tagus, on the following day. The bridges of Arsobizbo and Almaraz were destroyed, and a rear-guard of Spaniards, with thirty guns, left to defend the former passage. But the French corps, in great strength, were now

Cuesta
abandons
Talavera
and the
English
wounded.

August 3.

August 4.

August 5.

August 7.

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 1809.
 August 8. appearing on the banks of the Tagus: Soult, with three corps, mustering already thirty-four thousand men, was in the neighbourhood of Almarez; and Victor, with twenty-five thousand, attacked and defeated the Spaniards at Arsobizbo, by crossing the Tagus at a ford a little above the broken bridge, with eight hundred horse, and captured all their guns. Nothing now appeared capable of preventing the junction of the whole French armies, and the attack of sixty thousand excellent troops on the allied army, already suffering from extreme want of provisions, exhausted by fatigue, and little capable of withstanding so formidable a force. But the object of delivering Madrid being accomplished, and the allies driven to the south of the Tagus, the French generals had no inclination for further active operations; their soldiers, worn out with continued marching, stood much in need of repose; the recollection of Talavera checked the hope of any successful enterprise to the south of the Tagus, while its shores were guarded by the victors in that hard-fought field; and the great accumulation of troops around its banks exposed them, equally with the allies, to extreme suffering from want of provisions. These considerations pressing equally on both sides, produced a general separation of force, and suspension of operations, after the combat of Arsobizbo. Cuesta, disgusted with his reverses, resigned the command, and his army was broken into two parts; ten thousand were dispatched towards Toledo, to reinforce Venegas, who was now bombarding that city, and twenty thousand, under the command of the Duke d'Albuquerque, remained in the neighbourhood of the English army, in the mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana. The French armies also separated: Joseph returned with his guards, Dessolles' division,

August 12.

and Sebastiani's corps, to drive Venegas from Toledo; while Soult and Mortier remained at Talavera, Oropesa, and Plasencia; and Ney retraced his steps to Leon and the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. But so favourable an opportunity never occurred again of breaking down the English power in the Peninsula; and Napoleon,—who never ceased to lament to the last hour of his life that the advice of Soult was not followed, who wished to take advantage of this concentration of five corps, in all ninety thousand combatants, in the valley of the Tagus, and march at once on Coria and Lisbon,—soon after dismissed Jourdan from his situation of major-general to Joseph, and conferred that important situation on Soult.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

¹ Nap. ii.
417, 426.
Belm. i.
94, 95.
Jom. iii.
349, 357.
Tor. iii.
50, 53.

The justice of this opinion appeared in a still more striking manner, from the proof which was soon afforded of the inefficient character of those corps threatening Madrid, which had caused such alarm in the mind of Joseph, as to lead him to break up the noble force which he had latterly accumulated in the valley of the Tagus. Ney, in his way back from Plasencia, met unexpectedly, in the Puerto de Banos, the division of Sir Robert Wilson, consisting of three thousand Portuguese and as many Spaniards, who were winding their way amidst rocks and precipices, from the neighbourhood of Madrid to the Portuguese frontier, with which, being ignorant of the strength of the enemy, he endeavoured to stop the French corps. The result of a combat so unequal, might easily have been anticipated; Wilson was, after a stout resistance of three hours, dislodged and thrown back on the Portuguese frontier, with the loss of a thousand men. More important operations took place at the same time in the plains of La Mancha. Venegas, during the concentration of the French forces at Talavera, had not

Defeats of
Spaniards at
Puerto de
Banos and
Almonacid.

August 8.

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1809.

August 11.

only, with one of his divisions, occupied Aranjuez, with its royal palace, but with two others was besieging and bombarding Toledo. No sooner was Joseph relieved, by the retreat of the English from Talavera, from the necessity of remaining in force on the Alberche, than he moved off, with Sebastiani's corps and Dessolles' division, to attack him. Deceived as to the strength of his adversary, whose force he imagined did not exceed fourteen thousand men, the Spanish general resolved to give battle, and awaited the enemy in a good position at Almonacid. The French had twenty-four thousand foot and four thousand horse in the battle; the Spaniards about an equal force, but the difference in the quality of the troops in the opposite armies soon decided the contest. Encouraged by the ardour of his men, who demanded, with loud cries, to be led on to the combat, Sebastiani commenced the attack without waiting for the arrival of Dessolles' division: a division of Poles, under Sulkoski, attacked a hill, the key of the position, on which the Spanish left rested, while the Germans under Laval assailed it in flank. The crest of the mount was speedily won, and the Spanish left fell back on their reserve, consisting of the soldiers of Bayleu; but they rallied the fugitives and stood firm, while Venegas, charging the victorious French in flank, threw them into confusion, and drove them back in great disorder. Victory seemed to declare in favour of the Spaniards, when the arrival of Dessolles and Joseph, with the reserve, restored the combat. Assailed both in front and flank by fresh forces, when still disordered by success, the Spanish troops, after a sharp conflict, fell back; the old Moorish castle of Almonacid, where the reserve was stationed, was carried, after a bloody combat;¹ and Venegas, utterly routed, was glad to seek refuge in

¹ Gurw. v. 66. Tor. iii. 56, 59. Jom. iii. 352, 354. Nap. ii. 431, 433. Belm. i. 95.

the Sierra Morena, with the loss of thirty-five guns, nearly all his ammunition, and six thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the loss of two thousand men on the side of the victors, proved with what unwonted steadiness the Spaniards had fought on this occasion.

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For nearly a month after their retreat to the southern bank of the Tagus, the English army remained undisturbed in their position on that river, with their head-quarters at Deleitosa; and Wellington, informed of the return of Ney to Salamanca, was even preparing to resume offensive operations on its northern bank; with which view, he was busied in repairing the broken arch over the Tagus at Almaraz, when the total failure on the part of the Spaniards to provide subsistence for the English troops, rendered a retreat to Badajoz, and the vicinity of their own magazines, a matter of absolute necessity. From the moment the English troops entered Spain, they had experienced the wide difference between the promises and the performance of the Spanish authorities; and we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that, if the Junta of Truxillo had kept their contract for furnishing 240,000 rations to the English army, the allies would, on the night of the 27th July, have slept in Madrid.¹ But, for the month which followed the battle of Talavera, their distresses in this respect had been indeed excessive, and had reached a height which was altogether insupportable. Notwithstanding the most energetic remonstrances from Wellington, he had got hardly any supplies from the Spanish generals or authorities, from the time of his entering Spain; Cuesta had refused to lend him ninety mules to draw his artillery, though at the time he had several hundreds in his army doing nothing: the troops of all arms were liter-

Sufferings of
the English
army, and
their return
to the Por-
tuguese
frontier.

¹ Gurw. v.
355.

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ally starving : during a month which followed the junction of the two armies on 22d July, they had not received ten days' bread ; on many days they got only a little meat, without salt, on others nothing at all : the cavalry and artillery horses had not received, in the same time, three deliveries of forage, and in consequence a thousand had died, and seven hundred were on the sick list. These privations were the more exasperating, that during the greater part of the time, the Spanish troops received their rations regularly both for men and horses. The composition of the Spanish troops, and their conduct at Talavera and on other occasions, was not such as to inspire the least confidence in their capability of resisting the attack of the French armies : their men, hardly disciplined and without uniform, threw away their arms and dispersed, the moment they experienced any reverse, and permitted the whole weight of the contest to fall on the English soldiers, who had no similar means of escape. These causes had gradually produced an estrangement, at length a positive animosity between the privates and officers of the two armies ; an angry correspondence took place between their respective generals, which widened the breach ; and at last Wellington, finding all his representations disregarded, intimated his resolution to withdraw the British troops to the frontiers of Portugal, where they might be maintained from their own magazines. The Spanish authorities, upon this, made the most earnest protestations of their wish to supply the wants of the British soldiers, and offered to divide the magazines at Truxillo with them, or even put them entirely at their disposal. But Wellington had ascertained that this boasted resource would not supply the army for one day ; his troops were daily becoming more sickly ; and justly deeming

its very existence at stake if these evils any longer continued, the English general, on the 22d August, gave orders for the army to retire across the mountains into the valley of the Guadiana, where it took up its cantonments in the end of August, the headquarters being at Badajoz. But the malaria of that pestilential district in the autumnal months, soon produced the most deleterious effect on the health of the soldiers; the noxious vapours which exhaled from the beds of the rivers, joined to the cessation of active habits, and consequent circulation of the bilious secretion through the system, rendered fevers alarmingly frequent; seven thousand men were soon in hospital, of whom nearly two-thirds died, and the sands of the Guadiana proved more fatal to the army than the sword of the enemy.¹

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August 22.

August 29.

Well. Des.

Gurw. v.

10, 11, 12,

22, 24, 33,

52, 57, 63,

59, 71.

Nap. ii.

434, 446.

Being perfectly aware of the inability of the Spanish armies to contend with the French veterans, Wellington now earnestly counselled their leaders to adopt a different system of warfare; to avoid all general actions, encamp always on strong positions, and fortify them, when in the neighbourhood of the enemy, and make the best use of those numerous mountain chains which intersected the country in every direction, and afforded the means of avoiding the numerous and terrible Imperial horse.² An example soon occurred of the beneficial effects which would have resulted from the general adoption of this system. Ney's corps, which had been delivered over to General Marchand, when that marshal returned himself unto France, lay in the plains of Leon, near Ciudad Rodrigo; and the army formerly commanded by the Marquis Romana, having at length emerged from the Galician mountains, and arrived in the same neighbourhood, the French general adopted the resolution of bringing him to action. After a variety of

Success of
the Span-
iards at
Tamanes.

Gurw. v.

345.

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Oct. 24.

marches, the Duke del Parque, who had just been appointed to the command of the army, took post in the strong position of Tamanes, in the mountains on the northern side of the Puerto de Banos, where he was attacked, in the end of October, by Marchand, with twelve thousand men. The French troops commenced the attack with all their wonted spirit, anticipating an easy victory, and at first gained considerable success; but the main body of the Spanish army, trained in the campaign of Galicia to a mountain warfare, falling back to their strong ground, made a vigorous resistance, and from behind inaccessible rocks showered down a murderous fire on the assailants. After a sharp conflict, the unusual spectacle was exhibited of the French eagles receding before the Spanish standards, and Marchand drew off with the loss of fifteen hundred men and one gun; while the Duke del Parque gave decisive proof of the reality of his success, by advancing immediately after the action, and taking unresisted possession of Salamanca, with five-and-twenty thousand men.¹

¹ Jom. iii.
358. Gurw.
v. 362.
Nap. ii. 65,
66. Tor.
iii. 134,
137.

Events
which led to
the battle of
Ocana.

This transient gleam of success, instead of inducing the Spaniards to persevere in the cautious policy to which it had been owing, and which Wellington had so strenuously recommended, inspired them with a presumptuous self-confidence, which proved their total ruin. The success gained by the Duke del Parque at Tamanes, and the junction of his followers to those of Ballasteros, who had come down from Asturias with eight thousand fresh troops, gave such disquietude to the French, from their close proximity to their principal line of communication with Bayonne, that they deemed it necessary to withdraw part of Mortier's corps from Estremadura; and this inspired the Central Junta with the hope, that they might now undertake, with some prospect of success, their long-

cherished project of recovering Madrid. Areizaga, accordingly, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Venegas, which, by great exertions, and the junction of the greater part of Cuesta's force, had been raised to fifty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, moved forward, in the beginning of November, from the foot of the Sierra Morena, and soon arrived in the plain of OCANA, where Milhaud lay with the advanced guard of Sebastiani's corps. Encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, the Spanish horse fell with great vigour on the French division; but Milhaud was at the head of those redoubtable cuirassiers who had appeared with glory in all the great battles of Europe since the accession of Napoleon; and, after a short encounter, he routed the enemy with severe loss, and contrived to keep his ground in front of Aranjuez and the Tagus, till the great body of the army came up to his assistance. In effect, Joseph soon arrived with part of the corps of Soult and Mortier, and the royal guards, which raised his force to thirty thousand men, of whom five thousand were horsemen and lancers, with fifty guns. The Spanish general, whose ignorance of war was equal to his presumption, now perceived his danger, and took post on the best ground within his reach to give battle; but it was essentially defective, and proved one great cause of the unheard-of disaster which followed. The left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was placed *behind* a deep ravine, which it could not cross without falling into confusion; the centre was in advance of the town of Ocana, and the right *in front* of the same ravine, which ran along the whole line; so that the one wing was without a retreat in case of disaster, the other without the means of attacking the enemy in the event of success.¹

CHAP.
LVIII.

1809.

Nov. 3.

Nov. 12.

¹ Nap. iii.

79, 80.

Jom. iii.

359, 360.

Tor. iii.

144. Vict.

et Conq.

xix. 302.

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1809.

Total defeat
of the Span-
iards.

Totally unequal to such a crisis, Areizaga took post at break of day in one of the steeples of Ocana, behind his centre, where he remained during the whole battle, neither giving orders nor sending succour to any part of his line. Thus left to themselves, however, his troops at first made a gallant defence. Laval's division was the first which advanced to the attack, preceded by Senarmont's terrible battery of thirty guns, the effect of which had been so severely experienced by the Russians at Friedland. The Spanish troops in the centre, however, stood firm, and, with loud shouts, awaited the onset of the enemy, while their guns in position there kept up a heavy and destructive cannonade upon the advancing columns; and such was the weight of their fire, that the leading ranks of the assailants hesitated and fell back. Soult and Mortier, perceiving the disorder, instantly hastened to the spot, and brought up Gerard's division; and, opening their ranks to let the fugitives through, presented a front of fresh troops, in admirable order, to the combat. The prompt succour thus afforded restored the battle, and soon gave the French a glorious victory. The right wing of the Spaniards, severely pressed by Sebastiani's corps, was compelled to retreat behind the ravine, in front of which it stood at the commencement of the battle; while the dense lines of the Spanish left, posted behind the impassable gully in their front, were compelled to remain inactive spectators of the rout, arising from the whole enemy's force being thrown on their centre and right. The troops which had repulsed Laval were compelled to retire through the town of Ocana, where Areizaga was chased from his steeple, and instantly took to flight. On the right, Sebastiani, by penetrating between the town and the extreme Spanish right, cut off six thousand men, and

obliged them to surrender. The line, now broken in every part, rushed in wild disorder towards the rear, followed by the terrible French dragoons, who soon drove ten thousand men into a space behind Ocana, having only one outlet behind, where the throng was soon so great, that escape was impossible, and almost the whole were made prisoners. The army, upon this, dispersed in all directions, while the French cavalry, spreading out from Ocana like a fan, thundered in pursuit over the wide and desolate plains which extend to the south towards the Sierra Morena. Twenty thousand prisoners, fifty-five pieces of cannon, and the whole ammunition of the army, were the fruits of this glorious battle, which lasted only four hours, and in which the victors fired only 1700 hundred cannon-shot. Wearied with collecting prisoners, the French at length merely took their arms from the fugitives, desiring them to go home, telling them that war was a trade which they were not fit for; and such was the wreck of the army, which lately numbered fifty thousand combatants, that, ten days after the battle, Areizaga could not collect a single battalion to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena.¹

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1809.

¹ Jom. 359,
361. Well.
Desp. Gur.
v. 363.
Nap. iii.
80, 84.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
302, 304.
Tor. iii.
144, 146.

This astonishing victory would doubtless have been immediately followed by the passing of the Sierra Morena, and probably the total extinction of all regular resistance on the part of the Spaniards, had it not been that the position of the English army at Badajoz rendered it imprudent to engage in those defiles, through which it might be difficult to retrace their steps, in the event of a powerful force from Estremadura advancing to cut off the communication with Madrid. Joseph, therefore, highly elated with this victory, which he hoped would at length put an end to the contest, returned with the greater

Rout of the
Duke del
Parque at
Alba de
Tormes.

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1809.

Nov. 23.

Nov. 25.

part of his army in triumph to the capital, where his government was now established on a solid basis; and all the elements of resistance in New Castile being now destroyed, the whole revenue of the province was collected, and the administration conducted by the intrusive government. A similar catastrophe soon after gave them a like command over the population and the resources of Leon and New Castile. In that province, the Duke del Parque, finding the force in his front considerably diminished by the collection of the French troops to oppose the incursion of Areizaga to Ocana, advanced towards Medina del Rio Seco, in order to assist in the general movement on the capital. He attacked a body of ten thousand French on the 23d of November, and gained considerable success. But, in two days after, the enemy was strongly reinforced by some of the troops who had combated at Ocana, and who immediately spread the news of that dreadful event, as much to the elevation of the one as to the depression of the other army. The Spanish general, upon this disastrous intelligence, immediately retreated; but his troops were so extremely disheartened by this great defeat in the south, that, on the following day, when Kellerman, with a body of horse, came up with the army near Alba de Tormes, the Spanish cavalry fled the moment the enemy appeared, without striking a blow. The infantry, however, stood firm and made a stout resistance, which enabled the Duke to effect his retreat without any considerable loss, notwithstanding the repeated charges of the French horse upon his flank. Such, however, was the depressed state of the troops, that, at daybreak on the following morning, when a French patrol entered the town in which they were lying, the whole Spanish army took to flight and separated in all directions, leaving their whole artillery,

ammunition, and carriages of every sort, in the hands of the enemy. So complete was their dispersion, that for some days the Duke del Parque was left literally without an army. But the Spanish troops, whose constancy in adversity was as worthy of admiration as their unsteadiness in the field was remarkable, again rallied round the standard of their chief, and in a fortnight the Duke, who had retired to the mountains to the south of Ciudad Rodrigo, again found himself at the head of twelve or fifteen thousand men, but for the most part unarmed, without cannon or ammunition, and literally famishing from want.¹

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¹ Nap. iii.
86, 89.
Vict. et
Conq. xix.
305, 308.
Tor. 147,
151. Well.
Desp. Gur.
v. 364.

As these terrible blows had dispersed the only forces in the field which the Spaniards had, worthy of the name of armies; and, as the event had now clearly proved what he had long foreseen, not only that they were incapable of maintaining war themselves in the field with the French, but that, by their inability to perform movements in presence of the enemy, they could not be relied upon to form a part in any combined system of operations, Wellington perceived clearly that henceforth the protection of Portugal must form his main object, and that, if the deliverance of the Peninsula was ever to be effected, it must be by the forces which rested on the fulcrum of that kingdom. He wisely resolved, therefore, to move his army from the banks of the Guadiana, where it had already suffered so severely from the autumnal fevers, to the frontier of the province of Beira, where it might at once recover its health upon higher and hilly ground, guard the principal road to the Portuguese capital from the centre of Spain, and watch the formidable force, now nearly thirty-six thousand strong, which the French had collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the beginning of December, therefore, Wellington,

Transfer of
the British
army to the
frontier of
Beira.

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1809.

Wel. Desp.
Gurw. v.
364, and
Desp. 20th
October,
1809. v.
234, 240.
Jom. iii.
363.

Disastrous
state of the
Spanish
affairs at
this period.

after having repaired to Seville and concerted measures with the junta there, moved his army to the neighbourhood of Almeida and the banks of the Agueda, leaving only a comparatively small force at Elvas and in the Alentejo, to co-operate with the Spaniards in Estremadura; and at the same time commenced those formidable lines at Torres Vedras and in front of Lisbon, which he had long contemplated, and which at length permanently arrested the hitherto irresistible torrent of French conquest!¹

These movements closed the bloody and eventful campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula; and, certainly, never since the beginning of the world had a war occurred presenting more objects worthy of the admiration of the patriot, the study of the statesman, and the observation of the soldier. The sieges of Saragossa and Gerona, where forty thousand ill-disciplined troops, supported by the heroic inhabitants of these towns, had inflicted a greater loss upon the French than the whole military force of Austria in the field of Wagram, had afforded memorable examples of what could be effected by the feelings of religious and patriotic duty, when brought into the conflict under circumstances where the usual advantages of discipline and prowess could not immediately decide the contest. On the other hand, the long train of disasters which the Spaniards had since incurred in every other quarter, terminating in the frightful catastrophe of Ocana, had demonstrated, in equally striking colours, the total inability of undisciplined troops, even when animated by the most ardent zeal in behalf of their independence, and the greatest possible advantages of a mountainous country, to withstand the attacks of a powerful, disciplined, and well-directed enemy. That the Spanish people were brave, was evident from the courage

with which they withstood, and on many occasions repulsed, the first attacks of the French veterans ; that they were hardy, was demonstrated by the privations which they underwent with unshaken constancy ; that they were zealous in the cause of their country, was clear from the multitudes who in every quarter thronged to its standards ; that they were enduring in adversity, was manifest from the unparalleled tenacity with which they maintained the contest, after reverses and under circumstances which would have overwhelmed the resistance of any other people. Yet, with all these admirable qualities, they had every where proved unfortunate, and could not point to one single province rescued by their efforts from the grasp of the enemy ; for it was evident that the deliverance of Galicia and Asturias was to be ascribed, not to the arms of Romana and the mountaineers of those provinces, brave and indomitable as they were, but to the disciplined battalions of Wellington, which first, by depriving Soult's corps of all its equipments, compelled him to evacuate that province, and afterwards, by threatening Madrid, forced the French generals to concentrate all their forces for the defence of the capital—a memorable example to succeeding ages, both of the astonishing effects of patriotic ardour in supporting the cause, when properly directed, of national independence, and of the total inadequacy of mere popular efforts to effect the national deliverance from serious dangers, if not directed by a strong government, and resting on the foundation of national forces, previously disciplined and prepared for the contest.

It was a clear perception of these truths, joined to the comparatively small force which he had at his disposal, and the extraordinary difficulty either of providing men or money in Great Britain for addi-

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Wellington's policy
in consequence.

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tional troops, which was the ruling principle in the campaigns of Wellington, that are to form so brilliant a part in the subsequent chapters of this history. With a force seldom exceeding thirty thousand British soldiers, and which could rarely bring, after the usual deductions, above twenty-five thousand into the field, he had to maintain a contest with six French corps, the whole of which, if necessary, would concentrate against his army, and which could bring into the field, after amply providing for their rear and communications, at least one hundred and fifty thousand combatants. The Spanish armies, at different periods during the campaign that was past, had indeed been numerous, their officers daring, and many had been the reproaches cast upon the English general for at last declining to join in the rash operations which terminated in the disasters of Ocana and Alba de Tormes. But it was now manifest to all the world that any such operation could have terminated in nothing but disaster, and that, if the English corps of twenty-four thousand men had advanced in the close of the year towards the Spanish capital, the consequence would have been, that the French generals would immediately have concentrated their whole forces upon it, as they did upon Sir John Moore, and that if it escaped destruction at all, it could only have been by a retreat as disastrous and destructive as that to Corunna. The undisciplined state of the Spanish armies rendered this a matter of ease ; for they were incapable, in the field, of moving to attack the enemy without falling into confusion ; and any progress which their desultory bands might make in other provinces during such concentration of their troops, would only expose them to greater disasters upon the separation of the French forces after the destruction of the English army.

Immense as were the obstacles with which Wel-
 lington had to contend, in striving for the deliver-
 ance of the Peninsula with such allies, against such
 an overwhelming superiority of force, the difficulty
 became still greater from the different modes in which
 the respective armies carried on the war. The Bri-
 tish, according to the established mode of civilized
 warfare, at least in modern times, maintained them-
 selves chiefly from magazines in their rear; and when
 they were obliged to depend upon the supplies of the
 provinces where the war was carried on, they paid
 for them just as they would have done in their own
 country. In consequence of this circumstance, and
 the distance to which their supplies were to be con-
 veyed, the expense of carrying on war, with even
 a comparatively inconsiderable force, on the conti-
 nent, was severely felt by the British government.
 Already, the cost of even the small army which Wel-
 lington headed in Portugal, was about L.230,000 a
 month. The French, on the other hand, by revert-
 ing to the old Roman system of making war main-
 tain war, not only felt no additional burden, but ex-
 perience the most sensible relief by their armies
 carrying on war with foreign states. From the mo-
 ment that his forces entered a hostile territory, it was
 a fundamental principle of Napoleon's, that they
 should draw nothing from the French exchequer;
 and, while the people of Paris were amused with the
 flattering statements of the moderate expense at
 which their vast army was maintained, the fact was
 carefully concealed, that the whole troops engaged in
 foreign service—that is, two-thirds of the whole mili-
 tary establishment of the empire—were paid, fed,
 and lodged, at the expense of the countries where
 hostilities were going forward. To such a length

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LVIII.

1809.

Difficulties
with which
he had to
contend.

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1809.

¹ Gurw. vi.
552.

Differences
in the
French and
English
mode of
carrying
on war.

was this system carried, that we have the authority of the Duke of Wellington for the assertion, that the cost of the pay and hospitals for the French army, in Spain alone, was greater than the sum stated in the French Budget for the year 1809, as the expense of their whole military establishment.¹

These causes produced a total difference in the modes in which the generals of the two armies were obliged or enabled to carry on war. The English, paying for every thing which they consumed, found their difficulties and expenses increase the further they advanced from the coast; and, when they got into the interior of the Peninsula, any considerable failure in their supplies, or any blow struck by the enemy at their communications, threatened them with total ruin. The French, on the other hand, fearlessly plunged into the most desolate provinces, totally regardless of their flanks or rear; and, without magazines or communications of any kind, contrived to wrench from the inhabitants, by the terrors of military execution, ample supplies for a long period, in a country where a British regiment could not find subsistence for a single week. "The mode," says the Duke of Wellington, "in which they provide for their armies, is this: they plunder every thing they find in the country; they force from the inhabitants, under pain of death, all that they have in their houses for the consumption of the year, without payment, and are indifferent respecting the consequences to the unfortunate people. Every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal and vehicle of every description, is considered to belong of right and without payment to the French army; and they require a communication with their rear, only for the purpose of conveying intelligence and receiving orders from the Emperor."²

² Well.
Desp.
Gurw. vii.
283, 299.

It may readily be conceived what advantages an enemy acting on these principles must always possess over another conforming to the good old fashion of taking nothing but what they can pay for. So, also, will fraud or violence, if directed by talent or supported by power, almost always gain the ascendancy in the first instance in private life, over the unobtrusive efforts of honest industry. But the same moral law is applicable to both ; mark the end of these things, alike to the private villain and the Imperial robber. What the French military historians call the circumspection and caution of the British general, was the necessary result of those principles of justice and perseverance, which, commencing with the reverses of the Spanish campaign, were destined, ere long, to rouse mankind in their favour, and lead to the triumph of Vittoria and the Moscow retreat. The energy and fearlessness which they justly admire in their own generals, were the consequence of the system which, destroying the half of every army in the course of every campaign, was destined, in the end, to exhaust the military strength of the empire, and bring the powers of Europe in irresistible force to the banks of the Seine.

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1809.

Notwithstanding all these untoward circumstances, and the difficulties necessarily arising from the co-operation of the armies of three independent kingdoms in one campaign, Wellington, even after the retreat from Talavera, had no fears of the result, and repeatedly wrote, both to the British and the Spanish governments, that he had no doubt he should be able to deliver the Peninsula, if the Spanish generals would only adhere to the cautious system of policy which he so strongly inculcated.*

* "I declare, that if they had preserved their two armies, or even one

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1809.

Rashness
and folly of
the Spanish
rulers.

Their course was perfectly clear. It was, to use the mattock and the spade more than the sword or the bayonet ; to take advantage of the numerous mountain ranges which the country afforded, to shelter their armies, and of the admirable courage of their citizens behind walls to defend their strongholds. In a word, they had nothing to do but to follow the course by which the Scotch, on eleven different occasions, baffled the English armies, numbering from fifty to eighty thousand combatants, in each invasion, who had crossed the Tweed ; and by which Washington, at every possible disadvantage, at length worked out the independence of the American States. But to this judicious system the ignorance and infatuation of the Central Junta, joined to the presumption and inexperience of their generals, opposed invincible obstacles. No disasters could convince them that they were not superior to the French troops in the open field ; and so elated were they by the least success, that no sooner did they see the Imperial armies receding before them, than, hurrying from their mountain fastnesses with a rabble almost undisciplined, and without even uniform, they rushed into conflict with the veterans against whom the armies of Austria and Russia had contended in vain. Nothing could be expected from such a system but the result which actually took place, viz., the total destruction of the Spanish armies, and the throwing the whole weight of the contest in future upon the British and Portuguese forces.

of them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent no reinforcements which could have been of any use ; time would have been gained ; the state of affairs would have improved daily ; all the chances were in our favour ; and in the first moment of weakness, occasioned by any diversion on the continent, or by the growing discontent of the French themselves with the war, the French armies must have been driven out of Spain."—WELL. *Desp.* GURW. v. 335.

And, though the success which attended her efforts had not been proportioned to the magnitude of the exertions which she made, yet England had no reason to feel ashamed of the part which she had taken in the contest. For the first time, since the commencement of the war, she now appeared with troops in the field adequate to her mighty strength ; and it affords a marvellous proof of the magnitude of the British resources that this display should have been made in the seventeenth year of the war. The forces by land and sea which she put forth in this year were unparalleled. With a fleet of two hundred and forty ships of the line, and nearly eleven hundred vessels of all sizes, she maintained the undisputed command of the waves ; blockaded every hostile harbour in Europe ; at once chased the Toulon squadron ashore at the mouth of the Rhone, burned the Brest fleet amidst the shallows of Basque Roads, drove the Russian navy under the cannon of Cronstadt, and still found thirty-seven ships of the line wherewith to strike a redoubtable blow at the fleets in the Scheldt. With a hundred thousand regular troops, she maintained her immense colonial empire in every part of the world, and, as it suited her convenience, rooted out the French flag from their last transmarine possessions : with one hundred and ninety thousand more, she swayed the sceptre of Hindostan, and kept in subjection her seventy millions of Asiatic subjects : with four hundred thousand regular and local militia, she amply provided for the safety of the British islands : while, with another hundred thousand gallant disposable soldiers, she carried on the war with unexampled vigour on the continent of Europe ; menaced at once Antwerp, Madrid, and Naples, and was prevented only by the dilatory con-

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1809.

Vast efforts
of Great
Britain dur-
ing the
campaign.

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duct of her general from carrying off, in triumph, thirty ships of the line from the Scheldt, and by the failure of the Spanish authorities to provide supplies, from chasing the Imperial Usurper from his palace at Madrid. The Roman empire never had such forces on foot; they exceeded those wielded by Napoleon in the zenith of his power. To say that the latter enterprises, in the end, miscarried and terminated in disappointment, is no real reproach to the national character. To command success is not always in the power of nations, any more than of individuals. Skill in war, as in pacific enterprises, is not to be attained but by experience. The best security for ultimate triumph is to be found in the spirit which can conceive, and the courage which can deserve it; and the nation, which, after such a contest, could make such exertions, if not in possession of the honours, was at least on the path to the fruits of, victory.

Comparison
with what
it was at
the outset of
the war and
has since
become.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this astonishing display of strength in the British empire took place, and it is interesting to observe what, during that period, has been the change upon the national force and the means of asserting the independence of the country, if again called in question by foreign aggression. The intervening period has been one, it is well known, either of unprecedented triumphs or of unbroken tranquillity. Five years of successful combats brought the war to a glorious issue; five-and-twenty years of subsequent uninterrupted peace have increased in an extraordinary degree the wealth, population, and resources of the empire. The numbers of the people during that time have increased nearly a half; the exports and imports have more than doubled; the tonnage of the commercial navy has increased a half; and agriculture, following the

wants of the increased population of the empire, has advanced in a similar proportion. The warlike establishments of other states have undergone little or no diminution. France has nearly four hundred thousand men in arms; Russia six hundred thousand, besides forty ships of the line constantly in commission, and ready for service. What, then, with such resources, and exposed to such dangers, is the establishment which Great Britain now maintains when on the verge of a war in both hemispheres?

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Her army of three hundred thousand regular soldiers and militia, has sunk down to ninety-six thousand men: her fleet of two hundred and forty ships of the line has dwindled away to twenty in commission, fifty-eight in ordinary, and twelve building—in all, ninety; her Indian army, which in 1826 numbered two hundred and ninety thousand, has declined to one hundred and eighty thousand combatants, while the population and extent of her Asiatic possessions are hourly on the increase; her regular and local militia have entirely disappeared. All this has taken place, too, at a time when the wants and necessities of the empire in every quarter of the globe have rapidly augmented, and the resources of the state to maintain an adequate establishment are at least double what they were thirty years ago. Nay, to such a length has the public mind become deluded, that it was lately seriously stated by an intelligent and upright Lord of the Admiralty, in his place in Parliament, that “it could not be said that Great Britain was defenceless, for that she had *three ships of the line, and three guard-ships ready to protect the shores of England*,” being just one-third of the force which Denmark possessed to protect the island of Zealand,¹ when her fleet and arsenals were taken

¹ See Sir C. Adam's Speech, March 8, 1839.

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by Great Britain in 1807. There is not, perhaps, to be found so remarkable an instance of the decay of national strength, consequent upon prosperity, in the whole history of the world.*

Probable effects of this change on the future fortunes of England.

² Bacon's Works, ii. 393.

³ Las Cases, ii. 256.

“In the youth of a state,” says Bacon, “arms do flourish; in the middle age of a state, learning; and then both of them together for a time: in the declining age of a state, *mechanical arts and merchandise*.”² “If a monarchy,” says Napoleon, “were made of granite, it would soon be reduced to powder by the political economists.”³ Are, then, the prognostics of these great men now about to be fulfilled? and is the British empire, the foundations of which were laid by her Edwards and Henries, and the maturity crowned by the genius of Shakspeare and Newton,

* Tables exhibiting the Resources, and Military and Naval Establishments, of the British Empire in 1792, 1809, and 1838:—

I. RESOURCES.

	Population of Great Britain and Ireland.	Exports. Official value.	Imports. Official value.	Tonnage. Great Britain and Ireland.	Revenue.
1792, .	12,680,000	L.24,904,850	L.19,659,358	1,540,145	L.19,258,814
1809, .	17,500,000	46,292,632	31,750,557	2,368,468	63,719,400
1838, .	27,250,000	97,621,548	57,023,867	2,792,646	48,547,435

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*; MARSHALL'S *Tables*; PORTER'S *Progress of Nations*.

II. MILITARY FORCES, AND COLONIAL POPULATION TO DEFEND.

	Regulars.	Militia or Fencibles.	Volunteers or Local Militia.	Colonial population to defend.	Army.	Total.
1792, .	17,013	16,120	None	47,000,000	88,429	121,562
1809, .	210,000	84,000	320,000	73,000,000	185,504	614,000
1838, .	96,000	None	None	101,124,000	185,339	281,339

—MARTIN'S *Hist. Col.* i. 314, and 318, &c.; PORTER, ii. 321; *Ann. Reg.* 1792, 147.

III. NAVAL FORCES.

	LINE.					FRIGATES.			Small- er ves. in all.	Total.		Grand Total.
	In commis.		Ordinary.			In com.	Ordr.	Build.		Line.	Frigs.	
		Guard ships.	Line.	Guard ships.	Build- ing.				Sloops, Brigs, &c.			
1792,	26	3	87	25	12	52	57	6	149	153	109	411
1809,	113	28	14	40	47	140	25	25	634	242	185	1061
1838,	21	None	58	None	12	9	74	10	190	90	93	373

—JAMES' *Naval History*, i. 404—*Table 1.*; iv.404—*Table 1.*; BARROW'S *Life of Anson*, *App.* p. 424.

the conquests of Nelson, and the triumphs of Wellington, to terminate at last in the selfishness of pleasure, or the timid spirit of mercantile opulence? Are the glories of the British name, the wonders of the British empire, to be overwhelmed in the growth of manufacturing wealth, and the short-sighted passion for commercial aggrandisement? Without pretending to decide on these important questions, the solution of which, as yet, lies buried in the womb of fate, it may safely be affirmed that the topic now alluded to affords deep subject for consideration both for the British patriot at this time, and the philosophic observer in every future age of mankind. The moralist, who observes how rapidly in private life excessive prosperity saps the foundation of individual virtue, will perhaps be inclined to fear that a similar cause of corruption has, at the period of its greatest exaltation, blasted the strength of the British empire. The historian, who surveys the indelible traces which human affairs every where exhibit of the seeds of mortality, will probably be led to fear that the days of British greatness are numbered, and that, with the growth of the selfish passions springing out of long-continued and unbroken good-fortune, the virtue to deserve, the spirit to defend it, is gradually wearing out of the realm.

But, when the days of party strife have passed away, and the events of this time have been transferred into the records of history, all will probably concur in thinking that the immediate cause of this extraordinary decline is to be found in the long-continued and undue preponderance, since the peace, of the popular part of the constitution, and the extraordinary duration and violence of that passion for economical reduction, which always springs from

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the ascendancy, for any considerable time, in the national councils, of the great body of mankind. It is not surprising that such limited views should be entertained by the popular party in Great Britain, when all the eloquence of Demosthenes failed in inducing the most spiritual democracy of antiquity to take any steps to ward off the imminent dangers arising from the ambition of Philip; and all the wisdom of Washington was unable to communicate to the greatest republic of modern times sufficient strength to prevent its capital being taken, and its arsenals pillaged, by a British division not four thousand five hundred strong. And, without joining in the outcry now directed against either of the administrations which have recently ruled the state, on account of a prostration of the national defences of which it is easier to see the dangers than to provide the remedy, and in which all parties, save the few far-seeing patriots who had courage to resist the general delusion, and steadily opposed, amidst general obloquy, the excessive and disastrous reductions which were so loudly applauded, will probably be found to be nearly equally implicated, it is the duty of the historian to point out this memorable decline for the constant observation of future ages. Posterity will perhaps deduce from it the inference that present popularity is seldom the reward of real wisdom; that measures calculated for the benefit of future ages are hardly ever agreeable to the present; and that the institutions which compel the rulers of the state to bend to the temporary inclinations of the people, in opposition to their ultimate interests, bear in themselves the seeds of mortality, and were the unobserved, but certain cause of the destruction of the greatest power which had existed in the world since the fall of the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER LIX.

CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS, AND YEAR 1810.

ARGUMENT.

Greatness of Napoleon's Situation after the Battle of Wagram—The want which he felt of heirs and historic descent—Different Alliances which were the object of his choice—Disclosure of his resolution for a Divorce to Josephine at Fontainebleau—Speech of the Emperor on the occasion—Josephine's dignified Answer—Proposals made to the Emperor Alexander for his Sister—Napoleon proposes to Marie Louise, and is accepted—Journey of Marie Louise to Paris—Pique of the Emperor Alexander on the occasion—Character of Josephine—and of Marie Louise—Journey of the Emperor and Empress to Belgium—Conflagration of Prince Schwarzenberg's Ball-room—Strange Intrigue and Disgrace of Fouché—Rupture with Louis Bonaparte, and his abdication of the throne of Holland—Incorporation of Holland with the French Empire—General Consternation in England at the result of the last Campaign—Debates in Parliament against the continuance of the War in the Peninsula—Arguments of the Opposition against the continuance of the Peninsular War—Arguments of the Ministry in support of it—Resolution of Parliament, and Supplies for the year—Important Effect which these gloomy Views in England had upon the policy of the French Government—Conquest of Andalusia by Soult—Rapid and able March of Albuquerque, which saves Cadiz—Operations in Catalonia—Fall of Lerida and Mequinenza—Preparations for the Grand Attack on Portugal by Massena—Wellington's Views for the defence of Portugal, and ultimate deliverance of the Peninsula—His magnanimous resolution to discharge his duty, notwithstanding all the clamour with which he was assailed—Comparative Forces of the two armies at the commencement of the Campaign—Extraordinary difficulties with which Wellington had to contend—Siege and Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo—Siege and Fall of Almeida—Retreat of Wellington into the interior of Portugal—He crosses the Mondego and occupies the ridge of Busaco—Battle there—Bloody defeat of the French—Massena turns the position, and Wellington retires to Torres-Vedras—Description of the Lines and Position there—Junction of Romana, and admirable position of the British Troops—Continued Distresses, and ultimate Retreat of the French to Santarem—Arrival of Reinforcements from England, and ultimate Retreat of Massena—Operations in Estremadura, and Investment of Badajoz—Defeat of Mendizabel—Fall of Badajoz—Operations to raise the siege of Cadiz—Battle of Barossa—Inaction of La Pena, and return of the troops to the isle of Leon—Various Actions during the Retreat—Blockade of Almeida, and Efforts of Massena for its Relief—Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro—Obstinate Nature of the Fight, and Danger of the English—Ultimate Failure of Massena, and his Retreat

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 LIX. tugal—Its incalculable Importance—Exhibits the first Example of the stopping
 1809. of the Revolutionary Torrent—Magnanimity of Wellington in adhering to the
 System he had laid down.

Greatness of
 Napoleon's
 situation
 after the
 battle of
 Wagram.

THE result of the campaign of Wagram had elevated Napoleon to the highest point of greatness, in so far as it could be conferred by present strength and grandeur. Resistance seemed impossible against a power which had vanquished successively the armies of Prussia, Russia, and Austria; contest hopeless with a state which had emerged victorious from eighteen years of warfare. The conflict in the Peninsula, it was true, still lingered; but disaster had every where attended the Spanish arms, and it only seemed to await the choice of the Emperor when the moment was to arrive that was to see their efforts finally subdued, and the French eagles planted in triumph on the towers of Lisbon. If the maritime war yet continued, it was only because England, with now seemingly unavailing obstinacy, maintained a hopeless contest; and, if she was still the mistress of the waves, that sterile supremacy had been attained by the sacrifice of all the objects for which the dominion of the earth had ever been coveted. More truly than in the time of the Roman Emperors, the inhabitants of Albion were now severed from the civilized nations of the world, and the celebrated line of the poet—

Penitus divisos orbe Britannos,

seemed, after the revolution of seventeen hundred years, again to present a faithful description of the situation of the British isles.

What, then, was awaiting to a sovereign surrounded with such magnificence, to a chief wielding such awful power? Historic descent, and ancestral

glory: and for this one defect, even all the achievements of Napoleon afforded no adequate compensation. In vain the orators of the empire dwelt with deserved emphasis on his marvellous exploits; in vain they pointed to Europe subdued by his arms, the world entranced by his glory; the present could not always fascinate mankind, the splendour of existing greatness could not entirely obliterate the recollection of departed virtue. Faintly at first, but still perceptibly, the grandeur of ancient days glimmered through the blaze of modern renown: as the whirl of the Revolution subsided, the exploits of the monarchy returned again to the recollection; the rapid fall of almost all dynasties recorded in history, founded on individual greatness, recurred in painful clearness, even to superficial observation, and in the next generation, the claims to the throne, even of the heir of Napoleon's glory, might be overbalanced by those of an infant who had succeeded to the majestic inheritance of fourteen hundred years. The Emperor was too clear-sighted not to perceive those truths; the policy of his imperial government was calculated to revive the sway of those natural feelings in the breasts of the people; but it was difficult to make them stop at the desired point, and the danger was obvious, that the feeling of awe and veneration with which he endeavoured to make them regard the throne, might insensibly, in the next age, revive the ancient feelings and attachments of the monarchy. The necessity of having descendants to perpetuate his dynasty was apparent, and for this object he was prepared to sacrifice the dearest attachment of his existence; but he required heirs who might unite the lustre of former descent with the brightness of recent achievements, and exhibit on the throne an

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The want
which he
felt of heirs
and historic
descent.

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enduring example of that fusion of ancient grandeur with modern interests, which it was the object of all the institutions of the empire to effect. He succeeded in his wish : he exhibited to the astonished world the spectacle of a soldier of fortune from Corsica, winning at the sword's point a daughter of the Cæsars ; the birth of a son seemed to realize all his hopes, and blend the imperial blood with the exploits of a greater than Charlemagne ; and yet, such is the connexion often indissoluble, even in this world, between injustice and retribution, and such the mysterious manner in which Providence renders the actions of men the unconscious instruments of its will, that from this apparently auspicious event may be dated the commencement of his downfall : the birth of the King of Rome was coeval with the retreat of Massena from before the lines of Torres Vedras, the first occasion on which the Imperial arms had permanently recoiled in continental warfare ; and in the jealousy excited in the Russian cabinet by the preference given to the Austrian alliance, is to be found the ultimate source of his ruin. "That marriage," said Napoleon, "was the cause of my destruction ; in contracting it, I placed my foot on an abyss covered over with flowers."¹

Las Cases, ii. 108 ;
and iii. 131.

Different
alliances
which were
the object
of his
choice.

The Emperor had long meditated the divorce of the Empress, and his marriage with a princess who might afford him the hopes of a family. Not that he felt the unconcern so common with sovereigns in making this momentous separation ; his union with Josephine had not been founded on reasons of state, or contracted with a view to political aggrandisement : it had been formed in early youth, based on romantic attachment ; it was interwoven with all his fortunes, and associated with his most interesting recollections ; and though impetuous in his desires, and by no means

insensible on many occasions to the attractions of other women, his homage to them had been the momentary impulse of desire, without ever eradicating from his heart its genuine affection for the first object of his attachment. But all these feelings were subordinate with Napoleon to considerations of public necessity or reasons of state policy; and though he suffered severely from the prospect of the separation, the anguish which he experienced was never permitted for an instant to swerve him from the resolution he had adopted. The grandeur of his fortune, and the apparent solidity of his throne, gave him the choice of all the Princesses of continental Europe; and the affair was debated in the council of state as a mere matter of public expedience, without the slightest regard to private inclination, and still less to oppressed virtue. For a moment an alliance with a native of France was the subject of consideration, but it was soon laid aside for very obvious reasons; a princess of Saxony was also proposed, but it was rather recommended by the absence of any objections against, than the weight of any reason for its adoption. At length it was resolved to make advances to the courts both of St Petersburg and Vienna; and, without committing the Emperor positively to either, to be determined by the march of events, and the manner in which the proposals were received, from which of the two imperial houses a partner for the throne of Napoleon was to be selected.¹

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¹ Thib vii.

99, 101.

Montg. vii.

4. Bign.

ix. 63, 66.

It was at Fontainebleau, in November, 1809, after the return of the Emperor from the battle of Wagram, that the heart-rending communication of this resolution was first made to the Empress. She had hastened to meet Napoleon after his return from that

Disclosure

of the re-

solution for

a divorce to

Josephine at

Fontaine-

bleau.

CHAP. eventful campaign ; but, though received at first with
 LIX. kindness, she was not long of perceiving, from the
 1809. restraint and embarrassment of his manner, and the
 separation studiously maintained between them, that
 the stroke which she had so long dreaded was about
 to fall upon her. After fifteen days of painful sus-
 Nov. 30. pense and anxiety, the fatal resolution was commu-
 nicated to her, on the 30th of November, by the
 Emperor himself. They dined together as usual,
 but neither spoke a word during the repast ; their
 eyes were averted as soon as they met, but the
 countenance of both revealed the mortal anguish of
 their minds. When it was over, he dismissed the
 attendants, and, approaching the Empress with a
 trembling step, took her hand and laid it upon his
 heart :—" Josephine," said he, " my good Josephine,
 you know how I have loved you ; it is to you, to you
 alone, that I owe the few moments of happiness I have
 known in the world : Josephine, my destiny is more
 powerful than my will, my dearest affections must
 yield to the interests of France."—" Say no more,"
 cried the Empress ; " I expected this ; I understand,
 and feel for you ; but the stroke is not the less mor-
 tal." With these words, she uttered piercing shrieks,
 and fell down in a swoon. Dr Corvisart was at hand
 to render assistance, and she was restored to a sense
 of her wretchedness in her own apartment. The
 Emperor came to see her in the evening, but she
 could hardly bear the emotion occasioned by his
 appearance. How memorable a proof of the equality
 with which happiness is bestowed on all classes of
 men, that Napoleon, at the summit of earthly gran-
 deur, and when sated with every human felicity,
 confessed that the only moments of happiness he had
 known in life,¹ had been derived from those affections

¹ Bour. viii.
 342, 344.
 Mém. de
 Joseph. i.
 202, 209.

which were common to him with all mankind, and was driven to a sacrifice of them, which would not have been required from the meanest of his subjects.

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A painful duty now was imposed on all those concerned in this exalted drama, that of assigning their motives, and playing their parts in its last stages, before the great audience of the world; and, certainly, if on such occasions the speeches are generally composed for the actors, there never was one on which nobler sentiments were delivered, or more descriptive perhaps of the real feelings of the parties. On the 15th of December, all the kings, princes, and princesses, members of the Imperial family, with the great officers of the empire, being assembled in the Tuileries, the Emperor thus addressed them:—
“The political interests of my monarchy, the wishes of my people, which have constantly guided my actions, require that I should leave behind me, to heirs of my love for my people, the throne on which Providence has placed me. For many years I have lost all hopes of having children by my beloved spouse the Empress Josephine; that it is which induces me to sacrifice the sweetest affections of my heart, to consider only the good of my subjects, and desire the dissolution of our marriage. Arrived at the age of forty years, I may indulge a reasonable hope of living long enough to rear, in the spirit of my own thoughts and disposition, the children with which it may please Providence to bless me. God knows! what such a determination has cost my heart; but there is no sacrifice which is above my courage, when it is proved to be for the interests of France. Far from having any cause of complaint, I have nothing to say but in praise of the attachment and tenderness of my beloved wife. She has embellished fifteen years of

Speech of
the Em-
peror on the
occasion of
the divorce.

Dec. 15.

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¹ Moniteur,
Feb. 6,
1810.
Bign. ix.
58, 59.

Josephine's
dignified
answer.

my life; the remembrance of them will be for ever engraven on my heart. She was crowned by my hand; she shall retain always the rank and title of Empress; but, above all, let her never doubt my feelings, or regard me but as her best and dearest friend.”¹

Josephine replied, with a faltering voice and tears in her eyes, but in words worthy of the grandeur of the occasion. “I respond to all the sentiments of the Emperor in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which henceforth is an obstacle to the happiness of France, by depriving it of the blessing of being one day governed by the descendants of that great man, evidently raised up by providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and restore the altar, the throne, and social order. But his marriage will in no respect change the sentiments of my heart: the Emperor will ever find in me his best friend. I know what this act, commanded by policy and exalted interests, has cost his heart: but we both glory in the sacrifices which we make to the good of our country: I feel elevated by giving the greatest proof of attachment and devotion that was ever given upon earth.” “When my mother,” said Eugene Beauharnois, “was crowned before the nation, by the hands of her august husband, she contracted the obligation to sacrifice her affections to the interests of France. She has discharged, with courage and dignity, that first of duties. Her heart has been often torn by beholding the soul of a man accustomed to master fortune, and to advance with a firm step in the prosecution of his great designs, exhausted by painful conflicts. The tears which this resolution have cost the Emperor suffice for my mother’s glory. In the situation where she will be placed, she will not be a stranger to his

wishes or his sentiments : and it will be with a satisfaction mingled with pride, that she will witness the felicity which her sacrifices have purchased for her country."¹ But though they used this language in public, the members of the Imperial family were far from feeling the same equanimity in private : they were all in the deepest affliction : Josephine was almost constantly in tears ; in vain she appealed to the Emperor, to the Pope, for protection ; and so violent and long continued was her grief, that for six months afterwards her eyesight was seriously impaired.

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¹ Goldsmith's Recueil, iv. 746, 747. Bign. ix. 58, 61. Mém. de Josephine, ii. 205, 208.

The subsequent arrangements were rapidly completed ; and, on the same day, the marriage of the Emperor and Empress was dissolved by an act of the senate : the jointure of the latter being fixed at two millions of francs, or L.80,000 a-year, and Malmaison as her place of residence.²

Dec. 15.

² Bign. ix. 61.

Though the divorce was thus completed, yet it was by no means as yet determined, whether the honour of furnishing a successor to the Imperial throne should belong to the imperial family of Russia or Austria. Napoleon, without deciding as yet in favour of either the one or the other, sounded in secret the disposition of both courts. His views had, in the first instance, been directed towards the Russian alliance ; and, on the 24th November, a week before he had even communicated his designs to Josephine, a letter in cypher had been dispatched to Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at St Petersburg, enjoining him to open the project of a marriage with his sister to the Emperor Alexander in person ; requiring him, at the same time, to make enquiries when the young Grand Duchess might become a mother, as in the existing state of affairs six months might make a material difference. Alexander replied

Proposals made to the Emperor Alexander for his sister.

Nov. 24.

Dec. 28.

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Jan. 1,
1810.

Jan. 10.

to the French ambassador, that the proposal was extremely agreeable to himself personally, and coincided entirely with his political views; but that an imperial ukase, as well as the last will of his father, had left his sisters entirely at the disposal of his mother. "Her ideas," added he, "are not always in unison with my wishes, nor with policy, nor even reason. When I spoke to the Emperor at Erfurth, of the anxious desire which all his friends had to see his dynasty established by heirs, he answered only vaguely; I thought that he did not enter into my ideas, and did nothing in consequence. Having not prepared the way, I cannot in consequence now answer you. If the affair depended on me, you should have my word before leaving this cabinet." At a subsequent interview, a few days after, the Emperor expressed his regret that Napoleon had not sooner expressed his intentions, and declared in favour of his elder sister (since Duchess of Oldenburg), who, both from talent, character, and age, would have been much more suitable than her younger sister, Anne Paulowna, who was now in question. In regard to her, he declared his intention of sounding his mother, without actually compromising the French Emperor. But these delays were little suitable to the ardent temper of Napoleon. He demanded, as soon as he was informed of these conversations, a categorical answer in the space of ten days; but this period was consumed in fruitless discussions with the Dowager Empress, who alleged the extreme youth of the Grand Duchess, who was only sixteen, the difference of their religion, and other reasons still more insignificant, such as, whether Napoleon was qualified to become a father. "A princess of Russia," said she, "is not to be wooed and won in a few days:

two years hence it will be time enough to come to the conclusion of such an affair." She concluded by demanding a Russian chapel and priests in the Tuileries, and a delay of a few months to improve the age and overcome the scruples or timidity of the young princess.¹

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¹ Bign. ix.

66, 72.

Thib. viii.

101, 104.

"To adjourn is to refuse," said Napoleon: "besides, I do not choose to have foreign priests in my palace, between my wife and myself." He instantly took his determination: he saw that a refusal was likely to ensue, and he resolved to prevent such a mortification by himself taking the initiative in breaking off the Russian negotiation. Before the expiry of the ten days even, fixed by Caulaincourt for the ultimatum of Russia, secret advances were made by Maret, minister of foreign affairs, to Prince Schwarzenberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris: the proposals were eagerly accepted; as soon as this was known, the question of a Russian or Austrian alliance was publicly mooted and debated in the council of state by the great officers of the empire, and, after a warm discussion, decided in favour of the latter, on a division; Napoleon professed himself determined entirely by the majority; and, five days before the answer of Russia arrived, requesting delay, the decision of the cabinet of the Tuileries had been irrevocably taken in favour of the Austrian alliance. So rapidly were the preliminaries adjusted, that the marriage contract was signed at Paris, on the model of that of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, on the 7th, and at Vienna on the 16th February; and on the 11th March the marriage was celebrated at Vienna with great pomp: Berthier demanding the hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise, and the Archduke Charles standing proxy for Napoleon.¹

Napoleon
proposes to
Marie
Louise, and
is accepted.

Jan. 26.

Feb. 1.

Feb. 6.

Feb. 7.

Feb. 16.

March 11.

¹ Bign. ix.

66, 76.

Thib. viii.

101, 105

On the day after the ceremony the new Empress

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Journey of
the Empress
Marie
Louise to
Paris.

set out from Vienna, and was received at Braunau, the frontier town of Austria, by the Queen of Naples; and there she separated from her Austrian attendants, and continued her journey by slow stages, and surrounded with all the pomp of Imperial splendour, and all the fatigue of etiquette, to the neighbourhood of Paris. Notwithstanding all the political advantages of the alliance, her departure was the occasion of great regret at Vienna; a large portion of the people openly murmured against the sacrifice of a daughter of Austria to the state necessities of the time; they regarded it as worse than the cession of the Illyrian provinces, more disgraceful than the abandonment of Hofer to the vengeance of the conqueror; and even the continuance of the war appeared preferable to the humiliating conditions by which it was thought peace had been obtained. In France, on the other hand, all the public authorities vied with each other in demonstrations of loyalty and enthusiasm; the choicest flowers awaited her at every stage; crowds of respectful spectators lined the streets of all the towns through which she passed; this great event was regarded as at once the final triumph, and closing the gulf of the Revolution, by winning for its victorious leader the daughter of the first family in Europe, and mingling the lustre of descent with the grandeur of Napoleon's throne. "She is not beautiful," said the Emperor, on a subsequent visit to Josephine, when he saw her miniature, "but she is the daughter of the Cæsars." These sonorous words more than compensated every deficiency; the sinister presage, arising from the fate of Marie Antoinette, was forgotten, and the most intoxicating anticipations were formed of the consequences of this auspicious union.¹

¹ Thib. viii.
108. Bign.
ix. 79, 82.
Las. Cas. i.
330.

According to the programme of the etiquette to be

observed on the occasion, the Emperor was to meet the Empress at Compeigne, and immediately return to Paris ; while she proceeded to St Cloud, where she was to remain till the marriage was celebrated : but the ardour of Napoleon broke through these formalities, and saved both parties the tedium of several days' expectation. After the example of Henry IV., when he went to Lyons to meet his bride, Marie de Medicis, on her journey from Italy, he had no sooner received intelligence of her approaching Compeigne, where he then was, than he went to meet her at the next post, and when she came up, springing out of his carriage, he leapt into that of the Empress, embraced her with more than youthful vehemence, and ordered the postilions to drive at the gallop to the palace of Compeigne. He had previously enquired of the legal authorities, whether, if a child were to be born without the formal marriage being celebrated, it would, after its conclusion by proxy, be legitimate ; and being answered in the affirmative, he took this method of cutting short all the fatiguing ceremonies of the occasion. The Empress was by no means displeased at the unexpected ardour, as well as young appearance of her husband, and next day, it is affirmed, her attendants hardly knew their former mistress, so much had she improved in ease and affability from the establishment of her rank, and the society of the Emperor. The marriage was celebrated with extraordinary pomp at St Cloud on the 1st April : on the day following, the Emperor and Empress made their solemn entrance into Paris, amidst the roar of artillery, the clang of bells, and the acclamations of three hundred thousand spectators. They received the nuptial benediction at the Tuileries ; four Queens held the train of Marie Louise : all the splendour of riches, and all the bril-

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1810.

March 28.

April 1.

April 2.

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LIX.

1810.

¹ *Moniteur*,
March 28,
April 3,
1810.
Thib. viii.
109, 120.
Bign. ix.
79, 86.
Las Cases,
i. 330,
331.

liancy of arms, were exhausted to give magnificence to the occasion. But though the *Moniteur* was filled for several months with congratulations on the event, and all the flowers of rhetoric, and all the arts of adulation were exhausted in flattery, the people evinced no real enthusiasm after the spectacles were over, and in the multitude of gorgeous heralds, plumed pages, and arm-emblazoned carriages, which were every where to be seen, the few remaining Republicans beheld the extinction of their last dreams of liberty and equality.¹

Pique of the
Emperor
Alexander
on the
occasion.

The hand of Napoleon, however, was too important an element in the balance of European power to be given away, without leaving deep traces in the minds of those who deemed themselves slighted on the occasion; and it soon appeared to what incalculable consequences this marriage might ultimately lead. Alexander, though not particularly solicitous about the connexion, was yet piqued in no ordinary degree at the haste with which the Austrian alliance had been concluded, and in an especial manner mortified at the hand of his sister having been in effect discarded, while yet the proposal for it was under consideration at St Petersburg. This feeling was so strong, that it was apparent even through all the congratulations of the Imperial court and all the practised dissimulation of the Emperor. "We are pleased with this event," said Romanzoff, the chancellor of the empire, to Caulaincourt; "we feel no envy at Austria; we have no cause of complaint against her; every thing that secures her tranquillity and that of Europe cannot but be agreeable to us." "Congratulate the Emperor," said Alexander, "on his choice; he wishes to have children; all France desire it: this alliance is for Austria and France a pledge of peace, and on that account I am enchanted at it. Nevertheless, it

is fortunate that the objection of age so soon disposed of the affair. If I had not taken the precaution to speak to the Empress only in my own name, as of an event which by possibility might arise, what effect would now have been produced? Where should we now have been if I had not scrupulously attended to her rights? What reproaches might I not have justly addressed to you? The delays of which you so much complained were therefore the result of prudence. Have you been equally considerate? Were you not conducting two negotiations at once? How was it possible that the marriage could have been concluded at Paris on the 9th February, almost before the arrival of the messenger from St Petersburg, dispatched on the 21st January, after the lapse of the ten days allowed for our ultimatum, and who was the bearer only of a proposal for further delay to overcome the scruples of the Empress and Archduchess? If the difference of religion had been an insurmountable objection, you should have said so at first. It is beyond measure fortunate that the age of the Archduchess could not be got over. In this instance, as when the same subject was talked of at Erfurth, it was your Emperor who spoke first; I only interfered in it as a friend; personally I may have some reason to complain, but I do not do so: I rejoice at whatever is for the good of France." When such was the language of the Emperor, it may be conceived what were the feelings of St Petersburg, and how materially the discontent of the court weakened the French influence, already so hateful to the nobles and the people. These details are not foreign to the dignity of history: they are intimately blended with the greatest events which modern Europe has witnessed; for, though governed in his conduct in

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¹ Bign. ix.
86, 90.
Hard. xi.
77, 79.

Character
of Jose-
phine.

general only by state policy, and a perfect master of dissimulation, Alexander was scrupulously attentive to his private honour; the coldness between the two courts soon became apparent; but such is the weakness of human nature, alike in its most exalted as its humblest stations, that possibly political considerations might have failed to extricate the cabinet of St Petersburg from the fetters of Tilsit and Erfurth, if they had not been aided by private pique; and Napoleon been still on the throne, if to the slavery of Europe, and the wrongs of the Emperor, had not been superadded in the breast of the Czar, the wounded feelings of the man.¹

Few persons in that elevated rank have undergone such varieties of fortune as Josephine, and fewer still have borne so well the ordeal both of prosperity and adversity. Born at first in the middle class of society, she was the wife of a respectable but obscure officer; the Revolution afterwards threw her into a dungeon, where she was saved from the scaffold only by the fall of Robespierre; the hand of Napoleon elevated her successively to every rank, from the general's staff to the Emperor's throne; and the same connexion consigned her, at the very highest point of her elevation, to degradation and seclusion; the loss of her consequence, the separation from her husband, the sacrifice of her affections. Stript of her influence, cast down from her rank, wounded in her feelings, the divorced Empress found the calamity, felt in any rank of being childless, the envenomed dart which was to pierce her to the heart. It was no common character which could pass through such marvellous changes of fortune unmarked by any decided stain, unsullied by any tears of suffering. If, during the confusion of all moral ideas consequent on

the first triumph of the Revolution, her reputation did not escape the breath of scandal; and if the favourite of Barras occasioned, even when the wife of Napoleon, some frightful fits of jealousy in her husband, she maintained an exemplary decorum when seated on the Consular and Imperial throne, and communicated a degree of elegance to the court of the Tuileries, which could hardly have been expected, after the confusion of ranks and ruin of the old nobility which had preceded her elevation. Passionately fond of dress, and often blamably extravagant in that particular, she occasioned no small embarrassment to the treasury by her expenses; but this weakness was forgiven in the recollection of its necessity to compensate the inequality of their years, in the amiable use which she made of her possessions, the grace of her manner, and the alacrity with which she was ever ready to exert her influence with her husband to plead the cause of suffering, or avert the punishment of innocence. Though little inclined to yield in general to female persuasion, Napoleon both loved and felt the sway of this amiable character; and often in his sternest fits he was weaned from violent measures by her influence. The divorce and marriage of Marie Louise produced no estrangement between them: in her retirement at Malmaison she was frequently visited and consulted by the Emperor; they corresponded to the last moment of her life; and the fidelity with which she adhered to him in his misfortunes, won the esteem of his conquerors, as it must command the respect of all succeeding ages of the world.¹

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¹ Las Cases,
i. 330.
Bour. pas-
sim.

Born in the highest rank, descended from the noblest ancestry, called to the most exalted destinies, the daughter of the Cæsars, the wife of Napoleon,

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1810.

And of
Marie
Louise.

the mother of his son, Marie Louise appeared to unite in her person all the grandeur and felicity of which human nature is susceptible. But her mind had received no lofty impress ; her character was unworthy of the greatness of her fortune. She had the blood of Maria Theresa in her veins, but not her spirit in her soul. Her fair hair, blue eyes and pleasing expression, bespoke the Gothic blood, and the affability of her demeanour, and sweetness of her manner, at first produced a general prepossession in her favour. But she was adapted for the sunshine of prosperity only ; the wind of adversity blew, and she sunk before its breath. Young, amiable, prepossessing, she won the Emperor's affections by the naïveté and simplicity of her character ; and he always said that she was innocence with all its sweetness, Josephine grace with all its charms. All the attractions of art, says he, were employed by the first Empress with such skill, that they were never perceived ; all the charms of innocence displayed by the second with such simplicity that their existence was never suspected.¹ Both were benevolent, kind-hearted, affectionate ; both, to the last hour of his life, retained the warm regard of the Emperor ; and both possessed qualities worthy of his affection. If her husband had lived and died on the Imperial throne, few Empresses would have left a more blameless reputation ; but she was unequal to the trials of the latter years of the empire. If her dubious situation, the daughter of one Emperor, the wife of another, both leaders in the strife, might serve her excuse for not taking any decided part in favour of the national independence on the invasion of France, the misfortunes of her husband and son had claims upon her fidelity which should never have been overlooked. The wife of the

¹ Las Cases, i. 330 ;
ii. 112.

Emperor should never have permitted him to go into exile alone ; the mother of the King of Rome should never have forgotten to what destinies her son had been born. What an object would she, after such sacrifices, returning from St Helena after his death, have formed in history ! Force may have prevented her from discharging that sacred duty ; but force did not compel her to appear at the Congress of Verona, leaning on the arm of Wellington, nor oblige the widow of Napoleon to sink at last into the degraded wife of her own chamberlain.

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Shortly after his marriage, the Emperor set out with his young bride for the Low Countries. They proceeded by St Quentin, Cambray, and Valenciennes, to Brussels, every where received with adulatory addresses, passing under triumphal arches, and entering cities amidst the roar of artillery. But other cares than the civil government of his dominions, other designs than the amusement of the young Empress, occupied the mind of the Emperor. The war with England still continued ; maritime preparations were necessary for its subjugation ; Antwerp was the centre of his preparations. It was from the Scheldt that the mortal stroke was to be dealt out. The first care of the Emperor, therefore, was to visit the citadel, fortifications, and vast naval preparations at this important point. An eighty gun ship was launched in his presence, and one of the new forts erecting on the left bank of the river, beyond the Tête-de-Flandre, was called by the name of Marie Louise, which it still bears. He had every reason to be satisfied with the works in progress, thirty ships of the line, nearly as great a fleet as that which was destroyed at Trafalgar, were ready for sea in the docks. From Antwerp, the Emperor descended the Scheldt to

Journey of
the Emperor
and Em-
press to Bel-
gium.

CHAP. Flushing and Middleburg, where he gave directions
 LIX. for extensive works and fortifications, that were to
 1810. do more than repair the devastations that were committed by the English in the island of Walcheren. They afterwards returned by Ghent, Lisle, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre de Grace, to Paris, which they reached on the 1st of June. Napoleon there assisted in the interment of the body of Marshal Lannes at the Chapel of the Invalids at Paris. The direction of this journey, undertaken so shortly after his marriage, revealed the secret designs of the Emperor. Naval preparations, the conquest of England, were uppermost in his thoughts; and if any additional arguments were necessary to vindicate the Walcheren expedition, it would be found in the direction he gave to this journey.¹

¹ Thib. viii.
124, 129.

Dreadful
catastrophe
at Prince
Schwartz-
enberg's ball.

July 6.

A deplorable event occurred shortly after, which recalled the recollection of the lamentable accident that had occurred on the occasion of the marriage of Marie Antoinette, and was regarded of sinister augury for the marriage of the young Empress. Prince Schwartzberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, gave a magnificent ball on the 6th of July, at which the Emperor and Empress, and the whole court were assembled. From the great number of guests expected on the occasion, it was deemed necessary to enlarge the accommodations of his hotel. The great dancing room was fitted up in the most sumptuous manner, in a temporary building behind, and the festoons and drapery, in particular, excited universal admiration. By accident, one of the gauze curtains took fire from a lamp in its vicinity, and in an instant the flames spread over the whole roof and interior of the structure. The coolness of Napoleon was as conspicuous here as in the field of battle; he

immediately sought out the Empress, took her quietly by the arm and led her out of the danger. Many persons, however, were scorched by the flames, or wounded by the falling of the beams, and some of them died afterwards of these injuries. But all lesser considerations were forgotten in the dreadful fate of the Princess Pauline of Schwartzenberg, the sister-in-law of the ambassador. This amiable person had been one of the last of the company who escaped from the burning room with her daughter in her hand. Both had got out in safety, but in the confusion the child was separated from her mother, and the latter, conceiving that she had been left behind in the scene of danger, rushed, with generous devotion, back again into the burning saloon, and was crushed by the falling of the beams. So fierce were the flames that the place where the unfortunate princess had perished, could only be discovered by a gold ornament she had worn on her arm, which resisted the conflagration. This frightful incident excited a deep sensation in Paris, chiefly from its being regarded as a prognostic connected with the marriage of the Empress; but history must assign it a nobler destiny, and record the fate of the Princess Schwartzenberg as perhaps the noblest instance of maternal heroism recorded in the annals of the world.¹

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1810.

¹ Bign. xix.
159. Thib.
viii. 128,
129.

This period was rendered remarkable by the fall of one of the ministers of Napoleon, who had hitherto exercised the most unbounded influence in the internal concerns of the empire. Fouché, whose talents for intrigue, and thorough acquaintance with the details both of Jacobin conspiracy and police administration, had hitherto rendered him a necessary part of the Imperial administration, fell into disgrace. The immediate cause of this overthrow was the improper

Singular
intrigue and
fall of
Fouché.

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1810.

May 1810.

use and undue extension which he gave to a secret proposition at this time made to the British government, by Napoleon, for a general peace. The Dutch ambassador was the agent employed in this mysterious communication, and the proposals of Napoleon went to surrender to the English almost the entire government of the seas, provided that that power would surrender to Napoleon the uncontrolled government of the continent of Europe. In his secret conferences with the French agent on this subject, Marquis Wellesley insisted strongly on the prosperous condition of the British empire, and its ability to withstand a long period of future warfare from the resources which the monopoly of the trade of the world had thrown into its hands. These views singularly interested Napoleon, who had more than one agent employed in the transaction. This secret negotiation was discovered by Fouché, and either from an excusable desire to get to the bottom of the views of the British cabinet on the subject, or from an insatiable passion for intrigue, which could not allow any such transaction to go on without assuming its direction, he took upon himself, without the knowledge or authority of the Emperor, to open a secret negotiation directly with Marquis Wellesley. The agent employed in these mysterious communications was M. Ouvrard, a man of considerable skill in intrigue, and whose vast monetary transactions had already produced such important effects in the early part of Napoleon's reign.* Ouvrard repaired to Amsterdam, where he entered into communication with an Irishman of the name of Fagan, in London. Labouchere, an agent of the King of Holland, who had formerly been on a similar mission to the British

* *Ante*, v. 629.

government, was also employed in the transaction, and he communicated it to his sovereign, Louis, by whom it was revealed to Napoleon, at Antwerp. Ouvrard was in consequence arrested, immediately after Napoleon's return to Paris, and closely interrogated by the Emperor. It was proved from this examination, and from the documents found in his possession, that the basis of Fouché's propositions were, that the government of the continent of Europe should be surrendered to Napoleon, and that of all the transmarine states and the seas to England, with the exception of South America, which was to be made over to the French Emperor. In order to accomplish this double spoliation, a French army of forty thousand men was to be embarked on board an English fleet, and charged with the reduction of North America to the government of Great Britain, and of South America to that of France. Extravagant as these propositions may appear, it is proved by a holograph note of Napoleon himself, that they had been made by the Minister of Police to the English government.¹ "What was M. Ouvrard commissioned to do in England?" said Napoleon to Fouché, when examined before the council. "To ascertain," replied he, "the disposition of the new minister for Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, according to the views which I have had the honour of submitting to your Majesty." "Thus then," replied Napoleon, "you take upon yourself to make peace or war without my knowledge. Duke of Otranto, your head should fall upon the scaffold." Upon consideration, however, Napoleon was inclined to adopt less rigorous measures. He was fearful of exhibiting to the world any instance of treachery in the Imperial government, and perhaps not altogether

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1810.

¹ Note of
Nap. 8th
July 1810.

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at ease concerning the revelations which Fouché, if driven to extremities, might make regarding his own administration. He limited the punishment of the fallen Minister, therefore, to deprivation of his office of Minister of Police, which was immediately bestowed on Savary, Duke of Rovigo.* To break his fall, Fouché was, in the first instance, declared Governor of Rome, and he set out from Paris shortly after for that destination; but the recall of his appointment overtook him before he arrived at the eternal city: he stopped short at Leghorn, and, in his despair, took his place in a vessel with a view to seek for refuge in America. The sufferings he had undergone, however, from sea sickness, in the outset of his passage, ultimately deterred him from carrying that intention into effect. He remained in Tuscany, determined to take his chance of Napoleon's vengeance, rather than incur the certain misery of a voyage across the Atlantic. He obtained, soon after, permission to return to Aix, in Provence, where he lived for some time in retirement, and, at length, the necessities of his situation obliged Napoleon again to have recourse to his assistance, and he took a prominent part in the subsequent course of events, which ultimately brought about the overthrow of the empire.¹

¹ Mem. de Fouché, i. 417, 418; ii. 13, 38. Thib. viii. 130, 138. Bign. ix. 136, 142.

A still more important consequence resulted from

* The Emperor said to Savary, on appointing him Minister of Police, "I have put you in Fouché's place, because I have found I could no longer rely upon him. He was taking precautions against me, when I had no designs against him, and attempting to establish consideration for himself at my expense. He was constantly endeavouring to divine my intentions, in order to appear to lead me; and as I have become reserved towards him, he became the dupe of intrigues, and was often getting into scrapes. You will soon see that it was in that spirit that he undertook, without my knowledge, to make peace between France and England."—SAVARY, IV. 315.

the journey of Napoleon to the Low Countries, in the
 resignation of Louis, and annexation of Holland and
 the Hanse Towns to the French empire. Napoleon
 had long been dissatisfied with his brother's govern-
 ment of the Dutch provinces; for that sovereign,
 sensible that his subjects' existence depended on their
 commerce, had done all in his power to soften the
 hardships of their situation, and had not enforced the
 Imperial decree against English trade with the rigour
 which the impatient disposition of the Emperor
 deemed necessary. The displeasure arising from
 this cause was much increased by the immense impor-
 tations of English merchandise and colonial produce,
 which took place into the north of Germany and the
 States of Holland, in consequence of the absence of the
 French guards from the coast during the campaigns
 of Wagram and the Walcheren expedition; an im-
 portation so enormous, that chiefly owing to its
 influence, the British exports, which in 1808 had
 been only L.30,387,990 were raised in the succeeding
 year to L.46,292,632.¹ Determined to put an end to
 such a state of matters, which he deemed entirely
 subversive of his continental policy, so far at least as
 Holland was concerned, as well as with a view to
 prepare the minds of the Dutch for the general
 incorporation which he meditated, Napoleon com-
 pelled Louis, by a treaty concluded in the middle of
 March, to cede to France its whole territory on the
 left bank of the Rhine, including the isles of Wal-
 cheren, South Beveland, Cadsand, and the adjacent
 territory on the continent to the left of that river,
 which was formed into a department under the name
 of that of the Mouth of the Scheldt.¹ At the same
 time, it was intimated to the King of Holland, that
 he must relinquish all intercourse direct or indirect

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1810.

Rupture
with Louis
Bonaparte.¹ Marshall's
Stat. Tab.
48; and
Porter ii.
98.

March 16.

¹ Treaty
with Louis,
Mart. v.
327, Sup.
Bign. ix.
132, 133.
Thib. viii.
139.

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1810.

Incorporation of Holland with the French empire.

May 16.

July 1.

¹ Hard. xi.
86, 90.
Mart. Sup.
v. 338.
Thib. viii.
137, 141.
Bign. iv.
139, 196.

with England, and consent to his coasts being entirely guarded by French soldiers.

This cession, however, was but the prelude to more important advances. During the Emperor's visit to Antwerp, he became more than ever convinced of the expedience of incorporating the whole of Holland with the French empire; and many letters, in the most haughty style, were written by him to the unfortunate King of Holland in the course of his journey back to Paris, evidently intended to make him in despair resign the crown. The last, from Lille, on 16th May, concluded with these words:—

“It is high time that I should know definitively whether you are determined to occasion the ruin of Holland: write no more to me in your accustomed phrases; for three years you have been constantly repeating them, and every successive day has proved their falsehood. This is the last letter in my life I will ever write to you.” Matters soon after came to a crisis: Oudinot, with a French army twenty thousand strong, crossed the frontier, and rapidly advanced towards Amsterdam. Louis, who had a thorough reliance on the affections of his Dutch subjects, who knew what mortifications he had undergone on their account, at first thought seriously of resistance; but upon the assurance of his generals that it was hopeless, he abandoned the attempt. It was next proposed to imitate the conduct of the Prince Royal of Portugal and fly to Batavia; but this project was relinquished as impracticable, and at length the unhappy monarch came to the determination of resigning in favour of his son, the Prince Royal, Napoleon Louis.¹ Having executed this deed, he set out in the night from Haarlem for Toplitz in Bohemia, having first taken the precaution to order

that the resignation should not be published till he had quitted the kingdom. The publication of this unexpected resolution excited universal consternation in Holland; but every one foresaw what soon after turned out to be the denouement of the tragedy. On the 9th July, a decree appeared, incorporating the whole kingdom of Holland with the French empire.

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1810.

“Obliged,” as the report preceding the decree set forth, “to make common cause with France, Holland bore the charges of such an association without experiencing any of its advantages. Its debt, fixed on so inconsiderable a territory, was above a fourth of that of the whole empire. Its taxes were triple what they were in France. In such a state of matters, the interest of Holland loudly called for its annexation to the Empire; Nor was the interest of France less obvious in the transaction. To leave in foreign hands the mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, would be to render the French commerce and manufactures tributary to the possessor of those estuaries. The present incorporation, on the other hand, completes the empire of Napoleon and his system of war, policy, and commerce. It is a step necessary to the restoration of his marine; in fine, it is the most decisive stroke which he could deliver to England.” Louis protested against the measure, as destructive alike of the interests of Holland and the rights of his son; and with much dignity refused the provision of two millions of francs a-year (L.80,000) fixed on him by a supplemental decree of the Senate in December following. Prince Louis, his son, repaired to Paris, where he was kindly received by the Emperor, who had been much annoyed by the scandal which this family rupture would occasion in the world. His words, at his first interview with his

Napoleon's
public and
private
motives for
this step.

Aug. 1.

Dec. 13,
1810.

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LIX.

1810.

¹ Bign. ix.
897, 199.
Thib. viii.
139, 146.
Mart. v.
338, 340,
Sup. Hard.
xi. 89, 90.

discrowned nephew, were as characteristic of his private feelings, as his public declaration on the subject was descriptive of the ruling principles of his policy. "Come, my son, I will be your father: you will lose nothing by the exchange. The conduct of your father has wounded my heart. When you are grown up, you will discharge his debt and your own. Never forget, in whatever position you may be placed by my policy and the interest of my empire, that your first duties are towards me, your second towards France; all your other duties, even to the people whom I may confide to your care, must be postponed to these."¹

Flight of
Lucien
Bonaparte
to America.

March,
1810.

Aug. 5,
1810.

The resignation of Louis was the source of great distress to Napoleon, on which he forcibly enlarged, even in the solitude of St Helena. But it was soon followed by an event which still more nearly affected him. For some years past his brother Lucien and he had been on distant terms; and he could ill brook the sturdy, but honest feeling, which induced that disinterested republican to refuse honours and royalty, when bestowed by the Imperial hand. Their rupture became irreconcilable by the refusal of Lucien to divorce his wife, an American by birth, to whom he was tenderly attached, in order to receive a princess suggested by the political views of the Emperor. He withdrew first to Rome, where he lived several years in privacy, devoted to poetry and the arts; and when the Roman States were incorporated with the French empire, he resolved to take refuge in the United States, in order to be altogether beyond the reach of his brother's imperious temper. He set sail, accordingly, for America, but was taken prisoner by two English frigates, and conducted to Malta, from whence he obtained liberty

to reside on his parole in the British dominions. He fixed his residence in the first instance at Ludlow in Shropshire, where he continued to devote his whole time to literary pursuits, and the completion of an epic poem on Charlemagne, which had long occupied his attention. Shortly after this voluntary expatriation, he purchased the villa of Thorngrove, near Worcester, where he lived in affluence and elegant retirement, till the conclusion of the war. About the same time letters were intercepted by the Spanish Guerrillas, from Joseph, in which he bitterly complained of the rigorous mandates which he received from the Emperor, and the perpetual mortifications to which he was exposed, and declared that if he could do so, he would willingly resign the crown, and retire to a private station.* Thus, while the Emperors of Russia and Austria, dazzled by the blaze of his military glory, were vying with each other for the honour of Napoleon's hand, his own brothers, whom he had raised from the dust to thrones, from a practical acquaintance with his tyrannical government, were seeking in preference the security of private life, and voluntarily took up their abode with his enemies rather than incur any longer the vexations of his imperious disposition.¹

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LIX.

1810.

Dec. 19,
1810.¹ Thib. viii.
147, 148.

The retreat of Wellington from Talavera, and the unsuccessful issue of the preceding campaign, excited the most desponding feelings in a large proportion of the inhabitants of Great Britain. The

* "I enclose an intercepted letter from Joseph to Napoleon, which seems to me to be as interesting a document as has yet appeared. It shows that he treats his brothers as tyrannically as he does other people, and gives ground to hope that his tyrannical temper will at no distant period deprive him of the advantages of the Austrian alliance."

—WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 18th June, 1811. GURWOOD, viii. 35.

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1810.

General
consterna-
tion in
England at
the results
of the last
campaign.

people of that country, although now strongly imbued with the military spirit, enthusiastic in the support of the war, and passionately desirous of military renown, were still mere novices in the military art, and totally incapable of appreciating the merits of a system of defence which was to last for years, and in which ultimate success was to be purchased by a cautious system of defensive policy, and frequent retirement before the enemy in the outset, till the Peninsular troops were trained to fight, and something approaching to equality in the field could be attained. Following the usual bent of popular bodies, to form their opinions from present impressions, the people never considered that a vast and admirably disciplined corps, like the French army, which had grown up with the victories of fifteen years, and was now drawn from the military strength of almost all Europe, could not be successfully resisted but by a steady perseverance at first in the most cautious policy; they forgot that it was by delay that Fabius restored the Roman affairs. Their idea of war was a victory followed by an immediate advance to the enemy's capital; and the moment that a retreat commenced they abandoned themselves to the most unmanly depression, and gave over all for lost, because the military power which had conquered all Europe, was not at once crushed by twenty thousand English soldiers.

Address of
the city of
London for
an inquiry
into the
conduct of
Wellington.

These feelings, characteristic in all ages of the great body of the people, who are usually governed by present occurrences, and incapable, when left to their own direction, of the steady foresight and sustained efforts indispensable in every department for durable success, were called forth with extraordinary violence in Great Britain in the beginning of 1810, by the un-

successful result of the Walcheren expedition, and the successive retreats of Sir John Moore and Lord Wellington, at the close of the preceding campaigns. In proportion to the unbounded hopes and expectations excited by the brilliant success of the first contest in the Peninsula, was the despondence which universally prevailed at the ultimate discomfiture of the English arms, and the apparently unprofitable waste of British gallantry, and above all, the innumerable defeats and disasters of the Spanish armies, which had now, seemingly, completely destroyed all hopes of successful resistance in the Peninsula. The Opposition, as usual, took advantage of these feelings, to excite the people to such a manifestation of public opinion, as might compel the termination of the war in the Peninsula, and ultimately hurl the ministers from office. The temper of the public mind, at this period, and the feelings of the Opposition on the subject, may be judged of by the fact, that the Common Council of the city of London, not merely petitioned Parliament against the bill brought in by ministers for granting Lord Wellington an annuity of L.2000 a-year, in consideration of the valour and skill he had displayed in the battle of Talavera, but prayed the King for *an enquiry* into the circumstances connected with the failure of the late expedition into the interior of Spain. The expressions made use of on this occasion deserve to be recorded, as containing a memorable example of the well-known truth, that real greatness in public life, has rarely been attained but by those who, at one period, have resolutely acted in opposition to the opinions and clamours of the great body of the people, and that not unfrequently the acts of their life which have given them the most durable reputation with posterity,

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LIX.
1810.

Feb. 26,
1810.

CHAP.
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1810.

Dec. 14,
1809.

Feb. 26,
1810.

¹ Moniteur,
20th Jan.
1810. See
also City of
London's
Petition to
Commons,
Feb. 26,
1810. Parl.
Deb. xv.
600.

are those which have occasioned the most violent outcry and obloquy at the moment. The common council stated, "admitting the valour of Lord Wellington, the petitioners can see no reason why any recompense should be bestowed on him for his military conduct. Profiting by no lessons of experience, regardless of the influence to be drawn from the disgraceful convention of Cintra, and calamitous retreat of Sir John Moore, a third army, well equipped, under the orders of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was precipitated into the interior of Spain, with the same ignorance of the force and movements of the enemy. After an useless display of British valour, and a frightful carnage, that army, like the preceding one, was compelled to seek its safety in a precipitate flight, before an enemy, whom, we were told, had been conquered — abandoning many thousands of our wounded countrymen into the hands of the French. That calamity, like the others, had passed without any inquiry, and, as if their long-experienced impunity had put the servants of the Crown above the reach of justice, ministers have actually gone the length of advising your Majesty to confer honourable distinctions on a general, who has *thus exhibited, with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but a useless valour.*" This address having been offered to the King, is not to be found in the Parliamentary history, or Annual Register, though a petition of a similar character was presented to Parliament against the grant of Wellington's pension; but it was eagerly transcribed from the English daily papers into the columns of the *Moniteur*,¹ where it now remains among many other documents which their authors would now willingly consign to oblivion, but which history, looking to the encou-

agement of strenuous virtue under unmerited obloquy, in future times, deems it its first duty to bring prominently into light.

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When such was the temper of the Opposition party throughout the kingdom, it may well be conceived that their leaders in Parliament were not slow in taking advantage of a state of public opinion which promised such great results to themselves, and threatened such discomfiture to their antagonists. The preceding campaign in Spain, accordingly, was the subject of long and interesting debates in both houses of Parliament; and the study of them is highly important, not merely as indicating the extent to which general delusion may prevail on the subject of the greatest events recorded in history, but as illustrative of the difficulties with which both Wellington and Government had to struggle in the farther prosecution of the Peninsular campaigns.

On the part of the Opposition it was strongly urged, on repeated occasions, by Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, Mr Ponsonby, and Mr Whitbread, that “admitting it was proper to bestow rewards where great public services had been performed, it is difficult to see upon what ground the battle of Talavera can be considered as of that character. If a decisive overthrow has been achieved, such as that of Maida, it may be proper to confer such a distinction, even although no durable results follow from the laurels of victory; but where that is not the case, and the contest has terminated in something like a drawn battle, it is reasonable to ask, when no subsequent advance has taken place, what evidence have we that a victory at all has been gained? Now, what was the case at Talavera? The enemy’s army was neither dispersed nor overthrown, and, therefore, that

Argument
of the
Opposition
against
Wellington’s
campaign,
and the con-
tinuance of
the war in
Spain.

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test of success was awaiting. Then what was the grand object of the campaign? Unquestionably to advance with the aid of the Spanish armies to Madrid; and, so far is that object from having been gained, that we ourselves were in the end obliged to abandon our sick and wounded, and retire with disgrace, first behind the Guadiana, and ultimately within the frontiers of Portugal. Nor was this all. By his disastrous retreat Lord Wellington left the flanks of his army unsupported, and the consequence was, that Sir Robert Wilson, though a most able and gallant officer, was defeated on the one flank at Escalano, and Venegas, with the best army that the Spaniards had, underwent a total overthrow at Ocana.

“ Granting to Lord Wellington the praise of being an able, active, and enterprising officer, his conduct at the battle of Talavera was not such as to entitle him to the character of a good general. It was clear that the strong ground on the left had not been adequately taken possession of or secured, and the charge of cavalry in the valley was injudicious, leading, as it did, to a very heavy loss without any adequate advantage. If the Spaniards on the right were really the incapable body of troops which might be inferred from his Lordship’s despatches, what must have been the temerity of the general, who, supported by such troops, could advance into the heart of the enemy’s territory? If they were incapable of moving in the presence of the enemy, why did he leave to them the important duty of defending the post of Talavera, and the British wounded? And, if this was done because a still greater force, under Soult, threatened our rear and communications, on what principle can we defend the conduct of a general who could thus move so far into the enemy’s country,

without having done any thing to secure his flank or rear; or how affirm that the dispositions of the inhabitants of the country are with us, when they gave no intelligence of the concentration and march of three French corps, and their approach to the theatre of war was for the first time made known by their threatening, and all but cutting off our retreat to Portugal?

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“Such has been the effect of want of supplies and disease upon the British army after their retreat into Portugal, that hardly nine thousand men remained capable of bearing arms to defend the frontiers of that kingdom. This was a deplorable result to succeed immediately what, we were told, had been a glorious victory. There is something inconceivable in the difficulties alleged by the English general in regard to the providing supplies for his army. How was it that the French generals experienced no such difficulty? After the battles of Austerlitz, Essling, and Wagram, their operations never were cramped by the want of provisions. How did this happen? Because they boldly pushed forward and seized the enemy’s magazines. It argues a total want of organization, foresight, and arrangement, to be thus checked in all our operations by the alleged difficulty of obtaining that which it is the first duty of every prudent general to provide for his soldiers. In fact, the French sent out small parties after their victories, and thus obtained supplies, while we were utterly unable to do any thing of the kind after our alleged triumphs.

“Unhappily for the country, the same ministers who had already so disgracefully thrown away all the advantages of the Spanish war, are still in power. And they have derived no wisdom whatever from the failure of all their preceding efforts. It is now plain

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that they could no longer look either for co-operation, or efficient government, or even for the supplies necessary for their own troops in that country. Repeated disasters, unprecedented in history for their magnitude and importance, have at length taught us the value of the Spanish alliance, and the capability of that nation to maintain a war with France. They could not plead ignorance on this subject, for it was expressly stated in a letter of Mr Secretary Canning to Mr Frere, that 'we had shed our best blood in their cause, unassisted by the Spanish Government, or even the good-will of the country through which we passed.' When government determined, in opposition to all the dictates of prudence, to continue the war in the Peninsula they took the most injudicious possible mode of carrying it on, by directing Lord Wellington to advance into Spain, if it could be done consistently with the interests of Portugal. By doing so, we made the Spaniards abandon the system of guerrilla warfare, in which they had uniformly been successful, and take up that of great battles, in which they had as uniformly been defeated. And when we did enter into war on that great scale, what have we done to support it? Why, we sent twenty-five thousand men under Wellington to Portugal, forty thousand to perish in the marshes of the Scheldt, and fifteen thousand to make a useless promenade along the coasts of Italy. These forces, if united together, would have formed a noble army of eighty thousand men, which would have effectually driven the French from the Peninsula. Instead of this, by straining at every thing, we have gained nothing, and disgraced ourselves in the eyes of the world, by putting forward immense forces, which have in every quarter experienced defeat. If the war is to be con-

ducted in this manner, better, far better, to retire from it at once, when it can be done without ruin to our own forces, than persist in a system of policy which has no tendency but to lure the Spaniards by the prospect of assistance, from their true system of defensive warfare, and then leave them exposed, by our desertion, to the sad realities of defeat.”¹

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¹ Parl. Deb.
xvi. 472,
504; xv.
140, 146,
458, 462.

On the other hand, it was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Liverpool, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr Perceval,—“The object of the British general was, first, to expel the invaders from Portugal; and, next, to attempt the deliverance of the Spanish capital. The first object was attained by the passage of the Douro: an achievement as rapid and able as any recorded in military history, and which exposed the invading force to disasters fully equal to those which had been so loudly dwelt on in Sir John Moore’s retreat. When Wellington advanced into Spain, he had a fair prospect of success, and he neither could nor was entitled to anticipate, the refusal of Cuesta to co-operate in the proposed attack on Victor, before Sebastiani and the king came up, which if executed, as he suggested, would unquestionably have led to a glorious and probably decisive overthrow. As to the merits of the battle itself, it is alike unfair and ungenerous to ascribe the whole credit to the troops, and allow nothing to the skill, resolution, and perseverance of the commander, who with half the enemy’s force achieved so memorable a triumph. Did no glory redound from such a victory to the whole British name? Has it not been acknowledged, even by the enemy, to have been the severest check which he had yet sustained? Is it to be reckoned as nothing, in national acquisitions, the striking a blow which gives a spirit to your soldiers that renders

Answer of
the Admi-
nistration in
support of
the war.

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1810. them well-nigh invincible? What territorial acquisitions followed the victories of Cressy, Poitiers, or Agincourt; and yet, can there be the least doubt that these glorious days have contributed more to the subsequent tranquillity of England, by the renown with which they have surrounded our name, than the permanent acquisition of vast provinces?

“ But, in truth, it is a total mistake to assert, that no benefit to the common cause has accrued, from the battle of Talavera. What else was it that arrested the course of French conquest in the Peninsula; gave a breathing time to the south, to prepare fresh armies; liberated Galicia and Asturias from their numerous oppressors? What else prevented the invasion of Portugal, and gave time for the equipment, disciplining and organising of the Portuguese forces? It is in vain to suppose that an immense military force, like that of France in Spain, can be permanently arrested, but by pitched battles, and serious disasters; and, accordingly, the consequence of the march of the English army to Talavera, has been, that the French have been stopped in their incursions into every part of the Peninsula, and instead of a vigorous offensive, have been driven to a cautious defensive in every quarter. It may be quite true, that the advantages thus gained, and which were of such a magnitude as was, in the opinion of Lord Wellington, sufficient to have rendered the Spanish cause absolutely safe, if conducted with prudence and wisdom, may have been in a great measure thrown away, perhaps altogether lost, by the blamable imprudence and rashness with which they have subsequently rushed into conflict with the enemy in the open plain, and the dreadful overthrows which their inexperienced troops have consequently

received. But neither Lord Wellington, nor Ministers, are responsible for these consequences; for not only were these subsequent efforts of the Spaniards undertaken without the concurrence of the British government, or their General in Spain, but in direct opposition to the most strenuous and earnest advice of both; and, if the council given them had been adopted, the Spaniards would have possessed a powerful army of fifty thousand men to cover Andalusia, which would have rendered any attempt at the subjugation of that province hopeless, while the disciplined English and Portuguese armies retained a menacing position on the frontiers of Castile.

“It is true, that experience has now demonstrated, that very little reliance is to be placed in the Spanish army in the field, in pitched battles; and, above all, that they are almost universally unfit to make movements in presence of the enemy. This defect was anticipated, to a certain degree, from the outset, although it could not be denied that Lord Wellington, from the appearance and experience of Cuesta’s army, had good reason to be dissatisfied with the inefficiency of his troops during the short campaign in Estremadura. But it does by no means follow from that deficiency, that it is now expedient to abandon the war in the Peninsula. If, indeed, it had appeared that the spirit of patriotism had begun to languish in the breasts of the Spaniards; if miscarriages, disasters, and defeats had broke their courage, or damped their ardour, then it might indeed be said that farther assistance to them was unavailing. But there is still life in Spain; her patriotic heart still beats high. The perseverance with which her people have returned to the charge after repeated overthrows, reminds us of the deeds of their fathers in the days of

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Sertorius, and the Moorish wars. The sieges of Saragossa and Gerona have emulated the noblest examples of ancient patriotism. The generous and exalted sentiments, therefore, which first prompted us to aid Spain, should still inspire us to continue that aid to the last. The contest in which she is engaged is not merely a Spanish struggle. The fate of England is inseparably blended with that of the Peninsula. Shall we not therefore stand by her to the last? As long as we maintain the war there, we avert it from our own shores. How often in nations, above all, how often in Spain, have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new life—the harbingers of renovated vigour? Universal conquest, ever since the Revolution, has been the main object of France. Experience has proved, that there are no means, however unprincipled—no efforts, however great, at which the government of that country will scruple, provided they tend to the destruction and overthrow of this country. How, then, is this tremendous power to be met, but by cherishing, wherever it is to be found, the spirit of resistance to its usurpation, and occupying the French armies as long as possible in the Peninsula, in order to gain time until the other powers of Europe may be induced to come forward in support of the freedom of the world!¹

¹ Parl. Deb. xvii. 472, 505; xvi. 131, 154.

No division took place in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Peninsular war; but in the House of Lords, Ministers were supported by a majority of 32, the numbers being 65 against 33.²

² Parl. Deb. xvii. 503.

Reflections
on this
debate.

In reviewing, with all the advantages of subsequent experience, the charges here advanced against government and Lord Wellington, it seems sufficiently clear that the only part of the charges that

were really well-founded, consisted in the considerable British force which was uselessly wasted on the coast of Italy. That the Walcheren expedition was wisely directed to the mouth of the Scheldt, can be doubted by none who recollect that there was the vital point of the enemy's preparations for our subjugation; that thirty ships of the line, and immense naval stores were there already accumulated; and that Napoleon has himself told us that he regarded Antwerp as of such importance to his empire that he lost his crown rather than give it up. That success was easily attainable with the force employed, has already been sufficiently demonstrated by the opinions of all the French military writers, and even of Napoleon himself.* That the prosecution of the war in Spain was not merely expedient, but necessary, must be evident to every rational person, from the consideration, that without our assistance the Peninsula would immediately have been subdued, the whole forces of Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against the British dominions, and that at least two hundred thousand French troops would have been ordered across the Pyrenees, to menace the independence of this country, from the banks of the Scheldt and the heights of Boulogne. But it is impossible to make any defence for the unprofitable display of British force on the shores of Italy. The expedition under Sir John Stewart was perfectly useless as a diversion in support of Austria, as it did not sail till the middle of June, at which time the whole forces of Napoleon were collected for the decisive struggle on the shores of the Danube. The ten thousand British troops thus wasted in this tardy and unavailing demonstration, would probably have cast the balance in the

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* Ante, vii. 542, 543.

CHAP. nearly equal-poised contest in the Spanish Peninsula.
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1810. Landed on the coast of Catalonia, they could have raised the siege of Gerona, and hurled M. St Cyr back to Roussillon. United to the force of Wellington, they would have brought his standards in triumph to Madrid. But, ignorance of the incalculable value of time in war, and of the necessity of concentrating their forces upon the vital point of attack, were the two grand defects which want of warlike experience had, at that time, impressed upon the British cabinet; and thus they sent Sir John Stewart to the coast of Italy, when it was too late to aid the Austrians, and kept him away from Spain, when he would have been in time to have materially benefited Wellington.

Important
effect which
these
gloomy
views in
England
had on the
conduct of
the French
Govern-
ment.

Severely as the government and Wellington were cramped by the violent clamour thus raised against the conduct of the war, both in Parliament and throughout the country, one good and important effect resulted, which was not at the time foreseen, and probably was little intended by the authors of the outcry. This was the impression which was produced upon the French government and people, by the publication of these debates, as to the total inability of England to continue the struggle on the continent with any prospect of success. The constant repetition in Parliament, and in all public meetings, of the dreadful burdens which oppressed England from the continuance of the war, and the unbounded extent of the calamities which had befallen her armies in the last campaign, naturally inspired the belief, either that the contest would speedily be terminated by the complete destruction of the English forces, or that the British nation would interfere, and forcibly compel the government to abandon it. This opinion was adopted by Napo-

leon, who trusted to these passionate declamations as an index to the real feeling of Great Britain, and who, having never yet been brought into collision with the English troops, was ignorant alike of the profound sense of the necessity of resistance which animated the great body and best part of the people, and of the prowess which an admirable discipline, and their own inherent valour had communicated to their soldiers. All the speeches on this subject in Britain, were ostentatiously quoted in the *Moniteur*, and they compose at least a third of the columns of that curious record for the year 1810. The Emperor was thus led to regard the war in the Peninsula as a contest which could, at any time he pleased, be brought to a conclusion, and which, while it continued, would act as a cancer that would wear out the whole strength of England; and to this impression, more, perhaps, than to any thing else, is to be ascribed the simultaneous undertaking of the Russian and Spanish wars, which proved too great a strain upon the strength of his empire, and was the immediate cause of his ruin.

Having thus come to the resolution of continuing the war with vigour in the Peninsula, Government applied for, and obtained, the most ample supplies from Parliament for its prosecution. The termination of the contest in every other quarter by the submission of Sweden to Russia, which will be immediately noticed, enabled them to concentrate the whole forces of the nation upon the struggle in Portugal, and thus to communicate a degree of vigour to it never before witnessed in British history. The supplies to the navy were L.20,000,000, those to the army were above L.21,000,000, besides L.5,000,000 for the ordnance. No new taxes were imposed, although a loan to the amount of

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Resolution
of Parlia-
ment, and
supplies of
the year.

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1810. forces were kept up to the number of two hundred and ten thousand. And the ships in commission in the year were 107 of the line, besides 620 frigates and smaller vessels. The British navy at that time consisted of 240 ships of the line, besides 36 building, and the total numbers were 1019 vessels. The produce of the permanent taxes for the year 1810 was L.39,744,000, and the war taxes and loans L.40,000,000. The total expenditure of the year rose to the enormous sum of L.94,000,000.*

¹ James' Naval History, v. 320, Table xix. Parl. Deb. xvi. 1044. Ann. Reg. 1811. Chron. 310.

Preparations of Napoleon for the campaign in Spain.

The decisive overthrow of Ocana having entirely destroyed the force of the Spanish army of the centre, and the Austrian alliance having relieved him of all disquietude in Germany, Napoleon deemed it high time to accomplish the entire subjugation of the Peninsula. With this view, he moved a large portion of the troops engaged in the campaign of Wagram, amounting to one hundred and twenty thousand men, across the Pyrenees, and arranged his forces in nine corps, besides the reserve on the Ebro, under the most renowned marshals of the empire. Twenty thousand of the Imperial guard even marched from Chartres and Orleans towards the Bidassoa; a large body of Polish and Italian troops assembled at Perpignan and entered Catalonia; and an immense battering train of fifty heavy guns and nine hundred chariots, took the road from Bayonne to Burgos. The emperor even went so far as, in his discourse to the Senate on December 3d, to announce his intention of immediately setting out for the south of the Pyrenees.† Such was the magnitude of these reinforce-

* See App. note A.

† "When I shall show myself beyond the Pyrenees, the *Leopard* in terror will plunge into the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms will be the victory of the genius of good over that

ments, that they raised the total effective French force in Spain, which, in the end of 1809, had sunk to two hundred and twenty-six thousand men, to no less than three hundred and sixty-six thousand, of whom two hundred and eighty thousand were present with the eagles, and fit for service. Out of this immense force he formed two great armies, each composed of three corps destined for the great operations of the campaign: the first, comprising the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, with Des-solles' reserve, mustering about sixty-five thousand men, under the command of Soult, was destined for the immediate conquest of Andalusia: the second, consisting of the corps of Victor, Ney, and Junot, consisting of eighty thousand men, which assembled in the valley of the Tagus, was charged in the first instance with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and ultimately with the conquest of Portugal. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of these forces, the Emperor adhered rigidly to his system of making war support war; he reduced to 2,000,000 francs (L.80,000) a month, the sum to be drawn from the Imperial treasury for all his troops in the Peninsula, leaving the whole remaining funds for their support to be drawn from the provinces to the south of the Pyrenees, which were of course exposed to the most unheard-of spoliation. To such a length was this system of regular extortion carried, that separate military governments were formed in each of the provinces of Biscay, Navarre, Arragon, Catalonia, Old Castile, and Leon, the object of which was to render the whole

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of evil; of moderation, order, morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the destructive passions. My friendship and my protection will give, I trust, tranquillity and happiness to the people of Spain."—*Discourse of the EMPEROR to the Legislative Body, December 3d, 1809.*—*Moniteur, 3d Dec. 1809.*

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¹ Belm. i.
103, 105.
Jom. iii.
407, 409.
Nap. iii.
101, 102.
Well. Desp.
vi. 552.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
4, 5.

Prepara-
tions for the
invasion of
Andalusia
by the
French.

resources of the country available for the clothing, feeding, and pay of the soldiers; and so completely did they intercept the revenue which should have been enjoyed by Joseph at Madrid, that he had literally nothing to depend upon but the customs collected at the gates of the capital. Yet with all this machinery to extort money from the people, and with this enormous army to collect it, the resources of the country were so thoroughly exhausted, and the ruin of industry was so universal, that the troops were generally in the greatest want, their pay was almost every where thirteen months in arrear: the ministers at Madrid were starving from the non-payment of their salaries; the King himself was without a shilling, and it was as much from the necessity of finding fresh fields of plunder, as from military or political views, that the simultaneous conquest of Andalusia and Portugal was attempted.¹

The Spanish government was in no condition to withstand so formidable an irruption. After the destruction of the army of the centre at Ocana, they had been unequal to the task of organizing a fresh force capable of defending the defiles of the Sierra Morena against so vast a host. Areizaga, indeed, had contrived, even in the short time which had elapsed since that dreadful overthrow, to collect twenty-five thousand fugitives in those celebrated passes, who repaired to their standards after their former dispersion, with that extraordinary tenacity after defeat, which has always formed so remarkable a feature in the Spanish character; but they were so completely dispirited and disorganized, as to be incapable of opposing any effective resistance. The central Junta was in the utmost state of debility, without either unity of purpose, vigour of counsel, or resolution of

conduct; destitute alike of money, consideration, or authority, it was utterly unable to stem the dreadful torrent which was about to burst upon Andalusia. The disaster of Ocana had called again into fearful activity all the passions of the people; but misfortune had not taught wisdom, nor did danger inspire resolution. A decree was hastily passed to raise a hundred thousand men, which was followed a few days after by another, to distribute a hundred thousand poniards; Blake was recalled from Catalonia to command the army of Murcia; intrenchments were thrown up in the defiles of the mountains at a pass of vast strength, called the Despinas Perros, where Areizaga, with twenty-five thousand men, was stationed. Echievaria had eight thousand at Helen, a little in the rear, and the Duke de Albuquerque had fifteen thousand good troops behind the Guadiana in Estremadura. But the forces in the important defiles of the Sierra Morena under Areizaga were in such a disorderly state, that no reliance could be placed upon them, even in defending the strongest mountain position; and if once driven from their ground, it was easy to foresee that their immediate dissolution was at hand.¹

The French troops, during the three first weeks of January, collected in great force in the plains at the foot of the northern front of the Sierra Morena, under the nominal command of Joseph, but really directed by Marshal Soult; and on the 20th they put themselves in motion along the whole line, directing their masses chiefly against the defile of Despinas Perros, and the pass of Puerto del Rey, which were the only passes by which the passage could be effected. Hardly any resistance was made at either point. Dessoles carried the Puerto del Rey at the first charge, the

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Jan. 5,
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Jan. 9.

¹ Tor. iii.
165, 167.
Nap. iii.
102, 109.
Thib. viii.
256, 257.
Jom. iii.
409.

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Andalusia
and Murcia
by the
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troops who were defending it having retired precipitately, and dispersed at Navas de Tolosas, the scene of the desperate battle between the Moors and Christians, six centuries before. At the same time, Gazan's division mounted upon the right and left of the hills commanding the frightful gorge of the Despinas Perros, and soon drove the Spanish troops from the sides of the defile. No sooner was the road opened, than Mortier poured through with his horse, foot, and cannon, in great strength, and united with Dessoles' division, who had carried the Puerto del Rey that very night at Carolina, on the southern side of the mountains. Next day they passed over the field at Baylen, and arrived at Andujar. Meanwhile Sebastiani, with his division, passed, after some fighting, through the Pass of Villa Nueva de Los Infantes, and descended to the upper part of the valley of the Guadalquiver.¹

Jan. 21.

¹ Tor. iii.
174, 178.
Nap. iii.
114, 116.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
47, 48.

Jan. 27.

Having thus accomplished the passage of the mountains, which was the only obstacle that they apprehended, the French generals divided their forces. Sebastiani, with the left wing, advanced against Jaen and Granada; while Soult, with the corps of Mortier and Victor, moved upon Cordova and Seville. Both irruptions proved entirely successful. Sebastiani, with the left wing, soon made himself master of Jaen, with forty-six pieces of cannon; while Areizaga's army, posted in the neighbourhood, fled and dispersed upon the first appearance of the enemy, without any resistance; and, pursuing his advantages, the French general entered Granada amidst the apparent acclamations of the people, and completely dissolved the elements of resistance in that province. At the same time Joseph, with the centre, advanced to Cordova, which was occupied without

bloodshed ; and pushing on with little intermission, appeared before Seville on the 30th. All was confusion and dismay in that city. The working classes, with that ardent patriotism which often in a great crisis distinguishes the humbler ranks in society, and forms a striking contrast to the selfish timidity of their superiors, were enthusiastic in the national cause, and loudly called for arms and leaders to resist the enemy. But the higher ranks were irresolute and divided. The grandees, anxious only to secure their property or enjoy their possessions, had almost all sought refuge in Cadiz ; and the junta, distracted by internal divisions, and stunned by the calamities which had befallen their country, had almost all taken to flight, and left the city without a government. Thus, although there were seven thousand troops in the town, and the people had every disposition to make the most vigorous resistance, there were no leaders to direct their efforts ; and this noble city, with its foundery of cannon and immense arsenals, became an easy prey to the enemy. On the 31st, Seville surrendered, and on the day following, Joseph entered that city in triumph. A few days afterwards, Milhaud, with the advanced guard of Sebastiani's corps, pushed on to Malaga. The armed inhabitants in that city made a brave but an equally ineffectual resistance ; nothing could withstand the impetuous charges of the French cuirassiers ; and, after sustaining a loss of five hundred killed, Malaga was taken, with a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of stores of all sorts.¹

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Jan. 31.
Feb. 1.
Feb. 5.
¹ Tor. iii.
174, 182.
Nap. iii.
114, 118.
Thib. viii.
257, 260.
Jom. iii.
410, 412.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
47, 49.

These rapid successes appeared to have put an end to the war in Andalusia ; but, at this critical juncture, a bold and fortunate movement of the Duke

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Rapid and
able march
of Albu-
querque,
which saves
Cadiz.

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Jan. 31.

de Albuquerque saved Cadiz, and prolonged the contest in the southern parts of the Peninsula. In the end of January, several members of the Central Junta had straggled into that town in their flight from Seville; but so completely denuded of their authority and consideration, that they could be regarded as little better than private individuals. Feeling the necessity of resigning a power which they had exercised to so little purpose, they passed a decree, vesting the government, in the mean-while, in a regency of six persons, and containing various important enactments for the convocation of the Cortes, which will be the subject of consideration, when the proceedings of that body are noticed in a subsequent chapter. Mean-while, however, the danger was imminent, that this great city, the heart of the Spanish war, the seat of government, and of the whole remaining naval and military establishments of the south of Spain, would fall into the enemy's hands, in the *interregnum* between the cessation of the one, and the establishment of another ruling power. The new regency was proclaimed on the 31st; but already a rival authority, self-constituted, under the name of the Junta of Cadiz, elected under the pressure of necessity on the flight of the Central Junta from Seville, and composed almost entirely of the mercantile class, exercised a power greater than the regency of the kingdom, and threatened to paralyse the public defence, by the partition between two rival and conflicting authorities. From these dangers they were rescued by the vigour and resolution of Albuquerque. This able chief, perceiving at once, after the forcing of the Sierra Morena, that Seville was lost, and that the only chance for the kingdom was to save Cadiz, took upon himself, with

true moral courage, the responsibility of disobeying his orders, which were to move to Almada and support the Spanish left in the mountains there, and, after disposing of half his forces, by throwing them into Badajoz, he himself, with the other half, consisting of eight thousand infantry and six hundred horse, set off by forced marches by Llerena and Guadalcanal for Cadiz.¹

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¹ Tor. iii.
172. Belm.
i. 108.
Nap. iii.
116, 117.

The fate of Europe hung upon his steps ; for, if the French had succeeded in making themselves masters of that city before his arrival there, and thereby extinguished the war in the south of Spain, there was hardly any chance that Wellington would have been able to maintain his ground against the united force of the armies of Soult and Massena in the mountains of Portugal. Every thing depended on rapidity of movement, for the Imperial generals were equally alive themselves to the vast importance of getting possession of the island of Leon ; it was literally a race between the two armies which should first reach its walls ; and the Spanish troops, when they arrived on the banks of the Guadalquivir, fell in with the French advanced posts pushing on for the same destination. But the French, who had much the least ground to go over, were needlessly tardy in their movements ; in ten days they only advanced a hundred miles ; and by marching night and day with extraordinary rapidity, Albuquerque got first, and late on the evening of the 3d of February entered Cadiz from Xeres, and instantly broke down the bridge of Zuazo, over the canal at Santa Petri, which separates the Isle of Leon from the adjoining continent of Andalusia. It was full time, for hardly was this done when the advanced posts of Victor were seen on the side of Chiclana ; and next morning the French battalions

Feb. 3.

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Feb. 23.

¹ Tor. iii.
172, 173.
Lond. i.
445, 447.
Belm. i.
108, 109.
Jom. iii.
412, 414.
Nap. iii.
116, 119.

appeared in great strength on the opposite shores of the straits. The arrival of Albuquerque, however, diffused universal joy, and between the troops which he brought with him, the garrison of Cadiz, and the disbanded soldiers who flocked in from all quarters, his force was raised to fourteen thousand Spanish troops. The most urgent representations were made by the regency for assistance from Portugal; five thousand British and Portuguese soldiers were speedily dispatched by Wellington, and arrived in safety at Cadiz. Confidence was soon restored, from the magnitude of the garrison, the firm countenance of the English soldiers, and the assistance of the British fleet in the bay; and the government at Cadiz, undismayed by the conquest of the whole of Spain, still presented, with heroic constancy, an undaunted front to the hostility of Napoleon, leading on the forces of half of Europe.¹

Operations
in Catalonia.
Suchet's
failure be-
fore Valen-
cia.

While these important events were extinguishing the war to the south of the Sierra Morena, circumstances of considerable importance and extremely detrimental to the Spanish cause, were occurring in Arragon and Catalonia. In the first of these provinces, Suchet, having received considerable reinforcements from France, undertook an expedition against Valencia at the same time that Joseph was engaged in his grand enterprise against Andalusia. His army advanced in two columns; and as the Spaniards had no forces capable of withstanding him in the field, he arrived without resistance under the walls of Valencia. He had come unprovided with heavy artillery, and in the hope that the inhabitants, intimidated by the fall of Seville and conquest of Andalusia, would hasten to make their submission to the conqueror; and had already entered into

March 3.

correspondence with several persons of consideration in the city, who had promised to surrender it on the first summons. But the plot was discovered, the leaders arrested, and one of them executed; and the government of the city being in the hands of determined patriots, all proposals for a surrender were resolutely rejected. Mean-while, the guerrillas, who had wisely avoided an encounter with the French troops in the field, collected in great numbers around their flanks and rear, and cut off their supplies, and straitened their communications to such a degree that the French general, after remaining five days before the town, in expectation of a capitulation, was obliged to retrace his steps, not without danger, to Saragossa, which he reached on the 17th of March. This check proved very prejudicial to the French interests in the east of Spain, and almost counterbalanced, in its effect upon the population of Arragon and Catalonia, the fall of Seville and conquest of Andalusia; for the Spaniards were, beyond any other people in Europe, regardless of the events of the war, and were elevated or depressed, not in proportion to its general aspect upon the whole, but the events in the provinces with which they were immediately connected.¹

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

March 17.

Tor. iii.

214, 217.

Nap. iii.

127, 129.

Thib. viii.

272, 273.

Suchet, i.

94, 105.

Fall of

Hostalrich.

This check before Valencia, was not the only one which the armies of Napoleon experienced at this period, in this quarter of the Peninsula. Ever since the reduction of Gerona, the arms of Augereau had been unsuccessful in Catalonia; and Napoleon loudly complained, with some appearance of justice, that the great force which he had accumulated in that quarter, and which was now not less than fifty thousand men, had produced no result at all commensurate to the efforts which had been made to

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Feb. 20.

May 12.

¹ Tor. iii.
220, 224.
Nap. iii.
133, 143.
Belm. i.
118, 119.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
37, 55.

Siege of
Lerida, and
action at
Margalef.

equip and augment it. The Spanish general, Cam-poverde, in the absence of Augereau, who had gone to Barcelona, attacked and destroyed a detachment of six hundred men which had been placed at Santa Perpetua, to keep up the communication between that fortress and Hostalrich ; but this success, which gave extraordinary encouragement to the Catalonians, was balanced by a defeat which O'Donnell received in the neighbourhood of Vich in the middle of February, when the Spanish loss amounted to three thousand men. In consequence of this disaster, the Spaniards were obliged to take shelter under the cannon of Tarragona ; and Hostalrich, which had been blockaded for two months, was closely beset, and at length reduced to the last extremity from the want of provisions. The brave governor, Estrada, however, who had borne every privation with heroic constancy, disdained to submit, even in that extremity ; and, at midnight, on the 12th of May, sallied forth to cut his way, sword in hand, through the blockading force ; and although he himself fell, with three hundred men, into the hands of the enemy, the remainder, to the number of eight hundred, got clear off, and embarking in vessels sent to receive them, joined with the bands of their countrymen in Tarragona. The possession of Hostalrich, however, was of great importance to the French, as, having got possession now both of it and Gerona, they were masters of the great road from Roussilon to Barcelona.¹

The return of Suchet from Valencia, however, and the arrival of Marshal Macdonald with considerable reinforcements from France, soon restored the French ascendancy in Catalonia. That active General resolved to take advantage of these favourable

circumstances, to undertake the siege of Lerida, a fortress situated between the mountains of Arragon and Catalonia, and which in ancient times had been the scene of the memorable combats between Cæsar and Afranius and Petreius, the lieutenants of Pompey. The garrison of this important place consisted of nine thousand men, and the governor, when summoned to surrender, at first made a gallant reply, stating, that "Lerida had never looked to any thing but its own ramparts, for defence;" but the vigour of his resistance was by no means in proportion to these professions. The investment was effected in the beginning of April, and the operations were conducted with such vigour, that this celebrated place, which had twice in previous wars repelled its assailants, made a much less respectable defence than might have been expected. Its importance, however, induced the Catalonians to make the utmost efforts for its relief. O'Donnell, who commanded the Spanish forces in the province, collected eight thousand chosen infantry and six hundred horse, with which he approached its walls; and on the 23d of April, drew near to the French outposts round the town. They were at first driven in; but the Spaniards being quickly assailed by General Boussard, with two regiments of cuirassiers, the whole were thrown into confusion, and totally defeated, with the loss of three guns, a thousand killed, and five thousand prisoners.¹

This disaster enabled Suchet to commence his operations in form, before the fortress, and the breaching batteries opened with great force upon the rampart on the 12th of May. The fire soon made three practicable breaches, and at night, the besiegers took the outwork of Fort Garden. Next day, the assault took place at all the breaches, and although the

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

April 23.

¹ Nap. iii.

144, 148.

Tor. iii.

226. Vict.

et Conq.

xx. 26, 29.

Fall of

Lerida.

May 14.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

May 14.

Spanish fire at the first was so violent that the heads of the French assaulting columns staggered, yet, at length, the vigour of the assailants prevailed over the resolution of the besieged, and the French troops made their way through in all quarters. And now commenced a scene of horror almost unparalleled, even in the bloody annals of the Peninsular war. Suchet directed his troops, by a concentrate movement, to drive the citizens of every age and sex towards the high ground on which the citadel stood; and the helpless multitude of men, women, and children, were gradually driven into the narrow space occupied by that stronghold. In the general confusion, the governor was unable to prevent their entrance; nor was it possible, perhaps, for any resolution to drive back a helpless multitude of women and children upon the bayonets of the enemy. No sooner, however, were they shut in, than the French general directed a powerful fire of howitzers and bombs upon the crowded citadel, which was kept up with extraordinary vigour during the whole night and succeeding day. These projectiles thrown in amongst a wretched multitude of men, women, and children, for whom it was impossible to provide either shelter or covering, produced such a tragic effect, and spread such unutterable woe in the narrow space, that the firmness of the Spanish officers yielded under the trial. At noon, next day, Garcia Conde, the governor, hoisted the white flag, and the garrison surrendered to the number of above seven thousand men, with a hundred and thirty pieces of cannon, and vast stores of ammunition and provisions. The sudden fall of this celebrated fortress gave rise at the time to strong suspicions of treachery on the part of the governor; but they seem to have been unfounded,

and the capture of the citadel is sufficiently explained by the diabolical device adopted by Suchet—a refinement of cruelty which, as Colonel Napier justly observes, is not authorized by the laws of civilised war, and which, though attended, as the excesses of wickedness often are, by success in the outset, did not fail to produce disastrous results to the French arms in the end, and contributed, along with the abominable cruelty of Augereau, who hung peasants taken in arms on great gibbets erected on the road side, all the way from Gerona to Figueras, to exasperate the feelings of the people, and prolong the war in that province long after the period when, under a more humane system, it might have been terminated.¹

CHAP
LIX.

1810.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xx.
54. Nap.
iii. 143.
Suchet, i.
106, 149.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
25, 32.
Nap. iii.
144, 157.
Tor. iii.
226, 228.

Taking advantage of the consternation produced by this frightful catastrophe, Suchet immediately proceeded against the castle of Mequinenza, a fortress situated upon the top of a steep rock, seven hundred feet high, lying at the confluence of the rivers Segra and Ebro. The difficulty of carrying on operations against a stronghold situated upon such a height, and the extreme hardness of the rock in which the trenches were to be made, were insufficient to arrest the indefatigable activity of the French general. The engineer officers had reported that the siege was altogether impracticable, but he nevertheless resolved to attempt it, and by the vigour of his resolutions speedily overcame every difficulty. The investment of the fort was effected on the 19th of May. During the next fortnight a road practicable for artillery was, with incredible labour, cut through the rocks of the neighbouring mountains, for the distance of above two miles; and at length the breaching batteries established within three hundred yards of the place, on the night of the 1st June 1.

Fall of
Mequin-
enza.

- CHAP. of June. The approaches were blown out of the
 LIX. solid rock by the indefatigable perseverance of the
 1810. French sappers and miners, and on the night of the
 June 4. 4th of June the town was carried by escalade. This
 advantage precluded the garrison from all chance of
 escaping by the Ebro, to which they before had ac-
 cess. The breaching batteries were now advanced
 close to the castle walls, and the fire was kept up
 with extraordinary vigour on both sides until the
 June 8. morning of the 8th, when a great part of the ram-
 part having fallen down, and left a wide aperture,
 the garrison surrendered with forty-five guns, and
 two thousand men.¹ At the same time, Napoleon,
 who had been extremely displeased with Augereau,
 for retiring during the siege of Lerida from the
 position which had been assigned to him, to cover the
 besieging forces, and who had, by retreating to Barce-
 lona, exposed Suchet's corps to the attack which it sus-
 tained from the enterprising O'Donnell, recalled him
 from Spain, and he was succeeded by Marshal Mac-
 donald, who conducted the war in Catalonia both with
 more judgment and less ferocity. Such had been the
 incapacity of Augereau in the latter months of his
 command, that he not only failed in his great object
 of covering the siege of Lerida, but exposed his
 troops, by dispersing them in small bodies in different
 stations, to be cut up in detail, by the indefatigable
 activity and skilful rapidity of General O'Donnell.
 This able chief, with the remains of the army
 which only a few weeks before had been routed at
 Vich, surprised and put to the sword a battalion in
 Villa Franca, cut off nearly a whole brigade; under
 Schwartz, at Manreza; and so straitened the enemy
 for provisions, as compelled Augereau himself,
 though at the head of nearly twenty thousand men,

¹ Suchet, i.
 151, 170.
 Tor. iii.
 228, 230.

Disasters
 and recall of
 Augereau
 in Catalo-
 nia.

to take refuge in Gerona,¹ with the loss of above three thousand men. It is impossible, in contemplating the vigorous efforts thus made by the Spaniards in Catalonia, and the heroic courage with which they maintained the war, against every disadvantage, and deeply dyed almost every French triumph with disaster, not to feel the most poignant regret at the want of military discernment in the British government, which detained at this critical period ten thousand English troops, amply sufficient to have cast the balance even against the skill and energy of Suchet, in useless inactivity on the shores of Sicily.

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LIX.

1810.

¹ Tor. iii.
228, 231.

Vict. et
Conq. xx.
46, 55.

Nap. iii.
161, 166.

Suchet, i.
151, 170.

While Andalusia was thus at once prostrated before the enemy, and the balance on the eastern coast of Spain, notwithstanding a more resolute resistance, was inclining slowly, but sensibly, in favour of the French arms, Wellington was steadily laying the foundations of that invincible defence of Portugal, which has justly rendered his name immortal. The result of the short campaign in Talavera, had completely demonstrated to him that no reliance could be placed on the co-operation in the field of the Spanish armies, and that, although the aid of their desultory forces was by no means to be despised, yet it would be much more efficacious when they were left to pursue the war in their own way, and the existence of the English army was not endangered, by the concentration of the whole disposable resources of the enemy, to repel any regular invasion of Spain by their forces. He saw clearly that the Spanish government, partly from the occupation of so large a portion of their territory by the enemy, and the consequent destruction of almost all their revenue, partly from the incapacity, presumption,

Wellington's views
for the
defence of
Portugal,
and ultimate
deliverance
of the
Peninsula.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

¹ Well.
Desp.
20th April,
1810.
Gurw. vi.
47 ; viii.
89. 20th
October,
1809 ; v.
234, 274,
275 317.

and ignorance of the members of administration and generals of the army, was totally incapable of either directing, feeding, or paying, their troops ; and consequently that their armed bands could be regarded as little better than patriotic robbers, who exacted alike from friends and foes the requisite supplies for their support. Wisely resolving, therefore, to put no reliance on their assistance, he determined to organize in Portugal, the means of the most strenuous resistance to the enemy, and to equip in that kingdom a body of men, who, being raised by the efforts of English officers to the rank of real soldiers, might, with the assistance of the British army, and by the aid of the powerful means of defence which the mountain ranges with which the country abounded, afforded, maintain on the flank of the French armies in the Peninsula a permanent resistance. With this view he spent the winter in sedulously filling up the ranks, and improving the discipline of the Portuguese soldiers ; and the opportune arrival of thirty-one thousand stand of arms and suits of uniform from England in the spring of 1810, contributed greatly to their improvement and efficiency. The British army was daily increasing in strength and orderly habits, from the continued rest of the winter ; while the rapid progress of the vast fortifications which Wellington had directed to be constructed, in the October preceding, at Torres Vedras, and in interior lines between that and Lisbon, afforded a well-grounded hope, that, if manned by adequate defenders, they would prove impregnable, and at length impose an impassable barrier to the hitherto irresistible progress of the French armies.¹

The difficulties, however, with which the English general had to contend, in the prosecution of these

great designs, were of no ordinary kind, and would unquestionably have been deemed insurmountable by almost any other commander. The British government itself had been seriously weakened, and its moral resolution much impaired, by the external disasters of the year 1809, and the internal dissensions in the cabinet to which they had given rise. The unfortunate success of all their enterprises, and especially the Walcheren expedition, had not only materially diminished their popularity, but brought them to the very verge of overthrow; and the clamour raised by the Opposition in the country against any further prosecution of the war on the continent was so loud and vehement, and supported by so large a proportion of the middle classes, that it required no ordinary degree of firmness to persist in a system exposed to such obloquy, and hitherto attended with such disaster. In addition to this, the unfortunate dissension between Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning, had banished from the cabinet the two men whose genius and firmness were most adequate to encounter the difficulties with which they were surrounded. The place of the former, as Secretary at War, had been inadequately supplied by Lord Liverpool, a statesman possessed, indeed, of sound judgment, admirable temper in public debate, and great tact in directing the government during ordinary periods, but without the firmness of character and clearness of perception which belongs to the highest class of intellect, and therefore unfitted to take a great and commanding lead in opposition to the current of public opinion, in the most trying crisis of the war. In civil transactions, Mr Perceval, the head of the administration, was indeed bold and intrepid; but being bred a lawyer, and accustomed only to pacific concerns, he

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Extraordi-
nary diffi-
culties to
which Wel-
lington was
exposed.

CHAP. was in a great degree ignorant of military affairs,
 LIX. and did not possess sufficient confidence in his own
 1810. judgment on these matters, to take a due share in the
 responsibility of the mighty contest in which the
 nation was engaged. Thus, though the government
 had fortitude enough to continue the struggle in the
 Peninsula, notwithstanding the retreat from Talave-
 ra, the loud clamour of the Opposition, and subsequent
 destruction of the Spanish armies; yet they did so
 rather in compliance with the clear opinion expressed
 by Wellington, that the British army could keep its
 ground in Portugal, than from any conviction of
 their own on the subject; and they repeatedly stated,
 that they threw upon him the whole responsibility
 connected with the maintenance of the English forces
 on the continent of Europe.¹*

¹ Well.
 Desp.
 7th April,
 1810.
 Gurw. vi.
 21, 28,
 49; v.
 274, 275,
 280, 335.

Inefficiency
 and weak-
 ness of the
 Portuguese
 govern-
 ment.

In addition to these difficulties, which necessarily
 arose from the popular form of the government in
 Great Britain, and which are the price that every
 free country pays for the vast advantages of a general
 discussion on public affairs, the English general had
 to contend also with extraordinary obstacles arising
 from the weakness and perversity of the Portuguese
 authorities. Notwithstanding the most vigorous re-
 presentations which Wellington made to the members
 of the regency there, of the necessity of completing
 the regiments to their full nominal amount, faithfully
 collecting and applying the revenue, and impartially

* “The state of opinion in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the Opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion, that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle which is to answer no purpose. Their instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it shall be necessary to evacuate it.”—*Desp.* 21st April, 1810, GURW. vi. 48, 49.

punishing all magistrates of whatever rank, who shrunk from or neglected their duty, the utmost degree of weakness, inefficiency, and corruption prevailed in every part of the civil department in the state. The people, indeed, were generally brave, determined, and even enthusiastic in the cause; but the persons in office partook, in a most remarkable degree, at once of the corruption of aristocratic, and the weakness of democratic, authority. The country was, in one sense, in a state of convulsion; but the spirit of the movement was, as Wellington observes, anti-Gallican, not democratic; the authorities who had been elected during the first fervour of the Revolution, were for the most part drawn from the dignified clergy or old nobility, and they were not only in a great measure ignorant of business, or influenced by local interests and prejudices, but entertained a nervous terror of losing their popularity, a feeling which is, of all others, the most effectual extinguisher to the utility of any public officer. Even during Massena's invasion, they measured the stability of the country, and the probable issue of the contest, not by the number of troops whom they could bring into the field, or the magazines and equipments which they had provided for the army, but by the lists of persons who attended their levees, and the loudness of cheers which they received when passing through the streets of Lisbon. A government consisting of the aristocratic party, elected or supported by mere popular favour, is the weakest and least burdensome of all governments; one composed of Jacobin adventurers, who have risen to public eminence in the midst of democratic convulsions, the most fearfully energetic and oppressive. Hence, although the numbers taken into British pay were

CHAP.
LIX.
1810.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

¹ Well.
Desp.
vi. 155,
168; vii.
424, 426,
610.

Magnani-
mous reso-
lution of
Wellington
to discharge
his duty in
the face of
all clamour.

nominally thirty thousand, and twenty thousand more were to be raised from the resources of Portugal, yet between the two, never more than thirty thousand could be collected round the English standards; and although the monthly expenses of the campaign had risen to L.376,000, yet the allied army was never able to bring more than fifty-two thousand men into the field.¹

It is in the firm resolution to strive at least to overcome all these obstacles, and the magnanimous determination to risk at once his popularity, military renown, and chances of glory, rather than either abandon his duty or deviate from the plan by which he saw it could alone be discharged, that the brightest page in the career of Wellington is to be found. He was fully informed of the violent outcry raised against him by the Opposition in England. No person was so well aware of the irresolution and terror of responsibility which existed in the British government, and none knew better the corruption, not only of the Portuguese Regency, but of almost all the civil functionaries in their dominions. In these difficult circumstances, however, he did not despair. Disregarding alike the clamour of the populace, both in Portugal and Great Britain, the efforts of faction, and the strength of the enemy, he looked to nothing but the discharge of duty. His principles and resolution at this time cannot be better expressed than in his own words:—"I conceive that the honour and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can; and I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on those of the ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling for means which I know they cannot give,

and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position, which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible. I think that if the Portuguese do their duty I shall have enough to maintain it; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country; and, if from that cause I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army."¹

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

¹ Well.
Desp.
14th Jan.
1810.
Gurw. v.
426.

The British general had need of all his firmness and heroic sense of duty, for the forces which Napoleon was preparing for the subjugation of Portugal were immense. The three corps of Ney, Regnier, and Junot, which were under the immediate command of Marshal Massena, consisted of eighty-six thousand men present with the eagles, all veteran soldiers.* A reserve of twenty-two thousand, under Drouet, was at Valladolid, and might be relied on to supply any waste in the main body; while General Serras, with fifteen thousand, covered the right of the army on the Esla, towards Benevente and Leon, watching the army of Galicia, and resting on the fortress of Astorga, which, after a protracted siege, had at length yielded to the arms of Napoleon. The rear and communications of the French army were covered by Bessieres with twenty-six thousand men, including sixteen thousand of the young guards, who occupied Biscay, Navarre, and Old Castile.¹

Prepara-
tions for
the grand
attack on
Portugal by
Massena.
May 1810.April 21,
1810.¹ Belm. i.
121, 122.
Nap. iii.
201, 207.
App. 568.

The force which Wellington had at his disposal was little more than the half of this immense host, and the troops of which it was composed, with the

* See Note B. Appendix.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Force of
Wellington
for the
defence of
Portugal.

exception of the English soldiers, could not be relied upon as equal in combat to the enemy. The British troops, organized in five divisions, with the cavalry under General Cotton, consisted of twenty-two thousand infantry, and three thousand horse; and the Portuguese regular troops, whom General Beresford had trained and rendered most efficient, amounted to about thirty thousand more. These forces were supported by a large body of militia, of whom nearly thirty thousand might be relied upon for desultory operations, but it was impossible to bring them into the field in regular battle with any chance of success. After making allowance for the necessary detachments in the rear, and the sick, the largest force which Wellington was ever able to collect in this campaign on the frontiers of Portugal, opposite Ciudad Rodrigo, was thirty-two thousand men, while General Hill, who was stationed at Thomar and Abrantes to guard the valley of the Tagus, had about thirteen thousand more, of whom nearly two thousand were horse. Thus, for the defence of Portugal, Wellington could only collect, at the very uttermost, forty-five thousand regular troops, which might be increased to fifty thousand when the army drew near its reserves at Lisbon; while Massena had fully eighty thousand men under his immediate command, supported by reserves and flanking forces, from which he could draw forty thousand more.¹

¹ Nap. iii.
261, 262.
Well. Mem.
Gurw. vii.
292.

Siege and
fall of
Ciudad
Rodrigo.

Marshal Massena arrived on the 1st of June, took the command of the army, and immediately invested the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. General Crawford, who commanded the English advanced guard, fell back, according to Wellington's orders, after making a gallant resistance, across the Agueda, leaving the Spanish fortress to its own resources. The investment was immediately formed, and, on the

25th, the breaching batteries commenced their fire with great effect upon the place. Wellington instantly hastened to the spot, and took post on the Agueda with thirty-two thousand men. That was a trying moment for the English general, perhaps the most trying that he ever underwent. He was at the head of a gallant army, which burned with desire to raise the siege. He had promised the Spaniards, if possible, to effect it. The governor and the garrison were making a brave defence; the sound of their cannon, the incessant roar of the breaching batteries, was heard in every part of the English lines; his own reputation, that of his army, his country, appeared to be at stake; but Wellington refused, resolutely refused, to move forward a man to succour the place. He was charged, not with the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo merely, but with that of Portugal, and, eventually, with the safety and independence of the British Empire. If he had descended into the plain with thirty-two thousand men, half of whom were Portuguese, who had never seen a shot fired, to attack sixty-six thousand French, of whom ten thousand were admirable horse, who formed the covering force, he would have exposed his army, and, probably the cause of European independence, to certain destruction. Like Fabius, therefore, he persevered in his cautious course, disregarding alike the taunts of the enemy, the cries of the Spaniards, and the reproaches of his own troops. Though grievously affected by the necessity of abandoning the fortress to its fate, he never swerved from his resolution. The French, thus undisturbed in their operations, soon brought the siege to a successful issue.¹ The fire kept up from their batteries was so violent, that, on the 10th of July, several practicable breaches were

CHAP.

LIX.

1810.

¹ Tor.

258, 268.

Nap. iii.

263, 283.

Belm. i.

125. Well.

Mem.

Gurw. 292,

293. Vict.

et Conq.

xx. 60, 67.

Well. Desp.

vi. 404.

July 10.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Combat on
the Coa,
and siege
and fall of
Almeida.

made in the walls ; and, on the next day, as resistance and relief were alike hopeless, the governor surrendered the place, with his garrison of four thousand men, 125 guns, and great stores of ammunition, after having made a most gallant defence.¹*

Having thus secured this important fortress, in which he deposited the heavy train and reserve parks of his army, Massena lost no time in moving forward across the frontier, while Wellington, in pursuance of the system he had adopted, retired before him, leaving Almeida also to its fate. Before its investment took place, however, a very gallant action occurred between the French advanced guard and General Crawford, who commanded the British rear-guard, four thousand five hundred strong, on the banks of the Coa. Crawford, during the whole siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, had with this small force maintained his position on the French side of that stream ; and he maintained it even when they approached Almeida. He was there assailed, on the 24th of July, by a French force of twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, with thirty guns. The river

* How severely Wellington felt the necessity under which he lay, at this period, of abandoning the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo ; and the vast importance of the cautious system in which he then persisted, is well stated in a despatch from the English general, and a passage in the Spanish historian Torreno, which are equally honourable to the feelings of both. “ Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year ; and it is very obvious, that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing, therefore, could be more desirable to me personally, than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless. In either case, the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing, as I do, more than a chance of final success, if we can main-

in the rear could be passed only by a single bridge, but by the great steadiness of the men, and the resolution with which the light troops fought, they succeeded in crossing the ravine without any considerable loss. No sooner were they passed, however, than the French, with extraordinary gallantry, dashed across the bridge, but the head of the column was swept away by the terrible fire of the British infantry and artillery; and after a bloody combat of two hours, a heavy rain separated the combatants, and Crawford retired with his division to the main body of the army. In this bloody affair, both parties sustained a loss of between four and five hundred men. All obstacles to the investment of Almeida being now removed, it took place on the following day. The trenches were opened on the 15th of CHAP.
LIX.
1810. Aug. 15. August. The fire of the place was at first extremely well sustained; and as the garrison consisted of four thousand Portuguese regulars and militia, and the governor, General Cox, was a man of known resolution, a protracted resistance was expected. But these anticipations proved nugatory, in consequence of a frightful catastrophe, which, at the very outset

tain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system; I should not do my duty by the government, if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion."—*Desp.* 19th August, 1810, *GURW.* vii. 346, 347. "We feel ourselves bound to say," says Torreno, "that Wellington on that occasion acted as a prudent captain, if to raise the siege it was necessary to risk a battle. His forces were not superior to those of the enemy; and his troops and the Portuguese were not sufficiently disciplined to be able to manœuvre with effect in presence of such a foe, or feel sufficient confidence in themselves to go into battle with the enemy. The battle, if gained, would only have saved Ciudad Rodrigo, but not decided the fate of the war. If lost, the English army would have been totally destroyed—the road to Lisbon laid open, and the Spanish cause rudely shaken, if not struck to the ground."—*TOR.* iii. 367.

CHAP. of the bombardment, deprived the besieged of all
 LIX. their means of defence. At daybreak of the 26th, a
 1810. heavy fire commenced upon the place from sixty-five
 Aug. 26. guns, to which the garrison replied during the whole
 forenoon, with great vigour and effect; but, at five
 o'clock in the evening, a bomb was thrown, which ac-
 cidentally fell into the great magazine of the fortress,
 containing one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of
 powder. The terrible explosion which followed, blew
 up the cathedral, the principal edifices in the town, a
 large part of the houses, and occasioned many breaches
 in the ramparts. The consternation produced by this
 frightful catastrophe was such, that on the same
 evening the garrison mutinied, and compelled the go-
 vernor, who had retired into the town, to surrender;
 and on the following day the garrison, still consisting
 of three thousand men, were made prisoners, and a
 hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy cannon taken.¹

¹ Lond. i.
 494, 497.
 Vict. et
 Conq. xx.
 71, 75.
 Nap. iii.
 304, 306.
 Well. Desp.
 Gurw. vi.
 364.

Retreat of
 Wellington
 into the
 interior of
 Portugal.

Wellington now retreated down the valley of the Mondego, and the dispositions of Massena soon showed that he was to follow in the same direction; the extraordinary difficulties experienced by Junot, in 1808, in his advance into Portugal by the road of Abrantes, having deterred the French general from penetrating into the country by that route. For the same reason, Regnier's corps, which had been posted in the valley of the Tagus, opposite to Hill's division, marched rapidly across the mountains, from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Mondego; upon which Hill, moving parallel to him, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and moved swiftly to join Wellington by the pass of Espinoha. The French marshal's instructions had been to invade Portugal at the same time by both banks of the Tagus; but, as the English general was possessed of an interior line of com-

munication, by the bridge of Villa Velha, over the Tagus, he justly deemed it too hazardous an experiment to attempt such a division of his force in presence of an enterprising enemy, who might suddenly fall with superior force upon one division of his forces, when detached by a broad river from the other. The whole French force, accordingly, was ordered to assemble in the valley of the Mondego, on the 16th of September; and Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were concentrating all their forces, immediately ordered Hill to join him with the right wing of the army. This important movement through the mountains was effected with great expedition, and, on the 21st, the two corps of the allied army completed their junction on the Alva, in the valley of the Mondego. Mean-while ten thousand militia, under General Trant, were collected in the mountains between that river and Oporto, and already occupied the defiles leading to Lamego. The most peremptory orders had been given by the retreating general to lay waste the country, destroy the mills, and deprive the enemy of all their means of subsistence.¹

Mean-while, however, the continued retreat of the English troops, and the multitude of fugitive peasants and proprietors who flocked into Lisbon, produced the utmost consternation in that capital. Wellington soon felt the necessity of making an effort to support the drooping spirits of the people, and inspire additional energy into the governments of both countries. He therefore resolved to take post on the first favourable ground which might present itself, and as Massena was descending the valley of the Mondego, by the northern bank of the river, he crossed his whole army over, and took post on the summit of the ridge of BUSACO. This

CHAP.
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1810.

Sept. 21.

¹ Nap. iii.

312, 320.

Jom. iii.

428, 429.

Well. Mem.

Gurw. vii.

296, 297.

Belm. i.

129, 130.

He crosses

the Monde-

go, and

takes post

at Busaco.

CHAP. mountain range runs from the northern shores of
 LIX. the Mondego in a northerly direction, about eight
 1810. miles, where it unites with the great ridge which
 separates the valley of the Mondego from that of
 the Douro. Thus this Sierra forms a natural bar-
 rier, running across the northern bank of the Mon-
 dego, and the same ridge continues along the same
 mountains under the name of Sierra da Murcella,
 which runs in a southerly direction till it joins the
 great chain which separates the valley of the Mondego
 from that of the Tagus. On the summit of the
 northern portion of this range, Wellington collected
 his whole army on the evening of the 26th, in all,
 about fifty thousand men, while Massena, with
 seventy-two thousand, lay at its foot, determined to
 force the passage.¹

Sept. 26.

¹ Well.

Mem.

vii. 296 ;

vi. 445,

446. Jom.

iii. 429,

430. Nap.

iii. 321,

322, 324.

Battle of
 Busaco.

Sept. 24.

The French Marshal was not ignorant of the
 strength of the position which the English general
 had now assumed, or of the perilous nature of the
 situation in which he was placed, for while lying at
 the foot of the ridge of Busaco, he received intelli-
 gence that Colonel Trant had, with ten regiments of
 militia, attacked the reserved artillery and military
 chest near Tojal, and captured the whole, with eight
 hundred prisoners ; and already the communication
 by the Spanish frontier was entirely cut off by the Por-
 tuguese light parties. But the orders of the Empe-
 ror were pressing, and he was well aware that fight he
 must, at whatever disadvantage.* Next day collect-
 ing, therefore, all his force, Massena commenced a

* In an intercepted letter from Napoleon at this period, to Massena, he says, " Lord Wellington has only eighteen thousand men. Hill has only six thousand ; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on, after having well observed where

desperate attack upon the English position, at day-break of the morning of the 27th. The British army, during the night, lay in dense masses on the summit of the mountain. The sky was clear, and the dark rocky eminences rising on both sides of the pass, were crowned by the fires of innumerable bivouacs. The veterans in the English army, accustomed to similar scenes of excitement, slept profoundly on their stony beds; but many of the younger soldiers, who were now to witness a battle for the first time, were kept awake by the grandeur and solemnity of the scene around them. As the first streaks of dawn were beginning to appear over the eastern hills, a rustling noise was heard in the wooded dells which ran up to the crest of the mountains. It arose from the French outposts, who, stealing unobserved during the night, had thus got close to the outposts of the English position without being perceived. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops started to their arms at all points. It was full time, for in a few minutes more, the French in two massive columns were upon them. Ney, with three divisions, numbering full twenty-five thousand combatants, advanced against the British left, by the great road leading to the convent of Busaco; while Regnier, with two, moved by St Antonio de Cantara, against their right, about three miles distant. The first, headed by Loison's division, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came rapidly up the wooded hollow which leads to Busaco, and the

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LIX.

1810.

Sept. 27.

the blow may be given. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations."—
NAP. iii. 307, 308.

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1810.

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xx.
83, 87.
Nap. iii.
331, 333.
Well. Desp.
30th Sept.
1810.
Gurw. vi.
446, 447.

Bloody de-
feat of the
French.

British sharpshooters, driven before them, soon emerged from the woods, breathless and in disorder. Crawford, whose division stood at that point, had stationed his artillery most advantageously to play upon the enemy during their ascent from the hollow; but though the guns were worked with extraordinary rapidity, nothing could stop the undaunted advance of the French troops. Emerging bravely from the hollow, they stand upon the edge of the mountain. The British artillery is quickly drawn to the rear. The shout of victory is already heard from the French line, when suddenly, Crawford, with the 43d and 52d regiments, springing out of a hollow behind the highest part of the ridge, where they lay concealed, appeared on the summit, and eighteen hundred British bayonets sparkled on the crest of the hill. The head of the French column instantly fired, but in vain. It is broken and driven back. Both its flanks are overlapped by the English line, and three terrible discharges, within a few yards distance, drove them headlong down, in wild confusion, with dreadful loss, to the bottom of the hollow.¹

The attack on the British right by the two divisions of Regnier's corps, met with no better success. The ground in that quarter was indeed of comparatively easy ascent, and although the British and Portuguese skirmishers opposed a vigorous resistance, and twenty pieces of cannon played incessantly on the advancing column, yet nothing could arrest the ardour and gallantry of the French, who mounted with an intrepid step up the hill, and after routing a Portuguese regiment stationed before them, established themselves on the summit, and were beginning to deploy to the right and left. At this instant, however, when the British position in this point

appeared to be almost carried, and the third division, part of which had been forced to give way, could with difficulty maintain itself against the dense and intrepid column which had forced itself into the centre of its line, General Leith and General Picton brought up their divisions, and charged them with such vigour, that the enemy, after a desperate struggle, were hurled down the hill, the British firing upon them as long as their muskets would carry, but not pursuing, lest their ranks should be broken, and the crest of the hill be again won. The other French division of Regnier's corps, which advanced up a hollow way a little to the left of his main column, was repulsed by the left of Picton's division, before they reached the summit of the mountain. After these bloody defeats, the French made no attempt again to carry the top of the hill, though Loison and Marchand maintained a long and obstinate conflict in the hollows at its foot, but their efforts were effectually held in check by the brigades of Pack and Spencer, and at length, towards evening, Massena, wearied of the fruitless butchery, drew off his troops, after having sustained a loss of eighteen hundred killed and three thousand wounded, among whom were Generals Foy and Merle, while the total loss of the allies was not above thirteen hundred men.¹

CHAP.
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1810.

¹ Nap. iii.
329, 334.
Gurw. vi.
446, 450.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
82, 87.
Belm. i.
131.

The battle of Busaco produced an astonishing effect at the time at which it was fought; and, in its ultimate consequences, was beyond all question one of the most important that took place in the whole Peninsular war. It, for the first time, brought the Portuguese troops into battle with the French, and under such advantageous circumstances as at once gave them a victory. Incalculable was the effect

Important
results of
this battle.

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produced by this glorious triumph. To have stood side by side with the British soldiers in a pitched battle, and shared with them in the achievement of defeating the French, was a distinction which they could hardly have hoped to attain so early in the campaign. Wellington judiciously bestowed the highest praises upon their conduct in this battle, and declared in his public despatch, that "they were worthy of contending in the same ranks with the British soldiers in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving." It may safely be affirmed that on the day after the battle, the strength of the Portuguese troops was doubled. The sight of this auspicious change dispelled every desponding feeling from the British army. No presentiments of ultimate discomfiture were any longer entertained. The plan of defence which the far-seeing sagacity of their chief had formed revealed itself to the meanest sentinel in the ranks, and the troops of every nation prepared to follow the standard of their leader wherever he should lead them, with that ready alacrity and undoubting confidence which is at once the forerunner and the cause of ultimate triumph.¹

¹ Well.
Desp.
30th Sept.
1810.
Gurw. iv.
446, 449.

Wellington has since declared, that he expected that the battle of Busaco would have stopped the advance of Massena in Portugal; and that, if the French general had been governed by the principles of the military art, he would have halted and retired

¹ Wellington
to Romana,
30th Sept.
1810,
Gurw. vi.
450; and
3d Nov.
1810,
Gurw. vi.
552.

after that check; and the English general wrote to Romana immediately after the battle, that he had no doubt whatever of the success of the campaign.¹ But fortunately for England and the cause of European freedom, Massena was forced on by that necessity of advancing in the hazardous pursuit of doubtful success which afterwards drove Napoleon to Moscow,

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and is at last the consequence and the punishment, both in civil and military affairs, of revolutionary aggression. Impelled by this necessity, the French marshal, finding that he could not carry the English position by attack in front, resolved to turn it by a flank movement; and, accordingly, on the following day, he moved on his own right, through a pass in the mountains which led to Sardao, and brought him on the great road from Oporto to Coimbra and Lisbon. To attempt such a flank movement with an army that had sustained so severe and bloody a check, in presence of a brave and enterprising enemy, was a hazardous undertaking; but the French general had no alternative but to run the risk, or re-measure his steps to the Spanish frontier. Wellington, from the summit of the Busaco ridge, clearly perceived the French troops defiling in that direction on the evening of the 28th, but he wisely resolved not to disturb the operation. By attacking the French army when in march, he might bring the Portuguese levies into action under less favourable circumstances, than those in which they had recently fought, and which might weaken, or destroy their moral influence. His policy now, was to leave nothing to chance. Behind him were the lines of Torres Vedras, now completely finished, and mounted with six hundred guns; before which he was well convinced all the waves of French conquest would beat in vain. He immediately gave orders accordingly for the army to retire to their stronghold. The troops broke up from their position at Busaco on the 30th, and driving the whole population of the country within their reach before them, retired rapidly by Coimbra and Leyria to Torres Vedras, which the advanced guards reached on the 8th October, and the whole

Sept. 28.

Sept. 28.

CHAP. army was collected within the lines on the 15th.
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1810. The French followed more slowly, and in very dis-

orderly array, while Trant, with the Portuguese militia, came up so rapidly on their rear, that on the
Oct. 7. 7th of October he made himself master of Coimbra, with above five thousand men, principally sick and wounded, who had been left there. This disaster, however, made no change in the dispositions of the French marshal. Pressing resolutely forward, without any regard either to magazines, of which he had none, or to his communications in the rear, which were entirely cut off by the Portuguese militia, he marched headlong on, and arrived in the middle of October in sight of the lines of Torres Vedras, of which he had never before heard, but which now rose in appalling strength to bar his further progress towards the Portuguese capital.¹

¹ Well.
Desp.
30th Sept.
1810.
Gurw. vi.
448, 450;
and Mem.
vii. 297.
Nap. iii.
336, 351.
Jom. iii.
432, 433.
Belm. i.
132, 133.

Description
of the lines
of Torres
Vedras.

The lines of Torres Vedras, on which the English engineers had previously been engaged for above a twelvemonth, and which have acquired immortal celebrity from being the position in which the desolating torrent of French conquest was first permanently arrested, consisted of three distinct ranges of defence, one within another, which formed so many intrenched positions, each of which must be successively forced before the invading force could reach Lisbon. The first, which was twenty-nine miles long, extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to Zezambre on the seacoast. The second, in general about eight miles in the rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus, to the mouth of the St Lorenza, in the sea. The third, intended to cover a post embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus, to the Tower of Jonquera on the coast. Within this interior line was an entrenched camp designed to

cover the embarkation of the troops, if that extremity should become necessary, and it rested on Fort St Julian, whose high ramparts and deep ditches rendered any attempt at escalade impracticable ; so that, in the event of disaster, the most ample means were provided for bringing away the troops in safety. Of these lines, the second was incomparably the strongest, and it was there that Wellington had originally intended to make his stand, the first being meant rather to retard the advance of the enemy and take off the first edge of his attack, than to be the permanent resting place of the allied forces ; but the long delay of Massena at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, had given so much time to the English engineers, that the first line was completed, and deemed susceptible of defence, when the French arrived before it. It consisted of thirty redoubts placed on a ridge of heights, on which were mounted, in all, 140 guns ; the great redoubt of Sobral, in the centre, on which was mounted forty-five pieces of heavy cannon, was perched upon an eminence that overlooked the whole exterior lines, and from which signal-posts communicated over their whole extent ; an admirable road, running along the front of the position, enabled one part of the army to communicate rapidly with the other ; the highways piercing through this terrible barrier were all pallisadoed ; the redoubts, armed with cheveux-de-frize, and a glacis cut away to make room for their fire, and the intervening spaces which were not fortified formed into encampments for the troops, under shelter of the guns of one or other of the redoubts, where they might give battle to the enemy with every prospect of success. On the whole lines, no less than 600 pieces of artillery were mounted on 150 redoubts.¹ Neither the Romans

CHAP.

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1810.

¹ Belm. i.

133, 135.

Nap. iii.

351, 359.

Jom. iii.

433, 434.

Vict. et

Conq. xx.

93, 95.

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Junction of
Romana,
and admi-
rable posi-
tion of the
British
army.

in ancient, nor Napoleon in modern times, have left such a monument of their power and perseverance; and they will remain in indestructible majesty to the end of the world, an enduring monument of the grandeur of conception in the chief who could design, and the nation which could execute such a stupendous undertaking.

The situation of the English army on this astonishing position, was as favourable as the ground which they occupied was carefully fortified. By drawing so close to the centre of his power, Wellington had greatly augmented the physical strength of his forces. Strong reinforcements arrived from England just after the troops entered the lines, and the Marquis Romana, who was summoned up by Wellington to concur in the defence of the last stronghold in the independence of the Peninsula, joined on the 20th of October with five thousand men. There were now about thirty thousand English troops in the front line, besides twenty-five thousand Portuguese, and five thousand Spaniards, in all sixty thousand men, perfectly disposable and unfettered by the care of the redoubts, while a superb body of marines that had been sent out from England, the militia of Estremadura and Lisbon, and the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, formed a mass of nearly sixty thousand additional combatants, of great value in defending positions, and manning the numerous redoubts which were scattered through the positions. Altogether, before the end of October, one hundred and thirty thousand men received rations within the British lines; twenty ships of the line, and a hundred large transports, provided the sure means of drawing off the army in case of disaster; and yet, such were the inexhaustible resources which the vigour and

activity of government had provided for this enormous warlike multitude, that not only was no want experienced during the whole time that the army lay in the lines of Torres Vedras, but the combatants of all descriptions, and the whole pacific multitude who had taken refuge with them, amounting, with the population of Lisbon, to at least four hundred thousand more, were amply provided with subsistence, and the troops of every description never were so healthy or in such high spirits. Military annals in no age of the world, have so stupendous an assemblage of military and naval strength to commemorate in such a position; and it was worthy of England, which had ever taken the lead in the cause of European deliverance, thus to stand forth, with unprecedented vigour, in the eighteenth year of the war.¹

CHAP.
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1810.

¹ Nap. iii.
358, 359.
Belm. i.
134, 135.
Well. Mem.
Gurw. vii.
297, 298.
Jom. iii.
433, 434.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
101, 102.

Massena, with all his resolution, paused at the sight of this formidable barrier, and employed several days in reconnoitering the lines in every direction, while his troops were gradually collecting at the foot of the entrenchments; and much time was consumed in endeavouring to discover a weak point in which they could be assailed with some prospect of success. But, although the outer line exhibited a front in several places many miles in length without any intrenchments, and the orders of Napoleon were positive that he should immediately attack if he had the least chance of success,¹ yet the great advantage derived by the allies from the redoubts with which their position was strengthened, and which enabled the English general to throw his whole disposable force upon any point that might be assailed, rendered it evidently hopeless to make the attempt. In the centre of the British army, twenty-five thousand men were encamped close round the great redoubt of Sobral, upon the Monte Agraca, which

Continued
distresses
and ultimate
retreat of
the French.

¹ Jom. iii.
435.

CHAP.
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1810.

could have reached any menaced point of the line in two hours. The French general, therefore, contented himself with sending off Foy, under an escort, to Paris, to demand instructions from the Emperor. Mean-while, the contest was reduced between the two armies to the question—Who should starve first? Massena, fondly hoping that Wellington would quit his lines to attack him in his own position, or that the British government, or the regency at Lisbon, would be intimidated by the near approach of his army, would abandon the contest held out for above a month, until he had consumed every article of subsistence which the country occupied by his troops afforded; and his troops, severely weakened by disease, were reduced to the last stage of starvation and misery. The Portuguese militia, fifteen thousand strong, drew round his rear, and became so adventurous, that they cut off all his communications, and confined his troops to the resources of the ground which they actually occupied. Yet such was the power of squeezing the resources out of a country which long practice had given to the French generals, that we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that Massena contrived to maintain sixty thousand men, and twenty thousand horses, for two months, in a country in which he could not have maintained an English division, with all the advantages of British wealth, and of the favourable inclination of the inhabitants.¹ At length, however, every article in the country being consumed, and the inhabitants, whom the French had oppressed, as well as themselves, reduced to utter starvation, Massena broke up from his position on the 14th of November, and, for the first time since the accession of Napoleon, the French eagles commenced a lasting retreat.²

¹ Well.
Desp.
Gurw. vii.
54, 55.

² Massena's
Report to
Napoleon,
29th Oct.
1810.
Belm. i.
App. 58.
Well. Desp.
Gurw. vii.
298, 299.

No sooner was the joyful report brought in by the outposts that the French army was retiring, than the British issued from their entrenchments, and Wellington commenced a pursuit at the head of sixty thousand men. Desirous, however, of committing nothing to chance in a contest in which skill and foresight was thus visibly in a manner compelling fortune to declare in his favour, he did not press the French rear-guard with any great force, but dispatched Hill across the Tagus to move upon Abrantes, while the bulk of the army followed on the great road by Cartaxo, towards Santarem. But Massena, whose great military qualities were now fully awakened, had no intention of retreating to any considerable distance; and after having retired about forty miles, he halted his rear-guard at the latter town, and there, with much skill, took up a position eminently calculated to combine the great objects of maintaining his ground in an unassailable situation, and at the same time providing supplies for his army. A strong rear guard was rested on Santarem, a town with old walls, situated on the top of a high hill, which could be approached only by a narrow causey running through the marshes formed by the Rio Major and the Tagus. While this formidable position, the strongest in Portugal to an army advancing from the westward, effectually protected his rear, the main body of his troops was cantoned behind in the valley of the Zezere, the rich fields of which, giving food to a hundred and ten thousand inhabitants, afforded ample supplies of grain, while the extensive mountains on either side yielded a very great quantity of cattle. The question of attacking the enemy in this strong ground was again well considered by Wellington, but finally abandoned, from a con-

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1810.

Positions of
the French
at Santarem,
and ultimate
retreat of
Massena.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Dec. 29.

1 Well.

Desp.

5th Jan.

1811; and

Mem. viii.

478, 479,

480. Nap.

iii. 392,

401, 452,

455. Belm.

i. 163, 165.

Jom. iii.

491, 494.

March 2.

viction that such an attempt could not, from the flooded state of the marshes on either side, succeed without immense loss, and that to hazard it, would be to expose the allied army to the chances of war, while certainty of ultimate success was in their power. Wellington, therefore, contented himself with taking up a position in front of Santarem, and narrowly watching the Tagus, on which the French marshal was preparing boats, and all the materials for passing the river. If he could have succeeded in that enterprise, and transported the seat of war into the Alentejo, he would have reached a country hitherto untouched, and offering resources of every kind for his army. But Wellington anticipated his design, and, detaching Hill with two divisions to the opposite bank of the Tagus, where he was reinforced by a large part of the militia of that province, guarded the banks of the river so effectually, and established batteries upon all the prominent parts with such skill, that the French generals found it impossible to effect the passage. Thus Massena was reduced to maintain his army entirely from the resources he could extract from the northern bank of the Tagus; and although he was joined by Drouet's corps with ten thousand men in the end of December, yet he did not deem himself in sufficient strength to attack the English army. Mean-while the British government, fully roused at last to the vast importance of the war in Portugal, and the fair hopes of conducting it to a successful issue, made great efforts to reinforce their army. The troops embarked were delayed by contrary winds for above six weeks after they had been put on board; but at length they set sail on the 20th of February, and landed at Lisbon on the 2d of March.¹ No sooner did the French marshal hear of their arrival,

than he broke up with his whole forces, taking the road through the mountains to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and Wellington, still keeping Hill, with two divisions, in the Alentejo, to render assistance to the Spaniards, who were at this time hard pressed in Estremadura, commenced the pursuit with forty thousand British and Portuguese troops.

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It was hard to say whether the position of the French or English general was most critical, when Massena thus, in good earnest, began his retreat from Portugal; for such, during the winter, had been the progress of the French in Estremadura, that it was extremely doubtful whether the English would not speedily be threatened by invasion by a formidable army on the side of Elvas and the Alentejo. Napoleon was no sooner informed of the serious aspect of the war in Portugal than he ordered Soult to confide to Victor the tedious duty of blockading Cadiz, while he himself should march with all his disposable forces upon Estremadura and Badajoz. In pursuance of these directions, that able chief set out from Seville, on the 2d of January, with twenty thousand men, taking the road by Llerena for Badajoz. The troops which Romana had left under Mendizabel in that province, after he himself joined Wellington at Torres Vedras, consisted only of two Spanish divisions of infantry, and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, not amounting in all to twelve thousand combatants. Too weak to oppose any resistance to Soult's considerable force, these troops, which were under the command of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, retired under the cannon of Badajoz and Olivenza. Four thousand men, imprudently thrown, without any provisions, into the latter fortress, surrendered after twelve days on the 22d of January; and Soult, then collecting all

Operations
of Soult in
Estrema-
dura.

Jan. 22.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

Jan. 23.

Feb. 6.

¹ Well.
Mem.
Gurw. viii.
475, 476.
Jom. iii.
481, 483.
Belm. i.
162, 163.
Tor. iv. 12,
20.

his troops, took up his position before Badajoz. No sooner was he informed of the danger of that important fortress, than Wellington resolved to dispatch Romana, with the two divisions which had so seasonably joined him at Torres Vedras, to co-operate in its relief. Just as he was preparing, however, to set out on this important expedition, this noble Spaniard, at once the bravest, the most skilful, and most disinterested of all the Peninsular generals, was seized with a disease in the heart, of which he suddenly died at Cartaxo.* His loss was severely felt by the Spanish army; for Mendizabel, who succeeded to the command, was totally disqualified for the duty with which he was intrusted. On the 30th of January, the Spanish divisions from Wellington's army joined the remainder of Mendizabel's troops, with which, in the first week of February, he took up a position under the cannon of Badajoz, with his right resting on the fort of St Christoval, forming one of the outer walls of that city. The arrival of this formidable reinforcement rendered Soult's situation extremely critical; for the necessity of keeping up his communications had reduced the forces under his command to sixteen thousand men, and the Spaniards, with a force nearly equal, occupied a strong position, resting on the cannon of the fortress.¹

From this critical position, he was soon relieved, by the astonishing negligence and fatuity of the Spanish general, which brought destruction on his

* "In Romana," said Wellington, "the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operation as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army."—WELL. *Desp.*, 26th January, 1811, GURW. vii. 190.

own army, and ultimately occasioned the fall of that important fortress, with the protection of which he was entrusted, to be regained only hereafter by tor- rents of English blood. Wellington had repeatedly advised Mendizabel to strengthen his position under the walls of the place with entrenchments, in order that he might possess an impregnable station from which he might co-operate in its defence; and, if he had done so, he would unquestionably have preserved it for the Spanish arms. Such, however, was his ignorant presumption, that he deemed it wholly unnecessary to follow this advice: and as his position was separated from that of the French by the Guadiana and the Gebora, both of which were flooded with rains, he contented himself with breaking down a bridge over the latter stream, and left his army in negligent security on its bank. On the 18th of February, however, Soult, observing that the waters of the rivers had declined, conceived the audacious design of crossing both, and surprising the Spaniards amidst their dream of security. Late on that evening, he forded the Guadiana at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. That stream, however, was still to cross: but next morning, before day-break, the passage was accomplished under cover of a thick mist; and, as the first dawn broke, the Spanish outposts near the ruined bridge, were alarmed by the tirailleurs, who already were on the opposite bank. The cavalry forded five miles further up, and speedily threatened the Spanish flank, while Mortier, with six thousand foot, assailed their front. The contest was only of a few minutes' duration: horse, foot, and cannon, were speedily driven together in frightful confusion into the centre; the cavalry cut its way through the

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

Total defeat
of Mendiza-
bel at the
Gebora.

Tor. iv.

20, 22.

Jom. iii.

483, 484.

Nap. iii.

434, 436.

Well. Desp.

Gurw. vii.

278; and

viii. 478.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

Siege and
fall of
Badajoz.

throng and escaped; but the infantry were almost all cut down or taken. Mendizabel fled with a thousand men to Elvas, two thousand got into Badajoz: but eight thousand, with the whole artillery, were taken; and not a vestige of the army of Estremadura remained in the field.

Soult immediately resumed the siege of Badajoz; but with little prospect of success, for the ramparts were of great strength; the garrison was nine thousand strong, amply supplied with provisions; and the extreme necessities of Massena's army on the Tagus, rendered it more than doubtful whether he would not speedily be driven to a retreat, and Beresford be seen approaching with two English divisions to raise the siege. From this difficulty he was again relieved by his good fortune, and the treachery of the Spanish governor of the fortress. Manecho, who first had the command, was a veteran of approved courage, and so far from being discouraged by the rout of the Gebora, he vigorously prepared for his defence, and gave out that he would rival the glories of Gerona and Saragossa. But this gallant Spaniard was unfortunately killed a few days after the fire began; and Imaz, who succeeded to the command, was a man of a very different stamp. Without vigour or resolution to keep up the spirits of his troops, he was, what was rare among the Spaniards, accessible to bribes from the enemy. Under his irresolute management, the enemy's works rapidly advanced, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the place considerably weakened, though the enemy's battering guns were only six, of which one was dismounted. Still the breach was impracticable; provisions were plentiful; the garrison was yet eight thousand strong; a great disaster had befallen the

French in Andalusia, and advices had been received by three different channels from Wellington, that Massena was in full retreat; that Beresford, with twelve thousand men, was rapidly approaching, and that in a few days he would be relieved. Don Juan Garcia, the second in command, was clear, in a council of war, to hold out. Camerio, the chief of the artillery, was of the same opinion: but though Imaz voted with them in the council, he, on the same day, shamefully surrendered the place with eight thousand men and a hundred and seventy guns.¹

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

¹ Tor. iv.
23, 25.
Nap. iii.
450, 451.
Well. Desp.
viii. 480,
482; and
Desp. 20th
March,
1811.
Gurw. vii.
371.

Soult had no sooner crowned with this marvellous success his short but brilliant campaign, in which, with a force not exceeding twenty thousand men, he had carried two fortresses, and taken or destroyed an equal number of the enemy, than he returned with all imaginable expedition to Andalusia, where his presence was loudly called for by a disaster, all but decisive, which had occurred to the blockading force before Cadiz during his absence. Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded the British and Portuguese troops in that city, was encouraged by the great diminution of force under Victor in consequence of Soult's absence, on the opposite shores of the bay, to try an expedition, with a view to raise the siege. The allies sailed on the 21st, and landed at Alge-siras on the day following; an attack was fixed for the 28th February; but, owing to the prevalence of contrary winds, it did not take place for a week later. Graham had collected four thousand British infantry and two hundred horse at Tarifa; and on the 29th, La Pena landed with ten thousand Spanish troops, and taking the command of the whole allied force, moved against the enemy. In a few days his force was increased by the guerrillas who came in from every direction, to twelve thousand foot,

Operations
before
Cadiz.
Battle of
Barrosa.

Feb. 28.

Feb. 29.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

March 5.

¹ Graham's
Desp. 6th
March,
1811.
Gurw. vii.
382. Nap.
iii. 440.
Tor. iv.
26, 33.

and eight hundred horse; but, mean-while, the French had collected their troops from all quarters, and fifteen thousand men were assembled round the standards of Victor before Cadiz, besides five thousand at Medina Sidonia, and other places in his rear. The allies, however, noways daunted, advanced to raise the siege; and on the 5th reached the heights of BARROSA, about four miles from the mouth of the Santi Petri, when Victor came out of his lines to give them battle.¹

Battle of
Barrosa,
March 6.

General Graham was extremely anxious to receive the attack on the heights of Barrosa, where his little band would have had an excellent position to repel the enemy. La Pena, however, ordered him to move through the wood of Bermeya towards the sea-coast; but no sooner did he commence this movement, than the Spanish general followed after him, leaving the important ridge of Barrosa, the key of the whole ground, unoccupied. The moment Victor was apprised of this, he directed his whole disposable force, about nine thousand strong, of the divisions Ruffin, Laval, and Villatte, all veterans inured to victory, with fourteen guns, to attack the heights. Some Spanish troops, whom they met on their ascent, were quickly overthrown; and Graham, while still entangled in the wood, was apprised by the torrent of fugitives which came after him, that the heights were won, and the enemy posted on the strong ground on his rear. An ordinary general would have thought only in such a crisis of retiring to the Isle of Leon, and extricating himself as rapidly as possible from his perilous situation: but Graham, who had the eye, as well as the soul, of a great commander, at once perceived, that to attempt this in presence of such an enemy, with the Spaniards in full retreat,¹ and already out of sight, would rapidly bring on disaster. He

March 6.

¹ Sir T.
Graham's
Desp. 6th
March,
1811.
Gurw. vii.
391. Nap.
iii. 42.
Belm. i.

172, 173.

instantly took his line : ten guns, under Major Duncan, wheeled about, and commenced a destructive fire on the enemy's masses, who were now descending the hill ; and the infantry, hastily formed into two columns, under Colonel Wheatley and General Dikes, faced about, and advanced to meet the foe.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

The onset at both points was exceedingly fierce ; the French, as usual, came on in column, preceded by a cloud of gallant light troops, who concealed the direction of their attack by a rapid fire ; but when Laval's division, which advanced unchecked even by the admirably directed fire of Duncan's guns, at length reached the British line, they were met by a determined charge of the 87th and 28th regiments, broken and driven back, with the loss of two guns and an eagle. The routed division fell back on their reserve, but they too were thrown into disorder, and the battle won on that side. Mean-while Dikes's division was not less successful against Ruffin's division, which was still on the brow of the hill. The guards, supported by two British regiments, there boldly mounted the steep : Ruffin's men, confident of victory, descended half-way to meet them, and with loud shouts the rival nations met in mortal conflict. The struggle was very violent, and for some time doubtful ; but at length the French were forced back to the top, and ultimately driven down the other side with extraordinary slaughter : Ruffin and Chaudon Rousseau, both generals of division, being severely wounded and taken. The two discomfited wings retired by converging lines to the rear, and soon met. They tried to retrieve the day, but in vain : Duncan's guns, with a close and rapid fire, played on their ranks ; Ponsonby, with his two hundred German horse, charged their retiring cavalry, over-

Victory of
the English.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

¹ Sir T.
Graham's
Desp. 6th
March,
1811.
Gurw. vii.
382. Nap.
iii. 442,
445. Vict.
et Conq. xx.
226, 231.
Belm. i.
173, 174.

Various
actions dur-
ing the
retreat.

threw them, and took two more guns; and if La Pena had sent merely his eight hundred Spanish cavalry, and powerful horse artillery, to the fight, Victor must have sustained a total defeat, and raised the siege of Cadiz. But not a man did that base general send to the aid of his heroic allies, though two of his battalions, without orders, returned to aid them when they heard the firing, and appeared on the field at the close of the day. The French thus withdrew without further disaster; and Graham, thoroughly disgusted with the conduct of the Spanish general, some days after re-entered the isle of Leon, bringing with him in triumph six French guns, one eagle, and three hundred prisoners, after having killed and wounded two thousand of the enemy, with a loss to himself of only twelve hundred men. La Pena speedily followed his example: the bridge of Santi Petri was again broken down. Victor cautiously resumed his position round the bay, where he was soon after joined by Soult returning from his victorious expedition into Estremadura; and the battle of Barrosa remained without result, save that imperishable one, which arises from the confidence which it communicated to the British arms, and the glory which it gave to the British name.¹

Immediate, however, as well as ultimate results, attended the retreat of Massena from his position at Santarem. Having exhausted the last means of subsistence which the country he occupied would afford, and finding his marauders at length returning on all sides empty handed from their excursions, this veteran commander commenced his retreat. He chose for its line the valley of the Mondego, and the road of Almeida; but, as this required a passage, in

presence of the enemy, of the range of mountains which separates that valley from that of the Zezere, where the French army lay, of an army encumbered with an immense train of artillery, and ten thousand sick, the operation was one which must necessarily be conducted with great caution. The great military talents of the hero of Aspern here shone forth with the brightest lustre. Forming his army into a solid mass, under the uniform protection of a powerful rear-guard, commanded by Ney, he retired slowly and deliberately, without either confusion or forced marches, and constantly availing himself of the numerous strong positions which the country afforded, to take his stand in such a manner that he required to be dislodged by a flank movement of the pursuing force, which necessarily required time, and gave opportunity for the main body and carriages to defile quietly in the rear. Two days were necessarily occupied at first by Wellington in watching the enemy, as his line of retreat was not yet declared, and he had assembled Ney's corps near Leyria, as if menacing the lines of Torres Vedras. But no sooner did it clearly appear that he had taken the line of the Mondego, and was retiring in good earnest, than the whole allied force to the north of the Tagus was put in motion after him. The bulk of his forces was directed by Wellington on Leyria, whither, also, the reinforcements, six thousand strong, were moved, which had recently arrived from England, in order to stop the enemy from moving on Oporto and the northern provinces of the kingdom. To gain time, the French general offered battle at Pombal, which obliged Wellington to concentrate his troops, and bring up the two divisions which had been sent across the Tagus to relieve

March 8.

March 9.

CHAP. Badajoz ; but, noⁿ sooner were seven divisions united,
 LIX. than he retired, and a slight skirmish alone took
 1811. place between the two armies. On the 12th, Ney,
 March 10. with the rear-guard, stood firm at Redinha, at the
 March 12. mouth of a long defile, through which the main body
¹ Nap. iii. of the army was retiring ; and the splendid spectacle
 455, 465. was exhibited of thirty thousand men marching in an
 Belm. i. open plain against this position. At their approach,
 165, 166. however, they retired without any considerable loss.¹
 Well. Desp. Gurw. viii. 481.

Coimbra at this period appears to be the point
 Continuation of the retreat to the frontier. towards which the French were tending ; but the
 fortunate occupation of that town, at this juncture,
 by Trant's militia, and the report which, though erro-
 neous, was believed, that the reinforcements for the
 British army had been forwarded by sea to the mouth
 of the Mondego, and had arrived there, induced Mas-
 sena to change the line of his retreat, and he fell
 back towards Almeida by the miserable road of Mi-
 randa del Corvo. Frightful ravages every where
 marked his steps ; not only were the villages in-
 variably burnt, and the peasants murdered who re-
 mained in them, but the town of Leyria and convent
 of Alcobaca were given to the flames by express
 orders from the French headquarters. But these
 barbarities soon produced their usual effect of aug-
 menting the distresses of the retreating army ; the
 narrow road was soon blocked up by carriages and
 baggage waggons ; confusion began to prevail, dis-
 tress and suffering were universal ; and nothing but
 March 14. the absence of two divisions of his army, which Wel-
 lington was obliged again to detach across the Tagus
 to stop the progress of Soult, and secure Elvas, after
 the fall of Badajoz, saved the enemy from vigorous
 attack and total ruin. But as the retiring mass was,
 after that large deduction, considerably stronger than

the pursuing, Wellington did not press the enemy as he might have done had he possessed an equal force, and Massena arrived at Celorico grievously distressed and almost destitute, but without any serious fighting, and the loss only of a thousand stragglers. The French general, was there joined by Claparede's division, nine thousand strong, of the reserve corps collected by Napoleon in Biscay ; and he resolved to remain there, and still maintain the war in Portugal. Ney, however, positively refused to obey this order, alleging the necessity of retiring to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo to give repose to the army ; and to such a length did the discord between these two chiefs arise, that Massena deprived him of his command and bestowed it on Loison. The indecision of the French marshal what course to adopt, however, was soon terminated by the approach of Wellington, who came up and drove him from the new line of operations he was endeavouring to adopt on Coria and Alcantara : the noble defensive position of Guarda was abandoned in confusion ; and the French army again forced back on the line of the Coa, with the loss of two thousand prisoners. Regnier's position at Sabugal, when the allied troops approached him, suggested to the English general the project of cutting him off from the remainder of the army, and compelling him to surrender. This well-designed enterprise failed in obtaining complete success, from the attack being prematurely made by the British advanced guard, before the flanking columns had come up, and the movement of the troops being somewhat perplexed by a violent storm of rain which came on accompanied with thick fog. As it was, however, the French, after a protracted conflict, and alternate success and defeat, were compelled to retire with

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

March 21.

March 29.

April 3.

CHAP. the loss of one howitzer, and a thousand men, in-
LIX. cluding three hundred prisoners, and all Soult's and

1811. Loison's baggage. On the same day Trant destroyed
three hundred of the enemy on the banks of the
Agueda. These checks convinced Massena of the
justice of Ney's opinion, that the army must seek
for rest behind the cannon of Ciudad Rodrigo ; and

April 5. he therefore threw a garrison into Almeida, and re-
treated with the bulk of his forces across the frontier
to that fortress, and thence to Salamanca. He entered
Portugal with seventy thousand men : ten thousand

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xx.
197, 202.
Well. Desp.
4th and 9th
April, 1811.
Gurw. vii.
415, 435.
Nap. ii.
473, 488.
Jom. iii.
493, 494.
joined him under Drouet at Santarem, and nine
thousand on the retreat to the Agueda ; and he
brought only forty-five thousand of all arms out of
the country. He lost, therefore, the enormous num-
ber of forty-five thousand men, during the invasion
and retreat, by want, sickness, and the sword of the
enemy : while the British were not weakened to the
extent of a fourth part of the number.¹ *

Blockade
of Almeida,
and efforts
of Massena
for its relief.
April 15.

Almeida was immediately invested by Wellington;
and as the French had retired to such a distance, and
gone into cantonments on the Tormes, he deemed it
safe to send a considerable part of his army, about
twenty-two thousand strong, to the south of the Tagus
to co-operate with the troops which Beresford had
collected for the siege of Campo Mayor and Badajoz,
and repaired there himself to conduct the operations.
Napoleon, however, was resolved not to permit the
English general to gain possession of the frontier for-
tresses without a struggle, and he transmitted peremp-

* "The army of Portugal, grievously weakened by the losses of
its long and disastrous retreat, could hardly, on re-entering Spain,
muster thirty-five thousand combatants. The cavalry had only two
thousand men in a condition to march ; the artillery could only muster
up twelve pieces."—BELMAS *Jour. du Sièges dans la Péninsule*, i. 176.

tory orders to Massena instantly to break up from the Tormes with his own three corps, and a considerable part of Bessieres' reserve, which was ordered to join him from Biscay, and attempt the relief of Almeida, which had only provisions for fourteen days. He accordingly again put his army in motion, and advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April; and, on the 2d May, crossed the Agueda at the bridge of that place, with fifty thousand men, including five thousand noble horse. Wellington hastened from Elvas, where headquarters had been established, and drew up his covering army, about thirty thousand strong, including sixteen hundred cavalry, on the summit of a vast plateau, between the Turones and the Dos Casas; the left at Fort Conception, the centre opposite Alameda, the right at FUENTES D'ONORO. The whole line was five miles in length, and the front was difficult of access, by reason of the Dos Casas flowing in a deep ravine across nearly its whole extent.¹

No sooner had the enemy formed on the ground on the afternoon of the 3d, than they commenced a vigorous attack on the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions. So vehement was their onset, so heavy their cannonade, that the British were forced to abandon the streets, and with difficulty maintained themselves on a craggy eminence at one end, around an old chapel. Wellington, upon this, reinforced the post with the 24th, 71st, and 79th regiments, which charged so vigorously down the streets that the enemy were driven out with great loss, and these battalions occupied the village throughout the night, the French retaining only a small part of its lower extremity. On the following day Massena collected his whole army close to the British position, and made his final dis-

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

April 29.

¹ Well.
Desp. 8th
May, 1811.
Gurw. vii.
514, and
viii. 486.
Nap. iii.
505, 509.
Belm. i.
176. Jom.
iii. 495.

Combat of
Fuentes
d'Onoro.
May 3.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

positions for the attack. The Coa, which ran along the rear of nearly their whole line, was in general bordered by craggy precipices, so that, if the allied army could be thrown into confusion, their retreat appeared almost impracticable. The convoy of provisions, destined for the relief of Almeida, was at Gallegos, seven miles in the rear, ready to move on as soon as the road was opened. For this purpose the grand attack was to be made from the British right, where an entrance to the plateau, on level ground, could be found ; for the whole front of their position was covered by the rugged ravine of the Dos Casas, which separated the two armies in front, and was in most places wholly unpassable for cavalry, and in some even for infantry. With this view, three divisions of infantry, twenty-four thousand strong, and nearly all the cavalry, were, late on the evening of the 4th, drawn to the extreme French left, and posted, so as to attack at daybreak the British right flank, on the neck of land, about three miles broad, where the plateau on which their army rested joined the level heights between the sources of the Turones and the Dos Casas.¹

¹ Vict. et
Conq. xx.
205, 207.
Belm. i.
177, 178.
Well. Desp.
8th May,
1811.
Gurw. vii.
515, 517.
Nap. iii.
512, 513.

Battle of
Fuentes
d'Onoro.

Early next morning the attack was commenced with great vehemence on the British right, under General Houston, near Poco Velho; and the enemy speedily drove them out of that village. Don Julian Sanchez, who commanded a body of three thousand guerrillas on the extreme British right, immediately retired across the Turones ; and Montbrun, finding the plain now open, fell with above four thousand admirable cuirassiers on the British and Portuguese horse, not twelve hundred strong. They were gallantly met and partially checked by the allied cavalry under General Charles Stewart, who took the

colonel of one of the regiments, La Motte, prisoner in the *melée* with his own hand; but the combat was too unequal, and after a gallant effort our horse were driven behind the cover of the light division and Houston's troops. Montbrun instantly swept with his terrible cuirassiers round the now exposed infantry; Houston's men rapidly formed square and repelled the attack: but so swift was the French onset, that ere a similar formation could be effected by the seventh division, the shock of steel was upon them; and though the Chasseurs Britanniques and some of the Brunswick infantry, with admirable steadiness, taking advantage of a ruined wall, repelled the charge *in line*, yet some were cut down, and Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery was entirely surrounded. All gave them over for lost: but, after they had for a while been concealed from the view, by the glancing throng of cuirassiers, an English shout was heard, and that noble officer was seen bursting through the throng, his horses bounding with their guns over the plain, and the mounted gunners in close order protecting the rear.¹ But still the progress of the enemy in this quarter was very evident; the British right was turned and broken through, and it was apparent, that, unless the ground lost could be regained, or a new defensive position defying attack taken up, the battle would be lost.²

Wellington's position was now in the highest degree critical: in his rear were the ravines of the Turones and the Coa, extremely rugged and difficult of passage, while his right, the key of his position, commanding the entrance of the plateau, from the small body of cavalry at his disposal, was unable to make head against the enemy. In these circumstances he took a hazardous resolution, but which

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

¹ Nap. iii.
513.² Well.
Desp. 8th
May, 1811.Gurw. vii.
516, 517.Vict. et
Conq. xx.
208, 209.Nap. iii.
512, 513.Lond. ii.
104, 106.Belm. i.
178, 179.Jom. iii.
497.Obstinate
nature of
the fight.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

Well.

Desp.

Gurw. vii.

517, 518.

Nap. iii.

515. Vict.

et Conq.

xx. 208,

210. Belm.

i. 178.

Massena's
ultimate
failure.

the admirable steadiness of his troops enabled him to execute with perfect success. He drew back the whole centre and right wing of his army, the left remaining firm at Fuentes d'Onoro, as the pivot on which the backward wheel was formed, in order to take up a new position facing to the original right of the line, and nearly at right angles to it, on a ridge of heights which ran across the plateau, and stretched from the ravine of Dos Casas to that of the Turones. Such a retreat, however, in the course of which the outer extremity of the line had to retire four miles over a level plateau, enveloped by a formidable and victorious cavalry, was most hazardous; the plain over which the troops were retiring was soon covered with carriages and fugitives from the camp followers; and if any of the divisions had given way, the enemy would have burst in upon them with such force, as would have sent the disorderly multitude headlong against some of its own squares, and thrown the whole into irreparable confusion. Mean-while a fierce contest was going on in Fuentes d'Onoro, where the three victorious regiments who had held it two days before, after a gallant resistance, were pierced through, Colonel Cameron of the 71st, mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town taken.¹

But in that dread hour, perhaps the most perilous of the whole war for England, she was saved by the skill of her chief and the incomparable valour of her soldiers. Slowly, and in perfect order, the squares of the 1st, 7th, and light divisions, retired for many miles, flanked on either side by the terrible cuirassiers of Montbrun, flushed with the newly won glories of Wagram; * pressed in rear by the columns and

* Ante, vii. 493.

batteries of Ney's corps, which had broken the Russian army at Friedland.* In vain their thundering squadrons swept round these serried bands, and the light of the British bayonets was, for a time, lost in the blaze of the French cuirasses; from every throng the unbroken squares still emerged, pursuing their steady way amidst a terrific fire; the seventh division successfully accomplished its long semicircular sweep, crossed the Turones, and took up its ground between that stream and the Coa; the centre of the army soon gained the ridge of heights for which it was destined; while the left, with invincible firmness, still made good the crags and chapel of Fuentes d'Onoro. When the whole had taken up their ground, Massena recoiled from the prospect of attacking such an enemy as he had now combated, posted in dense masses on a ridge not two miles in length, and covered on either flank by a steep ravine; and, confining himself to a cannonade along its front, redoubled his efforts on the left, where he sent the whole division of Drouet against the village of Fuentes d'Onoro. But though the fighting was most desperate all day in that quarter, though the enemy at one period had got possession of nearly the whole, and his skirmishers penetrated through on the other side towards the main position, the British always retained part of the houses; and at length, when the concentration of his forces enabled Wellington to re-inforce his left by fresh troops, they were driven through the streets with great slaughter by a charge of the 71st, 79th, and 88th regiments; on which occasion, perhaps alone in the war, the bayonets crossed, and the Imperial guards,¹ some of whom were lifted from the ground in the shock, and

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

¹ Well.
Desp. 8th
May, 1811.
Gurw. vii.
517, 518.
Nap. iii.
515, 516.
Jom. iii.
496, 497.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
208, 211.

* Ante, vii. 270.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

borne backward a few paces in the air, were forced to give ground before the Highland regiments. Night put an end to the slaughter in this quarter; the British retained their position around the chapel and on the Crag, and the French retired across the Dos Casas. Fifteen hundred men had fallen, or were made prisoners, on both sides; and yet neither could claim decided advantage.¹

Massena's
evacuation
of Almeida,
and his
retreat.
May 9.

Though the British lost ground on all points but the extreme left during this battle, and were certainly nearer experiencing a defeat than in any other action in Spain, yet the result proved that they had gained their object. Massena lingered three days in front of the allied position, which Wellington strengthened with field works, and rendered altogether unassailable. At length, despairing of either forcing or turning the British lines, he retreated across the Agueda, leaving Almeida to its fate; having first sent orders to the governor, General Brennier, by an intrepid soldier, named Tillet, to blow up the works, and endeavour to effect his retreat through the blockading force. These directions were obeyed with surprising skill and success.

May 10.

At midnight on the 10th, this brave man blew up the bastions, and sallying forth, marched swiftly and bravely forward to the Barba del Puerco, which he had ascertained was the most unguarded point of the Allied line. The fourth regiment, which was ordered to occupy that point, did not receive its orders in time, and when it did, unfortunately missed its road in the dark, and the consequence was, that Brennier, with eleven hundred of his gallant followers, got clear off, and joined Massena near Ciudad Rodrigo; ¹ but four hundred were killed or made prisoners in crossing the deep chasm of the Barba

¹ Well.
Desp. Gur.
vii. 548.
Nap. iii.
519, 520.
Vict. et
Conq. xx.
212, 213.
Jom. iii.
499.

del Puerco. Wellington, on the day following, took possession of Almeida, in which the artillery was entire, but several large chasms existed in the walls. CHAP. LIX.
1811.

Massena withdrew to Salamanca and the banks of the Tormes, and the last act in the eventful drama of the invasion of Portugal was terminated. May 12.

The retreat of the French from Portugal, a model of military skill and ability on the part both of the soldiers and commanders, was disgraced by a systematic and deliberate cruelty which can never be sufficiently condemned. We have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that "their conduct was, throughout the retreat, marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, never surpassed. Even the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the headquarters had been for several months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited by promises of safety to remain, were plundered, and in part destroyed, on the night the retreat began; and they have since burnt every town and village through which they passed." A single incident will illustrate the horrors of such a system of warfare better than any general description, and it comes from a gallant eye-witness, whose graphic powers are never called forth by mawkish sensibility, or indignant feelings excited by undue hostility towards his adversaries:—"A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom only one was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food which we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face

Reflections
on this cam-
paign, and
cruelties of
the French.

Well.
Desp. 14th
March,
1811. Gur
vii. 348.

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1811.

¹ Nap. iii.
457.

² Well.
Desp. vii.
188, 196.

were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The men seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned; and even in this distress had arranged the bodies of those who first died with decency and care.”¹ Such is ambition in its most terrible form; such the result of the atrocious system which, under the specious pretence of making war support war, consigns the innocent inhabitants of invaded countries, old men, women, and children, to ineffable misery, starvation, and death. Doubtless such horrors have in every age attended serious and long-continued hostility, and they are sometimes unavoidable, where great bodies of men, inflamed by violent passions, are brought into collision; but it is the peculiar and characteristic disgrace of the French Revolutionary armies, that they were not merely permitted, but enjoined by the commanders; and that those atrocities, which in other armies spring from the licence or brutality of the soldiers, and the officers labour assiduously to prevent, were with them systematically acted upon by all ranks, and flowed from the system which, impressed upon the generals by the rapacity of government, was by them reduced to a regular form, and enjoined in general orders emanating from headquarters.²*

But these unheard-of atrocities, thus communicated to vast armies by a regular system of plunder, and

* “The Convent of Alcobaca was burnt by orders from the French headquarters. The bishop’s palace, and the whole town of Leyria, where General Drouet had his headquarters, shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of the country, of any class or description, who has had any communication or dealing with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it.” — WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 14th March, 1811; GURWOOD, vii. 348.

exercised on a great scale in every part of Europe, were at length producing their natural effects. Un-
 speakable was the indignation excited in the Portu-
 guese peasantry by such revolting cruelties ; and, although the inefficiency and desire for popularity in the regency at Lisbon for long paralysed the efforts of the country, and rendered in some degree unavailing the ardent spirit of the people, yet the most perfect unanimity prevailed among the rural inhabitants, and the British were supported in their enterprises by the peasantry with a cordiality and fidelity which were alike honourable to both nations. Wellington has told us, that, in no single instance, were the humbler ranks in Portugal discovered in any correspondence with the enemy ; that the prisoners, though in some instances obliged to join the French ranks, all deserted on the first opportunity to the standard of their country ; that the Portuguese peasants, though of such different habits, agreed admirably with the English soldiers ; and that, though great numbers of crimes were committed, especially at first, by the disorderly Irish, who formed so large a part of many newly sent out regiments, yet it was next to impossible to get the natives who had suffered to come forward and give evidence against them.¹ These are truly noble traits in national character, and, combined with the heroic stand which, under British guidance, they made against their tremendous enemy, despite all the weakness and imbecility of their rulers, prove that materials for greatness exist in the Peninsula, if the time shall ever arrive when the spirit and energy of the higher ranks, then altogether wanting, shall equal the courage and virtue of the people.

Nor were these noble qualities in the Portuguese

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1811.

Grant of
Parliament,
and sub-
scription for
the Portu-
guese in
England.

Well.
Desp. Gur.
vi. 105,
520, and
viii. 165.

CHAP.
LIX.

1811.

Feb. 24.

¹ Ann Reg.
1811, 37.
Parl. Deb.
xix. 447,
462.

Vast effect
produced by
this cam-
paign in
Great Bri-
tain and
over Eu-
rope.

peasantry even then without their reward. Their bravery and their suffering excited the warmest sympathy in Great Britain; the enthusiasm of all classes, ever readily awakened in the cause of woe, was roused to the highest pitch; a grant of a hundred thousand pounds by Parliament, to the sufferers by the French invasion, was passed without a single dissentient voice in the House of Commons; private subscription in every town and village of the empire soon trebled its amount, and the noblest qualities in our nature, patriotism and charity, excited by the heart-stirring course of events to the very highest pitch, poured forth from two perennial fountains a stream of mingled energy and benevolence, which was, because it deserved to be, invincible.¹

Immense was the effect produced by the glorious termination of the war in Portugal, on the British nation and the whole of Europe. The French armies had at length been brought to a stand; and that apparently irresistible torrent of conquest, which had hitherto flowed over the whole of Europe, was now, to all appearance, permanently arrested. Experience had proved, that, by combining military discipline and regular forces, with vast exertions and patriotic enthusiasm, a barrier could be opposed to revolutionary aggression: the failure of Austria, in her late heroic attempt, was forgotten in the still more recent triumph of England: Russia, contemplating a similar attack upon her own independence, watched with intense anxiety the interesting struggle, and beheld, in the defensive system and triumph of Wellington, both the model on which her defensive preparations should be formed, and the best grounds to hope for a successful issue from her own exertions. But the effect produced in England was still greater, and, if possible,

more important. In proportion to the breathless suspense in which the nation had been kept by the advance of Massena, and the confident predictions of immediate success, with which it had been preceded, from many in the British Islands, and all on the continent, was the universal joy which prevailed when the prospect of unlooked-for success began at last to dawn upon the nation. The battle of Busaco first flashed through the gloom of general despondence, occasioned by the retreat of Wellington into the interior of Portugal ; but its cheering light soon faded, and the public mind was more violently agitated than ever, when, after such a triumph, the retreat was still continued to the close vicinity of Lisbon. But when Wellington at last took his stand, and, through the thick clouds, with which the horizon was beset, the lines of Torres Vedras were seen dimly rising in stupendous and impregnable strength, the general enthusiasm knew no bounds. The advantages of the British position, hitherto altogether unknown, save to its chief, were now at once revealed : it was seen that England possessed an unconquerable stronghold, in which she might securely place her resources, where her armies, how numerous soever, would be amply provided for by her fleets ; while the forces of Napoleon, how great soever, would either fall at the foot of the entrenchments, or perish of famine in the desert which they had created around them. The profound observation of Henry IV., “ If you make war in Spain with a small army, you are beaten, with a large one, you are starved,” arose in vivid importance to their recollection ; and the nation ceased to despair in a contest, in which the very magnitude of the enemy’s force had at length been turned with decisive effect against him.¹

CHAP.

LIX.

1810.

¹ Well.
Desp. viii.
76, 77.

CHAP.
LIX.

1810.

Error of
Napoleon in
the cam-
paign, and
its cause.

There can be no doubt that the simultaneous invasion of Andalusia and Portugal, in a military point of view, was a capital error on the part of Napoleon. It was a direct deviation from his own principle, of bringing all the disposable forces to bear upon the decisive point. The line of the Tagus was the quarter where the decisive blow was to be struck. If Soult, with sixty thousand men, had invaded the Alentejo at the same time that Massena, with eighty thousand, poured down the valley of the Mondego, it is extremely doubtful whether even the strength of Torres Vedras would have enabled Wellington to maintain his ground at Lisbon. No one knew better than the French Emperor, that the passage of the Sierra Morena was an eccentric movement, which strengthened the enemy's chances of success at the vital point ; but he was driven to adopt it by the political necessities of his situation. France could not, with safety, be more heavily taxed ; the central provinces of Spain were utterly exhausted ; fresh resources were indispensable, and the simultaneous invasion of Andalusia and Portugal was resorted to in the prospect of obtaining their hitherto untouched fields of plunder. Crime and oppression may for long prove victorious, but they bear in themselves the seeds of their ultimate punishment, and they are constrained to bring those seeds to maturity by the efforts which they make for their own advancement.¹

¹ Well.
Desp. vii.
286.

Views of
Government
on the cam-
paign.

Government at home were far from being equally impressed with Wellington, during the progress of the campaign, with the chances of ultimate success ; they were not aware of the vast strength of the Torres Vedras position ; and although they sent out all the succours which he demanded, yet they did so rather in deference to his wishes, and from respect to his opinion of the hope of success, than from any belief

of their own that his anticipations were well founded. When he drew near to Lisbon, their anxiety was very great ; and it was well known, that, for a considerable time, they expected that every arrival from that capital would bring the account of his embarkation. Yet, even in that contemplated extremity, they did not despair of the contest ; they provided a vast fleet of ships of the line and transports capable of bringing off the British and Portuguese army, with a great number of the inhabitants who were implicated in the war ; and gave orders to their general, that if he was driven from Lisbon, he should take refuge in Cadiz, and renew the war in Andalusia, from the basis of that city and Gibraltar.¹ This resolution was worthy of the highest admiration ; it rivals the noblest instances of Roman constancy, and should make us overlook many previous instances of insensibility to the right mode of carrying on the contest which had arisen from their long inexperience of military combination. And although we, judging with all the advantages of subsequent experience, may occasionally feel surprised at the gloomy feelings which at times pervaded both government and the nation, when the dawn of European deliverance was beginning to appear behind the hills of Torres Vedras ; yet it cannot be denied, that, judging from past events, both had too much grounds for their prognostications ; and recollecting in what disaster all previous expeditions to the continent had terminated, when engaged only with a part of Napoleon's force, there was little room for hope now that they were assailed by the whole. But from the generality and apparently solid ground for this opinion is to be drawn the brightest eulogium on the unshaken determination of the chief, which never faltered in the

CHAP.

LIX.

1810.

Well.

Desp. 2d

Aug. 1810.

Gurw. vii.

300.

CHAP. contest, and the clearest proof of the loftiness of the
 LIX. intellect which could discern, through the gloom,
 1810. the shadow of coming events, and find in its own
 strength the means of their accomplishment.

Magnani-
 mous prin-
 ciples by
 which Wel-
 lington was
 guided.

Those, whether in public or private life, who take expedience for the principle of their conduct, are often sadly perplexed what course to adopt, because, in the complicated maze of human events, they cannot see clearly to what end its conclusions point. Those who take duty for their guide are never at a loss, because its dictates are clear, and wholly independent of the changes of fortune. Ordinary observers too often judge of the future by the past, and act on the principle that subsequent events are to be exactly similar to those which have preceded them. It belongs to the highest class of intellect, to combine with the experience of the past the observation of the present; to perceive that human events are indeed governed, in all ages, by the same principles, but that new elements of power are perpetually rising into action; and that, in every state of human affairs, an under current is flowing in an opposite direction from that on the surface, bringing salvation to the miserable, and often destined to confound the anticipations of the prosperous. Wellington possessed both the moral principle, and the intellectual power, requisite for the leader of such a contest as that in which he was now engaged. Alike fearless of danger, and unmoved by obloquy, he looked merely to the discharge of duty: undismayed by the fall of Austria and Russia, he still did not despair of the cause of European freedom; and, with comparatively inconsiderable resources, prepared in a corner of Portugal the means of hurling back an enemy who had two hundred and fifty thousand disposable soldiers

in the Peninsula at his command. He saw that force originally had drawn forth the powers of the French Revolution ; that force had sustained its growth ; but that force was now undermining its foundations ; and that the power which was based on the misery of every people among whom it penetrated, could not fail of being at length overcome, if combated by an energy equal to its own, accompanied by a forbearance commensurate to its rapacity. Strenuously urging, therefore, all whom he could direct to the most vigorous exertions, he as scrupulously abstained from the abuses of power : his efforts to repel the enemy were not greater than those he made to control the license and restrain the disorders of his own army : he preferred a small force regulated by order and maintained by justice, to a great one elevated on the fruits of rapine. He thus succeeded in at last combating the Revolution with its own weapons, and, at the same time, detaching from them the moral weakness under which it laboured. He met it with its own forces, but he rested their efforts on a nobler principle. France had conquered Europe, by assailing virtue with the powers of intellect, guided by the fire of genius, and stimulated by passions of wickedness ; but Wellington conquered France, by raising against it the resources of wisdom, sustained by the constancy of duty, and directed by the principles of virtue.

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LIX.

1810.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER II

The Company's territories consist of 51,400 square miles; including the protected states, it amounts to 1,158,800 square miles. — *For a further account of the territories, see the Appendix to the Report of the Committee on the Affairs of India, 1831, and Martin, ibid. 1831, 1832.*

Note H, p. 4.

The exact numbers are—

Bengal Presidency	30,057,501
Madras do	15,000,000
Bombay do	6,947,700
Other states in northern provinces	40,000,000

Assam, Aracan, &c.	101,057,000
Alled or protected states	100,000,000

Total under British sway.

Population returns, 1831, and Martin, ibid. 1831, 1832.

Note C, p. 4.

The revenue in 1833 was £18,677,000; that for fifteen years ending 1839, £309,151,920, or about £20,600,000 per annum. The charges in India are £17,588,132, leaving at present a surplus of £1,094,820. The public debt has stood since 1792, at the

1792	£9,142,720
1803	30,812,441
1814	30,610,620
1829	47,255,414
1830	44,500,000

— See Parl. Pap. May 1833; and Martin, ibid. 1831.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER LI.

Note A, p. 4.

The Company's territories consist of 514,000 square miles; including the protected states, it embraces 1,128,800 square miles.—*Parl. Return*, 1831; and MARTIN, ix. 2, *duodecimo edition*. Europe contains, to the westward of the Ural mountains, 500,000 square leagues, or 3,500,000 square miles.—See MALTE BRUN, i. 4. France, 156,000 square miles.—*Ibid*, viii. 273.

Note B, p. 4.

The exact numbers are,—

Bengal Presidency,	.	.	.	39,957,561
Madras do.	.	.	.	15,090,084
Bombay do.	.	.	.	6,940,277
Other states in northern provinces,	.			40,000,000
Ava, Arracan, &c.	.	.	.	101,987,922
Allied or protected states,	.	.	.	100,000,000

Total under British sway, . . . 201,987,922

—See *Population Returns*, 1831; and MARTIN, viii. 256, 269.

Note C, p. 4.

The revenue in 1833 was £18,677,952; that for fifteen years, ending 1829, £309,151,920, or about £20,650,000 per annum. The charges in India are £17,583,132, leaving at present a surplus of £1,094,820. The public debt has stood, since 1792, as follows:—

1792,	.	.	.	£9,142,720
1809,	.	.	.	30,812,441
1814,	.	.	.	30,919,620
1829,	.	.	.	47,255,374
1833,	.	.	.	44,800,000

—See *Parl. Pap. May* 1833; and MARTIN, ix. 113.

Note D, p. 11.

As an example of the rapid diminution of crime in British India within the last twenty years, the Convictions for serious crimes in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, at Calcutta, may be quoted.

Year.	To Death.	Transportation.	Year.	Death.	Transportation.
1816,	115	282	1822,	50	165
1817,	114	268	1823,	77	118
1818,	54	261	1824,	51	145
1819,	94	345	1825,	66	128
1820,	55	324	1826,	67	171
1821,	58	278	1827,	55	153

Circuit Court of Bengal.

	Burglary.	Cattle Stealing.	Embezzlement.	Larceny
1816 to 1818,	2853	203	150	1516
1825 to 1827,	1036	31	49	223

Lower and Western provinces of Bengal.

	Sentenced.		Gang Robberies.	Murders.
1826,	13,869	1807,	1481	406
1827,	8,075	1824,	234	30

—MARTIN, ix. 322, 329.

Note E, p. 12.

The following Table exhibits the increase of Committals in the British Islands since the commencement of the present century.

	England.	Ireland.	Scotland.
1805,	4605	2644	89
1807,	4446	2890	114
1820,	9318	12,476	1486
1825,	9964	15,515	1876
1830,	18,107	16,192	2063
1832,	20,829	16,056	2451
1834,	22,451	21,381	2711
1836,	20,984	23,892	2852
1837,		27,396	2922

—See MOREAU's *Statist. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 289, 297; *Parl. Paper, Commons*, 1812, and *Parl. Returns of Crime*, in 1834-6, PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 137, 145, 144.

Contrast the decrease of crime in different provinces of India during the same period, with the deplorable increase of offences of the same description in the British Islands.

Cases of Shooting, Stabbing, and Poisoning, in England and Wales.

1826,	47	1828,	72	1830,	86	1832,	132
1827,	82	1829,	81	1831,	104	1833,	138

Western Provinces of India.

Affrays with loss of Life.		Homicides.		Violent Depredations.	
1821-23,	232	1818-20,	377,	1818-20,	1000
1827-28,	118	1827-28,	185,	1827-28,	512

Violent Affrays in Kishennagur. Gang Robberies in Do. Bengal Circuit Court Sentenced.

1807,	482	1808,	329	1822-24,	2170
1824,	33	1824,	10	1825-27,	1524

Table of Crimes, Persons Apprehended, Convicted, Property Stolen and Recovered, in three years, ending 1832, in the Supreme Court at Calcutta.

	Offences.	Persons Committed.	Convicted.	Property Stolen.	Recovered.
1830	2330	3556	625	136,383	4854
1831	1304	1256	675	123,714	33,828
1832	1329	2023	718	62,981	6793

—ROBERTSON'S *Civil Government of India*, and MARTIN, ix. 326, 335.

State of Sentences for Crime in Lower and Western Provinces of Bengal in two periods of two years each.

Lower Provinces.	Murder and Robbery.	Do. with torture or wounding.	With Violence.	Murder.	Homicide.	Violent Assault.
1824 and 1826,	165	283	330	358	303	86
1827 and 1828,	96	194	221	196	248	47
Western Provinces.						
1824 and 1826,	460	901	83	311	311	180
1827 and 1828,	271	512	34	252	185	118

—MARTIN'S *India*, ix. 326.

Contrast this with the increase of serious Crime, tried by Jury, in Glasgow during the last fifteen years, and in Ireland in the same period.

GLASGOW, 1822—37.

IRELAND, 1822—37.

Tried by Jury.		Rate of serious Crime to whole Population in each year.		Committed
1822,	98	1 to	1540	15,251
1823,	114	—	1366	14,632
1824,	118	—	1361	15,258
1825,	160	—	1037	15,515
1826,	188	—	909	16,318
1827,	170	—	1041	18,031
1828,	212	—	873	14,683
1829,	239	—	790	15,271
1830,	271	—	719	15,794
1831,	238	—	848	16,192
1832,	272	—	768	16,036
1833,	341	—	633	17,819
1834,	267	—	838	21,381
1835,	348	—	633	22,367
1836,	329	—	741	23,891
1837,	392	—	645	27,396
1838,	454	—	556	

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 145. *Combination Committee Evidence*, 1838, 267.

Note F, p. 14.

In Holkar's country alone the number of villages rebuilt and re-peopled, were—

	Holkar's country.	Dhar.	Dewar.	Bhopel.
1818,	269	28	35	362
1819,	343	68	106	249
1820,	508	52	72	267

—MALCOLM'S *Central India, Appendix.*

Note G, p. 14.

The following is a statement of the wages of labour under the Peishwa's government in 1814, and the British in 1828:—

	1814. PEISHWA'S. Rupees monthly.	1828. BRITISH. Rupees monthly.
Carpenter, . . .	12—40	15—45
Sawyer, . . .	8	15—22
Smith, . . .	12—20	15—30
Tileman, . . .	12—	15—18
Bricklayer, . . .	15—20	25—35
Tailor, . . .	6	9—11
Camelman, . . .	5	7—9
Palanquin-man, . . .	10	15—16

No change in the value of money during this period.—COLONEL SYKES' *Bombay Statistics, Lords' Committee, 1830; and MARTIN, ix. 352.*

Note H, p. 15.

The following table shows the rapid increase in the export trade from Britain to India within the last twenty-five years, and illustrates both the advancing opulence and comfort of the inhabitants of Hindostan, and the incalculable importance of this branch of commerce, if established on equitable principles, both to the East and West, to the inhabitants of the British Islands.

Years.	Exports.	Years.	Exports.
1814, . . .	L.1,874,690	1826, . . .	L.3,471,552
1815, . . .	2,565,761	1827, . . .	4,636,190
1816, . . .	2,589,453	1828, . . .	4,467,673
1817, . . .	3,388,715	1829, . . .	4,100,002
1818, . . .	3,572,164	1830, . . .	4,087,311
1819, . . .	2,347,083	1831, . . .	4,105,444
1820, . . .	3,037,911	1832, . . .	4,235,483
1821, . . .	3,544,395	1833, . . .	4,711,619
1822, . . .	3,444,443	1834, . . .	4,644,318
1823, . . .	3,416,575	1835, . . .	5,456,116
1824, . . .	3,476,213	1836, . . .	6,750,842
1825, . . .	3,173,213		

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables, i. 193, 195; and Progress of the Nation, ii. 102.*

Note I, p. 24.

The following is the Revenue of India in the year 1831-2:—

Land Revenue,	£11,671,188
Professions and Ferries,	213,072
Salt and Licenses,	2,314,982
Customs,	1,380,099
Opium,	1,442,570
Post-Office,	103,501
Tobacco,	63,048
Mint Receipts,	60,518
Stamps,	328,300
Judicial Fees and Fines,	70,469
Lager and Akbarew,	764,759
Marine and Pilotage,	45,974
Calcutta Excise,	19,106
	£18,477,586

—*Parl. Pap. May, 1834; and MARTIN, ix. 113.*

Note K, p. 43.

Hindustan, from the Himalaya mountains to Cape Comorin, contains 514,000 square miles: including the protected states, 1,128,000. The population of the former is 102,000,000, being at the rate of about 200 to the square mile. This, under the tropical sun, and with the rich alluvial soil of a large part of India, capable in general of bearing two crops in the year, must be considered a very scanty population. France contains 32,000,000 of inhabitants, and 156,000 square miles, or 214 to the square mile: England, 13,500,000, and 38,500 square miles, or 330 to the square mile: Flanders, 3,762,000, and 7400 square miles, 507 to the square mile. Even in Bengal, the garden of Hindostan, out of 202,650 square miles, only 89,250 are actually under cultivation. The produce of the soil there varies from forty to a hundred fold: on an average about sixty fold; or, at least, four times that of the richest portion of Europe, which would of course maintain four times the number of persons on a square mile that can find subsistence in these northern climates.—MOREAU, *Stat. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 107—112; and MALTE BRUN, vi. 84; and *Stat. Journal*, i. 195. In the Madras presidency, the population is only 107 to the square mile: in the Bombay, 114: in Singapore and Malacca, 92: in Ceylon, 50: over the whole of India 144, which are hardly as much as a fourth of these respective numbers under the climate and soil of Europe.—MOREAU, ii. 113.

CHAPTER LII.

Note A, p. 119.

“Tippoo Sultaun, having manifested,” said Lord Wellesley, “the most hostile dispositions towards us, possesses an army of which a considerable portion is in a state of readiness; he has in-

creased the number of his French officers; and he may receive further assistance from the corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and many other native powers. He may be assisted by the invasion of Zemaun Schah, and by the direct co-operation of Scindiah. On the other hand, our protecting force on the coast of Coromandel, cannot be put in motion within a shorter space than six months, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic; our allies, meanwhile, are utterly unable to fulfil their defensive engagements towards us; the Peshwa being depressed and kept in check by the invasion of Scindiah, and the Nizam by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and the overbearing influence of an army commanded by French officers, and established in the centre of the Deccan. While we remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, or an ally to assist our operations, in the event of an attack from Tippoo, we leave the fate of the Carnatic to the discretion of Tippoo; we suffer the cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of strength in every quarter of India; we abandon our allies, the Nizam and the Peshwa, to the mercy of Scindiah and Tippoo, in conjunction with the French; and we leave to France the ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a permanent establishment in the Deccan, founded upon the destruction of our alliances."—*Minute of the Governor-General, Aug. 1798; WELLESLEY'S Despatch. i. 191, 192.*

Note B, p. 185.

"From the first hour of Colonel Monson's retreat," said Marquis Wellesley to Lord Lake, "I always augured the ruin of that detachment; if any part is saved, I deem it so much gain. Whatever may have been his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortunes to my own forces, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and zeal entitle him to this indulgence; and, however I may lament or suffer from his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his bravery if he survives. We must endeavour rather to retrieve than to blame what is past; and, under your auspices, I entertain no doubt of success. Every hour, however, which shall be left to this plunderer will be marked with some calamity; we must expect a general defection of our allies, and even confusion in our own territories, unless we can attack Holkar's main force *immediately* with decisive success. I perfectly agree with you; the first object must be the defeat of Holkar's infantry in the field, and to take his guns. Holkar defeated, all alarm and danger will instantly vanish; even a doubtful battle would be perilous; we must therefore look steadfastly at that grand object, and if we accomplish it, every other will be easy.—*LORD WELLESLEY to LORD LAKE, Sept. 11, 1804; WELL. Desp. iv. 205.*

At the same time Lord Lake wrote to Lord Wellesley:—"The first object, in my opinion, is to destroy Holkar; I shall therefore do every thing in my power to bring him to action at an early

period, which, by his bringing his guns, and having met with success, I think very probably may soon take place. The taking a large force with me, will, of course, leave our provinces in a weak and defenceless state; but as it appears the whole of India is at stake, some risk must be made to accomplish this, our principal object. Despondency is of no avail; we must therefore set to work and retrieve our misfortune as quickly as possible. Here, my dear Lord, I must remark, that whatever may be said upon the subject, you surely cannot be implicated in the business; for all blame ought to fall upon me for detaching the force in the first instance, when I thought I had selected a corps with an officer to command them, who would have accomplished all my wishes, and obtained the end proposed. This being the case, I certainly became responsible, in the first instance, and shall upon every occasion, both here and at home, declare publicly that you had nothing to do with the march of that detachment; and that all censure for that measure must be attributed to me, and me alone."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, *Sept.* 24, 1804; *WELL. Desp.* iv. 216. These are the principles by which empires are won and saved: here is on the part of both these great men, the eye of Napoleon, and the heart of Henry IV.

CHAPTER LIII.

Note A, p. 238.

The following is a detailed Statement of the different corps of the French and Austrian armies taken from the accurate works of Pelet and Stutterheim.—*Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809, par PELET; STUTTERHEIM, Krieg von 1809.*

FRENCH.

IN GERMANY.

		Effective.	Present.	Horse.
Army of the Rhine,	Davoust,	108,458	93,114	26,933
Corps of observation				
on Baltic,	Bernadotte,	15,360	12,933	3624
Reserve of Infantry,	Oudinot,	28,861	26,480	2646
Total French in Germany		152,679	132,527	33,203

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

Bavarians,	.	.	.	.	30,800
Saxons,	.	.	.	.	15,800
Wirttemburghers,	.	.	.	.	12,000
Westphalians,	.	.	.	.	14,000
Lesser Powers of the Confederation,	.	.	.	.	29,240
Total German,					101,840

IN POLAND.

Poles,	19,200
Russians,	15,000
	34,200

IN ITALY.

Five divisions of Infantry, three of Cavalry, under Eugene, 60,000

TOTAL EFFECTIVE.

French in Germany,	152,679
Confederation of the Rhine,	101,840
Poles and Russians,	34,200
In Italy,	60,000
Total,	348,719

Of whom 300,000 might be present with the Eagles, and 428 pieces of cannon with the Grand Army.—PELET, i. 172, 185.

AUSTRIANS.

IN GERMANY.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
1st corps. Count Bellegarde in Bohemia,	25,700	2100	
2d ——— Count Kollowrath at Pilsen,	23,300	2700	
3d ——— Hohenzollern at Prague,	23,913	1010	
4th ——— Prince Rosenberg around Scharding,	24,914	2894	
5th ——— Archduke Louis at Braunau,	24,383	2042	
6th ——— General Hiller at Braunau,	23,374	2139	
1st Reserve. Prince John of Lichtenstein at Newhaus,	12,998	2564	
2d ——— Kienmayer, Braunau,	6950	2460	
Jellachich's division, Salsburg,	9962	1009	
Artillerymen for 518 pieces, distributed between these corps,	12,976		
	188,470	18,918	518

IN ITALY.

8th corps. Marquis Chastellar at Klagenfurth,	18,250	1942	
9th ——— At Lapach, Count Giulay,	24,348	2758	
	42,598	4700	128

IN POLAND.

7th corps. Archduke Ferdinand at Croatia,	30,200	5200	94
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IN TYROL.

Chastellar's division (separate from his corps),	9672	260	
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	Total.		
	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
In Germany, under the Archduke Charles,	188,570	18,918	518
In Italy, under Archduke John,	42,598	4700	148
In Poland, under Archduke Ferdinand,	30,200	5200	94
In Tyrol,	9,672	260	16
Grand Total,	271,040	29,078	776
Of whom 250,000 might be relied on for active operations.—STUTTERHEIM, 38, 46.			

Note B, p. 239.

“ When all endeavours to preserve independence from the insatiable ambition of a foreign conqueror proved fruitless, when nations are falling around us, and when lawful sovereigns are torn from the hearts of their subjects ; when, in fine, the danger of universal subjugation threatens even the happy states of Austria, and their peaceable fortunate inhabitants, then does our country demand its deliverance from us, and we stand forth in its defence. On you, my brother soldiers, are fixed the eyes of the universe, and of all those who still feel for national honours and national prosperity. You shall not incur the disgrace of being made the instruments of oppression ; you shall not carry on the endless wars of ambition under distant climes ; your blood shall never flow for foreign fleets or insatiable covetousness, nor on you shall the curse alight of annihilating distant nations, and over the bodies of the slaughtered defenders of their country, paving the way for a foreigner to an usurped throne. A happier lot awaits you ; the liberty of Europe has taken refuge under your banners. Your victories will loose its fetters, and your brothers in Germany, yet in the ranks of the enemy, long for their deliverance. On the fields of Ulm and Marengo, of which the enemy so often reminds us with ostentatious pride, shall we renew the glorious deeds of Wurtzburg and Ostrach, of Stockach and Zurich, of Verona, Trebbia and Novi. We will conquer a lasting peace for our country, but that great end is not to be attained without proportionate virtues. Unconditional subordination, strict discipline, persevering courage, unshaken steadiness in danger, are the companions of true fortitude. Nothing but an union of will, and joint co-operation of the whole can lead to victory. I will be every where in the midst of you ; you shall receive the first thanks of your country from your general on the field of battle. The patriotism of the Austrian nobility has anticipated your wants ; this is a pledge of the national gratitude. Adorned with the marks of the public esteem, will I present to our sovereign, to the world, those brave men who have deserved well of their country. Civil virtues must also accompany your arms out of the field of battle ; the real soldier is moderate, compassionate, humane ; he knows the evils of war, and strives to lighten them. It is not the intention of our monarch to oppress foreign nations, but to deliver them, and to form with their princes a lasting peace, and maintain the general welfare and security.”—*Ann. Reg.* 1809, 691 ; *App. to Chron.*

CHAPTER LIV.

Note A, p. 291.

The lakes and valleys in the vicinity of Salzburg, particularly the König see, the valley of Berchtolsgaden, leading to it, the defile above Hallein, the Troon, Aber, and Alter sees, and the whole valley up to Gastern, present the most magnificent scenery in Europe. It rivals the Grande Chartreuse in grandeur, and unites to its romantic character the sublimity of the Gasteren-thal and the Oeschinen-thal at the upper extremity of the valley of Kandersteg in Switzerland, the finest and most impressive scenery in the vast amphitheatre of the central Alps. No words, in particular, can do justice to the König see, a noble sheet of water, eight or ten miles in length, thirty miles to the south of Salzburg, shrouded amidst stupendous mountains, whose summits, ten thousand feet high, wrapt in eternal snow, almost overhang the lake which nestles in their bosom. Vast forests of fir lie immediately below the region of rock and snow in these lofty piles; but the cliffs which shut in the lake, several thousand feet in perpendicular height, descend abrupt and sheer to the water's edge, varied at intervals by noble forests of beech and oak, whose tints, especially in autumn, add inexpressible beauty to the near points of this matchless landscape. The great superiority which the Alps in this quarter possess over those in the central cantons of Switzerland consists in this, that from their not rising from so elevated a plateau, the pine and the fir do not occur so uniformly and early in the scene; but rich forests of walnut, sycamore, beech, and oak, surmount, in the first instance, the green and grassy vales where mountain freedom and laborious industry have spread a velvet carpet amidst the shapeless piles of rock, which primæval earthquakes have detached from the overhanging mountains. The pine and larch occur in a more elevated region, forming a sable band between the brilliant tints of the foliage beneath, and the pure glitter of the snow, or the grey hue of the rocks above. The mountains are not of such height as to be overloaded, or have their ravines filled with snow; naked, or sprinkled only in the upper parts with a silvery mantle, they exhibit all their romantic forms to the eye, and the enormous strata are disposed with such regularity, that, at the distance even of twenty or thirty miles, every layer is distinctly visible, and the traveller feels as if he was approaching the ruined castles of the giants of the earth, some standing erect, some cast down and scattered in fragments around. Yet so steep and perpendicular are their sides, and so completely do they in many places overhang the lakes, that in rowing along you can see reflected in the mirror all the gradations, from the smooth shaven meadow, on the margin of the water, through the inaccessible cliffs rising abruptly from their sides, to the dark forests of the middle zone, and bare rocks of the upper region—you can touch with your hand the snowy summits of the mountains. The author visited these incomparable scenes two-and-twenty years ago; but the assistance of numerous

sketches then made is not requisite to recal the features of the scenery to his memory; they are indelibly imprinted there, and will remain engraven to the latest hour of his life.

Note B, p. 352.

Several writers, and in particular one celebrated historian, whose temper and judgment are not equal to his talent (MONTGAILLARD, vi. 405), have represented the early retreat of Napoleon from the field of battle in the evening of the 22d into the island of Lobau, and thence at midnight across the main stream to Vienna, as a pusillanimous desertion of his troops, which brings both his courage and capacity seriously into question. There does not seem to be any ground for this opinion. Chiefs were not wanting to the French Emperor, who would, with the utmost gallantry, head and stimulate the charges of the troops; but his own proper sphere of action was different, and one head only could sustain the weight of a hundred and fifty thousand men. Had Napoleon fallen at the head of his guards on the Marchfeld, no other courage would have been equal to sustaining the conflict; the army would have retreated to the Rhine, and the mighty fabric of the empire was dissolved in a moment. The time had not yet arrived when it was the duty of its chief to conquer or die. The case was different with the Archduke Charles; when he put himself at the head of the regiment of Zach, and, with the standard in his hand, threw himself on the enemy, the last hour of the Austrian monarchy appeared to be striking; the conflict was that of Napoleon on the heights of Montmartre; vain would be all the skill of the generalissimo, unless, in that decisive moment, the bravery of the colonel repaired the disorder, and arrested the dreadful irruption of Lannes' columns.

Note C, p. 353.

"On the two banks of the Danube," says Napoleon, "I had, at the time of the battle of Aspern, twenty thousand men more than the Archduke. In the battle of the 21st, twenty-five thousand men combated a hundred thousand during three hours and a-half, and preserved their positions."—NAPOLÉON in MONTHOLON, ii. 78, *Mélanges*. These numbers are grossly exaggerated, according to his usual practice; but the greater the disproportion is made, the worse for Napoleon, for how did a general at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand men come to expose twenty-five thousand to so grievous a chance as combating against such odds, with a river all but impassible in their rear? There are occasions in war when such a risk as this must be incurred, and when to hazard it is the first duty of a commander. Such was Wellington's situation on the Douro in 1809, and Napoleon's own at Lodi in 1796, and in Champagne in 1814; but in 1809 he lay under no such necessity; the capital, the resources, the arsenals of Austria were in his power, the great stroke which was to fascinate mankind had been struck; the Archduke was in the predicament of being compelled to undertake perilous measures.

CHAPTER LV.

Note A, p. 385.

The Tyrolese are of a singularly mechanical turn. Necessity has driven them to the useful arts, as a means of supplying the deficiencies of nature; and the numerous mountain streams and cascades, with which the country abounds, afford ample opportunity of obtaining, at no expense, an external power capable of setting in motion their simple machinery. Conducted into the fields, the houses, and mills, by little wooden troughs, in the course of their precipitous descent, the mountain torrents perform the most important functions of domestic economy. The irrigation of meadows, the grinding of corn, the fabrication of oil, the grinding of tools, are all performed by these streams, or the mills which they set in motion. In many places, each peasant has his mill, which is applied to almost every purpose of life—even the rocking of a cradle is sometimes performed by means of a water-wheel. Nor are the most minute arts overlooked by this industrious people; and numbers of families earn a not contemptible livelihood by rearing canary birds, which are sold in all the cities of Europe.

The following are some of the most remarkable statistical facts connected with the population of Tyrol, viz.—

			Acres.
Inhabitants, . . .	762,000	Meadows, . . .	392,000
Cows, . . .	131,000	Fields, . . .	152,000
Sheep, . . .	137,000	Vineyards, . . .	1,700
Oxen, . . .	44,000	Forests, . . .	1,508,600
Goats, . . .	63,000	Rock and waste, . .	2,906,700
Elementary Schools,	735		
Do. endowed by govern-		German race, . .	598,500
ment, . . .	15	Italian race, . .	163,420

The people are all Catholic. The great proportion of the country in forest and rock is very remarkable, and sufficiently explains its romantic character.—*See* MALTE BRUN, vii. 549, 551.

Note B, p. 397.

The following proclamation was issued by the Archduke John: —“Tyrolese! I am come to keep the promise which I made to you on 4th November, 1805, that the time would certainly come when I should have the joy of again finding myself among you. The peace of Presburg was the cause of all your subsequent disasters; it broke the tie which had connected Austria with Tyrol for 500 years; but even the father of your country recollected his beloved children. He stipulated that the Tyrol should remain undivided, retain all its rights and liberties; in a word, ‘that, in the same manner, and with the same rights and titles with which the Emperor had possessed it, it should be made over to Bavaria, and not otherwise.’ The King of Bavaria solemnly promised to your

deputies, 'that not an iota of the constitution should be changed ;' that he honoured the grief which the Tyrolese felt for their ancient masters ; but that he hoped, by constant care and attention, to make himself equally regretted by them. By the royal proclamation, 14th January, 1806, it was declared, 'that the Tyrolese should not only retain their ancient rights and liberties, but their welfare be promoted in every possible manner. Where has been the promised attention to your interests ; where the regard to the constitution you have so bravely defended ? The clergy were their first object of attack : this was their plan, because they were the intrepid defenders of the throne and the altar. With bitter feelings, the Tyrolese beheld their abbeys and monasteries destroyed, the property of the churches stolen and carried away, their bishops and priests exiled, their churches profaned, their chalices sold to the Jews. Your knights and nobles, who, before the institution of the tributary law, were all your equals, and never a burden to the country, are all destroyed—your cities and courts of justice are ruined—your sons or brothers hurried away by a cruel conscription to fight the battles of the oppressor against Austria, their lawful master, or Spain, or Russia. The Bavarians have refused the bank-bills of the Austrians in payment ; and when this occasioned to every man the loss of half his property, they overburdened the remainder with such oppressive taxes that it has reduced many landholders to the rank of day-labourers. Even the name of your country is taken from you, and your valleys are called after the unmeaning name of rivers. To arms ! Rise, Tyrolese ! to arms, for your God, your Emperor, your country ! Why is the war a holy one ?—why is it necessary and general ? Because so great a power cannot be opposed alone, and therefore every one should assist in the cause ; because the restoration of rights and liberties is to be gained if attempted ; because neither Germans nor Bohemians ought to be obliged to sell their blood as the blind instruments of an insatiable power—to be forced against their will to invade Russia or Spain, or oppress the less powerful kingdoms of the world. We have an enemy to oppose whom hitherto nothing has been able to oppose ; but, with unanimity, ardour, and firm perseverance, nothing is impossible. We possess this firmness and courage ; this unanimity warms every heart. Austria has gone through many dangers, and emerged from them victorious. The present is the greatest of them all, but there never was the same unanimity. In a moment of such consequence to our faithful country, in the midst of such ardour for the holiest cause for which sword was ever drawn, I plant the Austrian eagle on the earth of Tyrol. I know you—I recall you, as Duke Ferdinand did, 933 years ago,—the prelates, the nobles, the citizens, the peasants, to the foot of the throne. Arms, and courage, to restore the rights you desire. Recollect the glorious days when you defeated Joubert at Spinger Jenisir and Botzen. I am no stranger to your mountains and valleys. I am confident you will retain the hopes of your

fathers, and our highest expectations.—ARCHDUKE JOHN."—*See* GESCH. A. HOFER, 64, 76.

Note C, p. 415.

"All the passages over the Inn, and especially the bridge of Had, were vigilantly guarded by the Bavarian posts, who justly deemed it a matter of especial importance to prevent any joint measure being concerted on the opposite sides of the river. Spechbacher, however, undertook the perilous mission of opening up the communication between the northern and southern valleys. Accompanied by his trusty companions, George Zoppel and Simon Lechner, and a young peasant girl, Zoppel's servant, he set out on the evening of Whitmonday. In the evening they encountered a body of a hundred Bavarian dragoons: Spechbacher and his companions concealed themselves behind some pine trees at the foot of a cliff, fired on the party from their ambush, and, immediately scaling the precipice, loaded and fired again. The Bavarians, conceiving they were attacked by a numerous body of sharpshooters, fled, and left the passage open. Spechbacher met with Hofer accordingly, and a general assemblage around Innspruck was arranged for the 28th May. On his return, however, fresh difficulties were encountered: the bridge of Hall and all the points of transit were vigilantly guarded, and every person rigorously searched, who attempted to pass from the one side to the other. In this perplexity he was relieved by the inventive genius of his trusty companion, George Zoppel, and his servant maid. The girl first crossed the bridge; and as nothing suspicious was found upon her, she was allowed to pass. Then George Zoppel presented himself; after him came Spechbacher's great poodle dog, in whose woolly tail the despatches were concealed; and, while the sentinels were busily employed in searching Zoppel's pockets, the dog, obedient to the call of the servant maid, brushed past the soldiers, and ran up to her. Spechbacher came last, but being unknown, and nothing found upon him, he was allowed to pass.—*Bartholdy, Krieg*, 1809, 168, 172.

Note D, 439.

"Germans!" said the Duke of Brunswick, "will you continue to combat Germans? Will you, whose mothers, wives, and sisters have been outraged by the French, shed your blood in their defence? It is your brothers who now invoke you,—come to break your fetters,—to avenge the liberty of Germany! To arms! then, Hessians, Prussians, Brunswickers, Hanoverians! all who bear the honourable name of Germans, unite for the deliverance of your fatherland, to wipe away its shame and avenge its wrongs. Rise to deliver your country from a disgraceful yoke, under which it has so long groaned. The day of its emancipation has arrived: none more favourable can ever be desired."—"Aspern," said General Radivojivich, who had penetrated into Franconia, and occupied Barenth, with five thousand men from Egra, in Bohemia, "Aspern has

destroyed the invincibility of Napoleon! Arm yourselves for the cause of liberty, of justice, of Austria, to deliver Europe and the human race."—"You combat," said Noditz, one of the chiefs of the Tugendbund, to the Prussians of Bareuth, "in order to restore your country to your beloved King." The Duke of Brunswick's Volunteers wore a light blue uniform, with a death's-head and cross-bones on their cloaks, to indicate the mortal hostility in which they were engaged, from whence they acquired the name of the *Death's-Head Hussars*. The officers were distinguished from the privates, in a corps where all were respectable, only by a small cross on their arms. The Duke himself was as simply dressed as any of his followers: he shared their fare—slept beside them on the ground—underwent their fatigues. These martial qualities, joined to the ascendant of a noble figure and unconquerable intrepidity, so won the hearts of his followers, that they disdained to desert him even in the wreck of the fortunes of Germany, after the battle of Wagram; followed his standard with dauntless confidence across all Westphalia and Hanover, embarked in safety for England, and lived, as we shall see in the sequel, to flush their swords in the best blood of France on the field of Waterloo.—See HARDENBERG, x. 392, 394, and PELET, iv. 26, 27.

CHAPTER LVI.

Note A, p. 468.

Poniatowski's complaints of the tardiness of the Russians throughout this campaign, were, as might easily have been anticipated, both frequent and acrimonious. On the 27th June, he thus wrote to the Emperor Napoleon:—"Notwithstanding the positive promise of Prince Gallitzin to move two of his divisions across the San on the 21st instant, he did nothing of the kind. Under pretence of failure of provisions, that measure was not carried into effect till two days after, and then with the same tardiness which has characterised all the operations of the campaign. These delays have given the Austrian corps, which had been thrown forward on the right bank of the Vistula, the means of effecting its retreat without any molestation. The certain intelligence which, subsequent to that period, they had received, that Prince Gallitzin would not pass the Vistula, has encouraged the Archduke Ferdinand to move the greater part of his forces, or about twenty-five thousand men, to the Pilicz, and thus menace the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. This has obliged me to move upon Pulawy. The arrival of the Russian army in Galicia having afforded them a pretext for spreading themselves over the province, has contributed materially to retard the formation of the new levies; for the Russian generals establish wherever they go Austrian authorities, who do all they can to torment the inhabitants, and to stifle every feeling which may eventually menace the interests of their sovereign."—SAVARY, iv. 95. In another report he stated,—“The concert of

the Russians with Austria is so clearly demonstrated, that, to speak plainly, it was the Polish troops whom they both regarded as enemies. It was the more difficult to prevent the effects of that intelligence, that the chiefs of the two armies acted entirely in concert, to give occasions for it to arise."—PELET, iv. 73.

Note B, p. 415.

"Orders were despatched by the Archduke Charles, to the Archduke John, to hasten up to Enzersdorf on the evening of the 4th July. On the same night, Prince Eugene's army, to which he was opposed, entered the Island of Lobau. The Archduke John lay on the night of the 4th at Presburg, distant ten leagues from Wagram. He received the despatch at five in the morning of the 5th, and, instead of setting out as he should have done, in a few hours, he did not move *till midnight* on the 5th, and, in consequence, had only reached Marchegg, five leagues on his road, at ten o'clock on the 6th, the very time when he should have been attacking the French right at Leopoldsdorf or Glinzindorf. The Archduke Charles, conceiving he had, in obedience to his instructions, arrived there on the night of the 5th, had sent an order to him, as already mentioned, to co-operate in the attack on the latter village in the morning, which he could easily have done, had he arrived there the night before, as it is only four leagues distant from the extreme French right; whereas, he only appeared on the ground at half-past three in the afternoon, when the general retreat was resolved on. Prince John marched from Presburg to near Glinzindorf, between midnight on the 5th, and four o'clock P.M. on the 6th, that is in sixteen hours, which was as expeditious as could have been expected. Had he set out seven hours after getting his orders, *i. e.* at noon on the 5th, he would, at the same rate, have been on his ground at four A.M. on the 6th, in time to have co-operated with Rosenberg in the attack on the French right, retained Napoleon and his guards in that quarter to make head against such formidable assailants, and altogether prevented the countermarch of those veterans from right to left, which repaired the disaster of Massena and Bernadotte in the centre, and arrested the victorious advance of Kollowrath and Klenau on the right. But for the failure of the Archduke John to come up in time, therefore, the battle was irrevocably lost to Napoleon.—See PELET, iv. 162, 238.

Note C, p. 507.

"Bernadotte's proclamation to the Saxons was in these terms:—Saxons! in the day of the 5th July, seven or eight thousand of you pierced the centre of the enemy's army, and reached Deutch Wagram, despite all the efforts of forty thousand of the enemy, supported by sixty pieces of cannon; you continued the combat till midnight, and bivouacked in the middle of the Austrian lines. At daybreak on the 6th, you renewed the combat with the same perseverance, and in the midst of the ravages of the enemy's artillery, your living columns have remained immovable like brass. The

great Napoleon was a witness to your devotion; he has enrolled you among his bravest followers. Saxons! the fortune of a soldier consists in the performance of his duties; you have worthily performed yours."—Bivouac of Leopoldstadt, 7th July, 1809. This order of the day was inserted in all the German papers at the time.—BOUR. vii. 280.

Note D, p. 508.

Napoleon's order of the day was conceived in the following terms:—"Independent of the consideration, that His Majesty commands the army in person, and that to him it belongs to distribute the measure of praise or blame to every one; on this particular occasion, success was owing to the French and not to any foreign troops. The order of the day of the Prince of Pontecorvo, tending to inspire false pretensions in troops of the most ordinary description, is contrary to truth, to policy, to the national honour. The success of the day of the 5th, is due to the Marshals the Dukes of Rivoli and Oudinot, who pierced the centre of the enemy at the same time that the corps of the Duke of Auerstadt turned their flank. The village of Deutch Wagram was not taken on the evening of the 5th; it was so only on the morning of the 6th, at six o'clock, by the corps of Marshal Oudinot. The corps of the Prince of Pontecorvo did not remain 'immovable as brass;' on the contrary, it was the first to beat a retreat. His Majesty was obliged to cover the corps of the Viceroy, by the divisions Broussier and Lamarque, commanded by Marshal Macdonald, by the division of heavy cavalry commanded by General Nansouty, and a part of the cavalry of the guard. It is to that Marshal and his troops that the eulogium is really due, which the Prince of Pontecorvo has attributed to himself. His Majesty desires that this testimony of his displeasure may serve as an example to deter any marshal from arrogating to himself the glory which belongs to another. His Majesty has, nevertheless, desired, that this order of the day, which would doubtless distress the Saxon army, though its soldiers know well that they do not merit the eulogiums which have been bestowed upon them, shall remain secret, and only be sent to the marshals commanding the corps d'armée.—NAPOLEON."—See BOURIENNE, viii. 281, 289; who seems, nevertheless, to admit, that the leading facts stated in the severe order of the day by the Emperor, are well founded.

CHAPTER LVII.

Note A, p. 543.

"You are, upon the receipt of these our instructions, to repair with our said troops to the Scheldt, and carry into effect the following instructions in conjunction with the commander of the naval forces. This conjoint expedition has for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either building or afloat at Ant-

werp or Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt, the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards at Antwerp, Terneuse and Flushing, the reduction of the island of Walcheren, and rendering the Scheldt, if possible, no longer navigable for ships of war."—LORD CHATHAM'S *Instructions*, 16th July, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* xv. *App.* No. 1.

It appears, also, from Lord Chatham's evidence before the Parliamentary committee, that he was in possession of the more detailed government plan, which was to proceed across South Beveland immediately after landing, and land the troops at Sandvliet on the right bank of the Scheldt, opposite Bahtz, and thence push on direct to Antwerp. On the 5th of August, twenty thousand men, according to his statement, might have been collected there, a force amply sufficient for the complete success of the expedition. "I conceive," says Lord Chatham "what was intended to be done was, by landing such part of the army as was not engaged in the siege of Flushing, or employed in the reduction of Walcheren, *as soon as possible at Sandvliet*, and to proceed against Antwerp according to circumstances, which could not be distinctly known till the arrival of the expedition. The expedition, under the most favourable circumstances, might have arrived at Sandvliet in four days from leaving the Downs; on the 4th of August, the infantry and cavalry might have been disembarked at that place, and the heavy stores and ordnance in two or three days more."—LORD CHATHAM'S *Evidence*; *Parl. Deb.* xv. 350, 359. *App.* Sandvliet is only ten miles from Antwerp; and the first considerable reinforcement of the enemy arrived at that town on the 11th and 12th. It is evident, therefore, that the success of the expedition was certain, if the government plan of pushing up the Scheldt with the bulk of the army, leaving a division only to observe Flushing, had been complied with. But the cabinet at home appear to have not sufficiently impressed upon Lord Chatham the necessity of adhering energetically to this plan, and for not having interrupted the siege of Antwerp when once it was commenced.

Note B, p. 552.

The general policy of the expedition, according to the original instructions of government, was clearly established by the following documents. 1st, In Lord Castlereagh's secret instructions to Lord Chatham previous to sailing, it was stated:—"The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruction of the whole of the enemy's ships, whether building at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering the Scheldt, if possible, no longer navigable for ships of war. As the accomplishment of these objects, in their fullest extent, must, in a great measure, *depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise is carried into execution*, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an amount of force to this service, as may enable you, at the same time that you occupy Walcheren and South Beveland, *to advance at once a considerable force against Antwerp*, which may be reinforced as

soon as *Flushing* is invested, if not actually reduced. The expedition, therefore, must be considered as not, in the first instance, assuming any other character than a *coup-de-main*, combining with it a powerful diversion against the enemy."—*Secret Instructions*, June, 1809; *Parl. Deb.* xv. 426, *App.* 2d, It was proved by Col. Fyers, the chief engineer of the army, and General M'Leod, the commander of artillery to the expedition, that "supposing the army to have landed successively at Sandvliet on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August, thirty mortars might have been ready in battery to begin the bombardment of the city of Antwerp and fleet on the evening of the 9th or morning of the 10th, and that both might have been destroyed if they did not surrender."—*Ibid.* 553, 566, *App.* 3d, The battering train was immense, amounting to seventy battering guns; seventy-four mortars.—*Ibid.* sec. 7, *App. Evid.* c. 138. 4th, On the 9th August, there were only a few thousand troops and national guards in Antwerp, all in a great state of alarm; the first reinforcement of any amount which arrived, were the King of Holland's guards and troops of the line, in number five thousand, who did not arrive till the 12th, and could not have entered the town if the English had been before it.—JOMINI, *Vie de NAPOLEON*, iii. 302. These facts and documents are a complete exculpation of ministers in every particular, except the choice of Lord Chatham, and the delay in sending out the expedition.

Note C, p. 572.

The losses of Austria by this treaty were—

	Inhabitants.
In Gallicia, to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw,	1,500,000
————— to Russia,	400,000
In Germany, to Bavaria and Kingdom of Italy,	1,124,680
In Italy, to France and the Kingdom of Italy,	480,680
	3,505,360

The population of Austria, after these losses, was 20,738,541; her frontier was destroyed, both towards France and Italy; she was entirely cut off from all communication with the sea; and lost, besides all the harbours yielding customs, many of the most important mines of salt, silver, lead, and iron in her dominions.—See BIGNON, viii. 377; and HARDENBERG, x. 48—479; and SCHOELL. *Hist. des Traits*, ix. 297, 298; and *Congrès de Vienne*, *Rec. de Pièces Off.* iii. 57, 66.

CHAPTER LVIII.

Note A, p. 626.

Mr Champagny stated in his answer to Mr Canning's note, which announced the necessity of admitting the Spanish nation to the negotiation—"France and Russia can carry on the war, so long as the court of London shall not recur to just and equitable dispositions; and they are resolved to do so. How is it possible for the French government to entertain the proposal which has

been made to it of admitting to negotiation the Spanish insurgents? What would the English Government have said had it been proposed by them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them promises, and has frequently sent them succours. Could such a proposal have found place in a note, the object of which ought to have been not to irritate, but to conciliate, and effect a good understanding. England will *find herself under a strange mistake if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still entertains the idea of contending successfully upon the continent against the armies of France*. What hope can she now have, especially as France is irrevocably united to Russia? The only admissible basis is to admit to the negotiation all the allies of the king of England; whether it be the king who reigns in the Brazils, the king who reigns in Sweden, the king who reigns in Sicily, and to take for the basis of the negotiation the *Uti possidetis*."—CHAMPAGNY to Mr Secretary CANNING, 28th Nov. 1808; *Parl. Deb.* xii. 101.

Note B, p. 642.

The Budget of Great Britain and Ireland for 1809 stood as follows:—

INCOME.	
Malt, pensions, &c.,	L.3,000,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	4,000,000
Surplus Ways and Means, 1808,	2,757,000
War taxes,	19,000,000
Lottery,	300,000
Excess of Exchequer bills,	3,154,000
Excess of do.	1,355,000
Vote of credit,	3,000,000
Loan,	11,000,000
Irish taxes and loan,	6,000,000
War Income,	L.53,566,000
Permanent taxes,	36,959,000
Net payments,	L.90,525,000
EXPENDITURE.	
Navy,	L.18,986,000
Army,	21,144,000
Ordnance,	5,903,000
Miscellaneous,	1,900,000
Vote of credit,	3,300,000
Swedish subsidy,	300,000
Sicilian do.	400,000
Interest on Exchequer bills,	1,927,000
War Expenditure,	L.53,650,000
Interest of debt,	24,313,000
Sinking Fund,	11,359,000
Total,	L.89,522,000

—See *Parl. Deb.* xiv. ; *App. No. I.* and p. 533 ; and *Ann. Reg.* 1809, p. 81.

CHAPTER LIX.

Note A. p. 822.

Income and Expenditure of Great Britain for 1810:—

I.—INCOME.

Ordinary Revenues.

Customs,	L.9,909,735
Excise,	18,495,178
Stamps,	5,546,082
Land and Assessed Taxes,	8,011,205
Post-Office,	1,471,746
Crown Lands,	110,273
Lesser sources,	1,250,697

Total permanent,	L.44,794,916
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Extraordinary.

Customs,	3,906,483
Excise,	6,855,812
Property Tax,	13,492,215
Lottery,	471,250
Irish Loan,	2,448,470
Surplus fees of officers,	136,398
Loans, including L.1,400,000 Irish,	13,242,356

Grand total net payments,	L.85,350,900
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II.—EXPENDITURE.

Interest of National Debt, and charges of management,	L.21,773,227
Sinking Fund,	11,660,601
Interest of Exchequer Bills,	1,815,105
Civil List,	1,533,110
Civil Government of Scotland,	118,186
Miscellaneous,	775,399
Navy,	20,058,412
Army,	18,536,300
Ordnance,	4,652,331
Loans to other countries, viz.	
Sicily,	L.425,000
Portugal,	1,247,898
Spain,	387,294

2,050,082

Miscellaneous,	2,270,867
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L.85,243,620

The total expenditure rose to L.89,000,000.—*Parl. Deb. xx.*
1-15, *Appendix.*

Note B, p. 843.

The exact numbers were—

Etat major et gen-d'armes,	.	.	.	229
2d corps, Regnier,	.	.	.	19,232
6th do. Ney,	.	.	.	35,067
8th do. Junot,	.	.	.	2643
Reserve of cavalry, Montbrun,	.	.	.	5117
Under Massena's immediate command,	.	.	.	86,076
In reserve under Drouet at Valladolid,	.	.	.	22,315
——— under Serras at Benevente,	.	.	.	15,107
——— under Bonnet in Asturias,	.	.	.	14,885
Total under Massena,	.	.	.	200,671
—NAPIER, iii. 568, <i>Table</i> .				

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